PRIVATE  LIBRARY 


JESSE  ANDERSON. 

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MENTAL    SCIENCE 


METHODS  OF  MENTAL  CULTURE, 


DESIGNED   FOB 


THE   USE   OF   NORMAL    SCHOOLS,   ACADEMIES,   AND   PRIVATE 
STUDENTS   PREPARING   TO   BE  .TEACHERS. 


EDWARD  BROOKS,  A.  M.,Pn.  D., 

LATB  PRINCIPAL  OP  A    STATE   NORMAL  SCHOOL  OP  PENNSYLVANIA,  AND  AUTHOR  O» 
NORMAL  METHODS  OP  TEACHING,  A  NORMAL  SERIES  OP  MATHEMATICS    BTC. 


"  Whatever  that  is  which  thinks,  which  understands,  which  wills,  which  acts, 
it  is  something  celestial  and  divine;  and,  upon  that  account,  must  necessarily 
bi  eternal."— CICERO. 


LANCASTER,  PA. : 

NORMAL   PUBLISHING  COMPANY. 

1885.  "...   ...      .;;.: 

PHILADELPHIA! 
BATHMSAL  aOHOOL  OF  EiOOUTION  AFD  OSAWlt, 


BY  THE  AUTHOR  OF  THIS  WORK. 

I.  Normal  Methods  of  Teaching,  -        -        -        -  $1.75 

II.  Mental  Science  and  Culture,  -  1.75 

III.  The  Philosophy  of  Arithmetic,  ....  2.25 
NORMAL  PUBLISHING  CO., 

LANCASTER,  PA. 


I.  The  Normal  Series  of  Arithmetics. 

1.  The  Standard  Series :  A  full  course. 

Four  books:  New  Primary.  22;  Elementary,  45 ;  New 
Mental,  35;  New  Written,  80. 

2.  The  Union  Series:  a  shorter  course. 

Two  books;  Union  Part  I.,  25;  The  Normal  Union,  90. 

II .  Normal  Elementary  Algebra,  -  -  -  *  -  $1.10 
HI.  Normal  Geometry  and  Trigonometry,  -  -  1.10 
IV.  Normal  Higher  Arithmetic,  -  -  -  -  1,25 

V.  Keys  containing  Methods  and  Models. 

SOWER,  POTTS  &  CO.,  PUBLISHERS, 

630  MARKET  STREET,  P111LADELPHI  i. 
Copies  mailed  on  receipt  of  prices  annexed,  and  introduced  into 
schools/or  one-third  less. 


COPYRIGHT,  1882,  BY  EDWARD  BROOKS. 


INQUIRER  P.  A  P.  OO., 

BTXREOTTPERS  AND  PRIJ.TMW, 

LANCASTER,  PA. 


PREFACE. 


inDUCATION  embraces  the  culture  and  instruction  of  the  mind.     This 


culture  and  instruction  must  be  based  on  a  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  the  mind  and  its  activities.  Such  a  knowledge  is  not  only  a  necessity, 
but  this  necessity  is  now  generally  realized  by  educators  and  intelligent 
teachers.  Never  before  in  the  history  of  education  has  there  been  so  strong 
and  wide  a  demand  for  works  treating  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  and  its 
culture,  as  at  the  present  time.  With  the  view  of  meeting  this  demand, 
the  present  treatise  is  published. 

Origin.  —  This  treatise  originated  and  grew  up  in  the  class-room.  It  is 
the  result  of  many  years'  experience  in  the  instruction  of  student-teachers 
in  mental  philosophy.  Much  of  it  was  prepared  and  given  to  classes  in 
written  or  printed  notes  for  them  to  study  and  recite.  These  notes  acquired 
a  popularity  outside  of  the  school,  and,  by  permission,  were  used  in  several 
other  institutions.  A  demand  was  thus  created  for  a  text-book  on  the  sub- 
ject, and  to  meet  the  demand  these  notes  have  been  rewritten  and  expanded 
into  a  complete  treatise. 

Extent.  —  The  work  presents  a  complete  outline  of  the  subject  of  Mental 
Philosophy,  embracing  the  Intellect,  the  Sensibilities,  and  the  Will.  The 
treatment  of  the  Intellect  is  especially  full  and  detailed,  as  the  teacher's 
work  has  mainly  to  do  with  the  culture  and  training  of  this  faculty.  The 
Sensibilities  and  Will  are  discussed  more  briefly,  but  their  treatment  is 
comprehensive  and  complete.  While  aiming  at  conciseness  and  simplicity 
in  the  explanation  of  each  topic,  the  object  of  the  author  has  been  to  dis- 
cuss all  the  leading  principles  of  the  science,  and  thus  present  a  complete 
treatment  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  and  the  methods  of  cultivating  it. 
The  topics  are  so  arranged  that  students  who  wish  a  shorter  course  can 
omit  some  of  the  less  important  points  in  the  discussion  ;  and  an  outline  is 

(3) 


2210118 


4  PREFACE. 

presented,  indicating  a  twelve  or  fourteen  weeks'  course,  which  gives  a  con- 
nected view  of  the  whole  subject.  (See  page  10.) 

The  Material. — The  subject  of  mental  philosophy  has  been  so  thoroughly 
investigated  that  an  author  can  hope  to  present  but  little  that  is  new  or 
original.  The  first  object  of  a  writer  should  be  to  state  clearly  the  generally 
recognized  views  of  the  science,  and  this  has  been  the  primary  aim  in  the 
present  work ;  it  will  thus  be  found  to  agree  in  the  main  with  the  best 
thinkers  of  modern  times.  The  principal  object  has  not  been  to  be  original 
in  thought  or  expression,  but  to  be  clear,  accurate,  and  concise.  Nothing 
was  put  in  because  it  was  new,  and  nothing  left  out  because  it  was  old.  I 
have  aimed  to  produce  a  text-book  which  should  contain,  in  a  clear  and 
practical  form,  the  essential  elements  of  mental  science.  I  have  not  hesi- 
tated, however,  to  present  such  new  views  of  the  subject  as  my  own  think- 
ing has  suggested.  There  will  thus  be  found,  in  the  treatment  of  nearly 
every  topic,  some  new  idea,  or  some  new  phase  or  clearer  statement  of  an 
old  one.  Some  of  the  points  peculiar  to  this  work  are  the  regarding  of  the 
cognition  of  the  sensation  as  an  act  of  perception,  the  giving  of  four  distinct 
elements  to  the  memory,  the  spontaneity  of  recollection,  the  reduction  of  all 
the  laws  of  memory  to  the  one  law  of  the  relation  of  ideas,  the  distinct  as- 
sumption and  proof  of  two  elements  of  the  imagination,  making  it  a  com- 
bining and  a  creating  power,  the  formal  including  of  the  several  ideas  of 
Space,  Time,  etc.,  under  the  Intuitions  of  the  True,  the  treatment  of  the  Lu- 
dicrous as  a  rational  idea,  etc.  Special  attention  is  also  called  to  the  brief 
but  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  Will,  and  especially  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  Freedom  of  the  Will. 

Mental  Culture. — The  most  striking  feature  of  the  work  is  the  formal 
presentation  of  Methods  of  Cultivating  the  Different  Faculties.  This  feature 
especially  distinguishes  the  work  from  every  previous  treatise  that  has  fallen 
under  the  author's  notice ;  and,  it  is  thought,  will  render  it  especially  valu- 
able to  the  teacher  and  educator.  To  this  part  of  the  subject  the  author 
has  devoted  special  labor,  and  having  no  previous  treatment  to  guide  him, 
his  task  was  a  difficult  and  embarrassing  one.  Much  of  what  is  given  has 
been  used  in  oral  discussions  in  his  teaching  classes  for  many  years,  and  in 
bis  lectures  at  teachers'  institutes  in  different  parts  of  the  State.  As  he  was 


PKEFACE.  O 

compelled  by  the  limits  of  the  yolume  to  be  brief,  the  discussions  presented 
are  mere  outlines  of  what  could  be  written  on  the  subject.  It  is  proper  to 
remark,  also,  that  they  do  not  come  up  to  the  author's  ideal  of  what  could 
be  presented ;  but  they  may  serve  to  awaken  an  interest  in  the  subject,  and 
incite  others  to  a  fuller  and  more  suggestive  treatment  of  the  culture  of  the 
mind. 

Nature  of  the  System. — The  system  of  philosophy  here  presented  is  similar 
to  that  of  the  best  English  and  American  thinkers.  In  its  general  spirit  it 
coincides  with  that  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  though  it  differs  in  many 
details  from  that  illustrious  author.  It  also  agrees  in  spirit  with  much  of 
the  best  German  thinking  on  the  subject  of  metaphysics.  In  its  system  of 
thought  it  is  neither  materialistic  nor  absolutely  rationalistic,  but  aims  to 
unite  what  is  true  in  both  of  these  schemes  of  philosophy.  It  holds  that 
the  mind  is  an  entity  distinct  from  matter  and  the  author  of  thought,  rather 
•than  that  thought  is  a  function  of  matter,  as  taught  by  the  modern  materi- 
alistic school  of  thinkers.  It  does  not  ignore,  however,  the  physical  basis 
of  perception,  and  it  therefore  accepts  one  of  the  established  facts  of  the 
materialistic  school.  But  it  rises  above  this  school  by  assuming  that  the 
mind  is  an  original  source  of  truth,  and  that  it  can  originate  and  compre- 
hend necessary  and  universal  principles.  It  thus  rises  from  the  lowest 
facts  of  materialism  to  the  highest  facts  of  rationalistic  philosophy. 

Relation  to  Religion. — The  relation  of  its  teachings  to  religion  is  one  of 
the  striking  features  of  the  work.  Beginning  with  the  sensations  in  the 
nervous  tissue,  it  traces  ideas  up  through  the  senses  into  the  realm  of  ab- 
stract and  general  truth,  and  finally  up  into  the  domain  of  supersensual 
ideas  and  truths,  and  here  finds  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good. 
Here  it  reaches  the  conception  of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  and  uniting 
these  with  the  Good,  it  attains  to  the  highest  conception  of  the  mind,  that 
of  GOD.  Recognizing  this  idea  in  the  soul  as  an  immutable  verity,  and 
the  elements  of  Faith,  Love,  and  Obedience  as  associated  with  it,  the  work 
lays  a  philosophical  foundation  for  the  building  up  of  that  grand  temple 
of  belief  found  in  the  human  soul,  called  Religion.  This  system  of  philos- 
ophy is  therefore  not  only  rational,  but  it  is  also  religious. 

A  Text-Book. — The  special  merit  of  the  work  is  that  it  is  suitable  for  a 


6  PREFACE. 

text-book  upon  the  science.  The  aim  has  been  to  present  the  subject  with 
simplicity  and  clearness,  and  so  that  it  can  be  readily  understood  and  recited 
by  the  student.  The  student  of  a  science  needs  a  book  in  which  he  can 
prepare  a  lesson  for  the  recitation  of  the  class-room,  and  most  books  on 
mental  science  are  deficient  in  this  respect.  In  studying  a  new  science, 
many  subjects  must  be  committed,  and  a  text-book  should  present  the  mat- 
ter in  a  form  suitable  for  recitation.  Every  paragraph  of  this  work  has 
been  written  in  view  of  the  thought,  How  will  this  meet  the  demands  of 
the  recitation-room  ?  Thus  prepared,  it  is  hoped  that  one  of  its  strongest 
claims  on  teachers  and  students  will  be  its  merit  as  a  text-book.  The  value 
of  the  work  in  this  respect  has  also  been  enhanced  by  the  scholarly  sugges- 
tions of  Prof.  E.  Oram  Lyte,  who  has  kindly  and  with  critical  care  read 
nearly  all  the*  manuscript. 

In  closing  this  preface,  I  desire  to  express  the  hope  that  the  work  may 
prove  valuable  to  the  young  men  and  women  of  the  country,  in  giving  them 
clearer  views  of  the  dignity  and  power  of  the  human  mind  and  the  necessity 
and  nature  of  Its  culture.  In  my  own  classes  the  study  of  mental  science 
has  been  the  source  of  high  inspiration  in  thought  and  culture,  and  has 
contributed  largely  to  the  great  success  of  my  pupils  as  teachers  and  mem- 
bers of  the  other  professions.  Recalling  the  many  happy  hours  spent  in 
the  class-room  discussing  the  themes  here  treated,  I  take  pleasure  in  dedi- 
cating this,  my  latest,  and  probably  my  last  work, 

TO  MY  PUPILS  IN  MENTAL  SCIENCE, 

with  the  sentiment  they  have  often  heard  me  express  that  /  would  rather 
live  in  the  hearts  of  my  pupil*  than  be  honored  in  tong  or  story. 

EDWARD  BROOKS.  " 
STATE  NORMAL  SCHOOL, 

MilUrsville,  Pa.,  Jan.  16,  1883. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 
PREFACE , iii 

INTRODUCTION. 

CHAPTER   I. 
THE  NATURE  OF  MENTAL  SCIENCE  .  13 

CHAPTER   II 
THE  NATURE  OF  THE  MIND.  ...    23 

CHAPTER    III. 
THE  FACULTIES  OF  THE  MIND  .   .    30 

CHAPTER   IV. 
THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  MIND  ...    36 

MENTAL  ATTRIBUTES. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 
Definition  and  Nature  ....    43 
Objects  of  Consciousness  ...    46 
Products  of  Consciousness  .    .    48 
Unconscious  Mental   Modifica- 
tions   50 

Development  of  Conscious 
Knowledge 52 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  CULTURE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Culture  through  Conscious 
Knowledge 55 

Culture  through  Unconscious 
Knowledge 58 

Culture  of  Philosophical  Con- 
sciousness   61 

Abnormal  Consciousness  ...    64 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  NATURE  OF  ATTENTION. 

Definition  and  Nature  ....    66 
Can  we  Do  Anything  without 

Attention? 

Number  of  Objects  of  Attention. 


69 
71 

(7) 


PAOK. 

CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  CULTURE  OF  ATTENTION. 
Importance  of   Habits   of  At- 
tention   75 

Methods  of  Cultivating  Atten- 
tion   78 

Securing  Attention  of  Pupils  .    79 

THE   INTELLECT. 

PERCEPTION. 
CHAPTER  L 

THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 

Definition  and  Nature  ....  85 
The  Nervous  Organism  ....  87 
The  Perceptive  Process  ....  90 
Remarks  on  the  Process  ...  94 
Perception  by  the  Different 

Senses 99 

The  Qualities  of  Bodies  .   .   .110 

CHAPTER  IL 

THE  CULTURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 

Neglect  of  Culture 115 

Importance  of  Culture  ....  117 
Differences  of  Perceptive 

Power 119 

Time  for  Culture 120 

Methods  of  Culture 121 

Special  Lessons'  .  .    .    .    .    .    .125 

THE  MEMORY. 
CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  MEMORY. 

Definition  and  Nature  ....  127 

Elements  of  Memory 128 

Retention 129 

Recollection 131 

Representation 133 

Recognition 136 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

Laws  of  Memory 140 

Nature  of  the  Laws  .  .  .  .140 
Primary  Laws  ofaMernory  .  .  142 
Secondary  Laws  of  Memory  .  145 
The  One  Primary  Law  .  .  .  148 

Remarks  on  the  Memory  .    .    .151 

CHAPTER  II. 
THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  MEMORY. 

Nature  and  Importance    .    .    .  155 

Methods  of  Culture 158 

Application  in  Teaching  .    .    .166 

THE  IMAGINATION. 
CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 
Definition  and  Nature  ....  169 
Products  of  the  Imagination  .171 
Forms  of  the  Imagination  .  .173 
Laws  of  the  Imagination  .  .  .174 
Limits  and  Sphere 178 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 
Value  of  the  Imagination  .  .    .  188 
Culture  of  the  Imagination  .    .  192 

.    THE  UNDERSTANDING. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE    NATURE    OF    THE    UNDER- 
STANDING   201 

CHAPTER  II. 
THB  NATURE  OF  ABSTRACTION. 

Definition  and  Nature  ....  204 
Products  of  Abstraction  .  .  .  205 
Other  Views  of  Abstraction.  .207 

CHAPTER  III. 
THE  NATURE  OF  GENERALIZATION, 

OR  CONCEPTION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  .  .210 
Process  of  Conception  .  .  .  .210 
Remarks  on  the  Process  .  .  212 
Nature  of  the  Concept .  .  .  .214 
Qualities  of  Concepts  .  .  .  .218 
Unfolding  Conceptions  .  .  .  .221 
The  Value  of  General  Ideas .  .  223 
Existence  of  General  Ideas  .  .223 
Classification  ....  .225 


MOB. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  JUDGMENT. 
Definition  and  Nature  ....  228 

Nature  of  Judgments 231 

Derived  Judgments 234 

Conversion  of  Judgments  .  .    .  235 

CHAPTER  V. 
THE  NATURE  OF  REASONING. 

Definition  and  Kinds 237 

The  Syllogism 241 

Deductive  Reasoning 249 

Another  Form  of  Deduction  .  251 
Mathematical  Reasoning  .    .  252 

Inductive  Reasoning 255 

Criteria  of  Induction.  .    .    .  258 

Tests  of  Causal  Agency  .    .  260 

Hypothesis  and  Theory  ....  261 

Analogy 266 

Testimony 270 

CHAPTER  VI. 

CULTURE  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING. 
Importance  of  Culture  .  .    .    .274 

Neglect  of  Culture 276 

Time  for  Culture 276 

Culture  of  Abstraction  ...    .  277 

CHAPTER  VII. 
CULTURE  OF  GENERALIZATION  .    .  278 

By  Logical  Analysis 279 

By  Logical  Division 281 

By  Logical  Definition   ....  284 

The  Culture  of  Classification  .  286 

Importance  of  Classification.  287 

Methods  of  Culture  ....  288 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  JUDGMENT. 
Importance  of  the  Judgment  .  291 
Culture  of  the  Judgment    .    .  293 

CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  CULTURE  OF  REASONING. 

The  Culture  of  Deduction  .  .  297 
Study  of  Mathematics  ...  297 
Study  of  Language  .  .  .  .301 
Study  of  Metaphysics  .  .  .  303 
Avoid  Fallacies 306 

The  Culture  of  Induction  .  .  .  309 
Inductive  Teaching  .  .  .  .310 
Study  of  Natural  Science  .  .  312 


CONTENTS. 


9 


Inductive  Thinking  .  .  .  .314 
Ayoid  Fallacies 316 

INTUITION. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OP  INTUITION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  .  .319 
Existence  of  this  Faculty  .  .  .  320 
Relation  to  Other  Faculties  .  .  322 
Products  of  Intuition  ....  325 

Primary  Truths 325 

Nature  of  Primary  Truths  .  325 
Existence  of  Primary  Truths.  325 
Tests  of  Primary  Truths  .  .  327 
Remarks  on  Primary  Truths.  328 
Primary  Ideas 330 

CHAPTER  II. 
THE  INTUITIONS  OF  THE  TRUE. 

Space 331 

Time 333 

Identity 335 

Cause 340 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  INTUITIONS  OF  THE  BEAUTIFUL. 

Definition  of  the  Beautiful  .  .  345 
Subjective  Theories  ...  .346 
Objective  Theories 347 

The  Sublime 353 

The  Ludicrous 358 

Nature  of  the  Ludicrous  .  .  360 
Forms  of  the  Ludicrous  .  .  363 

The  Power  of  Taste 367 

CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  INTUITIONS  OF  THE  GOOD. 

Nature  of  the  Idea 371 

Nature  of  the  Right 373 

Origin  of  the  Idea 378 

Nature  of  Conscience   ....  383 

CHAPTER  V. 
THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  INTUITIONS 

OF  THE  TRUE 390 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  INTUITIONS 
OF  BEAUTY. 

Value  of  Beauty 396 

Culture  of  the  Beautiful  .        .  399 


PAGK. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  INTUITIONS 

OF  THE  RIGHT. 

Nature  of  Ethical  Culture  .  .  405 
Importance  of  Ethical  Culture.  409 
Principles  of  Ethical  Culture  .  412 
Culture  of  the  Different  Duties.  417 

Personal  Duties 417 

Duties  to  Others 421 

Duties  to  God 424 

THE  SENSIBILITIES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  SENSIBILITIES. 


433 
436 
436 
438 
439 
440 
442 


Definition  and  Nature  .    .    . 

The  Simple  Emotions  .  .  . 
The  Instinctive  Emotions 
The  Rational  Emotions  .  . 
The  Egoistic  Emotions  .  . 
The  ./Esthetic  Emotions  . 
The  Ethical  Emotions  .  . 

The  Affections 444 

The  Benevolent  Affections  .  444 
The  Malevolent  Affections   .  447 

The  Desires 449 

The  Animal  Desires  ....  450 
The  Rational  Desires  .  .    .    .451 

CHAPTER  II. 
THE  CULTURE  OF   THE   SENSIBIL 

ITIES. 

Importance  of  the  Sensibilities.  455 
Culture  of  the  Emotions  .  .  .  460 
Culture  of  the  Affections  .  .  .  464 
Culture  of  the  Desires  ....  468 

THE   WILL. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 
Definition  and  Nature  . 
Freedom  of  the  Will  .  . 


475 

484 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  WILL. 

Importance  of  the  Will .  .    .    .493 
Culture  of  the  Will 497 

HIGHER  SPIRITUAL  CULTURE  .  .   .  502 


A  FOURTEEN  WEEKS'  COURSE. 


This  work  presents  the  author's  ideal  of  a  complete  professional  course 
in  Mental  Science  and  Mental  Culture.  The  following  outline  indicates  a 
logically  connected  Shorter  Course  for  students  and  teachers  not  having 
time  to  complete  the  entire  work.  The  careful  study  of  the  parts  indicated, 
in  connection  with  the  attentive  reading  of  the  chapters  on  the  culture  of 
different  faculties,  can  be  accomplished  in  about  twelve  or  fourteen  weeks. 


PAGK 
13-22 
30-35 


NATURE  OP  MENTAL  SCIENCE 

FACULTIES  OP  THE  MIND  .  . 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  43-46 
Objects  of  Consciousness  .  46—48 
Products  of  Consciousness.  48—50 

ATTENTION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .    .      66-69 
Can  we  Do  Anything  with- 
out Attention?  ....      69-71 
Number  of  Objects  of  At- 
tention        71-74 

PERCEPTION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  85-87 
The  Nervous  Organism  .  .  87-90 
The  Perceptive  Process  .  .  90-94 

MEMORY. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  127-128 
Elements  of  Memory  .  .  .  128-140 
Laws  of  Memory 140-148 

IMAGINATION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .    .  169-171 
Products  of  the  Imagina- 
tion    171-173 

Forms  of  the  Imagination .  173-174 
Laws  of  the  Imagination  .  174—178 
Limits  and  Sphere  of  the 

Imagination 178-183 

THE  UNDERSTANDING  ....  201-203 

ABSTRACTION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  204-205 
Products  of  Abstraction  .  205-207 
Other  Views  of  Abstraction  207-209 

GENERALIZATION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  210 


PAGK 

Process  of  Conception  .  .  210-214 
Nature  of  the  Concept  .  .  214-218 

JUDGMENT. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  228-231 
Nature  of  Judgments  .  .  .  231-234 
Derived  Judgments  .  .  .  234-235 
Conversion  of  Judgments  .  235-236 

REASONING. 

Definition  and  Kinds  .  .    .  237-241 

The  Syllogism 241-244 

Deductive  Reasoning  .  .  .  249-252 
Inductive  Reasoning  .  .  .  255-258 
Hypothesis  and  Theory  .  .  261-265 
Analogy 266-270 

INTUITION. 

Definition  and  Nature  .    .  319-320 
Existence  of  this  Faculty.  320-322 
Relation   to  Other   Facul- 
ties    322-325 

Products  of  Intuition  .    .  325-330 

THE  BEAUTIFUL 345-353 

THE  GOOD,  OR  RIGHT. 

Nature  of  the  Idea ..  .  .371-373 
Nature  of  the  Right  .  .  .  373-378 
Origin  of  the  Idea  ....  378-383 

THE  SENSIBILITIES. 

Definition  and  Nature  .  .  433-436 
The  Simple  Emotions  .  .  436-444 

The  Affections 444-449 

The  Desires 449-454 

THE  WILL. 

Definition  and  Nature  .    .  475-477 

The  Motive 477-179 

The  Choice 479-481 

The  Executive  Volition  ..  481-482 


I.  NATURE  OP  MENTAL  SCIENCE, 
IL  NATURE  OF  THE  MIND. 
HI.  FACULTIES  OF  THE  MIND. 
IV.  CULTURE  OF  THE  MIND. 


MENTAL  ^SCIENCE 


AND 


METHODS   OF  MENTAL  CULTURE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   NATURE   OF   MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

MENTAL  SCIENCE  is  the  science  of  the  human  mind.  It 
treats  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  and  the  manner  in  which 
it  operates.  Its  object  is  to  ascertain  the  facts  of  mind  and  the 
laws  which  regulate  its  operations.  The  object  of  a  text-book  on 
Mental  Science  is  to  state  these  facts  and  laws  in  a  clear,  precise, 
and  systematic  manner. 

Mental  Philosophy. — The  science  of  the  mind  is  often  pre- 
sented under  the  name  of  Mental  Philosophy.  The  term  philoso- 
phy, however,  is  a  little  broader  in  its  signification  than  science. 
Strictly  speaking,  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  true;  in  its 
more  general  sense,  however,  it  means  the  investigation  and  ex- 
planation of  the  laws  and  principles  of  a  subject.  The  word  is 
derived  from  philos,  a  lover,  and  sophia,  wisdom,  a  philosopher 
being,  literally,  a  lover  of  wisdom.  The  origin  of  the  term  is 
usually  ascribed  to  Pythagoras,  though  Hamilton  thinks  it  more 
natural  to  refer  it  to  Socrates. 

Psychology. — The  technical  name  of  the  science  of  the  mind 
is  Psychology.  Psychology  may  thus  be  denned  as  the  science 
of  the  human  mind.  It  has  been  divided  into  Empirical  Psy- 
chology and  Rational  Psychology,  according  to  the  methods  of 
attaining  to  the  facts  and  principles  of  the  science.  The  term  is 

(13) 


14  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

derived  from  psyche,  the  soul,  and  logos,  a  discourse,  and  thus 
means  a  discourse  about  the  soul.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that 
the  relation  of  the  term  psyche  in  the  Greek  to  a  butterfly,  car- 
ries with  it  the  intimation  of  an  early  belief  in  the  immortality 
of  the  human  soul. 

Anthropology. — The  science^of  Psychology  stands  intermedi- 
ate between  two  other  sciences, — Physiology  and  Anthropology. 
All  of  these  sciences  treat  of  man,  but  in  different  ways.  Physi- 
ology treats  of  the  human  body ;  Psychology  treats  of  the  human 
mind ;  while  Anthropology  treats  of  the  entire  man  as  body  and 
soul.  Anthropology  investigates  man  as  a  complex  whole,  shows 
the  influence  of  climate,  soil,  and  physical  surroundings  on  the 
soul  and  body,  the  influence  of  the  soul  and  body  on  each  other, 
and  endeavors  to  ascertain  all  those  circumstances  and  principles 
which  determine  the  condition  and  character  of  the  individual 
and  the  race. 

Metaphysics. — The  term  Metaphysics  has  been  sometimes  ap- 
plied to  the  science  of  the  mind.  This  term,  according  to  its  ety- 
mological meaning,  stands  in  contrast  with  the  term  Physics,  or 
the  science  of  matter.  It  has  been  used  in  a  popular  sense  to 
include  whatever  is  not  embraced  under  Physics.  In  its  narrower 
sense  it  may  be  defined  as  the  science  of  abstract  truth.  The 
term  is  said  to  have  originated  with  the  disciples  of  Aristotle. 
Several  of  his  works  relating  to  the  material  world,  were  collected 
and  published  under  the  title  of  ra  <j>vatKa;  subsequently  other 
works  treating  of  philosophical  subjects  were  arranged  under  the 
title  of  TO,  fisTcupvfftKa,  indicating  that  they  were  to  be  read 
after  the  perusal  of  the  other  works.  From  this  the  term  came 
to  be  used  in  the  sense  of  embracing  everything  not  included 
under  Physics. 

OtJier  BrancJies. — The  term  Metaphysics,  however,  neither  in 
its  wider  nor  in  its  stricter  sense,  is  properly  used  as  the  name  of 
the  science  of  the  mind.  There  are  many  other  branches  besides 
mental  science  that  may  be  included  under  the  head  of  meta- 
physics. Thus,  we  have  Logic,  or  the  science  of  thought ;  Ethics, 


THE   NATURE   OF    MENTAL   SCIENCE.  15 

or  the  science  of  the  Right;  Esthetics,  or  the  science  of  the 
Beautiful;  Politics,  or  the  science  of  government ; i Ontology,  or 
the  science  of  pure  being,  etc.  These  branches  are  very  nearly 
coordinate  with  Psychology,  the  science  of  the  mind,  and  may  all 
be  properly  distinguished  as  metaphysical  sciences. 

THE  NATURE  OF  SCIENCE. — In  order  to  have  a  somewhat  clear 
notion  of  the  nature  of  mental  science,  it  will  be  well  to  obtain  a 
general  idea  of  the  nature  of  Science  and  the  elements  of  which 
it  is  composed.  Science  may  be  denned  as  organized  knowledge. 
It  embraces  the  facts  and  truth*  of  a  subject  systematically  ar- 
ranged and  bound  together  into  an  organic  unity  by  laws  and 
principles.  This  statement  gives  a  general  idea  of  the  nature  of 
science,  but  the  subject  will  be  more  clearly  understood  by  notic- 
ing the  character  of  the  two  general  classes  into  which  science 
is  divided. 

Two  Kinds  of  Science. — There  are  two  general  classes  of 
science,  which  may  be  distinguished  as  the  Deductive  and  the  In- 
ductive sciences.  A  Deductive  science  consists  of  three  things : 
first,  ideas,  which  lead  to  definitions ;  second,  self-evident  truths 
called  axioms;  third,  derived  truths  or  theorems.  Arithmetic, 
geometry,  etc.,  are  examples  of  a  deductive  science.  An  Induct- 
ive science  embraces  several  distinct  elements :  first,  facts  and 
phenomena;  second,  the  causes  of  these  facts  and  phenomena; 
third,  the  laws  which  govern  these  facts  and  phenomena.  Natural 
Philosophy  is  a  good  example  of  an  inductive  science.  A  few  of 
these  sciences,  as  botany,  consist  principally  of  facts  and  scientific 
classifications.  Some  sciences  partake  of  the  nature  of  both  of 
these  two  general  classes. 

These  two  classes  of  sciences  are  also  distinguished  as  Rational 
and  Empirical  sciences.  These  terms  indicate  the  origin  of  the 
elements  of  which  they  are  composed.  The  Empirical  sciences 
are  those  whose  elements  are  derived  from  experience ;  the  Ra- 
tional sciences  are  those  whose  elements  are  derived  from  the  rea- 
son. The  terms  Inductive  and  Deductive,  as  applied  to  these 
sciences,  indicate  the  methods  of  their  development,  the  former 


16  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

being  developed  by  inductive  reasoning,  and  the  latter  by  de- 
ductive reasoning. 

Nature  of  Elements. — The  elements  of  these  sciences  consist 
of  ideas,  thoughts,  truths,  facts,  phenomena,  causes,  laws,  etc.  An 
Idea  is  a  mental  product  which,  when  expressed  in  words,  does  not 
give  a  proposition;  as,  man,  animal,  triangle,  polygon,  etc.  A 
'Ihought  is  a  mental  product  which,  when  expressed  in  words, 
gives  a  proposition ;  as,  a  man  is  an  animal,  or  a  triangle  is  a 
polygon.  A  Truth  is  a  true  thought :  a  man  is  a  quadruped  is  a 
thought,  but  not  a  truth.  A  Fact  is  a  truth  in  the  domain  of 
experience ;  as,  the -sun  shines,  or  the  mind  remembers.  The  term 
Truth  is  often  limited  to  self-evident  and  derived  truths.  A 
Phenomenon  is  an  appearance ;  as,  the  twinkling  of  the  stars :  the 
statement  of  a  phenomenon  gives  a  fact ;  as,  the  stars  twinkle. 
A  Cause  is  that  which  produces  an  event.  A  Law  is  the  regular 
mode  or  order  according  to  which  something  acts  or  takes  place. 

Origin  of  Elements. — In  the  deductive  sciences  the  ideas  are 
usually  given  by  intuition — as,  the  ideas  of  geometry,  i.  e.,  angle, 
triangle,  circle,  etc.  The  truths  of  the  deductive  sciences  are  of 
two  kinds,  axioms  and  theorems.  The  axioms  are  self-evident 
truths  given  also  by  the  intuitive  power,  as,  "  all  right  angles  are 
equal  to  one* another."  The  theorems  are  derived  by  deductive 
reasoning,  as,  "  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  plane  triangle  equals 
two  right  angles."  In  the  inductive  sciences  the  facts  and  phe- 
nomena are  given  by  experience.  The  causes  and  laws  are  de- 
rived by  inductive  reasoning.  The  scientific  classifications  are 
given  by  generalization.  In  both  classes  of  sciences  the  material 
is  carefully  classified  and  systematized. 

NATURE  OF  MENTAL  SCIENCE. — Having  noticed  the  general 
nature  of  science,  we  are  prepared  to  see  more  clearly  the  nature 
of  mental  science.  Such  a  general  view  will  be  of  great  value  in 
the  study  and  comprehension  of  the  science.  In  order  to  pursue 
the  study  intelligently,  we  need  to  know  the  character  of  the 
knowledge  we  are  acquiring,  and  the  method  of  its  development. 
We  shall,  therefore,  present  a  brief  statement,  showing  of  what 


THE   NATURE    OF    MENTAL    SCIENCE.  17 

knowledge  the  science  is  composed,  and  how  this  knowledge  is 
obtained. 

Elements  Embraced. — The  science  of  the  mind  embraces 
several  distinct  elements.  First,  we  have  the  facts  pertaining  to 
the  mind,  including  the  various  faculties  and  their  operations. 
Second,  we  have  the  laws  which  govern  these  activities.  Third, 
we  have  a  statement  of  the  causes  of  certain  facts  and  phenomena 
of  the  mind.  Fourth,  we  have  hypotheses  and  theories  to  account 
for  certain  facts  and  phenomena  of  the  mind  not  readily  under- 
stood. Fifth,  these  activities  are  attended  with  certain  products, 
the  nature  and  origin  of  which  are  also  to  be  explained.  All 
these  are  to  be  systematically  arranged  and  presented. 

Facts  how  Obtained. — The  facts  of  the  mind,  including  its 
operations  and  products,  are  obtained  by  observation  and  experi- 
ence. The  operations  of  the  mind  are  revealed  to  us  by  con- 
sciousness. In  order  to  study  mental  science,  then,  we  must  first 
notice  carefully  the  operations  of  our  own  minds.  We  can  also, 
to  a  certain  extent,  observe  the  workings  of  the  minds  of  others, 
and  thereby  gain  some  facts  relating  to  the  science  of  the  mind. 
The  nature  of  the  mind  is  also  revealed  by  the  expression  of  its 
products  in  language.  We  can  therefore  study  mental  philoso- 
phy by  studying  the  products  of  mind  embodied  in  the  language 
and  literature  of  a  people.  Language  has  been  expressively  de- 
fined as  "  concrete  metaphysics." 

Laws  how  Obtained. — The  laws  of  the  activity  of  the  facul- 
ties are  gained  partly  by  experience  and  partly  by  an  induction 
from  the  facts  of  experience.  Some  of  the  principles  which 
govern  the  operations  of  the  mind  are  revealed  in  consciousness 
or  are  given  by  intuition.  Many  of  them  are  reached  by  a  care- 
ful comparison  of  the  facts  and  an  induction  of  a  general  law 
from  the  particulars.  The  hypotheses  and  theories  put  forth  to 
explain  the  facts  are  verified  by  reflection  and  reasoning.  Some 
of  the  facts  and  laws,  it  is  claimed,  can  be  deduced  from  general 
a  priori  principles  of  the  reason,  but  this  is  not  so  readily  seen. 

Similar  to  Natural  Science. — In  its   development  Mental 


18  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

Science  is  similar  to  a  natural  science.  In  a  natural  science,  as 
Natural  Philosophy,  \ve  begin  by  the  observation  of  facts ;  we 
then  seek  for  the  causes  of  these  facts  and  the  laws  which  govern 
them.  Thus,  we  observe  the  fad  that  certain  bodies  fall  toward 
the  earth;  we  then  inquire  after  the  cause,  and  find  it  to  be  the 
attraction  of  gravitation;  we  then  ascertain  the  laws  of  falling 
bodies,  and  find  that  the  distances  are  proportional  to  the  squares  of 
the  times.  So  in  mental  philosophy  we  obtain  facts  by  experience, 
and  then  search  for  the  causes  which  produce  and  the  laws  which 
govern  them. 

RELATION  TO  NATURAL  SCIENCE. — The  nature  of  mental 
science  may  be  better  understood  if  we  notice  a  little  more  closely 
its  relation  to  the  natural  sciences,  with  which  the  student  is  sup- 
posed to  be  somewhat  familiar  when  he  enters  upon  the  study  of 
mental  philosophy.  There  are  several  particulars  in  which  these 
two  sciences  agree,  and  also  several  points  of  difference. 

Knowledge  of  Each. — First,  we  know  only  the  phenomena 
of  each.  We  know  matter  by  its  properties,  and  mind  by  its 
activities.  Of  the  essence  or  essential  nature  of  matter,  we  know 
nothing ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  our  knowledge  of  mind.  We 
know  its  operations  and  states,  we  are  conscious  that  it  perceives, 
remembers,  imagines,  reasons,  that  it  loves,  hates,  desires,  deter- 
mines; etc. ;  but  what  it  is  in  its  essential  nature,  in  its  essence — of 
this  we  are  ignorant. 

Development  the  Same. — The  two  sciences  agree*  also  in  the 
manner  in  which  they  are  developed.  They  both  consist  of  facts, 
the  causes  of  the  facts,  and  the  laws  which  govern  them.  These 
facts,  in  both  cases,  are  the  result  of  experience.  From  the  facts 
and  phenomena  we  pass  to  their  causes  and  laws.  These  are  ob- 
tained by  a  careful  induction  from  particulars,  aided  frequently 
by  hypothesis  and  theory.  All  these  elements  are  reduced  to  a 
system  by  the  process  of  classification. 

How  They  Differ. — While  there  is  this  general  agreement 
in  the  manner  of  the  development  of  the  two  sciences,  there  are 
also  several  differences.  First,  the  facts  in  mental  science  are 


THE   NATURE   OF   MENTAL   SCIENCE.  19 

given,  not  by  an  observation  of  things  without,  but  by  a  con- 
sciousness of  what  takes  place  within  the  mind.  The  experience 
is  one  of  reflection  rather  than  of  observation.  Again,  the  in- 
quiry after  causes  is  not  so  prominent  in  the  science  of  mind  as 
in  that  of  matter.  The  reason  for  this  seems  to  be  that  the  fact 
is  more  nearly  related  to  its  cause,  or  rather  they  are  revealed  in  a 
closer  connection  with  each  other.  The  law  is  less  a  matter  of 
induction  and  more  a  matter  of  intuition  or  philosophical  insight 
in  mental  science  than  in  natural  science. 

Not  a  Natural  Science. — The  relation  of  the  two  classes  of 
sciences  is  so  close  that  some  thinkers  regard  mental  science  as  a 
natural  science.  For  this  they  adduce  two  reasons :  first,  their 
methods  of  development  are  the  same;  and  second,  the  mind 
belongs  to  the  domain  of  nature.  This  view  is  not  regarded  as 
correct.  The  latter  reason  would  make  arithmetic  and  geometry 
natural  sciences,  since  number  and  form  belong  to  the  natural 
world.  Even  though  the  methods  of  development  are  similar,  the 
subject  matter  is  so  different  that  we  are  justified  in  regarding 
them  as  two  different  kinds  of  sciences. 

VALUE  OP  MENTAL  SCIENCE. — In  entering  upon  a  new  study 
it  is  natural  for  the  student  to  inquire  in  respect  to  its  value  and 
use.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  so  abstract  a  science  as  mental 
philosophy,  a  science  also  of  which  the  general  scholar  has  so  little 
knowledge.  We  shall,  therefore,  devote  a  few  paragraphs  to 
showing  the  value  of  a  knowledge  of  mental  science.  We  preface 
these  remarks  by  speaking  of  the  neglect  of  the  study,  and  the 
reasons  for  this  neglect. 

The  Study  Neglected. — The  study  of  mental  science  has  been 
widely  neglected.  This  neglect  is  due  to  several  causes.  One  of 
these  causes  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  science  itself:  it  is  abstract 
and  difficult  for  the  ordinary  mind  to  understand.  Second,  the 
mind  turns  more  naturally  to  the  concrete  and  objective,  to  that 
which  lies  without  and  has  form  and  color,  than  to  the  formless 
and  intangible  operations  and  products  of  the  human  spirit. 
Third,  the  study  of  the  material  world  seems  to  promise  more 


20  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

practical  results,  as  it  deals  with  forces  which  serve  man's  conven- 
ience, and  contribute  to  his  comfort  and  material  welfare.  To 
build  a  railroad  or  invent  a  telegraph  seems  to  be  worth  more  to 
the  world  than  to  understand  the  laws  of  thought,  or  be  able  to 
discuss  the  freedom  of  the  will.  This  is  an  age  of  action  rather 
than  of  reflection ;  and  Ave  must  wait  until  "  that  period  comes  of 
golden  affluence,  and  leisure,  and  elegant  culture,  that  can  at  once 
appreciate  and  reward  the  higher  efforts  of  philosophic  investiga- 
tion." 

Valuable  as  a  Discipline. — The  study  of  mental  science  is 
especially  valuable  for  the  discipline  it  affords  to  the  mind.  It 
trains  the  mind  to  habits  of  reflective  thought,  and  cultivates  that 
fine  sense  of  discrimination  so  necessary  to  science.  It  does  more 
to  give  breadth  of  mental  grasp  and  philosophic  poise  of  thought 
than  any  other  branch  of  learning.  As  a  disciplinary  study  it 
has  no  superior,  even  if  it  has  an  equal,  among  the  sciences.  The 
three  great  disciplinary  studies  of  thought-power  are,  Mental 
Arithmetic,  Geometry,  and  Mental  Philosophy.  Mental  arith- 
metic trains  the  young  mind  to  habits  of  rigid  analysis ;  geometry 
trains  it  to  the  logical  forms  of  thought  and  expression ;  mental 
science  crowns  the  work,  and  cultivates  the  power  to  grasp 
abstract  principles.  The  study,  therefore,  which  we  place  highest 
on  the  list  for  the  culture  of  thought-power,  is  mental  science. 

Value  to  the  Teacher. — A  knowledge  of  mental  science  is  in- 
valuable to  the  teacher.  The  teacher's  work  is  to  develop  and 
train  the  minds  of  his  pupils ;  and  to  do  this  aright,  he  must 
understand  the  nature  of  the  mind  he  is  to  cultivate.  As  well 
might  the  farmer  undertake  to  cultivate  the  soil  without  knowing 
anything  of  its  nature,  or  the  physician  attempt  to  cure  disease 
without  knowing  anything  of  the  human  system,  as  for  the 
teacher  to  attempt  to  train  the  mind  without  understanding  any- 
thing of  its  nature  and  activity. 

To  be  more  specific,  the  teacher  should  understand  the  mind  in 
order  to  select  and  adapt  knowledge  suitable  to  its  capacities  in 
different  stages  of  its  activity.  That  is,  he  should  know  the  na- 


THE   NATURE   OF    MENTAL   SCIENCE.  21 

ture  of  the  mind  in  order  to  arrange  a  course  of  study  suited  to 
its  development.  Again,  the  teacher  should  understand  the  mind, 
since  the  principles  of  instruction  have  their  basis  in  and  are 
drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  mind.  These  principles  are  of 
three  classes ;  first,  those  pertaining  to  the  culture  of  the  mind ; 
second,  those  pertaining  to  the  order  hi  which  knowledge  shall  be 
presented;  and,  third,  those  pertaining  to  the  methods  of  com- 
municating knowledge.  The  first  of  these,  it  is  evident,  are 
drawn  immediately  from  the  nature  of  the  mind.  The  principles 
pertaining  to  the  order  of  presenting  knowledge  have  their  origin 
in  the  mind,  since  knowledge  originates  in  the  mind  and  thus  de- 
rives its  character  from  the  mind.  The  principles  relating  to  the 
methods  of  imparting  knowledge  can  also  be  shown  to  have  an 
intimate  relation  to  the  nature  of  the  mind. 

A  knowledge  of  mental  science  thus  lies  at  the  very  foundation 
of  the  teacher's  work.  No  person  is  fully  qualified  to  teach  until 
he  understands  the  nature  of  the  mind.  Much  of  the  blundering 
in  the  methods  of  teaching  is  due  to  the  ignorance  of  teachers  in 
this  respect.  The  cramming  of  our  schools,  which  has  produced 
so  many  cases  of  mental  dyspepsia,  is  the  result  of  this  wide-spread 
ignorance  of  mental  science.  All  the  reforms  of  modern  meth- 
ods of  teaching  are  based  upon  a  clearer  view  of  the  nature  and 
functions  of  the  mind  of  the  learner;  and  we  may  expect  our 
methods  to  continue  to  improve  in  the  direct  ratio  of  an  increase 
of  a  knowledge  of  mental  philosophy  among  teachers  and  edu- 
cators. 

Of  General  Value. — A  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  mind 
is  of  value  in  every  vocation.  It  gives  one  a  knowledge  of  human 
nature ;  and  such  a  knowledge  is  a  key  to  success  in  every  occu- 
pation depending  upon  the  influencing  of  men.  The  physician 
who  understands  the  mental  peculiarities  of  his  patients,  and  the 
relation  of  the  mind  to  the  bodily  functions,  can  often  do  more 
for  the  cure  of  disease  through  mental  influences  than  by  the  ad- 
ministering of  medicines.  The  lawyer  wins  or  loses  his  case, 
according  as  he  knows  how  to  influence  the  judgment  and  sensi- 


22  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

bilities  of  judge  and  jury.  The  minister  moves  the  hearts  and 
wills  of  his  congregation  better  when  he  understands  the  hidden 
springs  of  thought  and  emotion.  The  orator  leads  the  opinions 
and  arouses  the  passions  of  the  people  when  he  is  familiar  with 
the  secret  working  of  the  faculties  of  the  human  soul.  And  so 
in  every  vocation  where  mind  comes  in  contact  with  mind,  the 
man  who  understands  the  law  of  human  influence  is  usually  the 
man  of  influence  and  success. 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  MIND. 

MIND  is  that  part  of  our  nature  which  is  called  the 
-*-  spirit,  the  soul,  or  the  intelligence.  It  is  that  unseen  power 
which  constitutes  us  intelligent  and  rational  beings,  and  thus  dis- 
tinguishes us  from  the  material  world  around  us.  Of  its  essen- 
tial nature  nothing  is  known ;  we  study  it  only  by  its  manifesta- 
tions,— its  activities  and  products. 

How  to  Define  Mind. — The  mind  can  be  defined  only  by  its 
activities.  In  order  to  define  the  mind,  therefore,  we  must  ob- 
serve and  determine  its  various  forms  of  activity.  These  activi- 
ties, classified  under  a  few  general  heads  and  predicated  of  the 
unseen  something  which  manifests  them,  will  give  us  a  definition 
of  mind.  A  careful  analysis  enables  us  to  classify  all  the  mental 
activities  under  three  general  heads ;  thinking,  feeling,  and  will- 
ing: we  may  therefore  define  the  mind  as  tliat  which  thinks,  feels, 
and  wills. 

Other  Names. — The  terms  spirit  and  soul  are  generally  re- 
garded as  synonymous  with  mind.  Some  writers,  however,  dis- 
tinguish between  the  mind  and  the  soul,  regarding  the  mind 
merely  as  the  power  of  thinking  and  knowing,  or  as  a  part  of  the 
soul,  which  is  the  entire  spiritual  nature.  Some  distinguish  also 
between  the  soul  and  the  spirit,  regarding  the  soul  as  that  which 
is  or  has  been  connected  with  a  body,  while  the  spirit  is  that  which 
neither  is  now  nor  ever  has  been  connected  with  a  bodily  form. 
In  this  treatise  the  term  mind  is  used  as  embracing  the  whole 
spiritual  being. 

Essence  not  Known. — In  the  study  of  mental  science  no  at- 
tempt is  made  to  ascertain  the  essence,  or  essential  nature  of  the 

(23) 


24  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

mind.  Indeed,  of  the  essence  or  substance  of  which  the  mind  is 
composed  nothing  can  be  known.  Marivaux,  says  Dr.  Brown, 
was  once  asked  "  What «  the  soul  ?  "  "I  know  nothing  of  it,"  he 
replied,  "  except  that  it  is  spiritual  and  immortal."  "  Well,"  said 
his  friend,  "  let  us  ask  Fontenelle ;  perhaps  he  can  tell  us  what  it 
is."  "Ask  any  one  but  Fontenelle,"  replied  Marivaux,  "for  he 
has  too  much  good  sense  to  know  anything  more  about  it  than 
we  do."  But  though  we  cannot  know  mind  in  its  essential  attri- 
butes, we  can  know  that  it  exists,  and  can  understand  its  activi- 
ties and  the  forms  and  laws  of  its  operations. 

Existence  of  Mind. — The  existence  of  mind  is  revealed  by 
its  activities.  /  know,  therefore  I  am,  is  a  fundamental  principle 
of  mental  science.  Descartes,  a  philosopher  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  based  his  philosophy  upon  the  principle  cogito,  ergo  mm, 
— I  think,  therefore  I  am, — and  this  has  been  accepted  as  a  correct 
basis  of  belief  by  nearly  all  subsequent  writers.  The  existence 
of  mind  is  not  however  an  inference  from  thinking,  but  is  a  fact 
involved  in  the  very  act  of  thought.  The  evidence  of  each  per- 
son's own  existence  is  self-consciousness :  /  know  that  I  am  is  a 
final  and  ultimate  judgment  that  authenticates  my  personal  exis- 
tence. The  mind  knows  its  own  existence ;  and  this  knowledge  is 
ultimate  and  final. 

Not  a  Result  of  Matter. — This  something  which  we  call  the 
mind  is  not  a  phenomenon  of  matter,  like  electricity  or  galvan- 
ism. It  cannot  be  admitted  that  consciousness  results  from  the 
combination  or  action  of  any  number  of  chemical  elements.  It 
is  a  law  of  nature  that  a  mechanical  cause  passes  completely  into 
a  mechanical  effect.  It  is,  therefore,  impossible  to  conceive  of  the 
conversion  of  material  particles  into  so  dissimilar  a  thing  as 
human  intelligence ;  or  of  a  blind  force  like  gravity  or  electricity 
becoming  conscious  and  intelligent.  Even  Huxley  says,  "  How  it 
is  possible  that  anything  so  remarkable  as  a  state  of  consciousness 
comes  about  as  the  result  of  irritating  nervous  tissue,  is  just  as 
unaccountable  as  any  other  ultimate  fact  of  nature." 

The  Mind  Spiritual. — The  mind  is  said  to  be  spiritual  rather 


THE   NATUEE    OF   THE    MIND.  25 

than  material.  It  differs  from  matter  in  several  particulars. 
Mind  is  self-active ;  matter  is  not.  The  law  of  matter  is  that  of 
inertia ;  if  it  is  moved  at  all,  it  is  moved  by  some  force  extraneous 
to  itself:  the  mind  possesses  the  power  of  voluntary  motion;  it 
acts  from  within  by  an  energy  of  its  own.  The  movement  of 
matter  is  caused ;  mind  is  the  cause  of  its  own  movements.  Mat- 
ter has  extension  and  form ;  mind  does  not  reveal  itself  as  pos- 
sessing these  elements.  Matter  has  length,  breadth,  and  thick- 
ness ;  mind,  so  far  as  we  know,  possesses  none  of  these  attributes. 
^Matter  is  known  by  the  mind  through  the  senses  ;f  mind  is  self- 
knowing;  it  knows  itself.  •]  Matter  reveals  itself  to  us  in  its 
properties ;  mind  in  its  activities  and  capacities!^  \  Neither  mind 
nor  matter  is  known  in  its  essence ;  we  know  the  properties  of 
matter,  and  the  activities  of  the  mind.J' 

Not  Universally  Admitted. — This  distinction  between  mind 
and  matter  is  not  universally  admitted.  The  disciples  of  the 
materialistic  school  of  philosophy  regard  matter  as  the  only  one 
thing  of  which  we  have  any  positive  knowledge ;  and  assert  that 
we  have  no  authority  for  predicating  the  distinct  existence  of 
mind  and  matter.  They  hold  that  the  phenomenon  of  thinking 
is  a  function  of  matter,  like  extension  and  motion.  Huxley  says, 
"  We  have  no  knowledge  of  any  thinking  substance  apart  from 
an  extended  substance."  He  also  remarks  that  "  we  shall,  sooner 
or  later,  arrive  at  a  mechanical  equivalent  of  consciousness,  just 
as  we  have  arrived  at  a  mechanical  equivalent  of  heat." 

Objections  to  this  View. — This  view  of  the  mind  we  be- 
lieve to  be  entirely  erroneous.  It  involves  the  assumption  that 
something  which  cannot  know  itself  as  existing  (matter)  gives 
rise  to  something  which  knows  both  itself  and  that  which  pro- 
duced it  (mind)  ;  and  yet  this  knowing  something  that  asserts  the 
existence  of  itself  cannot  authenticate  its  own  existence,  but  can 
authenticate  the  existence  of  that  which  manifested  it !  A  more 
absurd  paradox  is  not  conceivable.  The  philosophy  taught  in 
this  volume  assumes  the  distinct  and  independent  existence  of  an 
entity  which  we  call  THE  MIND. 
2 


26  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Mental  Faculties. -Y£he  mind  reveals  itself  to  us  by  its  ac- 
tivities or  its  capacities  for  activity .1  These  activities  present 
themselves  in  different  forms,  which  may  be  compared  and  readily 
distinguished.  Each  different  form  of  activity  or  capacity  for  a 
form  of  activity  constitutes  what  is  called  a  faculty  of  the  mind. 
These  faculties  can  be  clearly  distinguished,  and  admit  of  being 
logically  classified. 

A  Mental  Faculty. — A  Mental  Faculty  may  be  defined  as  a 
capacity  for  a  distinct  form  of  mental  activity.  It  is  the  mind's 
power  of  doing  something,  of  putting  forth  some  energy,  of  man- 
ifesting itself  in  some  particular  manner.  The  number  of  distinct 
faculties,  it  is  evident,  must  depend  on  the  number  of  distinct 
forms  of  mental  activity.  A  careful  examination  of  the  various 
ways  in  which  the  mind  acts  has  enabled  philosophers  to  enumer- 
ate different  faculties  and  describe  their  operations. 

The  Mind  Simple. — The  mind,  though  possessing  different 
faculties,  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  complex.  It  is  not  made  up  of 
parts,  but  is  rather  single  and  one.  It  may  act  in  various  ways, 
and  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  various  capacities,  but  it  is  the 
same  one  thing  acting  under  different  forms,  or  in  different  ways. 
The  mind  is  a  spiritual  unity,  having  many  powers,  but  one 
essence.  To  it  may  be  applied,  with  especial  propriety,  the 
motto,  E  Pluribus  Unum. 

A  Correct  Conception  of  Mind. — Great  care  is  needful  to 
form  a  correct  conception  of  the  mind,  which  no  definition  or 
analysis  can  fully  present.  The  mind  is  a  spiritual  unity,  with 
many  susceptibilities  and  capacities,  but  with  oneness  of  person- 
ality. The  mind  is  a  self-conscious  activity,  and  not  a  mere  pass- 
ivity ;  it  is  a  pulsating  centre  of  forces,  all  resting  in  the  back- 
ground of  the  ego.  The  mind,  as  a  centre  of  forces,  stands 
related  to  the  forces  of  the  material  and  spiritual  universe,  and  is 
acted  upon  through  its  susceptibilities  by  these  forces.  As  a 
spiritual  activity  it  takes  the  impressions  derived  from  these 
forces,  and  works  them  up  into  the  organic  growth  of  itself,  con- 
verts them  into  conscious  knowledge,  and  uses  these  products  as 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE    MIND.  27 

means  to  set  other  forces  into  activity,  and  produce  new  results. 
Standing  above  nature,  and  independent  of  its  surroundings,  it 
nevertheless  feeds  upon  nature,  as  we  may  say,  and  transforms 
material  influences  into  spiritual  facts  akin  to  its  own  nature. 
Related  to  the  natural  world,  and  apparently  originating  from  it, 
it  yet  rises  above  this  natural  world,  and  with  the  crown  of  free- 
dom upon  its  brow,  rules  the  natural  obedient  to  its  will. 

General  Classification. — The  mind  has  been  divided  into 
three  general  classes  of  faculties :  the  faculties  of  knowing,  feel- 
ing, and  willing.  These  three  classes  of  faculties  have  been  called 
respectively,  the  Intellect,  the  Sensibilities,  and  the  Will.  Every 
capacity  or  power  which  the  mind  can  exercise,  is  found  to  fall 
under  one  of  these  three  heads.  Every  act  of  the  soul  is  an  act 
either  of  knowing,  feeling,  or  willing — an  act  of  the  Intellect,  the 
Sensibilities,  or  the  Will. 

Illustration. — The  relation  of  these  three  spheres  of  activity  may 
be  illustrated  in  a  variety  of  ways.  I  read  of  the  destitution  and 
suffering  of  the  people  of  a  great  city,  and  understand  the  means 
taken  for  their  relief:  this  is  an  act  of  the  intellect.  I  feel  a 
deep  sympathy  with  this  suffering ;  my  heart  is  touched  with 
pity,  and  I  experience  a  strong  desire  to  aid  in  relieving  their 
distress :  this  is  an  act  of  the  sensibilities.  I  desire  to  express 
my  feelings  of  pity  and  follow  my  sense  of  duty,  and  resolve  to 
aid  them  by  sending  a  contribution  or  going  personally  to  their 
relief:  this  is  an  act  of  the  will. 

Relation  of  these  Powers. — The  relation  of  these  three  classes 
of  powers  will  indicate  the  correctness  of  this  "  tri-logical  classi- 
fication." We  can  conceive  of  a  being  possessed  of  the  power  of 
cognition  and  yet  void  of  all  feeling  of  pain  or  pleasure,  and  of 
all  power  of  desire  or  volition.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot 
conceive  of  a  being  possessed  of  feelings  and  desires  without  a 
knowledge  of  those  feelings.  So  also  we  can  conceive  of  a  being 
possessed  of  knowledge  and  feeling,  yet  devoid  of  the  faculty  of 
volition  and  voluntary  action.  But  we  cannot  conceive  of  the 
existence  or  exercise  of  a  power  of  volition  independently  of  al] 


28  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

cognition  of  an  object  of  thought  or  some  feeling  in  relation  to 
such  a  volition. 

Origin  of  this  Division. — This  threefold  division  of  the  fac- 
ulties of  the  mind  was  first  distinctly  intimated  by  Kant.  Aris- 
totle spoke  of  five  classes  of  powers,  though  the  Peripatetic  school 
recognized  two  classes,  the  cognitive  and  the  conative  powers.  The 
schoolmen  ascribed  to  man  three  classes  of  powers ;  the  vegetative, 
the  perceptive,  and  the  rational.  Modern  writers  on  philosophy 
for  many  years  divided  the  powers  into  two  classes ;  the  Under- 
standing and  the  Will,  or  the  speculative  and  the  active  powers. 
Gradually  the  feelings  came  to  be  distinguished  as  a  separate  men- 
tal state,  coordinate  with  thought  and  will.  The  first  formally  to 
announce  this  threefold  classification  of  the  mind  into  Intellect, 
Sensibilities,  and  Will,  was  Prof.  Upham. 

Gradually  Developed. — Prof.  Upham  presents  a  large  num- 
ber of  quotations  to  show  that  this  division  was  gradually  devel- 
oping in  thoughtful  minds.  Among  others,  Lord  Chesterfield 
says,  in  a  letter  to  his  son  on  the  manner  of  conducting  negotia- 
tions :  "  If  you  engage  his  heart,  you  have  a  fair  chance  for  im- 
posing on  his  understanding,  and  determining  his  will"  Even 
Shakspeare  had  made  the  division  by  the  intuition  of  his  marvel- 
ous genius,  for  he  says, 

"It  shows  a  will  most  incorrect  to  heaven, 
A  heart  unfortified, 
An  understanding  simple  and  unschooled." 

This  classification  is  now  universally  accepted  by  those  who 
make  any  formal  division  of  the  faculties,  and  it  is  the  basis  of 
the  treatment  in  the  present  work. 

General  Suggestions. — In  the  study  of  the  mind  two  gen- 
eral suggestions  are  made.  -^First,  the  student  should  test  the 
statements  of  the  author  by  a  reference  to  the  action  of  his  own 
mind.  He  must  learn  to  look  within,  to  bend  the  mind  in  upon 
itself,  and  notice  and  analyze  his  own  mental  operations.  The 
test  of  a  fact  or  theory  should  be  his  own  consciousness,  i  Second, 
he  should  be  careful  not  to  think  of  his  mind  as  separate  from 


THE   NATUKE   OF   THE   MIND.  29 

himself.  The  mind  is  one's  self,  not  merely  something  belonging 
to  one's  self.  VA-nd  so  in  respect  to  our  faculties ;  we  should  not 
regard  a  faculty  as  a  part  of  the  mind,  as  a  blade  is  a  part  of  a 
knife,  but  rather  as  a  form  of  the  activity  of  the  mind.  UThe 
mind  is  single  and  one,  a  unity  of  substance  with  a  variety 
of  powers.  >It  is  one  and  the  same  ego  that  perceives,  remem- 
bers, reasons,  etc.  - 

Having  now  explained  the  general  nature  of  the  mind,  with 
its  three  great  classes  of  powers,  we  proceed  to  a  detailed  descrip- 
tion of  these  powers  and  the  laws  of  their  activity.  The  next 
chapter  contains  a  complete  outline  of  the  subject,  and  may  be 
called  the  alphabet  of  Mental  Science.  Any  one  who  has  thor- 
oughly mastered  it,  has  implanted  in  his  mind  the  germs  of  the 
entire  subject  of  Mental  Philosophy. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  FACULTIES  OF  THE  MIND. 

MIND  is  that  which  thinks,  feels,  and  wills.  It  is  that 
JL  immaterial  principle  which  we  call  the  soul,  the  spirit,  or  the 
intelligence.  Of  its  essence  or  substance,  nothing  is  known ;  we 
know  it  only  by  its  activities  and  its  operations.  The  different 
forms  of  activity  which  it  presents,  indicate  different  mental 
powers,  which  are  called  Faculties  of  the  mind. 

A  Mental  Faculty. — A  Mental  Faculty  is  a  capacity  for  a 
distinct  form  of  mental  activity.  It  is  the  mind's  power  of  doing 
something,  of  putting  forth  some  energy,  of  manifesting  itself  in 
some  particular  manner.  The  mind  possesses  as  many  faculties 
as  there  are  distinct  forms  of  mental  activity.  In  order,  there- 
fore, to  ascertain  the  different  faculties  of  the  mind,  we  must 
notice  carefully  the  various  ways  in  which  the  mind  acts. 

General  Classification. — The  mind  embraces  three  general 
classes  of  faculties;  the  Intellect,  the  Sensibilities,  and  the  Will. 
Every  capacity  or  power  which  the  mind  possesses  falls  under 
one  of  these  three  heads.  Every  mental  act  is  an  act  of  the  In- 
tellect, the  Sensibilities,  or  the  Will.  Every  product  of  the  mind 
is  either  an  intellection,  a  feeling,  or  a  volition. 

The  Mind  Triune. — This  three-fold  division  of  the  mind  is  the 
latest  teaching  of  Psychology.  All  mental  activity  is  embraced 
under  the  three  heads, — Intellect,  Sensibilities,  and  Will.  These 
are  not  to  be  considered  as  parts  of  a  complex  unit,  but  rather 
as  forms  of  manifestation  of  the  spiritual  entity  which  we  call 
The  Mind.  The  mind  is  thus  a  tri-unity, — one  substance  with 
a  trinity  of  powers  or  capacities.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity 
of  the  Mind  is  thus  a  fundamental  fact  of  Psychology. 

TJie  Intellect. — The  Intellect  is  the  power  by  which  we  think 

(30) 


THE   FACULTIES  OF   THE   MIND.  31 

and  know.  Its  products  are  ideas  and  thoughts.  An  Idea  is  a 
mental  product,  which  may  be  expressed  in  one  or  more  words, 
not  forming  a  proposition ;  as,  a  man,  an  animal,  etc.  A  Thought 
is  a  mental  product  consisting  of  the  combination  of  two  or  more 
ideas,  which  when  expressed  in  words,  gives  us  a  proposition ;  as, 
a  man  is  an  animaL  Our  notions  of  the  different  figures  of 
geometry,  as  angles,  triangles,  squares,  etc.,  are  ideas;  while  our 
conceptions  of  axioms  and  theorems  are  thoughts. 

The  Sensibilities. — The  Sensibilities  are  the  powers  by  which 
we  feel.  Their  products  are  emotions,  affections,  and  desires.  An 
emotion  is  a  simple  feeling,  as  the  emotion  of  joy,  sorrow,  etc. 
An  affection  is  an  emotion  that  goes  out  towards  an  object ;  as  love, 
hate',  envy,  etc.  A  desire  is  an  emotion  that  goes  out  to  an  object 
with  the  wish  of  possession ;  as  the  desire  of  wealth,  fame,  etc. 

The  Will. — The  Will  is  the  power  of  deciding  or  determining 
what  to  do  and  of  putting  forth  volitions  accordingly.  It  is  the 
executive  power  of  the  mind,  the  power  by  which  man  becomes 
the  conscious  author  of  an  intentional  act.  It  is  the  motive 
power  of  the  mind ;  by  it  we  put  the  other  faculties  into  activity 
and  control  their  action.  The  products  of  the  Will  are  volitions 
and  voluntary  actions.  It  is  in  the  domain  of  the  Will  that  man 
becomes  a  moral  and  responsible  being. 

The  Intellect. — The  Intellect  embraces  several  distinct  facul- 
ties; Perception,  Memory,  Imagination,  Understanding,  and  Intu- 
ition, or  the  Reason.  This  classification  of  the  Intellect  is  now 
almost  universally  accepted,  though  writers  occasionally  differ  in 
the  terms  they  use  to  name  the  different  powers. 

Perception. — Perception  is  the  power  by  which  we.  gain  a 
knowledge  of  external  objects  through  the  senses.  It  is  the 
faculty  by  which  we  gain  a  knowledge  of  objects  and  their  quali- 
ties. Its  products  are  ideas  of  external  objects  and  of  the  quali- 
ties of  objects.  The  products  of  perception  are  called  percepts. 
The  ideas  which  we  possess  of  persons,  places,  things,  etc.,  are 
mainly  given  by  perception. 

Memory. — Memory  is  the  power  by  which  we  retain  and  recall 


32  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

knowledge.  It  enables  us  to  hold  fast  to  the  knowledge  we  have 
acquired,  and  also  to  recall  it  when  we  wish  to  use  it.  These  two 
offices  of  the  Memory  are  distinguished  as  Retention  and  Recollec- 
tion. By  some  writers  these  are  regarded  as  separate  faculties ; 
and  others  again  discard  the  element  of  retention.  Besides  these, 
the  memory  also  gives  us  a  representation  of  that  which  it  recalls, 
and  recognizes  it  as  something  of  our  past  experience. 

Imagination. — Imagination  is  the  power  by  which  we  form 
ideal  conceptions.  It  is  the  power  of  forming  mental  images  by 
uniting  different  parts  of  objects  given  by  perception,  and  also  of 
creating  ideals  of  objects  different  from  anything  we  have  per- 
ceived. Thus,  I  can  conceive  of  a  flying  horse  by  uniting  my  ideas 
of  wings  and  a  horse ;  or  I  can  imagine  a  landscape  or  a  strain 
of  music  different  from  anything  I  have  ever  seen  or  heard.  Im- 
agination is  thus  the  power  of  ideal  creation. 

Understanding. — The  Understanding  is  the  power  by  which 
we  compare  objects  of  thought  and  derive  abstract  and  general 
ideas  and  truths.  It  is  the  'elaborative  power  of  the  mind ;  it 
takes  the  materials  furnished  by  the  other  faculties  and  works 
them  up  into  new  products.  Its  products  are  abstract  and  general 
ideas,  truths,  laws,  causes,  etc. 

Intuition. — Intuition,  or  the  Reason,  is  the  power  which  gives 
us  ideas  and  thoughts  not  furnished  by  the  senses  nor  elaborated 
by  the  Understanding.  Its  products  are  called  primary  ideas  and 
primary  truths.  The  Primary  Ideas  are  such  as  Space,  Time, 
Cause,  Identity,  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good.  The 
Primary  Truths  are  all  self-evident  truths,  as  the  axioms  of  math- 
ematics and  logic. 

TJie  Understanding. — The  Understand ir.jj  embraces  several 
distinct  faculties  or  forms  of  mental  activity.  These  are  Abstrac- 
tion, Conception,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning.  This  division  is  now 
almost  universally  adopted,  and  the  sanio  terms  are  employed  by 
[nearly  all  modern  writers. 

Abstraction. — Abstraction  is  the  power  of  forming  abstract 
ideas.  It  is  the  power  by  which  the  mind  draws  a  quality  away 


THE   FACULTIES    OF   THE   MIND.  33 

from  its  object,  and  makes  of  it  a  distinct  object  of  thought.  Ita 
products  are  abstract  ideas,  such  as  hardness,  softness,  color,  etc. 
The  naming  of  abstract  ideas  gives  us  abstract  terms.  The  term 
Abstraction  is  derived  from  ab,  from,  and  traho,  I  draw,  and  signi- 
fies a  drawing  from. 

Conception. — Conception  is  the  power  of  forming  general 
ideas.  By  it  we  take  several  particular  ideas,  and  unite  their 
common  properties,  and  thus  form  a  general  idea  which  embraces 
them  all.  The  products  of  Conception  are  general  ideas,  or  ideas 
of  classes ;  as  horse,  bird,  man,  etc.  The  naming  of  general  ideas 
gives  us  common  terms.  This  faculty  is  often  called  Generaliza- 
tion ;  but  the  term  Conception  is  more  appropriate,  and  is  the  one 
generally  adopted  by  logicians.  The  term  Conception  is  derived 
from  con,  together,  and  capio,  I  take,  and  signifies  a  taking 
together. 

Judgment. — Judgment  is  the  power  of  perceiving  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  two  objects  of  thought.  It  is  the  power 
of  comparison.  It  compares  one  object  directly  with  another,  and 
gives  us  a  proposition.  A  proposition  is  a  judgment  expressed  in 
words.  Thus,  a  bird  is  an  animal,  is  a  judgment  expressed.  The 
term  Judgment  is  applied  to  both  the  mental  faculty  and  its 
product. 

Reasoning. — Reasoning  is  the  power  of  comparing  two  ideas 
through  their  relation  to  a  third.  It  is  a  process  of  indirect  or 
mediate  comparison.  It  deals  with  three  objects  of  thought,  and 
requires  three  propositions.  Thus,  suppose  I  wish  to  compare  A 
and  B,  and  perceiving  no  relation  between  them,  see  that  A 
equals  C,  and  B  equals  C,  and  thus  infer  that  A  equals  B ;  such 
an  inference  is  an  act  of  reasoning. 

The  Syllogism. — The  form  in  which  reasoning  is  expressed  is 
called  a  Syllogism.  A  Syllogism  consists  of  three  propositions  so 
related  that  one  is  an  inference  from  the  other  two.  Two  of  these 
propositions  are  called  the  premises  and  the  third  the  conclusion. 
Thus,  in  the  above  example  the  two  propositions,  "  A  equals  C  " 
and  "B  equals  C,"  are  the  premises;  and  "A  equals  B"  is  the 
conclusion. 


34  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Inductive  Reasoning. — Reasoning  is  of  two  kinds;  Inductive 
Reasoning  and  Deductive  Reasoning.  Inductive  Reasoning  is  the 
process  of  deriving  a  general  truth  from  particular  truths.  Thus, 
if  I  find  that  heat  expands  several  metals,  as  zinc,  iron,  copper,  etc. 
I  may  infer  that  heat  will  expand  all  metals.  Such  an  inference 
of  a  general  truth  from  the  particular  facts  is  called  Induction. 
Inductive  Reasoning  proceeds  upon  the  principle  that  what  is  true 
of  the  many  is  true  of  the  whole. 

Deductive  Reasoning. — Deductive  Reasoning  is  the  process  of 
deriving  a  particular  truth  from  a  general  truth.  Thus,  from  the 
general  proposition  that  heat  expands  all  metals,  I  may  infer  by 
Deduction  that  heat  will  expand  any  particular  metal,  as  silver. 
Deduction  proceeds  upon  the  principle  that  wJiut  is  true  of  the 
whole  is  true  of  the  parts. 

Other  Forms  of  Activity. — Besides  the  faculties  now  named, 
two  other  forms  of  mental  activity  or  mental  states  are  usually 
described  by  writers  on  mental  science;  namely,  Consciousness 
and  Attention.  These  are  not  regarded  as  specific  faculties  of  the 
mind,  but  as  conditions  or  accompaniments  of  these  faculties.  A 
term  very  frequently  used  in  mental  philosophy  also  is  that  of 
Conception,  which  also  requires  a  few  words  of  explanation. 

Consciousness. — Consciousness  is  the  power  or  attribute  of  the 
mind  by  which  it  knows  its  own  states  and  actions.  The  term  is 
derived  from  con,  with,  and  scio,  I  know,  and  means  a  knowing 
with  the  mental  acts  or  states.  It  is  a  kind  of  inner  light  by 
which  one  knows  what  is  going  on  within  his  mind  ;  it  is  a  revealer 
of  the  internal  phenomena  of  thought,  feeling,  and  will.  Con- 
sciousness is  regarded  as  an  attribute  of  the  mind,  involved  in  the 
very  idea  of  mind,  and  not  as  a  distinct  mental  faculty. 

Attention. — Attention  is  the  power  of  directing  the  mind  volun- 
tarily to  any  object  of  thought  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  It  is 
the  power  of  selecting  one  of  several  objects,  and  concentrating 
the  mental  energies  upon  it.  Attention  is  not  a  distinct  form  of 
mental  activity,  but  is  involved  in  and  underlies  the  activity  of 
all  the  faculties.  The  voluntary  operation  of  any  of  the  mental 


THE   FACULTIES   OF   THE    MIND.  35 

powers,  as  Perception,  Memory,  etc.,  carries  with  it  an  act  of  at- 
tention. The  term  is  derived  from  ad,  to,  and  tendo,  I  bend, 
which  was  probably  suggested  by  the  attitude  of  the  body  in 
listening  attentively  to  a  sound. 

Conception. — The  term  Conception  is  often  used  in  a  general 
and  popular  sense,  meaning  that  power  which  the  mind  has  of 
making  anything  a  distinct  object  of  thought.  In  this  sense  it  is 
intimately  related  to  all  the  mental  faculties.  Thus  I  can  con- 
ceive of  a  tree  or  a  horse  which  I  have  seen,  a  landscape  which  I 
may  not  have  seen,  a  proposition  in  geometry,  a  truth  in  natural 
philosophy,  etc.  Some  writers  have  used  the  term  in  a  more  spe- 
cific sense,  as  the  power  of  forming  an  exact  transcript  of  a  past 
perception.  In  Logic  the  term  is  restricted  to  the  power  of  form- 
ing general  ideas,  as  we  have  previously  defined  it. 

Hamilton's  Classification. — Sir  Win.  Hamilton,  one  of  the 
most  eminent  philosophers  of  modern  times,  presents  a  classifica- 
tion of  the  intellect  which  has  been  much  admired  for  its  sim- 
plicity and  the  suggestive  character  of  the  terms  used.  He 
divides  the  Intellect  into  the  Presentative,  Conservative,  Repro- 
ductive, Representative,  Elaborative,  and  Regulative  powers. 

The  Presentative  power  is  that  which  presents  knowledge  to  the 
mind ;  it  corresponds  to  Perception.  The  Conservative  power  is 
that  which  retains  or  preserves  knowledge  in  the  mind ;  it  corres- 
ponds to  the  retentive  element  of  the  Memory.  The  Reproductive 
power  is  that  which  reproduces  knowledge  in  the  mind  ;  it  corres- 
ponds to  the  recalling  element  of  the  Memory.  The  Representa- 
tive power  is  that  which  represents  knowledge  to  the  mind ;  it 
corresponds  to  the  Imagination.  The  Elaborative  power  is  thai 
which  works  up  or  elaborates  the  knowledge  attained  by  the  other 
faculties ;  it  corresponds  to  the  Understanding.  The  Regulative 
power  is  that  which  regulates  the  activities  of  the  other  faculties  ; 
it  corresponds  to  the  Reason. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  CULTURE    OF  THE  MIND. 

SCIENCE  OF  EDUCATION  treats  of  the  developing  of  the 
-P-  powers  of  man  and  the  furnishing  of  his  mind  with  know- 
ledge. The  developing  of  the  powers  is  called  culture,  and  the 
furnishing  of  the  mind  with  knowledge  is  called  instruction.  A 
formal  treatment  of  the  methods  of  cultivating  the  mind  is  called 
Methods  of  Culture;  a  formal  treatment  of  the  methods  of  in- 
structing the  mind  is  called  Methods  of  Instruction. 

Nature  of  Culture. — Methods  of  Culture  treats  of  the  nature 
of  the  powers  of  man  and  how  to  develop  them.  It  includes 
several  branches,  such  as  Physical  Culture,  Intellectual  Cul- 
ture, jEsthetic  Culture,  Moral  Culture,  and  Keligious  Culture. 
The  present  work  treats  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  and  the 
methods  of  cultivating  it,  and  is  entitled  Mental  Science  and 
Mental  Culture.  Our  purpose,  therefore,  is  not  only  to  describe 
the  different  faculties  of  the  mind,  but  also  to  discuss  the  methods 
of  cultivating  them.  Having  given  an  idea  of  the  general  nature 
of  the  mind,  we  now  present  a  few  principles  relating  to  its 
culture.  These  may  be  called  the  fundamental  principles  of 
mental  culture. 

1.  The  object  of  mental  culture  is  the  fullest  development  and 
highest  activity  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind.  The  mind  is  developed 
by  culture.  Its  powers  are  strengthened  and  made  to  act  with 
vigor  and  skill  by  judicious  training.  Without  such  training  the 
mind  may  either  remain  comparatively  inert,  or  its  activities  may 
conflict  with  the  normal  laws  of  mental  development  and  fail  to 
produce  the  best  fruits  of  culture  and  knowledge.  In  this  respect 
the  mind  is  like  a  field,  and  mental  culture  like  the  culture  of 
the  soil.  Left  to  itself,  a  farm  may  be  overrun  with  weeds  and 

(36) 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  MIND.  37 

briers,  while  if  subjected  to  the  careful  culture  of  the  husband- 
man, it  will  teem  with  golden  harvests.  So  the  mind,  if  left  to 
itself,  may  waste  its  energies  and  acquire  incorrect  habits  of 
activity ;  while  if  subjected  to  the  guiding  hand  of  culture,  it  may 
develop  in  normal  strength  and  vigor,  and  bring  forth  rich 
harvests  of  precious  knowledge. 

2.  One  of  the  primary  conditions  of  mental  culture  is  a  well- 
organized  and  healthy  brain.     The  mind  acts  largely,  if  not  en- 
tirely, through  or  by  means  of  the  brain.     In  its  first  activities  of 
sensation,  the  brain  and  nervous  system  are  an  essential  condition 
and   medium  of  mental  activity.     Impressions   made  upon   the 
nerves  are  transmitted  to  the  brain,  and  there  emerge  in  conscious 
knowledge.     Subsequently  thought  becomes  abstract  and  seems 
to  be  independent  of  the  brain;  yet  experience  proves  that  the 
power  of  abstract  thought  depends  for  clearness  and  vigor  upon 
the  condition  of  the  physical  system.     Indeed,  it  is  not  certain 
that  genius  and  hereditary  mental  traits  may  not  depend  on  some 
subtle  organic  peculiarity  of  tke  brain.     It  is,  therefore,  an  estab- 
lished fact,  that  for  the  best  results  in  mental  culture  we  must 
endeavor  to  secure  the  best  condition  of  the  brain  and  nervous 
system.     "  A  sound  mind  in  a  sound  body "  is  a  maxim  not  to 
be  forgotten  in  mental  culture. 

3.  The  mind  is  cultivated  by  the  activity  of  its  faculties.     The 
mind   is   a  spiritual   activity   and   grows   by  its   own   inherent 
energies.     Mental   exercise  is  thus  the  law  of  mental   develop- 
ment.    As  a  muscle  grows  strong  by  use,  so  any  faculty  of  the 
mind  is  developed  by  its  proper  use  and  exercise.     An  inactive 
mind,  like  an  unused  muscle,   becomes  weak  and  unskillful. 
Hang  the  arm  in  a  sling  and  the  muscle  becomes  flabby  and 
loses  its  vigor  and  skill;  let  the  mind  remain   inactive,  and  it 
acquires  a  mental  flabbiness,  that  unfits  it  for  any  severe  or  pro- 
longed activity.     An  idle  mind  loses  its  tone  and  strength,  like 
an  unused  muscle ;  the  mental  powers  go  to  rust  through  idleness 
and  inaction.    To  develop  the  faculties  of  the  mind  and  secure 
their  highest  activity  and  efficiency  there  must  be  a  constant  and 


38  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

judicious  exercise  of  these  faculties.     The  object  of  culture  is  to 
stimulate  and  direct  the  activity  of  the  mind. 

4.  The  activity  of  the  mind  requires  objective  realities  for  it  to  act 
upon.    The  mind  cannot  act  upon  itself;  there  must  be  material 
for  it  to  act  upon.     As  a  power  to  know,  it  demands  an  external 
world  of  knowledge  to  meet  the  wants  of  the  internal  knowing 
subject.     There  is  such  a  world  of  knowledge  suited  to  and  cor- 
relating with  every  mental  activity.     The  material  world  is  seen 
to  be  an  embodiment  of  thought,  and  the  mind  begins  its  activities 
with  the  objects  of  the  material  world.     The  mind  itself  has  de- 
veloped knowledge  by  its  powers  of  thought,  which  is  also  adapted 
to  give  culture  to  each  faculty  and  capacity.     This  adaptation  is 
manifest,  since  knowledge,  as  the  product  of  one  mind,  must  be 
suited  to  the  different  capacities  of  all  minds.     The  mind  begins 
its  activity  with  the  knowledge  thus  furnished ;  it  then  passes  to 
the  creation  of  knowledge  for  itself,  which  affords  it  its  highest 
and  best  activity.     It  is  thus  apparent  that  the  culture  of  the 
mind  requires   objective   realities?  and  that  these  realities   are 
abundantly  furnished. 

5.  Each  faculty  of  the  mind  requires  a  culture  adapted  to  itself. 
The  mind  possesses  a  variety  of  powers,  and  each  one  of  these 
powers  operates  with   different   material,  and   has   an   activity 
peculiar  to  itself.     Each  power  needs  different  materials  for  its 
activity ;  what  would  be  best  for  one  faculty  would  not  be  the 
appropriate  material  for  some  other  faculty.     We  need  concrete 
objects  for  perception,  facts  for  the  memory,  abstract  truth  for  the 
judgment  and  the  power  of  reasoning,  beauty  for  the  imagination, 
moral  truth  for  the  conscience,  etc.     Besides  this  difference  of 
material,  there  is  also  a  difference  in  the  activity  of  the  different 
faculties ;  the  memory  operates  in  one  way,  the  understanding  in 
another,  etc.     Both  of  these  things,  the  material  and  the  methods 
of  activity,  are  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  culture  of 
the  mind.     Each  faculty,  therefore,  requires,  for  its  training  and 
development,  a  culture  peculiar  to  itself. 

6.  TJie  culture  of  the  mind  should  be  adapted  to  the  order  of  the 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  MIND.  39 

development  of  its  faculties.  The  different  faculties  do  not  develop 
simultaneously.  Though  all  are  active  from  the  earliest  dawn  of 
intelligence,  yet  they  are  active  in  different  degrees  at  different 
periods.  Some  faculties  are  much  more  active  in  childhood,  and 
others  need  the  maturity  of  years  for  their  mature  and  full  de- 
velopment. The  natural  order  of  their  development  should  be 
understood  and  followed  in  culture.  To  endeavor  to  force  all  the 
faculties  to  equal  activity  in  childhood  would  be  a  mistake 
injurious  to  the  mind  and  subversive  of  the  best  results  of  culture. 
The  true  order  of  development  should  be  carefully  studied  and 
distinctly  understood,  and  the  work  of  culture  adapted  thereto. 

7.  The  culture  of  the  mind  should  aim  at  a  harmonious  develop- 
ment of  all  the  faculties.    Man  possesses  a  multiplicity  of  capacities 
and  powers,  all  of  which  contribute  to  his  well-being  and  his 
dignity.     These  powers  are  so  related  that  they  may  be  unfolded 
in  very  nearly  equal  proportions,  and  harmoniously  blend  in  the 
final  results  of  culture.     For  the  attainment  of  a  true  ideal  of 
education  such  a  development  is  required.    A  perfectly  developed 
manhood  or  womanhood  implies  the  complete  development  of 
every  capacity  and  every  gift.     The  training  of  the  mind,  there- 
fore, should  reach  every  power  and  unfold  every  capacity.     The 
high  aim  of  culture  should  be  the  full  and  harmonious  develop- 
ment of  all  the  faculties. 

8.  The  culture  of  the  mind  should  be  modified  by  the  different 
tastes  and  talents  of  a  pupil.     While  all  minds  possess  the  same 
general  powers,  these  powers  are  often  possessed  in  different  de- 
grees.    There  is  often  an  unusual  gift  of  some  one  power  or 
combination  of  powers   which   gives   us   what   we  call   genius. 
Tastes  or  dispositions  for  different  activities  or  pursuits  also  vary. 
Such  differences  are  not  to  be  overlooked   in   mental   culture. 
While  we  should  aim  to  give  a  general  development  to  all  the 
faculties,  we  should  not  forget  these  special  gifts.     Genius  should 
be  recognized,  and  an  opportunity  given  for  its  highest  develop- 
ment and  achievements.     An  unusual  gift  for  poetry,  or  music, 
or  mathematics,  or  natural  science,  should  be  carefully  noticed, 


40  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

and  efforts  made  for  its  highest  culture.  It  is  these  gifts  which 
enrich  science  and  art,  and  add  to  the  sum  of  human  knowledge ; 
'and  the  progress  of  science  and  art  demands  that  genius  shall  have 
the  most  abundant  opportunities  for  its  full  and  complete  de- 
velopment. 

9.  The  culture  of  the  mind  is  not  creative  in  its  character;  its 
object  is  to  develop  existing  possibilities  into  realities.     The  mind 
possesses  innate  powers,  which  may  be  awakened  into  a  natural 
activity.     The  design  of  culture  is  to  aid  nature  in  improving 
the  powers  she  has  given.     No  new  power  can  be  created  by 
culture ;  we  can  increase  the  activity  of  these  powers,  but  cannot 
develop  any  new  activities.     Through  these  activities  new  ideas 
and  thoughts  may  be  developed,  and  the  sum  of  human  know- 
ledge increased ;  but  this  is  accomplished  by  a  high  activity  of 
the  natural  powers  with  which  the  mind  is  endowed,  and  not  by 
the  culture  of  new  powers.     The  profound  philosopher  uses  the 
same  faculties  that  the  little  child  is  developing  in  the  games  of 
the  nursery.     The  object  of  culture  is  to  arouse  the  powers  which 
nature  has  given  us  into  a  normal  activity,  and  to  stimulate  and 
guide  them  in  their  unfolding. 

10.  The  ultimate  end  of  culture  is  the  attainment  of  the  triune  re- 
sults— development,  learning,  and  efficiency.     The  primary  object 
of  culture  is  the  growth  and  development  of  the  faculties.     A 
correct  culture,  however,  naturally  leads  to  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge ;  the  man  of  cultured  mind  endeavors  to  enrich  his 
memory  with  the  truths  of  science  and  to  become  a  learned  man 
as  well  as  a  thinker.     A  second  result  of  culture  is  thus  seen  to 
be  the  furnishing  of  the  mind  with  knowledge.    It  is  not  enough, 
however,  that  the  mind  has  well-developed  powers  and  is  richly 
furnished  with  knowledge.     There  should  be  the  power  to  make 
use  of  this  culture  and  knowledge.     The  educated  man  should  be 
able  to  do  as  well  as  to  think  and  know.    A  third  result  of  culture 
is,  therefore,  the  acquisition  of  skill  in  the  use  of  the  mind  and  of 
knowledge.    In  cultivating  the  mind,  therefore,  the  aim  should  be 
to  attain  the  three  ends — culture,  knowledge,  and  efficiency. 


MEBTTAX,  ATTEIBTJTES. 

QSTOT 


I.  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

I.  NATURE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 
II.  CULTURE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

II.  ATTENTION. 

I.  NATURE  OF  ATTENTION. 
II.  CULTURE  OF  ATTENTION. 


CHAPTER  1. 

THE  NATURE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

/CONSCIOUSNESS  is  the  power  by  which  the  mind  kno^s  its 
v>^  own  states  and  actions.  It  is  that  attribute  of  the  mind  by 
which  it  is  aware  of  whatever  it  feels  or  does.  It  is  the  self- 
knowing  attribute  of  the  soul ;  the  attribute  by  which  it  knows 
itself,  its  states,  actions,  and  products. 

The  mind  has  not  only  the  power  of  knowing,  but  it  has  also 
the  power  of  self-knowing,  of  knowing  its  own  acts  and  states. 
Thus,  when  we  perceive,  or  judge,  or  reason,  we  are  aware  of 
these  mental  actions.  Not  to  be -aware  of  these  actions  would  be 
not  to  perform  them.  So,  also,  the  mind  knows  its  own  mental 
states  or  conditions.  When  it  is  joyous  or  sad,  loving  or-  hating, 
sympathizing  or  repining,  it  is  aware  of  these  feelings,  and  could 
not  have  them  unless  it  was  conscious  of  them.  This  attribute  of 
the  mind  by  which  it  is  aware  of  what  takes  place  within  itself,  is 
now  by  all  philosophers  called  consciousness. 

The  Term  Consciousness. — The  term  consciousness  is  derived 
from  con,  with,  and  scio,  I  know,  and  means  a  knowing  with. 
Consciousness  is  thus  the  power  of  knowing  with  the  other 
cognitive  acts  of  the  mind.  The  term  is  related  to  conscience, 
and  was  formerly  used  almost  exclusively  to  designate  the  moral 
sense.  The  first  to  employ  this  term  in  its  present  signification, 
in  distinction  from  its  ethical  meaning,  was  Descartes.  The  early 
Greek  writers,  Plato  and  Aristotle,  had  no  special  term  to  express 
that  attribute  of  the  soul  by  which  it  knows  its  own  states  and 
operations.  Locke  discusses  it  under  the  head  of  Reflection. 

Various  Definitions. — The  power  of  Consciousness  has  been 
variously  defined  by  writers  on  Mental  Philosophy.  Wayland 

(43) 


44  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

defines  it  as  that  condition  of  the  mind  in  which  it  is  cognizant 
of  its  own  operations.  Cousin  says  it  is  that  function  of  the 
intelligence  which  gives  us  information  of  everything  that  takes 
place  in  the  interior  of  our  minds.  Prof.  Tappan  makes  it  the 
necessary  knowledge  which  the  mind  has  of  its  own  operations. 
Dr.  Porter  says  it  is  the  power  by  which  the  soul  knows  its  own 
acts  and  states. 

.Difficulty  of  Defining. — The  difficulty  of  defining  conscious- 
ness arises  from  the  notion  being  so  elementary  that  it  cannot  be 
resolved  into  any  others  more  simple.  It  does  not  thus  admit  of 
a  logical  definition,  although  it  may  be  illustrated  and  philosophi- 
cally analyzed.  It  is  frequently  described  by  analogies,  some  of 
which  illustrate  and  others  perhaps  obscure  the  subject.  It  has 
been  called  "  an  inner  light/'  by  means  of  which  what  passes  in 
the  mind  is  rendered  visible.  It  has  been  called  an  "inner 
illumination,"  a  "revealer  of  mental  phenomena,"  and  "the  light 
of  all  our  seeing."  Dr.  Hickok  says :  "  The  conception  is  not  of 
a  faculty,  but  of  a  light ;  not  of  an  action,  but  of  an  illumination ; 
not  of  a  maker  of  phenomena,  but  of  a  revealer  of  them  as  already 
made."  It  has  also  been  called  the  "  inner  sense "  in  distinction 
from  the  sense  which  perceives  external  objects. 

Consciousness  not  a  Faculty.  —  Consciousness  is  not  re- 
garded as  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  but  rather  as  an  attribute 
necessary  to  its  existence.  It  is  not  a  distinct  form  of  mental 
activity,  but  rather  a  characteristic  of  mind  by  which  it  is  aware 
of  these  activities.  It  is  a  necessary  attribute  of  the  mind  that  it 
not  only  acts  but  knows  that  it  acts.  A  machine  works,  but  does 
not  know  that  it  works ;  the  mind  not  only  works,  but  knows  its 
•wn  workings.  Such  an  attribute  is  implied  in  the  very  idea  of 
mind.  We  cannot  conceive  of  a  being  with  powers  to  know  and 
feel  without  the  power  of  being  conscious  of  such  activities. 

Involved  in  Mental  Activity. — Consciousness  is  involved  in 
and  is  essential  to  all  mental  activity.  An  act  or  state  of  my 
mind  exists  only  as  I  am  conscious  of  its  existence.  Thus  to 
know  is  to  know  that  I  know ;  to  feel  is  to  know  that  I  feel ;  to 


THE   NATURE   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  45 

mil  is  to  know  that  I  will.  The  knowing,  the  feeling,  the  willing, 
are  possible  only  under  the  condition  of  their  being  known  to 
me.  If  I  did  not  know  that  I  know,  I  would  not  know.  If  I 
did  not  know  that  I  feel,  I  would  not  feel ;  if  I  did  not  know 
that  I  will,  I  would  not  will.  It  is  this  power  of  knowing  these 
acts  and  states  that  we  mean  by  consciousness.  The  expressions, 
I  know  that  I  know,  I  know  that  I  feel,  I  know  that  I  will,  may 
be  translated  into  I  am  conscious  that*  I  know,  I  am  conscious 
that  I  feel,  I  am  conscious  that  I  will. 

Basis  of  Mental  Activity. — Consciousness  lies  at  the  basis  of 
all  mental  activity.  All  the  faculties  rest  hi  it,  and  are  of  use  to 
us  only  as  their  acts  and  products  are  revealed  by  it.  It  is, 
therefore,  the  source  and  root  of  all  knowledge.  It  is  an  ultimate 
attribute  of  the  soul:  there  is  nothing  below  the  consciousness 
upon  which  it  rests.  There  is  no  sub-consciousness  to  reveal  the 
revelations  of  consciousness.  It  is  not  necessary  that  we  have 
some  power  by  which  we  may  know  that  we  are  conscious  of  a 
certain  act,  by  which  we  may  know  that  we  "know  we  know," 
for  that  would  involve  us  in  the  absurdity  of  a  mental  series  ad 
infinitum.  The  revelations  of  consciousness  must  therefore  be  re- 
garded as  final  and  ultimate. 

Kinds  of  Consciousness. — Writers  speak  of  two  kinds  of 
consciousness;  the  natural,  or  spontaneous,  and  the  artificial,  or 
reflective  consciousness.  They  are  also  distinguished  as  the 
primary  and  secondary  consciousness.  Natural  consciousness  is 
the  power  which  the  mind  naturally  and  necessarily  possesses  of 
knowing  its  own  states  and  actions.  Reflective  consciousness  is 
the  natural  consciousness  exercised  with  intentional  and  persistent 
effort.  It  is  consciousness  applied  to  mental  phenomena  for  the 
purpose  of  scientific  investigation.  It  is  what  is  called  reflection, 
or  an  intentional  bending  of  the  mind  inward  to  observe  its 
mental  operations.  It  is  the  result  of  a  philosophical  habit  of 
mind,  and  may  be  called  philosophical  consciousness. 

This  distinction  is  one  of  degree  rather  than  of  kind.  The  first 
form  of  consciousness  is  a  gift  of  nature  and  the  result  of  sponta- 


4:6  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

neous  development;  the  second  form  is  an  acquirement  of  art 
and  the  result  of  special  effort.  The  former  is  employed  by  all 
men ;  the  latter  is  acquired  by  only  a  few.  The  natural  precedes 
the  reflective  in  order  of  time ;  the  reflective  is  a  development  of 
the  natural  consciousness.  The  reflective  consciousness  is  closely 
related  to  the  subjective  phase  of  attention  described  in  the  next 
chapter. 

I.  THE  OBJECTS  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. — As  consciousness  lies  at 
the  basis  of  all  knowledge  and  reveals  every  mental  act  and  state, 
it  is  evidently  important  to  know  precisely  what  is  given  by  it. 
Any  mistake  here  is  fundamental,  affecting  all  that  follows  and 
vitiating  the  entire  system  of  psychology.  The  authority  of  con- 
sciousness is  ultimate  and  its  testimony  final ;  hence  nothing  must 
be  rejected  or  omitted,  which  is  found  in  consciousness.  It  is 
only  necessary  to  establish  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  any 
element  in  consciousness,  not  to  show  its  possibility,  in  order  to 
determine  the  facts  of  mental  philosophy. 

Affords  Actual  Knowledge. — Consciousness  affords  actual 
and  not  potential  knowledge%  Not  what  we  may  know  or  have 
known,  but  what  we  do  at  the  present  time  know,  is  a  fact  of  con- 
sciousness. Thus,  a  person  is  said  to  know  that  2x4  are  8,  though 
this  proposition  be  not  at  the  moment  the  object  of  his  thought; 
but  we  cannot  say  that  he  is  conscious  of  this  truth  unless  it  is 
actually  present  to  his  mind.  We  are  conscious  only  of  actual 
states,  not  possible  ones ;  we  are  conscious  of  what  is  now  in  the 
mind,  and  not  of  what  may  be  or  may  have  been  there. 

Immediate  Knotvledye. — Consciousness  affords  immediate 
and  not  mediate  kno  ivledge.  In  an  act  of  memory  we  are  said  to 
know  a  past  occurrence.  What  we  know,  immediately,  however, 
is  the  mental  representation  or  idea  of  the  past ;  and  we  know 
the  past  occurrence  itself,  not  immediately  but  mediately,  through 
the  mental  modification  which  represents  it.  We  are  conscious 
of  the  representation  as  immediately  known ;  but  we  cannot  be 
said  to  be  conscious  of  the  thing  represented,  which,  if  known  at 
all,  is  known  only  through  ite  representation. 


THE   NATURE   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  47 

Conscious  of  Mental  States. — Primarily,  we  are  conscious  of 
our  own  mental  states  and  operations.  When  we  perceive,  we  are 
conscious  of  perceiving;  when  we  think,  we  are  conscious  of 
thinking;  when  we  remember,  will,  love,  hate,  etc.,  we  are  con- 
scious of  these  mental  acts  and  states.  Not  to  be  conscious  of 
them  would  be  to  be  conscious  of  nothing.  Whether  the  mind 
knows  itself  or  not,  it  must  know  its  own  acts  and  states.  They 
come  and  go,  they  rise  and  fall  like  the  waves  of  the  ocean,  each 
pressing  forward  and  taking  the  place  of  the  one  that  went  before. 
Consciousness  catches  them  as  they  rise,  and  knows  them,  at  least 
for  the  passing  moment. 

Conscious  of  Self. — Secondly,  I  am  conscious  also  of  myself 
as  the  basis  of  these  acts  and  states.  I  know  these  states  and 
actions  to  be  my  own  states  and  actions.  This  is  the  cognition  of 
the  self  or  ego,  as  the  subject  or  background  of  these  acts  and 
states.  The  states  and  actions  come  and  go;  the  self  remains 
permanent  and  unchanged. 

Self-consciousness  a  Necessity.-^Such  a  conception  of  self  is  a 
necessary  element  of  an  act  of  consciousness.  Without  the  ego 
or  self,  the  states  and  actions  could  not  exist;  and  we  cannot 
be  conscious  of  the  latter  without  a  consciousness  also  of  the 
former.)  A  mental  state  which  is  not  experienced  in  connection 
with  the  idea  of  an  individual  self,  is  as  impossible  as  a  triangle 
without  three  angles,  or  a  square  without  four  sides.  This  con- 
sciousness of  the  ego  is,  however,  denied  by  some  philosophers,  as 
Hume  and  Brown.  Qthers  again,  as  Stewart  and  Hamilton,  who 
admit  it,  claim  that  it  is  not  immediate  and  intuitive,  but  a  de- 
rived and  secondary  knowledge. 

Consciousness  of  Self  Immediate. — This  consciousness  of  the 
ego,  we  hold,  is  not  the  result  of  reflection,  but  is  direct  and 
immediate.  We  are  not  first  conscious  of  the  mental  state  and 
then  forced  to  look  around  for  something  to  which  it  may  be  re- 
ferred ;  but  what  we  know,  we  know  belongs  to  the  ego,  to  ourself. 
The  experience  of  a  mental  state  without  the  cognition  of  it  as  my 
own  mental  state  is  as  inconceivable  as  a  mind  without  faculties 


48  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

or  the  memory  without  the  power  of  remembering.  The  con- 
sciousness of  the  mental  state  is  necessarily  and  inseparably  asso- 
ciated with  the  consciousness  of  the  self  as  experiencing  it. 

Conscious  of  Products. — Thirdly,  we  are  also  conscious  of 
the  result  or  product  of  these  states  and  activities.  I  am  conscious 
not  only  of  the  process  of  forming  an  idea,  but  also  of  the  idea 
formed.  I  am  aware  not  only  of  the  act  of  judging,  but  of  the 
thought  obtained  by  the  act  of  judgment.  In  an  act  of  reasoning, 
I  am  conscious  not  only  of  the  process  of  reasoning,  but  of  the 
truth  attained  by  the  reasoning  process.  So  in -an  act  of  imagi- 
nation, I  am  conscious  of  the  mental  image  formed  as  well  as  of 
the  act  of  forming  it.  It  is  thus  apparent  that  consciousness  re- 
veals both  the  mental  act  and  the  mental  product  resulting  from 
the  act. 

Conscious  of  the  Object. — Sir  William  Hamilton  goes  a  step 
further,  and  says  that  we  are  conscious  of  the  object  of  a  mental 
act  as  .well  as  the  act  and  its  product.  Thus  in  perception  we  are 
conscious  of  the  object  which  we  perceive ;  for,  he  asks,  how  can 
we  know  that  a  perception  exists  if  we  do  not  know  what  we  per- 
ceive? How  would  I  know  I  perceived  a  rose,  if  I  was  not  con- 
scious of  the  rose  ?  "  Annihilate  the  object,  and  you  annihilate 
the  operation;  annihilate  the  consciousness  of  the  object,  you 
annihilate  the  consciousness  of  the  operation." 

II.  PRODUCTS  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. — Having  seen  the  general 
character  of  the  products  of  consciousness,  let  us  see  what  are  its 
revelations  in  connection  with  each  one  of  the  various  faculties. 

In  Perception. — In  an  act  of  perception  we  are  conscious  of 
two  distinct  elements,  the  subject  perceiving  and  the  object  per- 
ceived. In  every  case  of  perception  there  is  a  clear  apprehension 
of  these  two  elements — the  self  and  the  not-self,  the  ego  and  the 
non-ego.  'xThus  in  the  perception  of  a  tree,  I  am  distinctly  con- 
scious of  the  tree  as  seen  and  of  myself  as  seeing  it.  Whether 
this  was  an  original  distinction  or  is  one  derived  from  experience, 
has  been  questioned.  That  we  have  made  this  distinction  from 
our  earliest  recollections,  we  know;  and  it  would  thus  seem  to  be 


THE   NATURE   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  49 

a  primitive  fact  of  our  nature./'  At  any  rate,  it  is  a  present  fact 
of  consciousness,  and  must  be  accepted  as  such.  We  never  for  a 
moment  do  imagine,  nor  can  we  imagine,  ourselves  and  the  object 
perceived  to  be  one  and  the  same.  If  the  object  of  perception  is 
merely  an  affection  of  the  organism,  as  in  smell  and  hearing,  the 
affection  perceived  is  cognized  as  distinct  from  the  mind  perceiv- 
ing it.  In  every  act  of  perception,  a  self  and  a  not-self  are  brought 
face  to  face,  and  are  known  as  distinct  from  each  other. 

In  Memory. — In  memory  we  recall  the  object  of  thought  and 
represent  it  by  an  image  or  a  word,  and  recognize  it  as  a  fact  of 
our  previous  experience.  We  are  conscious  of  the  act  of  recall- 
ing (when  the  recollection  is  not  spontaneous),  of  the  representa- 
tive object  before  the  mind,  and  of  its  relation  to  our  past  exper- 
ience. This,  however,  is  all  that  is  revealed.  There  is  no  con- 
sciousness of  anything  outside  of  the  mind  itself.  We  may  be 
conscious  that  the  image  before  the  mind  bears  some  relation  to 
an  object  without  the  mind;  but  the  external  object  is  not  con- 
templated as  present,  and  is  itself  not  an  object  of  consciousness. 
In  memory,  therefore,  there  is  a  consciousness  of  an  image  or 
some  general  product  in  the  mind,  of  the  fact  of  this  having  been 
retained,  of  the  act  by  which  it  was  restored,  and  of  the  recog- 
nition of  it  as  a  thing  of  our  former  experience. 

In  Imagination. — In  an  act  of  imagination  we  are  conscious 
of  the  act  of  representation  and  of  the  product  thus  formed.  We 
are  conscious  of  the  materials  used  in  the  formation  or  creation 
of  this  product,  whether  of  sight  or  sound.  We  are  also  con- 
scious that  the  image  produced  is  not  a  representation  of  any- 
thing real  which  we  have  before  seen  or  heard,  but  that  it  is  a 
mere  creation  of  the  mind.  In  memory  we  know  that  the  mental 
product  is  a  representative  of  something  real ;  in  imagination  we 
know  that  it  is  an  ideal  of  the  mind's  own  creation. 

In  the  Understanding. — The  same  thing  holds  true  in  re- 
spect to  the  operations  of  the  understanding.  In  this  faculty  we 
are  conscious  of  the  ideas  and  truths, — the  materials  with  which 
we  work, — of  the  acts  by  which  we  elaborate  them  into  new  pro- 


50  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ducts,  and  of  the  products  which  result  from  these  operations. 
In  judgment  we  are  conscious  of  the  act  of  comparing,  of  the 
objects  of  thought  compared,  and  of  the  thought  which  results 
from  the  comparison.  So  in  reasoning  we  are  conscious  of  our 
premises,  of  the  relation  between  them,  and  of  the  inference  or 
truth  derived  from  these  relations. 

In  Intuition. — In  an  act  of  the  intuitive  power,  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  ideas  and  thoughts  to  which  it  gives  rise.  We  are 
conscious  of  the  ideas  of  Space,  Time,  Cause,  the  True,  the  Beau- 
tiful, the  Good,  etc.,  and  also  of  the  belief  that  these  have  an 
existence  outside  and  independent  of  our  minds.  We  are  also 
conscious  of  the  infinitude  of  Time  and  Space,  of  the  infinite  chain 
of  causation,  of  the  logical  necessity  of  a  First  Cause,  etc.  We 
are  also  conscious  of  the  truths  of  intuition,  as  the  axioms  of 
geometry  and  logic,  of  the  necessity  and  incontradictability  of 
these  truths,  etc. 

In  Sensibility  and  Will. — So  also  in  the  domain  of  Sensibility 
and  Will ;  consciousness  reveals  all  that  pertains  to  the  activity 
and  results  of  these  powers,  to  their  processes  and  their  products. 
We  are  conscious  of  each  individual  feeling,  and  when  attention 
is  directed  to  them,  of  the  relations  of  these  feelings,  of  their 
similarities  and  differences.  In  an  effort  of  the  will  we  are  con- 
scious of  a  choice  when  one  is  made,  and  of  the  executive  volition 
to  carry  out  this  choice  into  action. 

The  Basis  of  Mental  Science. — It  is  thus  seen  that  conscious- 
ness lies  at  the  basis  of  all  mental  activities.  It  is  also  the  found- 
ation of  the  study  of  mental  philosophy.  We  know  only  what 
consciousness  reveals,  or  what  is  properly  to  be  inferred  from 
these  revelations.  The  test  of  a  fact  or  phenomenon,  in  the  study 
of  mental  science,  is  its  revelation  by  consciousness.  In  other 
words,  the  mind  must  be  studied  in  the  light  of  consciousness. 
The  student  of  mental  philosophy  must  learn  to  bend  the  mind 
in  upon  itself  to  observe  its  own  actions  and  products.  He  must 
test  each  fact  and  theory  by  his  own  experience. 

III.  UNCONSCIOUS  MENTAL  MODIFICATIONS. — The  doctrine  of 


THE    NATURE    OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  51 

latent  modification  of  consciousness  has  been  held  by  several  phil- 
osophers of  eminence,  among  whom  we  may  name  Leibnitz  and 
Hamilton.  Some  writers  object  to  the  expression  "latent  modifi- 
cations" as  being  infelicitous;  but  it  means  to  express  that  there 
are  some  affections  of  the  mind  of  which  we  are  unconscious. 
This  doctrine  may  be  shown  to  be  true  in  respect  to  the  activities 
of  several  of  the  faculties. 

In  Perception. — The  senses  are  often  affected  by  objects 
which  do  not  rise  into  consciousness.  Thus  the  greenness  of  the 
forest  which  we  see  is  made  up  of  parts  of  green  of  which  we  are 
not  conscious.  No  single  leaf  perhaps  is  visible  ;  but  the  green- 
ness of  the  forest  is  made  up  of  the  greenness  of  these  leaves. 
That  is,  the  total  impression  of  which  we  are  conscious  is  made 
up  of  an  infinitude  of  small  impressions  of  which  we  are  not  con- 
scious. The  same  is  true  of  the  sound  of  the  sea ;  a  single  wave 
does  not  seem  to  affect  the  ear,  while  the  combined  sound  of  many 
waves  is  distinctly  heard.  Now,  each  wave  must  contribute  its 
share  in  affecting  the  mind,  or  the  whole  could  not  be  heard. 

In  Memory. — The  same  seems  to  be  true  in  respect  to  the 
memory.  We  find  one  thought  rising  in  consciousness  imme- 
diately after  another,  but  without  any  perceptible  relation  between 
them.  In  such  cases  Hamilton  holds  that  the  links  which  united 
them  did  not  rise  into  consciousness :  just  as  in  a  row  of  billiard 
balls  touching  one  another,  if  the  first  ball  is  struck,  the  force  is 
transmitted  to  the  last  ball,  which  flies  off,  while  the  other  balls 
remain  stationary.  The  intermediate  balls  represent  the  inter- 
mediate ideas  in  the  chain  of  association  which  do  not  rise  into 
consciousness  in  the  case  supposed. 

In  Other  Faculties. — The  mind  may  probably  be  affected  in 
every  faculty  by  modifications  which  do  not  rise  into  conscious- 
ness. These  unconscious  affections  give  a  bias  to  the  mind,  and 
affect  those  acts  and  states  of  which  it  is  conscious.  There  are, 
no  doubt,  thousands  of  unconscious  influences  operating  upon 
the  soul,  that  give  a  tinge  of  coloring  to  our  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings, and  help  to  shape  our  opinions  and  characters. 


52  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Slight  Attention. — Many  instances  cited  of  unconscious  mod- 
ifications are,  however,  probably  examples  of  slight  attention. 
An  object  may  make  so  slight  an  impression  on  the  mind  as  not 
to  be  noticed  at  the  time,  and  yet  may  be  revived  with  great  dis- 
tinctness. I  write  a  letter  to-day,  and  notice  no  error  in  my 
writing;  to-morrow,  after  I  have  mailed  it,  I  recall  a  misspelled 
word  or  a  mistake  in  grammar.  So  some  part  of  an  object  ob- 
served may  escape  my  attention  at  the  time,  but  afterward  it 
occurs  to  the  memory  with  great  distinctness.  These  are  not 
examples  of  latent  modification  of  consciousness,  but  of  slight 
attention. 

IV.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CONSCIOUS  KNOWLEDGE. — The  revela- 
tions of  consciousness  are  not  fixed  and  unchangeable  in  their 
character.  They  differ  at  the  different  ages  of  each  individual 
and  at  different  ages  of  the  world.  New  ideas  and  thoughts  arise 
in  the  human  mind,  and  the  revelations  of  to-day  are  not  identi- 
cal with  the  revelations  of  yesterday  or  to-morrow.  There  is  a  sig- 
nificance in  this  fact  that  leads  us  to  give  it  a  brief  consideration. 

In  ttie  Individual  Mind. — The  growth  of  conscious  knowl- 
edge is  attested  by  the  experience  of  each  individual  mind.  New 
ideas  and  truths  rise  gradually  into  consciousness.  The  influences 
of  our  surroundings  make  impressions  on  the  mind  or  the  nervous 
system  of  which  at  the  time  we  are  unconscious.  These  impress- 
ions are  repeated  and  react  upon  one  another ;  and  at  last  they 
emerge  in  consciousness  in  the  form  of  an  idea.  A  book  read  but 
once  leaves  only  a  vague  impression  of  its  thought  and  sentiment ; 
the  book  re-read,  or  other  books  read  treating  of  the  same  sub- 
ject, may  be  the  occasion  of  these  vague  impressions  appearing  in 
the  form  of  definite  ideas  in  consciousness. 

Many  ideas  or  impressions  seem  to  stop  in  the  outer  court  of 
unconsciousness,  accumulating  there  and  acting  upon  each  other 
and  upon  the  soul ;  they  are  at  last  lifted  up  into  conscious  cogni- 
tion as  definite  intellectual  products.  The  mind,  as  it  were,  trans- 
mutes the  impression  on  the  nervous  system  into  spiritual  entities ; 
in  other  words,  the  living  soul  has  a  potency  by  which  it  can 


THE   NATUKE   OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  53 

transform  its  unconscious  impressions  into  knowledge,  and  lift 
them  up  out  of  unconsciousness  into  the  light  of  consciousness. 
The  poet  had  a  faint  glimpse  of  this  when  he  wrote : 

"All  thought  begins  in  feeling, — wide 

In  the  great  mass  its  base  is  hid, 
And,  narrowing  up  to  thought,  stands  glorified, 
A  moveless  pyramid." 

In  the  Universal  Mind. — This  is  true  also  of  the  universal 
as  well  as  of  the  individual  mind,  as  is  attested  by  the  experience 
of  the  race.  In  nearly  every  age  some  new  truth  or  some  new 
phase  of  an  old  truth  has  dawned  upon  the  consciousness  of 
humanity.  At  one  time  a  nation  believes  in,  or  is  indifferent  to, 
the  practice  of  human  slavery ;  in  a  few  years  there  grows  up  in 
the  consciousness  of  the  nation  such  an  abhorrence  of  the  insti- 
tution that  dealing  in  human  chattels  would  be  regarded  as  a 
crime  of  deepest  dye.  Governments  are  revolutionized  and 
thrones  drenched  in  blood  through  the  development  of  a  new  idea 
of  freedom  or  a  clearer  recognition  of  some  old  one.  Even  reli- 
gion has  gradually  developed  new  ideas  in  the  consciousness  of 
the  world.  A  few  centuries  ago  it  was  not  thought  to  be  wrong 
to  persecute  and  punish  for  a  difference  of  religious  belief;  but 
gradually  the  great  idea  of  religious  toleration  has  dawned  upon 
the  human  soul,  and  the  broad  spirit  of  Christian  fellowship  en- 
folds in  its  embrace  all  who  follow  the  teachings  of  the  Master. 

Ideas  Indicate  an  Objective  Reality. — The  gradual  devel- 
opment of  ideas  and  opinions  in  the  human  mind  indicates  some 
corresponding  objective  reality.  The  cognitions  of  the  qual- 
ities of  color  and  sound  have  their  counterparts  in  the  objects  of 
the  natural  world.  The  ideas  and  truths  of  mathematics  are  but 
conceptions  of  real  relations  of  form  and  number.  The  great 
conceptions  of  Space,  Time,  Cause,  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the 
Good,  have  their  objective  realities  in  the  universe  around  us.  So 
the  recognition  of  the  rights  of  man,  of  the  inalienable  right  of  free- 
dom, of  liberty  of  conscience,  etc.,  are  all  the  cognition  of  great 


54  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ideas  or  truths  that  no  enlightened  thought  would  now  attempt 
to  question  or  deny.  The  law  is,  that  the  gradual  and  universal 
development  of  some  definite  and  intelligent  belief  indicates  the 
actual  existence  of  that  which  is  believed. 

Our  Religioiis  Beliefs. — This  gradual  development  of  ideas 
and  thoughts  in  the  human  consciousness  has  a  deep  significance 
in  respect  to  religious  faith.  The  universal  belief  in  Immortality 
and  God,  it  would  seem,  must  be  accompanied  by  the  correlative 
fact  of  their  actual  existence.  The  idea  of  God  in  the  soul  attests 
the  idea  of  God  in  the  universe.  Influences  have  been  at  work 
through  the  ages  to  develop  more  and  more  clearly  the  grand 
ideas  of  God  and  Immortality ;  and  these  influences  must  have 
come  from  and  are  a  proof  of  an  actuality  of  existence. 
Whether  the  idea  of  God  was  put  into  the  mind  by  the  Creator 
at  the  beginning,  or  has  dawned  slowly  in  the  consciousness  by 
the  process  of  evolution,  its  present  appearance  there  indicates 
an  actual  correlative  existence  apart  from  the  mind  conceiving  it. 
As  ideas  of  material  things  in  the  soul  attest  the  existence  of 
material  things  without  the  soul,  so  must  ideas  of  spiritual  things 
indicate  and  attest  the  existence  of  spiritual  things.  The  spiritual 
can  impress  the  soul  and  leave  its  traces  there  as  well  as  the 
material ;  and  a  recognition  of  this  principle  will  enable  one  to 
meet  modern  skepticism  upon  its  own  ground  and  defeat  it  with  its 
own  weapons. 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE   CULTURE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

intimate  relation  of  consciousness  to  the  different  facul- 
-*-  ties  of  the  mind  renders  it  difficult  to  give  a  discussion  of  its 
culture  without  touching  upon  that  of  the  other  faculties.  Its 
culture  in  its  objective  phase  will  be  discussed  under  Attention; 
its  culture  in  its  subjective  or  reflective  phase  is  appropriately 
considered  here.  The  development  of  the  mind  is  influenced  by 
both  our  conscious  knowledge  and  the  unconscious  modifications 
of  the  mind  ;  and  the  natural  consciousness,  as  we  have  seen,  may 
be  developed  into  the  reflective  consciousness.  We  shall  there- 
fore discuss  the  culture  of  consciousness,  or  of  the  mind  in  rela- 
tion to  consciousness,  under  three  heads:  First,  the  culture 
through  conscious  knowledge ;  second,  the  culture  through  un- 
conscious modifications ;  and  third,  the  culture  of  the  reflective 
consciousness. 

I.  CULTURE  THROUGH  CONSCIOUS  KNOWLEDGE. — The  mind 
grows  by  its  conscious  modifications.  Such  modifications  are  its 
positive  knowledge,  and  knowledge  is  the  food  of  the  mind 
Knowledge  excites  it  to  activity;  it  is  the  stimulus  of  mental 
action;  and  the  mental  powers  are  developed  by  activity.  In 
knowledge  the  mind  finds  its  nutriment,  out  of  which,  by  assimi- 
lation, it  gets  its  growth  and  development. 

Uses  of  Conscious  Knoivledge. — The  first  object  of  the 
teacher  is  to  labor  to  give  the  mind  a  large  share  of  conscious 
knowledge.  The  pupil  should  be  led  to  acquire  clear  and  definite 
ideas  of  things.  Care  is  to  be  taken  that  the  mind  does  not  rest 
in  vague  and  confused  impressions.  Observation  should  be  clear 
and  distinct,  thought  should  be  definite  and  complete,  everything 

(55) 


56  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

that  is  misty  or  nebulous  should  be  removed  from  the  pupil's 
mental  products ;  whatever  he  knows  he  should  know  with  pre- 
cision and  thoroughness.  A  thing  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  known 
until  it  is  fully  and  completely  developed  in  consciousness. 

Knowledge  Conscious  by  Attention. — Knowledge  is  made 
conscious  by  continuance  of  attention.  An  inattentive  view  of 
any  object  gives  one  a  vague  idea  of  it,  but  fails  to  afford  a  dis- 
tinct and  definite  conception  of  the  object.  One  or  two  points 
may  be  noticed,  but  the  most  of  the  parts  of  the  object  remain 
unnoticed,  and  have  not  affected  us  consciously.  If,  however,  we 
look  at  the  object  with  attention,  every  part  of  it  makes  a  distinct 
impression  on  the  mind,  and  a  knowledge  of  the  object  and  its 
parts  becomes  a  matter  of  consciousness.  We  should,  therefore, 
lead  the  pupil  to  attend  closely  to  that  which  is  presented  to  his 
mind,  in  order  that  the  various  impressions  on  the  senses  may 
emerge  in  consciousness  and  become  a  distinct  cognition.  The 
acquisition  of  such  a  habit  of  attention  is  one  of  the  most  import- 
ant elements  of  education. 

Knowledge  Conscious  by  Analysis. — The  analytic  consid- 
eration of  things  aids  in  the  production  of  conscious  knowledge. 
An  object  seen  as  a  whole  leaves  a  certain  impression  on  the 
mind ;  but  though  we  may  be  conscious  of  its  general  appear- 
ance, we  cannot  bring  its  several  parts  distinctly  into  conscious- 
ness. The  impression  made  by  these  parts  has  never  risen  into 
consciousness,  and  thus  cannot  be  called  up  into  consciousness. 
If,  however,  we  analyze  the  object  into  its-  parts,  we  shall  thus 
gain  a  distinct  idea  of  these  parts,  and  they,  as  well  as  the  object 
itself,  will  be  a  possession  of  conscious  knowledge.  We  shall  thus 
avoid  the  vague  and  confused  notions  we  often  have  of  objects, 
and  make  our  ideas  of  them  clear,  definite,  and  precise.  Analysis 
is  thus  one  of  the  conditions  of  making  impressions  appear  in 
consciousness,  and  thus  of  the  production  of  distinct  and  definite 
ideas  of  things. 

Knowledge  Conscious  by  Repetition. — Impressions  upon 
the  mind  may  be  made  to  arise  in  consciousness  by  repetition.  A 


THE   CULTURS   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  57 

slight  impression  may  not  arise  into  consciousness  at  all ;  let  the 
impression  be  repeated  several  times,  and  it  will  make  its  appear- 
ance in  consciousness  in  the  form  of  a  distinct  sensation  or  cog- 
nition. Thus,  a  person  may  speak  to  me  when  I  am  absorbed  in 
some  object  of  thought,  and  I  may  not  hear  him ;  but  if  the  same 
words  are  repeated  several  times,  even  in  the  same  tone,  I  will 
become  conscious  of  them.  Repetition  is  thus  a  condition  for  an 
unconscious  impression  to  rise  into  consciousness.  Repetition  i« 
also  a  condition  for  the  ready  recall  or  reproduction  of  an  idea  in 
consciousness.  Many  ideas  rise  into  consciousness,  and  then  sink 
back  into  unconsciousness,  and  we  are  unable  to  call  them  up 
again.  If  the  impression  is  repeated  several  times,  the  modifica- 
tion of  mind  which  occurs  causes  the  idea  to  rise  spontaneously 
into  consciousness,  or  enables  us  to  recall  it  readily  at  our  will. 
Repetition  is,  therefore,  one  of  the  important  means  of  furnishing 
the  mind  with  conscious  knowledge. 

Knowledge  Conscious  by  Interest. — We  may  bring  the 
unconscious  into  consciousness  by  arousing  the  interest  of  the 
mind.  We  grasp  most  clearly,  and  remember  best,  those  things 
in  which  we  feel  the  deepest  interest,  or  which  excite  the  mind  the 
most.  A  thousand  things  impress  the  senses  daily,  which  we  are 
neither  conscious  of  at  the  time  nor  remember  afterwards.  Many 
things  we  hear  leave  no  impression  on  consciousness,  but  seem  to 
"  go  in  at  one  ear  and  out  at  the  other."  The  things  we  do  re- 
member are  usually  those  in  which  we  felt  the  deepest  interest. 
Thus,  a  man  on  trial  for  his  life  will  remember  with  minuteness 
the  evidence,  appearance  of  the  witnesses,  etc. 

Conscious  by  Subsequent  Intercut. — Even  a  subsequent 
interest  in  unconscious  mental  impressions  will  seem  to  enable  us 
to  revive  them.  Two  men  may  be  talking  in  a  room  in  which  I 
am  engaged,  and  I  hear  and  remember  nothing  that,  was  said. 
Their  conversation  may  have  made  some  impression  on  the  brain, 
but  not  enough  to  occasion  the  formation  of  an  idea  which  appears 
in  consciousness.  Subsequently  there  is  a  lawsuit,  in  which  nty 
evidence  in  the  matter  is  of  value,  and  I  endeavor  to  recall  what 


58  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

was  said,  and  can,  by  effort,  bring  some  things  up  into  conscious- 
ness. My  interest  in  the  subject  of  conversation  has  caused  an 
otherwise  unconscious  idea  to  rise  into  consciousness.  Thus  inter- 
est may  take  the  place  of  repetition,  and  even  do  what  repetition 
could  not  have  done. 

Increase  Conscious  Knowledge. — The  teacher  should  labor 
to  increase  the  conscious  knowledge  of  the  pupil.  By  conscious 
knowledge  is  meant  that  which  we  may  at  jany  time  bring  before 
consciousness.  In  a  certain  sense,  nearly  all  of  our  knowledge  is 
potential  rather  than  actual.  "We  can  be  conscious  of  certain 
ideas  if  we  will  to  be,  but  actually  we  are  conscious  only  of 
the  idea  or  ideas  which  are  at  the  present  moment  before  the 
mind.  Ideas  rise  up  out  of  unconsciousness,  and  sink  back  again 
into  unconsciousness ;  and  in  a  certain  sense  we  know  only  that 
of  which  we  are  at  any  time  conscious.  The  conscious  part  of 
our  mind  may  be  compared  to  that  part  of  a  wheel  which  touches 
a  tangent,  while  the  rest  of  the  wheel  may  represent  the  uncon- 
scious part.  Every  part  of  the  circumference  of  the  wheel  may 
be  made  to  touch  the  tangent,  but  only  one  part  ever  does  touch 
it  at  any  one  time.  Mental  culture  endeavors  to  enlarge  this 
knowledge  that  it  may  beooit-e  conscious ;  and  also  to  facilitate  the 
calling  of  the  unconscious  into  consciousness.  Carrying  out  the 
figure,  we  may  say  it  aims  to  increase  the  size  of  the  wheel,  and 
also  to  facilitate  its  revolution  at  the  command  of  the  will. 

II.  CULTURE  THROUGH  UNCONSCIOUS  KNOWLEDGE. — The 
mind  may  be  cultivated  also  through  its  unconscious  modifica- 
tions, which  for  convenience  we  may  call  its  unconscious  knowl- 
edge. The  mind  is  affected  and  moulded  by  impressions  that  do 
not  rise  into  consciousness.  These  "unconscious  influences  are  of 
vast  importance  in  education,  and  should  not  be  overlooked  by 
the  teacher  and  educator.  A  few  remarks  will  be  presented  to 
indicate  the  value  and  use  of  this  unconscious  knowledge. 

The  Unconscious  in  Perception. — And  first  we  remark  that 
much  of  our  knowledge,  perhaps  the  most  of  it  acquired  in  early 
life,  is  attained  unconsciously.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the  child 


THE  CULTURE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.          59 

icarns  the  fundamental  facts  of  the  world  and  of  life.  Our  lives 
are  object  lessons,  and  the  larger  part  of  what  we  learn  comes  to 
the  mind,  we  know  not  how  or  when.  We  see  the  relation  of 
cbjscts  in  nature,  and  though  we  know  nothing  of  the  laws  of 
perspective,  yet  when  we  look  at  a  picture  in  which  these  laws 
are  "violated  we  immediately  detect  the  error.  We  learn  music 
and  dancing  in  an  unconscious  way  v/ith  ease ;  if  we  should 
attempt  to  learn  each  note  and  step  by  rule,  the  task  would  be 
much  more  difficult.  The  child  is  unconscious  of  the  way  in 
which  it  learns  to  walk  and  talk,  but  it  learns  these  arts  much 
faster  than  if  it  could  comprehend  the  rules  and  directions  for 
the  different  acts. 

The  Unconscious  in  Memory. — The  unconscious  modifica- 
tions of  the  mind  may  be  of  value  in  memory.  I  may  not  be 
able  to  recall  an  object  or  a  fact,  and  yet  be  able  to  recognize  them 
if  they  are  again  brought  before  my  mind.  I  may  know  a  person 
so  that  I  could  recognize  him  if  I  met  him,  and  yet  be  entirely  un- 
able to  describe  him.  We  may  be  unahle  to  tell  whether  a  friend 
has  black  hair  or  brown  hair,  or  whether  the  eyes  are  blue  or 
gray ;  and  yet  our  knowledge  of  his  appearance  is  a  real,  practical 
knowledge  to  us,  and  we  would  immediately  know  it  if  any  change 
had  taken  place  in  his  looks.  We  meet  a  friend  after  several 
years'  absence,  and  say,  "How  changed  you  are,"  but  are  unable 
to  tell  in  what  the  change  consists.  It  is  said  that  a  person,  on 
being  asked,  could  not  tell  whether  his  father  wore  a  moustache. 
We  have  not  a  distinct  recollection  of  most  of  the  objects  we  see 
around  us  ;  we  are  unable  to  describe  the  pictures  in  our  room  or 
the  carpet  on  our  floor,  and  yet  how  quickly  we  would  notice  a 
change  in  these  objects.  This  unconscious  knowledge  is  of  real 
value  to  us,  and  should  be  taken  an  account  of  in  education. 

The  Unconscious  in  Thought. — Our  unconscious  knowledge 
influences  ard  modifies  our  thinking.  Our  judgments  and  opin- 
ions are  modified  by  the  unconscious  modifications  of  our  minds. 
The  impressions  fro7K  the  circumstances  and  surroundings  of 
early  life,  most  of  which  never  rise  into  consciousness,  and  v^hich 


60  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

we  may  not  be  able  to  call  up  into  consciousness,  affect  our  ideas 
and  thoughts,  and  mould  our  opinions.  Indeed,  it  is  probable 
that  the  subtle  and  intangible  influences  of  which  we  are  uncon- 
scious do  more  to  -mould  our  mental  characteristics  than  those 
influences  of  which  we  are  conscious.  As  the  peculiarities  of  the 
soil  give  a  peculiar  fragrance  to  the  rose  and  flavor  to  the  grape, 
so  the  unseen  and  unfelt  influences  that  surround  us  in  early 
years  give  color  to  our  tastes  and  shape  to  our  thoughts  and  ex- 
pressions. We  may  not  remember  one  in  a  hundred  of  the  refined 
sentiments  we  heard  fall  from  the  lips  of  cultured  men  and 
women,  but  they  have  all  left  an  impress  behind,  and  have 
touched  our  souls  "  to  new  issues."  We  have  forgotten  the  inci- 
dents of  the  books  we  read,  and  cannot  quote  a  dozen  of  their 
sentences,  yet  we  think  and  write  differently  from  what  we  should 
have  done  had  we  not  read  those  works.  Genius  is  partly  due  to 
early  influences  of  which  it  is  unconscious,  as  well  as  to  natural 
gifts.  These  facts  being  admitted,  the  great  advantage  of  the 
unconscious  in  the  culture  of  thought  will  be  readily  appreciated. 

The  Unconscious  in  Language. — Language  is  learned  at 
first  as  an  unconscious  acquisition.  The  majority  of  words  are 
acquired  unconsciously.  Who  taught  us  the  meaning  of  such 
words  as  here,  now,  to  be,  to  do,  beauty,  virtue,  etc.,  we  cannot  tell ; 
and  yet  we  use  those  words  correctly.  The  delicate  shades  of 
meaning  which  we  attach  to  words  we  learn,  not  from  the  diction- 
ary or  from  definitions,  but  mainly  by  our  reading.  Our  best 
lessons  in  grammar  are  learned,  not  consciously  from  the  text- 
books, but  unconsciously  from  hearing  or  reading  good  English. 
So  a  foreign  language  is  much  more  readily  learned  by  hearing  it 
spoken,  or,  after  one  gets  a  slight  knowledge  of  grammar  and  a 
brief  vocabulary,  by  reading  some  book  in  the  language,  until, 
as  some  one  says,  "  we  tumble  into  it  rathe*-  than  learn  it." 

TJie  Unconscious  in  Opinion- — Oiu-  prejudices  and  opinions 
are  largely  moulded  by  the  unconscious  modifications  of  our 
minds.  Our  estimates  of  persons  and  books  are  often  due  to  im- 
pressions which  we  cannot  define,  and  which  «sre  not  definitely 


THE   CULTURE    OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  61 

cognized.  We  meet  a  stranger  and  are  attracted  or  repelled  by 
him,  we  cannot  tell  for  what  reason.  The  title  of  a  book  often, 
by  some  impression  it  makes  upon  the  mind,  which  we  never  put 
into  a  proposition,  leads  us  to  read  or  neglect  it.  A  writer  says 
that  he  refused  to  read  "  Adam  Bede"  because  the  title  seemed 
flat  and  insipid ;  and  this  was  also  the  experience  of  the  author 
of  this  work.  Indeed,  we  believe  that  many  of  the  opinions  of 
mankind  are  prejudices  based  upon  influences  and  impressions 
that  have  never  risen  into  a  definite  form  in  the  consciousness. 
The  significance  of  these  facts  cannot  be  overestimated,  and  they 
deserve  the  serious  attention  of  the  educator  and  teacher. 

The  Unconscious  in  Character. — The  unconscious  modifica- 
tions of  the  mind  exercise  an  influence  on  the  development  of 
character.  The  refinement  of  a  mother's  words  and  manners,  the 
upright  life  and  unremembered  expressions  of  a  father,  leave  their 
impress  upon  the  soul,  and  show  themselves  in  our  own  actions 
and  moral  sentiment.  The  boy  who  is  surrounded  by  vulgar 
companions  may  not  remember  a  tithe  of  the  vulgarity  which  he 
has  seen  or  heard,  but  it  has  lowered  his  sense  of  refinement 
and  soiled  the  purity  of  his  imagination  and  taste.  The  boy  or 
girl  comes  out  of  a  home  of  culture  and  refinement  with  that 
subtle  peculiarity  of  manner  and  expression  which  we  call  good 
breeding. 

Even  the  physical  influences  that  surround  us  in  early  life 
help  to  mould  or.r  character  and  change  our  tastes.  The  spirit  of 
beauty  steals  insenciblv  into  the  soul  and  tunes  it  to  heavenly 
aspirations :  the  grandeur  of  the  mountains,  or  the  sublimity  of 
the  wide-spreading  ocojm,  seems  to  give  strength  to  thought  and 
elevation  to  sentiment.  The  educator  should  appreciate  the 
influence  of  these  unconscious  modifications  upon  the  soul,  and 
make  use  of  them  in  the  development  of  that  highest  product  of 
education,  a  noble  character. 

III.  CULTURE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  CONSCIOUSNESS. — The  nat- 
ural consciousness^  as  we  have  seen,  may  be  developed  into  the 
reflective  or  philosophical  consciousness ;  and  such  development 


62  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

may  be  secured  by  proper  culture.  The  time  for  such  culture  is 
not  childhood  or  youth  ;  it  is  rather  adapted  to  the  mature  mind. 
The  young  mind  operates  objectively  rather  than  subjectively ;  it 
is  not  until  the  mind  begins  to  ripen  in  the  process  of  thought 
that  it  begins  to  turn  its  gaze  within  and  reflect  upon  the  opera- 
tion of  its  own  faculties.  A  few  suggestions  will  be  made  in 
respect  to  this  culture. 

Practice  Reflection. — The  student  should  acquire  the  habit 
of  reflection.  He  should  be  led  to  look  in  upon  his  own  mental 
operations,  and  note  the  working  of  his  own  mind.  This  will  be 
difficult  at  first,  but  practice  will  render  it  comparatively  easy. 
He  may  notice  the  gi-owth  of  an  idea  of  perception,  trace  the  act 
of  the  mind  in  calling  up  anything  out  of  unconsciousness  into 
consciousness,  analyze  a  judgment  or  process  of  reasoning,  and 
watch  the  coming  and  developing  of  the  ideals  of  the  imagination. 

Should  be  Persistent. — This  attention  to  mental  phenomena 
should  be  continuous  and  persistent.  The  mind  should  be  held 
to -.the  contemplation  of  any  mental  phenomenon  until  it  is  dis- 
tinctly observed.  This  presents  a  difficulty,  since  the  mental  act 
or  state  exists  but  for  an  instant ;  it  comes  and  is  gone,  and  when 
we  attempt  to  look  at  it,  it  is  not  there.  We  can,  however,  prac- 
tically prolong  the  act  or  state  by  repeating  it.  What  we  fail  to 
notice  at  one  view  we  should  try  to  notice  at  another  view ;  what 
we  faintly  apprehend  at  first  sight  we  may  fix  and  confirm  at  a 
second  observation.  Past  experience  can  be  brought  before  the 
mind  in  an  act  of  memory  and  reviewed.  There  is  an  advantage, 
too,  in  this,  since  the  interest  in  the  idea  or  thought  at  first  may 
interfere  with  our  examination,  but  when  brought  back  by  the 
memory,  when  the  curiosity  is  satisfied  and  the  feelings  are 
calmed,  we  can  give  more  energy  to  the  contemplation  of  the  idea 
or  feeling  itself. 

Should  be  Minute. — We  should  cultivate  the  power  of  close 
and  minute  observation  of  the  acts  and  states  of  the  mind.  In 
the  power  to  do  this  we  find  the  difference  between  the  peasant 
and  the  philosopher.  All  persons  possess  the  same  natural  con- 


THE   CULTURE   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  63 

Bciousness  which  notices  the  broad  facts  of  mental  experience ;  but 
the  reflective  consciousness  detects  many  things  that  are  not 
noticed  by  the  ordinary  natural  consciousness.  To  cultivate  this 
reflective  consciousness  we  must  learn  to  fix  our  attention  upon 
the  acts  and  states  until  the  minute  and  occult  phenomena  are 
clearly  perceived. 

Should  be  Comprehensive. — We  should  cultivate  the  power 
of  comprehensive  observation  of  mental  phenomena.  Our  view 
should  embrace  not  merely  a  part,  but  all  of  the  mental  phenom- 
ena. No  partiality  of  taste  or  natural  bias  of  the  mind  should 
lead  us  to  concentrate  the  attention  upon  one  class  of  mental  phe- 
nomena, to  the  neglect  of  another  class.  Neither  should  any  pre- 
conceived opinions  in  respec  to  mental  phenomena  make  us  un- 
fair or  partial  in  our  examination.  We  want  the  entire  truth, 
and  not  a  mere  partial  or  one-sided  view  of  the  facts,  so  that  our 
inferences  from  them  may  be  correct. 

Should  Grasp  Relations. — We  should  aim  to  give  conscious- 
ness the  power  of  grasping  the  relations  of  mental  phenomena. 
The  comparison  of  ideas  or  objects  of  thought  and  the  detection 
of  relations  is  one  of  the  earliest  activities  of  the  mind  ;  and  con- 
sciousness should  recognize  these  comparisons  and  relations.  We 
must,  in  consciousness,  place  the  facts  of  mind  side  by  side,  and 
grasp  them  in  their  relations.  Consciousness  must  learn  to  cog- 
nize the  mental  processes  by  which  the  mind  elaborates  its  knowl- 
edge. The  mind  perceives  the  similar  and  the  dissimilar,  it 
judges  and  reasons,  it  classifies  its  knowledge,  and  seeks  for  the 
causes  and  laws  of  things,  and  builds  up  the  temples  of  scientific 
truth.  The  aim  of  the  culture  of  consciousness  is  to  enable  it  to 
become  conscious  of  these  processes,  and  the  relations  which  they 
unfold.  This  is  really  the  first  great  step  in  the  culture  of  the 
reflective  or  philosophical  consciousness. 

Sliould  Grasp  Laws  and  Causes. — We  should  train  the 
consciousness  also  to  grasp  the  laws  and  causes  of  mental  phe- 
nomena. The  mind  has  its  laws  or  fixed  methods  of  operation,  as 
well  as  matter ;  and  the  higher  philosophical  consciousness  aims 


64  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

to  grasp  them.  There  are  also  causes  of  certain  mental  phenom- 
ena, as  well  ,as  of  material  phenomena,  and  we  should  endeavor 
to  acquire  the  power  of  a  conscious  insight  into  these  causes.  We 
should  endeavor  to  interpret  the  facts  and  phenomena  presented, 
to  find  the  underlying  principle  that  gives  form  to  the  facts,  to 
reach  down  to  the  nature  or  essence  of  things,  and  seek  to  know 
them  in  their  ultimate  principles.  Here  the  consciousness  attains 
its  most  perfect  development,  and  man  becomes  the  philosopher. 

IV.  ABNORMAL  CONSCIOUSNESS. — Occasionally  we  find  an 
abnormal  activity  of  consciousness  which  is  both  an  injury  to 
mental  activity  and  a  source  of  personal  uuhappiness.  It  is  the 
duty  of  education  to  recognize  and  attend  to  these  unnatural 
conditions  ot  consciousness,  and,  so  far  as  possible,  to  remove 
them.  Dr.  Porter  has  so  clearly  developed  and  happily  expressed 
this  subject  that  I  can  do  no  better  than  reproduce  it  in  his  own 
words. 

Among  U/iildren. — "The  abnormal  or  the  morbid  self-con- 
sciousness is  distinguished  by  any  degree  of  attention  to  one's 
own  psychical  state  which  interferes  with  the  normal  use  and 
development  of  the  powers.  Children  are  appointed  by  nature  to 
an  objective  and,  in  one  sense,  an  animal  life.  But,  now  and 
then,  a  child,  through  an  unfortunate  bias,  or  some  ill-judged 
training,  has  learned  to  look  inward  upon  itself  with  unnatural 
precocity.  As  a  consequence,  the  subjective  predominates  over  the 
objective,  the  tendency  to  reflect  hinders  the  tendency  to  acquire, 
and  that  easy  and  spontaneous  play  of  observation,  memory,  im- 
agination, wit,  and  invention,  which  is  the  strength  and  the  charm 
of  childhood,  is  excluded  or  hindered." 

Among  Adults. — "  Among  adults,  frequent  examples  occur 
of  a  morbid  or  unnatural  attention  to  the  inner  life.  Hypochon- 
driacs, who  are  haunted  by  disturbing  sensations  which  proceed 
from  "bodily  disease,  till  their  attention  is  so  absorbed  in  watching 
these  sensations  that  it  cannot  respond  to  the  objects  that  are  fitted 
to  amuse  and  incite  to  action,  furnish  one  example.  Men  who 
have  inherited  or  indulged  a  sensitive  nature  till  it  has  become 


THE   CULTURE   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  65 

their  tyrant,  who  watch  their  feelings  with  a  selfish  exclusivenees 
or  who  pamper  them  with  a  dainty  fastidiousness,  like  Rousseau, 
may  become  half  insane  through  brooding  over  their  own  exag- 
gerated sufferings  and  wrongs." 

Self -Consciousness. — "Another  type  of  the  abnormal  con- 
sciousness is  that  which  results  from  an  egoistic  thoughtfulness 
of  one's  appearance,  manners,  words,  looks,  actions,  or  achieve- 
ments, which  shows  itself  in  the  countless  forms  of  affectation  that 
are  displayed  in  manners,  art,  or  literature.  So  common  has  this 
become  in  the  artificial  society  of  modern  times  that  it  has  given 
a  new  sense  to  the  words  conscious  and  consciousness,  with  and 
without  self  as  a  prefix."  To  be  conscious  of  one's  self  is  to  de- 
stroy that  simplicity  and  naturalness  of  character  and  behavior 
which  is  attractive  and  admirable. 

Cure  of  Abnormal  Consciousness. — Much  can  be  done  by 
proper  culture  to  cure  the  abnormal  action  of  consciousness.  The 
general  suggestion  is  to  interest  the  mind  in  things  without  itself. 
The  attention  should  be  led  from  the  subjective  to  the  objective. 
For  this  purpose  the  study  of  natural  science,  visiting  objects  of 
interest,  a  trip  to  a  foreign  country,  will  be  of  value.  Anything 
that  keeps  the  mind  away  from  itself,  and  occupies  it  with  exter- 
nal objects,  will  aid  in  curing  this  unnatural  condition.  Such 
culture,  too,  is  of  great  importance  ;  many  a  case  of  permanent 
melancholy,  or  even  insanity,  might  have  been  prevented  by 
careful  and  judicious  treatment.  The  tender  and  thoughtful  cn*- 
panion  of  Cowper,  by  her  care  and  the  gentle  occupations  ia 
which  she  led  him  to  engage,  saved  his  mind  from  insanity,  and 
thus  gave  us  several  of  those  exquisite  productions  of  his  rare 
poetical  genius. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   NATURE   OF   ATTENTION. 

A  TTENTION  is  the  power  of  directing  the  mind  to  one  ob- 
•*••*-  ject  of  thought  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  It  is  the 
power  of  selecting  one  of  several  objects,  and  concentrating  the 
mental  energies  upon  it.  The  term  is  derived  from  ad,  to,  and 
tendo,  I  bend,  meaning  a  bending  to  or  towards,  and  was  sug- 
gested probably  by  the  attitude  of  the  body  in  an  act  of  close 
attention  to  an  external  object. 

Illustration. — Thus,  suppose  I  am  standing  at  the  window  with 
my  eyes  open  ;  a  hundred  objects  are  mirrored  upon  the  retina  ; 
I  select  one  of  these  objects  and  fix  my  mind  upon  it,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  others ;  this  is  an  act  of  attention.  I  sit  in  the 
porch  on  a  summer  evening  ;  a  score  of  sounds  are  blending  in 
the  chambers  of  my  ear ;  I  have  a  general  impression  of  them  all 
— perhaps  a  distinct  idea  of  none.  I  select  one  or  more  from  the 
collection,  and  fix  my  thoughts  upon  these,  withdrawing  my  mind 
from  the  others.  This  is  also  an  act  of  attention. 

Subjective  cvnd  Objective. — Attention  may  operate  either 
objectively  or  subjectively.  Thus  we  may  fix  our  attention  on  an 
external  object,  as  a  bird  on  a  tree,  or  upon  any  part  or  quality 
of  the  object,  as  the  form  or  color.  In  this  case  the  attention 
operates  objectively.  We  may  also  fix  our  attention  upon  some 
operation  or  state  of  the  mind,  as  a  sensation,  an  emotion,  or  a 
volition,  or  upon  any  product  of  the  mind,  as  an  idea  or  a 
thought.  This  is  the  subjective  phase  of  attention.  In  this  latter 
form,  attention  is  very  nearly  identical  with  what  Locke  calls 
Reflection. 

Relation  to  Consciousness. — Attention  appears  to  be  closely 

(66) 


THE   NATURE   OF   ATTENTION.  67 

related  to  consciousness.  It  seems  to  be  a  directing  of  conscious- 
ness to  the  acts  and  states  of  the  mind.  Dr.  Way  land  describes 
it  as  a  sort  of  voluntary  consciousness,  a  condition  of  the  mind 
in  which  consciousness  is  excited  and  directed  by  an  act  of  the 
will.  This  applies  especially  to  the  subjective  phase  of  its  opera- 
tions. 

Attention  and  consciousness  are  not,  however,  identical.  At- 
tention is  consciousness  and  something  more ;  it  is  consciousness 
voluntarily  applied  to  some  determined  object;  it  is  a  sort  of 
concentrated  consciousness.  Hamilton  says :  "Consciousness  may 
be  compared  to  a  telescope;  Attention  is  the  pulling  out  and 
pressing  in  of  the  tubes  in  accommodating  the  focus  to  the  eye." 

Positive  and  Negative. — An  act  of  attention  involves  both  a 
positive  and  negative  operation  of  the  mind.  It  consists  in  turn- 
ing away  from  same  things  and  in  turning  toward  other  things. 
The  first  act  consists  in  excluding  and  refusing  to  consider  some 
objects, — a  negative  process;  the  second  act  consists  in  a  volun- 
tary effort  to  consider  others, — a  positive  process.  Negatively,  we 
arrest  or  detain  certain  powers  in  their  operations;  positively,  we 
direct  or  command  other  powers  to  put  forth  their  operations. 
The  negative  element  has  been  compared  to  the  detent  in  machin- 
ery, which  checks  the  wheels  in  rapid  motion  and  gives  opportu- 
nity for  any  desired  change.  The  positive  action  may  be  com- 
pared to  putting  the  belt  upon  the  wheel  to  be  turned,  thus 
concentrating  the  power  of  the  machinery  upon  it. 

The  principal  element,  however,  is  the  positive  element.  The 
mental  effort  is  not  so  much  to  withdraw  the  mind  from  the 
many,  as  to  concentrate  it  upon  the  few  or  the  one.  We  make 
our  choice  of  some  one  of  the  various  objects  claiming  our  atten- 
tion and  fix  the  mind  upon  it,  and  the  others  by  necessity  retire 
from  our  thoughts. 

Relation  to  the  Will. — Attention  is  partly  an  operation  of 
the  will.  It  is  an  intentional  mental  effort,  a  designed  directing 
of  the  mind  to  some  object  of  thought,  a  voluntary  concentration 
of  consciousness.  But  though  intimately  related  to  the  will,  it  ia 


68  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

not  identical  with  it.  All  will-power  is  not  attention.  It  ia 
merely  the  will-effort  that  directs  and  concentrates  the  mental 
activity,  or  that  voluntarily  observes  any  faculty  in  its  action. 

Not  Absolute  Control. — Attention  is  not  under  the  absolute 
control  of  the  will.  We  are  sometimes  determined  to  an  act  of 
attention  independently  of  the  free  volitions  of  the  will.  When 
absorbed  in  thought  or  study,  a  person  may  speak  to  us,  or  a 
clock  may  strike,  without  our  being  conscious  of  the  sound ;  but 
it  is  impossible  to  remain  in  this  state  of  unconsciousness  inten- 
tionally, and  by  a  direct  effort  of  the  will.  We  cannot  deter- 
minedly refuse  to  hear  by  voluntarily  withholding  our  attention ; 
and  we  cannot  open  our  eyes,  and  by  an  act  of  will  arrest  our 
minds  from  all  perceptions  of  sight.  We  may  close  our  eyes  or 
stop  our  ears ;  but  cannot  with  our  organs  unobstructed,  wholly 
refuse  to  see  and  hear. 

Involuntary  Attention. — Sometimes  attention  seems  to  act 
independently  of  the  will.  The  mind  is  attracted  by  something 
without  instead  of  being  urged  by  something  within.  We  often 
find  ourselves  looking,  listening,  thinking,  etc.,  without  any  con- 
scious effort  on  our  part,  and  without  seeming  to  have  willed  it. 
We  sit  down  to  read,  and  in  a  few  moments  find  ourselves  dream- 
ing, or  pursuing  a  rambling  train  of  thought,  unwilled  and  un- 
wished. We  walk  out  in  the  spring-time,  and  find  our  minds 
attracted  by  a  beautiful  flower,  the  song  of  a  bird,  or  the  rippling 
of  a  rivulet,  without  any  conscious  effort  of  our  own.  Such  facts, 
common  to  the  experience  of  all,  prove  that  the  attention  often 
acts  independently  of  our  free  volition. 

Three  Degrees. — In  view  of  these  considerations,  Sir  Wm. 
Hamilton  holds  that  attention  is  of  three  degrees  or  kinds.  The 
first  is  a  mere  vital  or  irresistible  act ;  the  second  is  an  act  deter- 
mined by  desire,  which,  though  voluntary,  may  be  resisted  ;  the 
third  is  an  act  determined  by  deliberate  volition. 

Not  a  Faculty. — Attention  is  not  regarded  as  a  distinct  faculty 
of  the  mind.  It  is  not  a  distinct  form  of  mental  activity,  but  is 
involved  in  and  underlies  the  activity  of  all  the  faculties.  It  is 


THE   NATURE   OF   ATTENTION.  69 

subsidiary  to  the  different  faculties,  acts  with  them  and  in  them, 
seeming  to  constitute  an  essential  part  of  each  mental  activity. 
The  voluntary  operation  of  any  of  the  mental  powers,  as  percep- 
tion, memory,  etc.,  carries  with  it  an  act  of  attention. 

Again,  attention  is  not  a  power  of  knowing,  but  of  directing 
that  which  may  know.  Of  itself  it  originates  nothing,  teaches 
nothing,  puts  us  in  possession  of  no  new  ideas  or  truths,  has  no 
distinct  field  or  province  of  its  own.  Yet  without  it  the  other 
faculties  would  be  of  little  use  to  us.  Attention  doubles  the 
efficiency  of  these  faculties,  giving  them  a  power  of  which  they 
would  otherwise  be  destitute. 

Two  QUESTIONS  IN  RESPECT  TO  ATTENTION. 

There  are  two  interesting  questions  discussed  by  writers  on  men- 
tal philosophy  which  are  entitled  to  a  brief  consideration.  The 
first  of  these  is, — Can  we  do  anything  without  attention  ?  The 
second  is, — Can  we  attend  to  more  than  one  thing  at  the  same  time  ? 

I/ CAN  WE  DO  ANYTHING  WITHOUT  ATTENTION? — The  first 
question  is,  can  we  do  anything  without  attention?  We  have 
learned  to  do  many  things  with  great  facility,  so  that  they  often 
take  place  when  our  minds  seem  to  be  attending  to  something 
else.  Do  they  really  take  place  without  any  degree  of  attention, 
or  is  the  attention  so  slight  that  we  do  not  notice  it  ?  Thus,  I  sit 
at  a  piano  running  over  some  familiar  piece  of  music,  and  at  the 
same  time  am  engaged  in  conversation  with  a  friend.  My  fingers 
seem  to  wander  among  the  keys  ad  libitum;  does  each  note  or 
each  movement  of  the  fingers  require  an  act  of  attention  ?  Or, 
if  the  piece  is  a  difficult  one,  and  I  am  giving  general  attention 
to  it,  is  there  a  special  act  of  attention  in  producing  each  note  ? 

Actions  Mechanical. — Upon  this  question  two  distinctly  op- 
posite views  have  been  presented.  Dr.  Reid  and  others,  especially 
students  of  physiology,  hold  that  these  and  many  similar  acts  are 
automatic  and  mechanical,  and  do  not  involve  any  mental  activity, 
and  thus  no  attention.  The  mind,  they  hold,  "  forms  the  general 
purpose  to  execute  the  given  piece,  but  the  particular  movements 


70  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

and  muscular  contractions  requisite  to  produce  the  individual 
notes  are,  for  the  most  part,  involuntary."  The  motions  follow 
one  another  as  a  matter  of  habit,  and  do  not  require  a  special 
volition  or  act  of  attention.  As  a  proof  of  their  position  they 
cite  the  fact  that  we  have  no  recollection  of  any  acts  of  attention. 

Actions  not  Mechanical. — Mr.  Stewart  and  some  other  writ- 
ers take  the  other  side  of  this  question,  holding  that  such  actions, 
however  rapid,  do  involve  some  mental  activity,  and  consequently 
some  attention.  The  attention  and  the  volition,  they  say,  are 
instantaneous,  and  make  so  slight  an  impression  upon  the  mind 
that  there  is  no  recollection  of  it  afterwards.  The  fact  that  we 
do  not  recollect  the  volitions  is  no  proof  that  we  did  not  exercise 
them.  A  piece  of  music  can  be  played  so  slowly  that  we  can 
observe  the  special  act  of  attention  and  volition  to  each  note  and 
recall  them  afterwards.  "  The  difference  of  the  two  cases,"  it  is 
claimed,  "lies  in  the  rapidity  of  the  movement,  and  not  in  the 
nature  of  the  operation." 

Objection  and  Reply. — The  objection  offered  to  this  view  is 
that  it  requires  too  great  rapidity  of  mental  action.  Take  a  pub- 
lic speaker  for  instance,  who  speaks  from  one  to  two  hundred 
words  in  a  minute ;  each  word  consists  of  four  or  five  elementary 
sounds,  and  each  elementary  sound  requires  several  muscular 
contractions.  To  attend  to  each  would  require  two  or  three 
thousand  acts  of  attention  in  a  minute.  Is  it  possible  for  the 
mind  to  act  with  such  rapidity  ?  This  objection,  however,  carries 
with  it  its  own  answer :  for  if  the  body  can  act  with  such  rapidity, 
it  is  surely  not  impossible  for  the  mind  to  do  so. 

Actions  not  Automatic. — To  illustrate  the  rapidity  of  actions 
not  automatic,  but  which  require  constant  attention,  Mr.  Stewart 
cites  the  case  of  the  equilibrist,  who,  while  balancing  himself  on 
a  slack-rope,  balances  a  number  of  balls  in  various  ways.  Here 
the  position  changes  every  instant,  and  in  order  to  keep  himself 
and  the  objects  from  falling,  every  change  must  be  noticed  and 
the  position  adjusted  accordingly.  These  movements  cannot  be 
tne  result  of  an  inseparable  association  of  ideas,  as  in  piano-play- 


THE   NATURE   OF   ATTENTION.  71 

ing,  for  they  do  not  follow  any  regular  order,  and  could  not;  if 
tried  thousands  of  times.  It  is  evident  that  in  this  case  the  per- 
former must  pay  close  attention  to  every  action ;  for  if  the  mind 
be  diverted  for  a  moment,  the  actor  or  his  balls  will  fall. 

The  Question  Decided. — It  is  not  easy  to  decide  this  question, 
though  I  believe  there  is  truth  on  both  sides  of  it.  It  must  be 
admitted  that  many  actions  are  automatic  and  mechanical.  There 
is  a  tendency  for  muscular  movements,  once  associated,  to  be  re- 
peated in  the  order  of  association.  Many  of  the  movements  in 
speaking,  walking,  piano-playing,  etc.,  are  no  doubt  purely  me- 
chanical. It  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  each  muscular  contrac- 
tion of  the  vocal  organs,  when  we  talk,  receives  a  special  act  of 
attention.  The  doctrine  of  reflex  nervous  action  leads  to  the 
same  conclusion.  It  must  also  be  admitted  that  there  are  mental 
acts  which  make  so  little  impression  upon  consciousness  that  they 
are  not  subsequently  remembered,  and  that  some  actions  which 
seem  to  be  automatic  do  really  require  an  act  of  attention. 

Hamilton's  Explanation. — Sir  William  Hamilton  presents 
an  interesting  explanation  of  the  subject  by  the  principle  of  latent 
agencies — that  is,  by  mental  operations  of  which  we  are  uncon- 
scious. In  respect  to  our  acquired  habits  and  dexterities,  as 
speaking,  playing,  etc.,  he  holds  that  many  of  the  mental  activities 
do  not  rise  into  consciousness.  He  concedes  to  the  mind  a  con- 
scious volition  over  the  series,  but  denies  to  it  a  conscious  and 
deliberate  volition  in  regard  to  each  separate  movement  in  the 
series  which  it  determines.  At  first  and  before  the  habit  is 
acquired,  every  act  is  slow,  and  we  are  conscious  of  each  mental 
action ;  but  at  length  the  acts  become  secure  and  precise,  the  speed 
increases,  the  individual  acts  drop,  one  by  one,  out  of  conscious- 
ness, as  we  lose  the  leaves  in  retiring  from  a  tree ;  and  at  last  we 
are  aware  only  of  the  general  state  which  results  from  these  un- 
conscious operations. 

II.  NUMBER  OF  OBJECTS  OF  ATTENTION. — The  second  ques- 
tion is,  can  the  mind  attend  to  more  than  one  object  at  the  same 
time  ?  Thus,  when  I  am  playing  the  piano  and,  at  the  same  time, 


72  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

am  engaged  in  conversation,  do  I  attend  to  the  playing  and  the 
talking  at  the  same  time,  or  does  the  mind  pass  from  one  to  the 
other?  And  so  when  the  equilibrist  balances  himself  and  a 
number  of  objects  on  different  parts  of  his  body,  does  he  attend 
to  more  than  one  of  these  at  any  particular  instant  of  time  ? 

Negative  View. — Several  philosophers  answer  this  question  in 
the  negative.  Dr.  Brown  holds  that  the  mind  cannot  exist,  at 
the  same  moment,  in  two  different  states — that  is,  in  two  states  in 
either  of  which  it  can  exist  separately.  He  would  have  us  be- 
lieve that  we  cannot  feel  the  sensations  of  fragrance  and  cold  at 
the  same  time.  The  same  doctrine  is  taught  by  Locke,  at  least 
by  inference,  in  his  inquiry  whether  the  mind  can  have  "  different, 
nay  inconsistent  and  opposite  (as  those  of  white  and  black  must 
be)  modifications  at  the  same  time." 

Stewart's  View. — Stewart  distinctly  teaches  that  we  cannot 
attend  to  more  than  one  object  of  thought  at  the  same  time.  He 
says  the  mind  passes  with  such  rapidity  from  one  object  to  another 
that  it  is  unconscious  of  the  transition,  and  seems  to  be  attending 
to  both  objects  at  once.  Thus  in  the  case  of  vision,  only  one  part 
of  an  object  is  at  any  one  instant  in  the  direct  line  of  vision;  but 
the  eye  passes  so  rapidly  from  point  to  point  that  we  seem  to  see 
the  entire  surface  at  a  glance.  So  in  viewing  a  mathematical 
figure  of  many  sides,  we  view  each  side  by  a  separate  act  of  atten- 
tion, till  we  have  passed  around  the  entire  outline.  He  says  there 
is  a  minimum  visible,  which  is  the  smallest  extension  of  color  or 
shaded  light  by  which  the  eye  can  be  affected.  He  speaks  also 
of  a  minimum  audible  in  respect  to  hearing. 

In  Comparing  Objects. — In  comparing  two  objects,  as  A  and  B, 
it  is  held  that  the  mind  does  not  think  of  both  objects  at  once ; 
that  while  I  am  thinking  of  A  I  have  no  thought  of  B,  and  while 
thinking  of  B  I  have  no  thought  of  A.  In  an  act  of  comparison, 
the  mind  passes  rapidly  from  one  object  to  the  other ;  so  rapidly 
that  the  same  effect  is  produced  as  if  both  objects  were  actually 
before  the  mind  at  the  same  moment. 

Affirmative  View. — On    the  contrary,  it  is  held   by  able 


THE   NATURE   OF   ATTENTION.  78 

thinkers,  that  we  can  attend  to  more  than  one  thing  at  a  time. 
Leibnitz,  in  answer  to  Locke's  inquiry  whether  the  mind  can 
have  inconsistent  and  opposite  modifications  at  the  same  moment, 
holds  that  it  can.  Sir  William  Hamilton  takes  the  same  view. 
This  view  seems  to  be  the  correct  one,  as  will  appear  from  several 
considerations. 

Consciousness  Affirms  It. — An  appeal  to  consciousness  seems  to 
affirm  this  view.  When  I  look  at  a  small  object,  as  a  pin,  it 
surely  seems  that  I  can  see  the  head  and  shaft  at  the  same  iden- 
tical moment.  So,  in  looking  at  my  hand,  I  feel  sure  that  I  can 
see  two  or  more  of  my  fingers,  or  a  finger  and  a  thumb,  at  the 
same  time.  So  when  I  listen  to  a  duet,  or  even  a  four-part  har- 
mony, I  am  conscious  that  I  hear  the  tones  blended,  and  not  first 
one  and  then  another.  Indeed,  could  I  have  the  sense  of  har- 
mony if  I  did  not  hear  the  tones  at  the  same  instant?  I  am 
conscious,  also,  as  I  sit  in  a  room,  that  I  can  know,  at  any  given 
instant,  that  there  are  several  persons  in  the  room  with  me ;  and 
that  when  I  look  out  of  the  window  I  can  see  more  than  one  sin- 
gle object. 

Negative  View  Absurd. — The  negative  view  seems  absurd  in 
that  it  assumes  too  much.  If  I  can  see  or  hear  only  one  thing  at 
a  time,  what  and  how  large  is  that  one  thing  ?  If  I  cannot  see 
or  hear  two  words  at  a  time,  then  I  cannot  see  or  hear  one  word, 
for  one  word  is  made  up  of  several  letters  or  sounds.  It  follows, 
also,  that  I  cannot  see  the  whole  of  a  letter,  since  a  letter  is  made 
up  of  parts !  Again,  when  I  look  out  on  a  wide-spreading  land- 
scape, if  I  can  see  only  the  minimum  visible,  how  long  will  it  take 
me  to  see  the  entire  landscape,  which  is  so  large  as  to  contain  the 
minimum  visible  a  countless  number  of  times  ? 

In  Comparing  Objects. — This  view  is  necessary  in  order  to 
explain  the  comparison  of  objects.  An  act  of  comparison,  as 
Hamilton  remarks,  supposes  that  we  are  able  to  comprehend,  in 
one  individual  consciousness,  the  different  objects  compared. 
Were  I  conscious  of  only  one  object  at  a  time,  I  could  never 
bring  them  into  relation ;  for  when  I  was  conscious  of  A  I  would 
4 


74  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

not  be  conscious  of  B,  and  when  conscious  of  B  I  would  be  un- 
conscious of  A.  Thus  no  judgments  could  be  formed,  since  the 
subject  and  predicate  could  not  be  united  in  thought ;  and  thought 
and  language  would  be  impossible. 

Number  of  Objects. — Admitting  that  the  mind  can  attend  to 
more  than  one  object  at  a  time,  the  question  arises, — how  many 
objects  can  it  embrace  at  once?  In  respect  to  this  question,  some 
writers  say  that  the  mind  can  have  a  distinct  notion  of  four 
objects,  and  others  of  six  objects.  Sir  William  Hamilton  limits 
the  number  to  six,  and  says  it  may  be  illustrated  by  throwing  a 
dumber  of  marbles  upon  the  floor,  and  grouping  them  in  twos,  in 
threes,  in  fours,  etc. 

Number  not  Definite. — It  is  to  be  doubted,  however,  whether 
the  number  of  objects  which  can  be  embraced  in  a  single  act  of 
attention  can  be  definitely  determined.  Some  minds  will  grasp 
more  and  some  less ;  and  the  grasp  of  the  mind  in  this  respect  is 
largely  due  to  practice  and  cultivation.  Besides,  too,  it  will 
depend  somewhat  upon  the  size  of  the  objects.  It  should  also  be 
remarked  that  clearness  of  cognition  will  be  at  its  maximum 
when  the  mind  is  concentrated  on  a  single  object :  that  is,  the 
greater  the  number  of  objects  among  which  the  attention  is  dis- 
tributed, the  feebler  and  less  distinct  will  be  its  cognizance  of 
each.  The  law  is  that  distinctness  of  cognition  is  inversely  pro- 
portional to  the  number  of  objects  to  which  the  mind  attends. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  CULTURE   OF   ATTENTION. 

HAVING  explained  the  general  nature  of  the  power  of  at- 
tention, we  now  proceed  to  the  discussion  of  the  methods 
of  its  cultivation.  We  shall  treat  the  subject  under  three  gen- 
eral heads ;  the  importance  of  habits  of  attention,  the  methods 
of  cultivating  attention,  and  the  way  to  secure  the  attention  of 
pupils. 

I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  HABITS  OF  ATTENTION. — The  importance 
of  habits  of  attention  cannot  be  overrated.  The  power  of  con- 
trolling one's  own  mental  faculties,  of  directing  them  at  will  into 
whatever  channel  the  occasion  may  demand,  of  excluding  from 
the  mind  all  irrelevant  ideas,  and  concentrating  the  mind  on  the 
one  object  of  thought,  is  a  power  of  the  highest  value.  It  is  in 
this  that  we  find  the  principal  difference  between  one  mind  and 
another  in  the  realm  of  thought  and  knowledge.  Mental  power 
is,  to  a  great  extent,  the  power  of  attention.  One  of  the  principal 
elements  of  genius  is  strength  of  will  to  control  the  mind  and 
command  the  mental  energies. 

To  all  the  Faculties. — Attention  is  of  great  value  to  all  the 
faculties.  It  is  involved  in  and  inseparably  connected  with  the 
exercise  of  these  faculties,  giving  them  their  direction  and  in- 
creasing their  power.  It  conditions  their  activity,  and  is  a  meas- 
ure of  their  strength  and  attainments.  Its  value  in  relation  to 
each  one  of  the  different  faculties  will  be  briefly  noticed. 

To  Perception. — The  power  of  perception  is  mainly  due  to 
the  power  of  attention.  In  an  act  of  perception  we  need  not  only 
the  open  senses,  but  also  the  attentive  mind.  Mere  gazing  is  not 
sufficient ;  we  need  the  concentration  of  the  mind  in  order  to  per- 
ceive. Too  many  persons  have  eyes  and  see  not,  ears  and  hear 

(75) 


76  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

not,  fingers  that  touch  and  yet  communicate  no  knowledge.  A 
large  share  of  the  perception  of  the  world  is  inattentive  and  care- 
less. 

Attention,  in  relation  to  perception,  is  like  a  microscope  to  the 
eye.  I  look  at  a  flower  and  perceive  many  things  concerning  it ; 
I  place  a  microscope  to  my  eye,  and  thus  see  points  of  interest  I 
never  dreamed  of  before.  So  attention  seems  to  concentrate  the 
rays  of  perceptive  power,  revealing  thereby  that  which  was  pre- 
viously unperceived.  In  its  relation  to  perception,  attention  may 
be  called  a  mental  microscope. 

To  Memory. — Attention  gives  power  to  the  memory.  It 
gives  clearness  of  conception,  which  is  a  condition  of  remember- 
ing. That  which  the  mind  has  clearly  apprehended,  which  it  has 
carefully  discriminated  from  other  things,  it  takes  firm  hold  of, 
and  thus  retains  it  in  its  mental  grasp.  Continuous  attention 
also  enables  us  to  fix  the  idea,  to  give  permanence  to  the  impres- 
3ion.  It  acts  like  a  kind  of  die  which  stamps  the  picture  upon  the 
tablet  of  memory.  Without  it,  the  greater  part  of  what  we  hear 
or  see  would  fade  from  the  mind,  as  a  shadow  flits  across  the  sum- 
mer landscape. 

Value  to  Thought. — Attention  is  to  a  very  great  extent  the 
source  of  thought-power.  Attention  is  mental  concentration,  and 
there  can  be  no  profound  thinking  without  mental  concentration. 
Unless  the  mental  energies  are  concentrated,  the  mind  indulges  in 
rambling  thought,  goes  out  "  wool-gathering,"  and  returns  empty- 
handed.  To  think  closely  and  effectively,  we  must  possess  the 
power  of  directing  the  mind  toward  and  holding  it  upon  a  subject 
with  persistent  energy. 

Gives  Penetrating  Power. — Attention  gives  penetrating  power 
to  the  mind ;  it  is  a  kind  of  mental  gimlet  by  which  we  bore  our 
way  into  a  hard  problem  or  penetrate  any  subject  difficult  to 
investigate.  Attention  may  also  be  compared  to  a  sun-glass.  I 
hold  my  hand  or  a  piece  of  paper  before  a  window,  and  the  soft 
rays  of  the  sunlight  fall  upon  it  with  a  pleasant  glow  and  warmth. 
I  place  a  sun-glass  between  my  hand  and  the  sun,  and  gather  the 


- 

I 

THE   CULTUKE   OF   ATTENTION.  77 

rays  into  a  focus  so  that  I  could  burn  a  hole  through  an  inch 
board.  So  attention  seems  to  collect  the  scattered  rays  of  thought 
into  a  focus,  enabling  one  to  penetrate  the  hardest  subject  of  in- 
vestigation. 

Power  of  Concentration. — The  concentration  of  the  mind  in  at- 
tention is  like  the  massing  of  troops  in  a  battle.  A  fortification 
is  stormed  and  taken  by  the  concentration  of  a  battalion.  Every 
hard  problem  is  a  fortress  to  be  captured,  and  we  must  unite  our 
mental  forces  to  capture  it.  Attention  enables  us  to  collect  and 
hurl  our  whole  mental  force  against  the  citadels  of  truth,  and  by 
persevering  effort,  carry  them,  as  it  were,  by  storm.  Attention 
may  be  regarded  as  the  commander-in-chief  of  our  mental  powers. 
If  we  wish  to  conquer  truth,  to  capture  and  hold  neAV  territory,  or 
to  occupy  and  appropriate  that  which  is  already  taken,  we  must 
concentrate  our  mental  forces,  and,  like  a  successful  general,  de- 
termine to  fight  it  out  on  that  line. 

Element  of  Thought-Power. — Attention  is  thus  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal elements  of  thought-power.  It  has  been  defined  by  some 
writers  as  "force  of  intellect."  Minds  differ,  perhaps,  more  in 
this  quality  than  in  any  of  the  faculties.  It  is  to  this  power, 
more  than  to  any  other,  that  the  highest  attainments  in  science 
and  art  are  due.  Newton  attributed  his  success  to  the  power  of 
attention.  Being  asked  one  day  how  he  made  his  great  discovery 
of  the  law  of  gravitation,  he  replied,  "  By  incessantly  thinking 
about  it." 

Element  of  Genius. — Attention  is  one  of  the  principal  ele- 
ments of  genius.  This  is  the  expressed  opinion  of  a  large  num- 
ber of  eminent  scholars  and  thinkers.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
says,  "  Genius  is  a  higher  capacity  of  attention."  Helvetius  de- 
fines genius  as  "  nothing  but  continued  attention."  Buffon  says, 
"  Genius  is  only  a  protracted  patience."  Cuvier  remarks,  "  In  the 
exact  sciences,  at  least,  it  is  the  patience  of  a  sound  intellect, 
when  invincible,  which  constitutes  genius."  Lord  Chesterfield 
observes  that  "the  power  of  applying  our  attention,  steady  and 
undissipated,  to  a  single  object,  is  the  sure  mark  of  superior 
genius." 


78  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

II.  THE  CULTIVATION  OF  ATTENTION. — Having  discussed  the 
nature  and  importance  of  attention,  we  shall  now  consider  the 
various  ways  in  which  it  may  be  cultivated.  The  importance  of 
this  discussion  is  evident  from  the  importance  of  the  power  of  at- 
tention. 

By  Exercise. — The  power  of  attention  is  cultivated  by  exer- 
cise. Exercise  is  the  great  law  of  culture,  either  in  body  or  in 
mind.  The  arm  grows  strong  by  exercise  and  becomes  weak 
from  disuse;  so  the  power  of  attention  will  be  developed  by 
regular  and  judicious  action,  and  will  be  weakened  by  careless 
and  heedless  mental  activity.  To  cultivate  the  power  of  atten- 
tion, therefore,  we  must  give  it  judicious  and  habitual  exercise. 
As  the  result  of  exercise,  Caesar  could  write  one  dispatch  and 
at  the  same  time  dictate  four  others,  or  he  could  dictate  seven. 
Philidor,  the  great  chess-player,  could  direct  three  games  at  the 
same  time.  I  knew  a  lady  who  in  a  sewing  circle  would  at  the 
same  time  sew,  tell  funny  stories,  and  dictate  two  or  three  pieces 
to  different  copyists,  for  the  paper  of  a  literary  society. 

Practice  Concentration. — To  cultivate  attention  we  should 
practice  the  concentration  of  the  mind  upon  whatever  we  may  be 
doing.  We  should  never  do  anything  without  attention  ;  nor 
should  we  usually  divide  the  attention  between  several  objects  of 
thought.  We  should  not  allow  the  mind  to  wander,  to  flit  about 
from  one  object  to  another  like  a  butterfly  flitting  from  flower  to 
flower.  Whatever  we  undertake  to  do,  we  should  do  with  a  will, 
we  should  concentrate  the  entire  mental  energies  upon  it  until 
the  work  is  completed.  It  is  in  this  way  that  we  may  cultivate 
habits  of  attention. 

In  Reading. — We  should  always  read  with  attention.  Glanc- 
ing hastily  and  carelessly  over  books  or  newspapers  tends  to 
weaken  the  power  of  attention.  Novel-reading,  as  often  prac- 
ticed by  young  people,  is  especially  injurious  in  this  respect. 
Reading  for  the  excitement  of  the  story  or  merely  to  see  how  it 
terminates,  without  the  object  of  relating  or  remembering  the 
events,  has  a  pernicious  influence  on  the  habit  of  attention.  Every 


THE  CULTURE  OF  ATTENTION.  79 

young  person  should  be  careful  to  acquire  the  habit  of  reading 
with  attention. 

In  Study. — We  should  study  with  attention.  Pupils  who 
repeat  the  words  of  the  book  while  their  thoughts  are  upon  some- 
thing else,  not  only  require  much  longer  time  to  study  their  les- 
sons, but  also  injure  their  powers  of  attention.  An  hour  or  two 
of  close  application  will  accomplish  more  than  many  hours  of 
desultory  study.  In  learning  a  lesson,  it  is  not  how  long  we 
study,  but  how  hard  we  study.  Teachers  should  be  careful  to 
see  that  their  pupils  acquire  the  habit  of  studying  with  attention. 

In  Mathematics. — The  study  of  mathematics  is  especially 
adapted  to  cultivate  habits  of  attention.  These  studies  require 
close  and  concentrated  thought,  and  thus  lead  to  a  habit  of  fixed 
attention.  In  solving  a  problem,  we  must  concentrate  the  mind 
upon  it,  and  we  thus  acquire  the  power  of  mental  concentration. 
Mental  arithmetic  is  especially  valuable  in  this  respect :  it  is  a 
sort  of  mental  whetstone,  sharpening  the  mind  and  giving  it  the 
power  of  penetrating  and  unfolding  the  complicated  conditions 
that  meet  us  in  the  problems  of  science  and  life.  Among  the 
school  studies,  mathematics  ranks  first  for  the  training  of  the 
power  of  attention. 

Practical  Exercises. — A  teacher  of  young  pupils  may  employ 
various  exercises  to  cultivate  their  attention.  He  may  have 
them  look  at  some  object  for  a  few  moments,  as  a  flower  or  a  fly, 
and  then  require  them  to  describe  it.  He  may  read  sentences, 
short  at  first  and  then  longer,  and  have  pupils  reproduce  them 
orally  or  in  writing.  He  may  read  long  combinations  of  small 
numbers  in  addition  and  subtraction,  and  have  the  pupils  repeat 
them  and  perform  the  operations. 

III.  SECURING  ATTENTION  OF  PUPILS. — A  teacher  must  learn 
to  secure  the  attention  of  his  pupils.  No  high  success  in  the  art 
of  teaching  is  possible  without  it.  "When  every  mind  is  intent 
upon  what  the  teacher  is  explaining,  it  will  be  understood  and 
remembered.  When  the  minds  of  the  pupils  are  inattentive  and 
wandering,  no  permanent  impression  will  be  made;  the  words 


80  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

will,  as  it  were,  pass  in  at  one  ear  and  out  at  the  other.  Let  it 
be  remembered,  too,  that  when  a  teacher  fails  to  secure  the  atten 
tion  of  his  pupils,  he  fails  in  his  vocation. 

Manner  of  Teaching. — A  teacher  can  secure  the  attention 
of  his  pupils  by  his  manner  of  teaching.  A  few  suggestions  on 
this  subject  will  be  of  practical  value. 

1.  A  teacher  should  be  earnest  in  his  work.     A  spirit  of  earnest- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  teacher  will  kindle  a  flame  of  interest  in 
the  heart  of  the  pupil ;  and  interest  is  the  mother  of  attention. 
A  teacher  who  shows  no  earnestness  in  communicating  knowledge 
can  expect  none  on  the  part  of  his  pupils  in  acquiring  knowledge. 

2.  A  teacher  should  have  a  clear  view  of  his  subject.     Clearness 
of  conception  leads  to  clearness  of  presentation ;  and  clearness  of 
expression  is  a  condition  of  attention.     A  hesitating  and  obscure 
statement  wearies   the  mind  and   dissipates  the  attention.     It 
needs  the  clear  sunlight  of  truth  from  the  teacher's  mind  to 
illumine  and  attract  the  mind  of  the  pupil. 

3.  A  teacher  should  not  speak  too  fast.     Rapidity  of  utterance 
distracts  the  attention.     The  mind,  unable  to  follow  the  teacher, 
loses  the  relation  of  facts  and  thus  becomes  confused  and  wan- 
ders away  from  what  is  being  presented.     This  caution  is  espec- 
ially important,  since  rapid  talking  is  a  common  fault  of  teachers. 

4.  A  teacher's  voice  should  be  properly  modulated.     The  voice  is 
the  open  sesame  of  the  soul ;  a  sweetly-toned  voice  charms  the  ear 
and  wins  the  attention.     A  teacher  should  speak  with  natural  and 
artistic  modulation.     He  should  not  speak  too  low,  for  that  will 
require  too  much  of  an  effort  to  listen ;  nor  too  loud,  for  that 
confuses  the  mind  and  distracts  the  attention. 

5.  A  teacher's  position  before  his  class  should,  as  a  rule,  be  a 
standing  one.    In  this  position  a  teacher  naturally  manifests  more 
animation  and  interest  in  the  subject.     His  attitude  and  gestures 
will  attract  the  eye  and  do  much  to  secure  attention.     Besides, 
he  has  a  better  command  of  his  pupils  and  can  check  the  tendency 
to  a  wandering  mind.     If  a  teacher  who  is  seated  rises  before  his 
class,  he  will  find  that  he  will  instantly  recall   all  wandering 
thoughts,  and  fix  their  minds  on  the  subject. 


THE  CULTURE  OF  ATTENTION".  81 

6.  A  teacher  should  be  interested  in  his  instruction.  This  is  the 
sine  qua  non  of  attention.  Interest  begets  interest ;  the  flame  of 
interest  in  the  teacher's  mind  will  kindle  a  flame  of  interest  in 
the  pupils'  minds.  Attention  cannot  be  compelled,  it  must  be 
enticed  ;  and  the  warmth  and  glow  of  the  teacher's  heart  casts  a 
glow  of  interest  around  a  subject  that  makes  it  attractive  to  the 
pupil,  and  thus  secures  his  attention. 

Method  of  Teaching. — The  teacher  may  do  much  to  secure 
the  attention  of  his  pupils  by  his  method  of  teaching.  A  few 
suggestions  on  this  point  will  be  of  interest. 

1.  The  teacher  should,  so  far  as  possible,  teach  without  the  text- 
book.    A  book  in  the  teacher's  hand  often  seems  to  build  a  par- 
tition wall  between  the  minds  of  the  teacher  and  pupil.     The 
constant  reference  to  the  book  breaks  the  spirit  of  interest  that 
should  flow  from  one  mind  to  another.    Teaching  without  a  book 
also  inspires  confidence  in  the  teacher's  ability,  which  is  not  an 
unimportant  condition  of  attention. 

2.  The  teacher  should  assign  topics  miscellaneously.   If  the  pupils 
know  the  order  of  the  topics  or  questions,  they  naturally  allow 
the  attention  to  wander  so  long  as  there  is  no  danger  of  a  question 
coming  to  them.     When  they  understand  that  a  question  may 
fall  anywhere,  they  keep  wide  awake,  so  as  to  be  ready  for  it 
when  it  comes. 

3.  A  teacher  should,  so  far  as  possible,  use  the  concrete  method. 
This  is  especially  necessary  with  young  pupils.  The  mind  follows 
the  eye;  and  the  attention  is  caught  through  the  senses.     What 
is  seen  is  much  more  attractive  than  what  is  only  heard  or  thought. 
Abstract  subjects,  even  with  older  pupils,  excite  more  interest 
when  illustrations  put  them  more  clearly  before  the  mind. 

4.  The  teacher  should  vary  his  methods  of  teaching.     Variety  is 
"  the  spice  of  life"  in  the  school-room  as  well  as  outside  of  it. 
The  routine  method  soon  loses  its  interest,  and  the  mind  becomes 
dull  and  weary.     Vary  the  method  and  the  mind  is  aroused  with 
the  novelty,  and  the  attention  led  captive  at  will. 

5.  The   teacher  should  not  talk  too  much.     Too  much  talking 


82  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

wearies  the  mind  and  dissipates  the  attention.  There  should  be 
frequent  questions  to  awaken  thought  and  allow  the  pupil  to  de- 
velop knowledge  for  himself.  Such  an  exercise  will  do  more  to 
attract  and  hold  the  attention  than  the  most  eloquent  discussions 
of  the  teacher.  Anything  that  arouses  mental  activity  will  secure 
attention. 

6.  The  teacher  should  often  use  the  written  method  of  recitation. 
In  a  large  class,  when  the  subjects  are  topical,  so  few  can  be  called 
on  that  the  attention  of  those  not  reciting  naturally  wanders.  In 
such  cases,  the  written  recitation  can  be  associated  with  the  oral 
one,  thus  holding  the  attention  of  every  pupil. 

Extent  of  Culture. — This  power  has  been  cultivated  in  a  high 
degree  by  almost  every  one  whose  name  is  associated  with  the 
progress  of  science.  Sometimes  the  power  has  existed  to  such  an 
extent  that  it  has  almost  degenerated  into  a  disease.  Cases  are 
on  record  where  persons  have  become  so  absorbed  in  thought  as 
to  be  oblivious  to  what  was  taking  place  around  them.  Plato 
tells  us  that  Socrates,  when  upon  a  military  expedition,  was  seen 
by  the  Athenian  army  to  stand  for  a  whole  day  and  a  night,  com- 
pletely engrossed  in  the  consideration  of  a  single  subject.  When 
Syracuse  was  stormed  by  the  Romans,  Archimedes  was  so  com- 
pletely absorbed  in  the  solution  of  a  geometrical  problem  that  he 
was  first  aware  of  the  enemy  by  receiving  his  death-wound  as  he 
was  bending  over  and  drawing  a  diagram  in  the  sand. 

Joseph  Scaliger,  when  a  Protestant  student  in  Paris,  was  so 
engrossed  in  the  study  of  Homer  that  he  became  aware  of  the  mas- 
sacre of  St.  Bartholomew,  and  of  his  own  escape,  only  on  the  day 
after  the  catastrophe.  Cardan,  the  illustrious  philosopher  and 
mathematician,  while  upon  a  journey,  became  so  lost  in  thought 
that  he  forgot  both  his  way  and  the  object  of  his  journey.  To  the 
question  of  his  driver  whither  he  should  proceed,  he  made  no 
answer,  and  when  he  came  to  himself  at  night-fall,  he  was  surprised 
to  find  the  carriage  at  a  stand  still  directly  under  a  gallows.  The 
life  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton  is  full  of  striking  incidents  illustrating  the 
complete  concentration  of  the  mind  upon  the  objects  of  his  study. 


THE  INTELLECT. 


I.  PERCEPTION. 
H.  MEMORY. 
HI.  IMAGINATION. 

IV.  UNDERSTANDING. 
I.  ABSTRACTION. 
II.  CONCEPTION. 

III.  JUDGMENT. 

IV.  REASONING. 

V.  INTUITION. 

I.  INTUITIONS  OF  THE  TRUB. 
II.  INTUITIONS  OF  THE  BEAUTIFUL^ 
III.  INTUITIONS  OF  THE  GOOD. 


PERCEPTION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OP  PERCEPTION. 

PERCEPTION  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  we  gain 
a  knowledge  of  external  objects  through  the  senses.  It  is 
the  power  of  cognizing  external  objects  and  their  qualities.  The 
term  is  derived  from  per,  through,  and  capio,  I  take,  and  means 
to  take  or  receive  through  the  senses.  It  is  sometimes  applied  to 
the  act  and  the  product  of  perception,  as  well  as  to  the  power  of 
perceiving.  Thus  we  say,  my  perception  of  the  object  was  not 
very  clear,  or  my  perception  was  distinctly  recalled. 

The  Percept. — The  products  of  perception  are  properly 
called  percepts.  A  Percept  is  a  notion  of  some  external  object 
derived  through  any  of  the  senses.  In  other  words,  a  percept  is 
that  mental  product  which  arises  from  the  perception  of  an 
external  object.  A  percept  is,  of  course,  an  Idea, — the  first  of 
the  two  classes  of  intellectual  products.  Thus,  my  idea  of-  my 
father,  my  mother,  or  of  any  particular  object,  is  a  percept.  A 
percept  is  a  particular  idea,  and  embraces  some  particular  form, 
color,  size,  etc.  All  proper  nouns  are  the  expression  of  percepts ; 
and,  vice  versa,  the  mental  products  corresponding  to  proper  names 
are  percepts. 

Ego  and  Non-Ego. — Perception  gives  us  an  idea  of  an  exter- 
nal object.  This  object  is  cognized  as  having  an  existence  distinct 
from  ourselves.  In  an  act  of  perception,  therefore,  consciousness 
recognizes  the  existence  of  two  distinct  elements;  ourselves  as 
perceiving,  and  an  object  perceived.  This  distinction  is  universal, 

(85) 


86  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

and  tacitly  accepted  by  all  men  under  all  circumstances,  and  is 
thus  to  be  regarded  as  an  accepted  postulate  of  mental  philosophy. 
These  two  elements  are  distinguished  as  the  subjective  and  object- 
ive elements  in  perception,  called  also  the  me  and  the  not-me,  the 
ego  and  the  non-ego. 

The  Organism. — The  mind  operates  in  an  act  of  perception 
through  or  by  means  of  a  nervous  organism  endowed  with  sensi- 
bility, and  capable  of  feeling  impressions  made  upon  it  by  the 
objects  of  the  external  world.  This  organism  has  its  centre  or 
origin  principally  in  the  head,  in  a  form  called  the  Brain.  Im- 
pressions made  upon  the  sentient  organism  by  external  objects  are 
conveyed  to  the  brain,  and  by  some  action  of  the  mind  become 
knowledge.  The  result  of  an  impression  of  an  object  on  the 
organism  is  a  feeling  which  is  called  a  Sensation.  The  act  of 
knowledge  arising  from  this  sensation  is  called  a  Perception.  The 
sentient  organism  is  thus  a  connecting  link  between  the  mind  and 
the  objective  world. 

The  Senses. — This  nervous  organism  is  arranged  in  different 
forms,  capable  of  receiving  different  impressions.  These  different 
forms  constitute  what  we  call  the  Senses.  There  are  five  such 
distinct  forms  or  senses,  namely,  Touch,  Sight,  Hearing,  Taste, 
and  Smell.  Each  one  of  these  senses  is  the  source  of  some  par- 
ticular kind  of  knowledge  of  external  objects. 

Conditions  of  Perception. — The  conditions  of  an  act  of  per- 
ception, it  is  thus  seen,  are :  1.  The  existence  of  a  mind  to  per- 
ceive; 2.  The  existence  of  an  object  to  be  perceived;  3.  The 
existence  of  a  nervous  organism  capable  of  sensation ;  4.  Such  a 
relation  of  the  object  to  the  organism  that  the  former  makes  an 
impression  on  the  latter.  Given  these  four  conditions,  and  an  act 
of  perception  is  possible ;  remove  any  one  of  them,  and  no  act  of 
perception  could  take  place. 

Divisions  for  Discussion. — Having  given  this  general  intro- 
duction to  the  subject  of  Perception,  we  shall  now  discuss  it  in 
detail  under  the  following  heads :  1.  The  Nervous  Organism ;  2. 
The  Perceptive  Process ;  3.  Remarks  on  Perception ;  4.  Percep- 
tion bv  the  Different -Senses ;  5.  The  Qualities  of  Bodies. 


THE  NATUKE   OF   PERCEPTION.  87 

I.  THE  NERVOUS  ORGANISM. 

The  first  condition  of  Perception  is  the  existence  of  a  nervous 
organism  called  a  Sensoriwn.  Such  an  organism  is  the  connect- 
ing link  between  matter  and  spirit ;  it  is  the  pathway  tha't  leads 
from  matter  to  mind,  the  avenue  by  which  the  qualities  of  the 
external  world  can  pass  into  or  become  known  to  consciousness. 
The  Sensorium  consists  of  the  brain  and  spinal  cord,  the  ganglia, 
and  the  nerves.  The  student  of  mental  philosophy  should  have 
some  knowledge  of  each  of  these. 

The  Brain. — The  brain  is  an  egg-shaped  organ  situated  in  the 
cranium,  surrounded  by  membranes,  and  consisting  of  two  parts, 
the  Cerebrum  and  the  Cerebellum.  It  is  composed  of  two  kinds 
of  substance ;  gray  matter  and  white  matter.  The  white  matter 
consists  of  nerve-fibres  supported  in  a  delicate  framework  of  con- 
nective tissue.  The  gray  matter,  in  addition,  contains  a  number 
of  nerve-cells,  or  ganglionic  corpuscles,  some  of  them  of  consider- 
able size.  These  cells  are  wholly  absent  in  the  white  matter.  The 
white  matter  seems  to  be  associated  with  motion,  and  the  gray 
matter  with  sensation. 

The  Cerebrum. — The  Cerebrum  occupies  the  front  and  upper 
parts  of  the  skull,  and  comprises  about  seven-eighths  of  the  entire 
weight  of  the  brain.  It  consits  of  a  mass  of  white  fibres  covered 
with  gray  matter.  It  is  arranged  in  wrinkles  or  folds,  called  con- 
volutions, which  afford  a  large  surface  for  the  gray  matter.  The 
cerebrum  is  divided  into  two  hemispheres,  connected  beneath  by 
fibres  of  white  matter.  We  thus  have  a  double  brain,  as  we  have 
two  eyes,  two  hands,  etc.  These  two  hemispheres  seem  to  be 
independent  in  their  operations,  as  one  hemisphere  has  been 
almost  entirely  destroyed  without  apparent  injury  to  the  mental 
powers.  The  cerebrum  is  the  seat  of  intelligence ;  when  it  is  re- 
moved from  animals  they  pass  into  a  state  of  apathy  and  stupor. 

The  Cerebellum. — The  Cerebellum  lies  behind  the  cerebrum,  in 
the  back  part  of  the  head.  Its  structure  is  similar  to  the  cere- 
brum, but  instead  of  convolutions  it  has  parallel  ridges  which  let 
the  gray  matter  down  into  the  white,  presenting  a  peculiar 


88  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

appearance  called  the  arbor-vitce,  or  tree  of  life.  The  cerebellum 
seems  to  be  the  centre  of  voluntary  motion  ;  when  it  is  injured  or 
diseased,  persons  walk  unsteadily  as  if  intoxicated.  Birds  from 
which  it  has  been  removed  lose  control  of  their  muscles. 

TJie  Spinal  Cord. — The  Spinal  Cord  begins  at  the  brain  in 
an  expansion  called  the  medulla  oblongata,  and  passes  down  the 
cavity  of  the  back-bone.  It  consists  of  the  same  tissue  as  the 
brain,  but  has  the  white  fibres  on  the  outside  and  the  gray  cells 
within.  It  is  separated  into  halves  by  deep  fissures,  called  the 
anterior  and  posterior  fissures.  Each  half  of  the  cord  is  divided 
longitudinally  into  three  equal  parts,  the  anterior,  lateral,  and 
posterior  columns,  by  the  lines  of  attachment  of  the  roots  of  the 
spinal  nerves.  These  nerves  pass  out  of  the  spinal  cord  by  aper- 
tures between  the  vertebrae,  and  then  divide  and  subdivide  and 
pass  to  the  muscles  and  skin. 

The  Nerves. — The  nerves  are  silvery  threads  composed,  like 
the  spinal  cord,  of  white  matter  without  and  gray  matter  within. 
Those  which  carry  an  impulse  to  the  brain  or  to  any  central 
organ,  are  called  sensory  or  afferent  nerves;  those  which  carry 
away  an  impulse  from  an  organ  are  called  motor  or  efferent  nerves. 
If  a  sensory  nerve  is  cut,  sensation  in  the  part  to  which  it  goes  is 
lost,  while  motion  remains ;  if  the  motor  nerve  is  cut,  motion  is 
lost,  but  sensation  remains.  The  structure  of  these  two  classes  of 
nerves  seem  to  be  the  same.  The  impulse  which  travels  along 
them  requires  time  for  its  passage,  and  is  much  slower  than  many 
other  forces,  even  slower  than  sound. 

Classes  of  Nerves. — The  Nerves  are  of  three  classes ;  the  spinal, 
cranial,  and  sympathetic.  The  Spinal  Nerves  arise  from  the  spinal 
cord  by  two  roots ;  the  anterior  root  is  the  motor  and  the  poster- 
ior is  the  sensory  one.  The  anterior  connects  with  the  white 
matter  of  the  cord  ;  the  posterior  connects  with  the  gray  matter, 
and  has  a  small  ganglion  of  its  own  at  a  little  distance  from  the 
origin.  The  roots  unite  and  are  bound  up  in  one  sheath,  though 
they  preserve  their  special  functions.  If  the  anterior  root  is  cut, 
vountary  motion  is  lost  and  sensation  remains ;  if  the  posterior 


THE  NATUJRE   OF   PERCEPTION.  89 

root  is  cut,  sensation  is  lost  and  voluntary  movement  remains.  If 
both  are  cut,  irritation  of  the  anterior  root  below  the  point  of 
division  causes  motion,  while  irritation  of  the  posterior  root  above 
this  point  causes  pain. 

The  Cranial  Nerves  spring  from  the  lower  parts  of  the  brain 
and  the  medulla  oblongata.  They  go  to  the  face,  nose,  ear,  eye, 
tongue,  larynx,  lungs,  stomach,  etc.  The  Sympathetic  System 
consists  of  a  double  chain  of  ganglia  on  each  side  of  the  spinal 
column,  extending  into  the  chest  and  abdomen.  From  these 
ganglia,  delicate  nerves  run  to  the  vital  organs, — the  heart,  lungs, 
stomach,  etc.,  to  the  veins  and  arteries,  and  to  the  spinal  and 
cranial  nerves. 

Functions  of  the  Nerves, — The  nerves  serve  to  convey  impres- 
sions and  impulses  to  and  from  the  central  organs.  One  filament 
of  each  pair  of  nerves  carries  the  sensation  to  the  central  organ, 
and  the  other  filament  carries  the  impulse  from  the  central  organ. 
If  any  point  where  they  terminate  is  excited,  one  filament  conveys 
the  notice  to  the  brain  or  ganglion,  and  the  other  brings  an  im- 
pulse back  to  the  point  where  the  sensation  occurred.  When  an 
impression  is  made  on  any  part  of  the  body,  the  message  flashes 
inward  on  the  afferent  nerve,  and  an  answer  is  flashed  outward  to 
the  place  on  the  efferent  nerve.  This  may  be  a  matter  of  con- 
sciousness ;  or  it  may  occur  without  the  knowledge  of  the  mind. 
This  power  of  involuntary  nervous  action  is  called  the  reflex  action 
of  the  nervous  system. 

Reflex  Action. — Reflex  action  is  the  power  of  converting 
afferent  into  efferent  impulses,  or  of  sending  back  or  reflecting  an 
impression  of  the  nervous  system.  Thus,  if  a  person  whose  legs 
are  paralyzed  by  spinal  injury  and  consequently  immovable,  be 
tickled  on  the  soles  of  the  feet,  the  legs  will  kick  out  convulsively. 
The  impulse  is  reflected  from  the  spinal  cord.  Winking  at  a 
flash  of  light  or  a  threatened  blow,  is  an  example  of  reflex  action, 
in  which  the  afferent  nerves  are  the  optic  and  the  efferent  nerves 
the  facial.  When  a  bad  smell  causes  a  grimace,  the  reflex  action 
conies  through  the  facial  nerves,  the  olfactory  nerves  being  affer- 


90  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ent  and  carrying  the  impression  to  the  brain.  This  power  is  pos- 
sessed by  the  gray  matter  and  not  by  the  white,  and  resides  con- 
sequently in  the  ganglia,  spinal  cord,  and  brain. 

Importance  of  Reflex  Action. — The  principle  of  reflex  action  is 
important  in  explaining  several  processes  connected  with  the 
action  of  the  mind.  Many  of  the  operations  in  complex  mental 
activities  are  due  to  this  principle.  Actions  which  at  first  require 
attention  and  volition,  by  frequent  repetition  become  in  a  manner 
part  of  our  organization,  and  are  performed  without  volition  or 
even  consciousness. 

The  possibility  of  physical  education  is  based  upon  the  existence 
of  this  power,  which  the  nervous  system  possesses,  of  organizing 
conscious  actions  into  unconscious  or  reflex  operations.  The 
training  of  a  gymnast,  the  practice  of  a  dancer,  the  drill  of  a 
soldier,  etc.,  are  all  founded  upon  this  principle.  The  force  of 
habit  is  illustrated  by  the  story  of  the  practical  joker  who,  seeing 
a  discharged  veteran  carrying  home  his  dinner,  suddenly  called 
out  "Attention,"  whereupon  the  man  instantly  brought  his  hands 
down  to  the  soldier's  position,  and  lost  his  mutton  and  potatoes  in 
the  gutter.  Even  the  mind  itself  acquires  habits  by  which  it 
tends  to  reproduce  often-repeated  words  and  thoughts. 

Organs  of  Perception. — The  nervous  tissue  possesses  the 
property  of  being  sensitive  to  impressions  of  objects.  It  is  ar- 
ranged into  organs  in  different  places,  and  adapted  to  different 
impressions  and  sensations.  In  some  cases  there  is  a  complicated 
organ,  as  the  eye  and  ear ;  in  other  cases  there  is  simply  an  ex- 
pansion of  the  nervous  tissue.  The  several  classes  of  nerves  of 
sensation  are  those  of  touch,  taste,  smell,  sight,  and  hearing.  All 
the  knowledge  we  have  of  the  qualities  of  bodies  comes  through 
the  impressions  made  on  these  different  nerves.  Having  given 
this  explanation  of  the  organism,  we  proceed  to  explain  how  the 
mind  perceives  through  the  different  senses. 

II.  THE  PERCEPTIVE  PROCESS. 

How  does  the  mind  perceive  through  the  senses  ?  What  is  the 
method  by  which  the  immaterial  spirit  takes  cognizance  of  the 


THE  NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  91 

objects  of  the  material  world  ?  This  is  one  of  the  first  and  one 
of  the  most  difficult  inquiries  of  mental  philosophy.  In  answer 
to  this  question,  it  may  be  briefly  stated  that  external  bodies  make 
an  impression  on  the  nervous  organism,  producing  sensations,  and 
that  perception  is  the  result.  How  this  occurs,  how  an  impression 
on  the  sense  appears  as  conscious  knowledge  in  the  mind,  is  a 
mystery  which  is  perhaps  beyond  the  power  of  human  philosophy 
to  unfold  with  complete  satisfaction. 

Nature  of  the  Subject. — In  order  fully  to  appreciate  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  question,  we  should  imagine  ourselves  without  any 
knowledge  of  external  objects  whatever,  and  then  try  to  trace  our 
way  out  from  the  subjective  world  to  the  objective  world;  to 
bridge  over  the  chasm  -between  the  ego  and  the  non-ego,  and  show 
how  the  immaterial  spirit  cognizes  the  material  object.  The  ex- 
planation of  this  is  what  we  call  the  procass  of  perception. 

Methods  of  Explanation. — There  have  been  many  theories 
advanced  to  explain  the  process  of  perception.  Most  of  the 
recent  writers  in  this  country  have  based  their  methods  of  explan- 
ation on  that  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  ;  and  at  least  the  spirit  of 
his  method  is  the  one  adopted  in  the  present  work.  The  process 
is  by  nearly  all  modern  writers  divided  into  two  distinct  parts, — 
Sensation  and  Perception.  Perception  is  usually  regarded  as 
including  two  things ;  the  cognition  of  the  organism,  and  the 
cognition  of  the  external  object.  We  shall,  in  describing  the 
process,  divide  it  into  four  distinct  parts  or  steps:  first,  Simple 
Sensation ;  second,  the  Distinct  Cognition  of  the  Sensation ;  third 
the  Cognition  of  the  Sentient  Organism  ;  fourth,  the  Cognition  of 
the  External  Object. 

Simple  Sensation. — The  first  step  in  the  process  of  percep- 
tion, or  rather  the  condition  of  that  process,  is  simple  sensation. 
Something  touches  me,  an  impression  is  made  on  the  nervous 
organism,  that  impression  is  transmitted  to  the  brain,  and  I  am 
conscious  of  a  certain  feeling  which  we  call  a  sensation.  This  feel- 
ing belongs  to  the  nervous  organism  as  connected  with  the  mind, 
and  involves  no  act  of  the  intellect.  The  nervous  tissue  is  sensi- 


92  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

live,  and  the  feeling  experienced  is  an  affection  of  the  nervous 
organism  as  connected  with  the  mind.  The  process,  so  far,  does 
not  involve  an  act  of  perception,  but  is  merely  the  condition  of 
perception. 

Cognition  of  tlie  Sensation. — The  mind  is  now  aroused  by 
this  sensation,  and  the  attention  is  directed  to  it.  The  sensation 
is  cognized  as  an  actual  condition,  as  a  real  phenomenon,  a  some- 
thing that  now  is  and  which  was  not.  As  these  phenomena  are 
repeated,  the  mind  distinguishes  one  sensation  from  another,  which 
involves  an  act  of  memory  and  comparison.  It  also  cognizes  the 
length  of  the  sensation  in  time,  as  in  a  sound,  the  position  of  the 
sensation  in  space,  as  in  touch,  its  intensity,  as  in  color,  etc. 

I  do  not,  however,  know  what  produced  the  sensation,  or 
whether  anything  produced  it.  I  do  not  at  first  recognize  it  as* 
an  affection  of  my  bodily  organism,  or  even  know  that  I  have  a 
bodily  organism.  I  am  conscious  of  it  only  as  a  feeling,  though 
a  feeling  distinct  in  time,  place,  and  degree.  The  process  is  en- 
tirely within  the  mind,  a  purely  subjective  process.  It  is,  how- 
ever, a  cognition  of  the  mind,  and,  therefore,  an  act  of  perception. 
This  is  really  the  first  step  in  the  process  of  perception. 

Cognition  of  the  Organism. — The  second  step  in  the  process 
is  the  cognition  of  the  organism.  These  sensations  are  exper- 
ienced in  different  places,  and  are  thus  cognized  as  apart  from  one 
another.  Thus  a  pain  in  the  head,  a  prick  in  the  finger,  a  wound 
in  the  foot,  are  felt  at  different  places.  To  experience  sensations 
in  different  places  is  to  cognize  a  difference  of  place  or  locality. 
This  cognition  of  locality  leads  to  the  idea  of  outness  and  thus 
of  extension.  This  outness  or  extension  is  limited  by  the  position 
of  the  different  sensations;  I  thus  cognize  an  extended  limited 
something  as  the  seat  of  sensations.  This  extended  something, 
limited  by  the  locality  of  sensations,  we  call  the  sentient  organism. 
The  sentient  organism  thus  passes  under  the  eye  of  consciousness, 
and  becomes  an  object  of  cognition,  distinct  from  the  mind  per- 
ceiving it.  It  is  to  me  an  externality  having  extension,  and  also 
form  as  the  limitation  of  extension.  It  is  to  me  a  non-ego,  dis- 
tinct from  the  ego,  which  perceives  it. 


THE    NATUKE   OF   PERCEPTION.  93 

This  cognition  of  the  organism  is  aided,  no  doubt,  by  the  sen- 
sation of  the  internal  organs.  The  sensations  of  the  muscles  and 
viscera  are  felt  in  different  places,  and  assist  in  limiting  and  filling 
out  our  idea  of  an  extended  sentient  organism. 

Remarks  on  the  Process. — In  this  cognition  we  pass  beyond 
sensation  and  the  subjective  phase  of  perception,  to  perception  in 
its  objective  phase :  it  has  been  regarded  by  some  writers  as  the  first 
step  of  perception  proper.  It  is  an  act  of  the  mind  midway  be- 
tween the  cognition  of  the  sensation  and  the  perception  of  the  ex- 
ternal object.  In  it  we  reach  the  first  objective  non-ego  as  dis- 
tinct from  the  ego.  It  is  thus  seen  that  the  consciousness  of  the 
sensation  is  not  perception,  but  the  condition  of  perception ;  that 
the  distinct  cognition  of  the  sensation  as  such  is  an  act  of  per- 
ception in  its  subjective  phase ;  and  that  the  cognition  of  the 
organism  as  distinct  from  the  sentient  mind  is  an  act  of  per- 
ception in  its  first  objective  phase. 

Cognition  of  the  Object. — The  process  is  still  incomplete,  for 
there  is  yet  no  conception  of  the  external  object.  How,  then, 
does  the  mind  get  out  into  the  objective  world  and  perceive  the 
object  itself?  This  is  the  most  difficult  part  of  the  subject,  and 
the  point  on  which  philosophers  differ  most  widely.  The  follow- 
ing explanation  seems  to  me  to  be  simple  and  satisfactory : 

One  Explanation. — I  am  conscious  of  my  bodily  organism  as 
extended.  I  touch  some  part  of  the  organism,  as  my  wrist,  with 
my  fingers,  and  find  a  double  sensation,  the  feeling  in  my  wrist  as 
touched,  and  in  my  fingers  as  touching.  I  touch  some  other 
object,  as  a  book,  and  find  but  one  set  of  sensations,  that  in  my 
fingers.  Thus  I  cognize  something  different  from  my  bodily  organ- 
ism, something  that  gives  a  sensation,  but  which  does  not  possess 
the  capacity  for  sensations.  This  new  something  now  becomes  an 
object  of  attention.  I  pass  my  hand  along  it,  and  for  a  certain 
time  experience  a  sensation  which  afterward  ceases ;  from  this  I 
perceive  the  object  has  a  limitation  in  length.  I  then  find  its 
limitations  in  breadth  and  thickness  in  the  same  way,  and  thus 
cognize  it  as  extended.  I  thus  get  a  cognition  of  an  extended 
something  different  from  my  organism — that  is,  of  an  extended 
object. 


94  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

Hamilton's  Explanation. — Sir  William  Hamilton  explains  the 
perception  of  an  external  object  through  the  cognition  of  resist- 
ance to  our  locomotive  energy.  I  am  conscious  of  my  bodily 
organism,  and  conscious  that  it  is  capable  of  movement  in  obed- 
ience to  my  volition.  I  am  conscious  of  the  effort  to  move  my 
person  or  one  of  its  members,  and  also  conscious  of  being  resisted 
in  these  movements.  This  new  phenomenon,  resistance,  new  be- 
comes an  object  of  attention.  To  know  that  I  am  resisted  is  to 
know,  by  a  necessary  law  of  intelligence,  that  something  resists  ; 
and  consciousness  revealing  nothing  within  the  mind  as  resisting, 
we  are  compelled  to  attribute  it  to  something  external  to  the  mind. 
To  be  conscious  of  resistance  and  know  that  it  does  not  arise  from 
the  ego,  is  to  know  that  it  must  arise  from  a  non-ego,  and,  there- 
fore, that  this  non-ego  exists.  Thus  the  outer  world  passes  under* 
the  eye  of  consciousness,  and  becomes  indirectly  an  object  of  per- 
ception. 

Steps  not  Distinct. — In  this  analysis  of  the  powers  of  percep- 
tion, we  have  regarded  the  act  of  perception  as  broken  up  into 
several  distinct  parts  or  steps.  This  division  is,  however,  a  logical 
rather  than  a  physiological  one.  Chronologically,  the  act  is  one 
and  indivisible ;  the  sensation  and  the  perception  are  synchronous. 
We  are  not,  in  an  act  of  perception,  first  conscious  of  a  sensation, 
then  of  the  bodily  organism,  and  then  of  an  external  something 
as  producing  the  sensation.  Usually  the  three  are  immediately 
united  in  a  single  act  of  perception.  The  explanation  given,  it 
must  be  remembered,  is  that  of  the  original  process  in  learning 
to  perceive,  and  not  of  our  matured  acts  of  perception.  There 
may  be  sensation,  of  course,  without  the  cognition  of  an  external 
object ;  but  there  can  be  no  cognition  of  an  external  object  with- 
out sensation. 

III.  REMARKS  ON  THE  PROCESS  OF  PERCEPTION. 

The  foregoing  discussion  will  give  one  a  general  idea  of  the 
process  by  which  the  mind  perceives  objects  through  the  senses. 
A  few  remarks  upon  the  method  described  will  afford  a  clearer 


THE   NATURE   OF    PERCEPTION.  95 

idea  of  some  points  involved  in  the  process,  and  also  answer  some 
questions  which  naturally  grow  out  of  it. 

Sensation  and  Perception. — Sensation  and  Perception  are 
to  be  clearly  discriminated.  Sensation  is  simply  the  phenomenon 
of  feeling  as  an  affection  of  the  organism.  It  is  purely  subject- 
ive, and  is  the  immediate  result  of  some  impression  on  the  organs 
of  sense.  Perception  is  the  cognition  of  the  feeling  as  a  distinct 
phenomenon ;  the  cognition  of  the  organism  as  affected  and  as  an 
externality  having  extension ;  and,  also,  the  cognition  of  objects 
external  to  the  organism.  Sensation  is  thus  the  indispensable 
condition  of  perception.  Some  writers  seem  to  regard  the  cogni- 
tion of  "  the  sensation  as  such  "  as  a  mere  sensation ;  but  since  it 
involves  a  distinct  act  of  mind,  it  is  more  than  sensation,  and 
must  be  considered  as  an  act  of  perception. 

Relation  of  Sensation  and  Perception, — The  relation  of 
Sensation  and  Perception  is  expressed  by  a  law  simple  and  uni- 
versal in  its  character.  This  law,  as  stated  by  Hamilton,  is  as 
follows :  Perception  and  Sensation,  though  always  co-existent,  are 
always  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  each  other.  That  is,  the  stronger  the 
sensation  the  weaker  the  perception,  and  vice  versa.  Thus,  in 
sight,  where  perception  is  at  its  maximum,  sensation  is  at  its  min- 
imum, for  we  are  not  conscious  of  any  organic  pleasure  or  pain 
from  the  impression  of  colors  on  the  retina.  In  touch,  where  the 
sensation  is  distinctly  felt,  the  perception  is  feeble.  The  same  law 
holds  in  the  relative  operations  of  each  sense,  for  the  more  intense 
the  impression  on  any  one  sense,  within  certain  limits,  the  less 
distinct  the  perception.  Thus  in. the  sense  of  sight,  if  the  im- 
pression be  strong,  we  are  dazzled  or  blinded,  and  while  conscious 
of  the  sensation,  perception  is  nearly  or  wholly  lost. 

Nature  of  Sensation. — The  nature  of  sensation  is  not  fully 
understood.  Whether  the  modification  of  the  organs  of  sense 
extends  inward  beyond  the  surface,  is  a  question  difficult  to 
answer.  Some  have  supposed  that  the  impression  is  carried  along 
the  nerves  to  the  brain  either  by  vibrations  in  the  substance  of 
the  nerve  or  by  the  "  flow  of  animal  spirits,"  or  by  some  general 


96  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

nervous  agent,  or  by  the  influx  of  actual  representative  films  or 
forms  or  species  from  without.  These,  however,  are  mere  hypoth- 
eses, some  of  them  utterly  inconceivable,  and  none  of  them  estab- 
lished by  experiment.  Some,  again,  suppose  that  the  mind  per- 
vades the  entire  sentient  organism,  or  passes  down  from  its 
presence-chamber  in  the  brain  to  the  place  where  the  impression 
is  made.  Knowing  nothing  about  it,  however,  we  can  assert 
nothing. 

Explanation  Based  on  Touch. — The  explanation  of  the 
perceptive  process  here  presented  is  based  on  the  sense  of  touch. 
It  does  not  attempt  to  explain  how  we  perceive  objects  by  the  eye 
or  ear.  It  assumes  that  our  first  perceptions  of  external  objects 
come  through  the  sense  of  touch,  and  that  the  other  senses  are 
instructed  by  the  sense  of  touch.  Thus  in  hearing,  it  is  held  that 
all  that  this  sense  gives  us  is  the  cognition  of  sound ;  and  that, 
having  learned  by  touch  that  there  is  an  external  world,  we  learn 
by  experience  to  refer  the  sound'  to  an  external  object.  So,  in 
respect  to  sight,  it  is  held  that  the  ideas  of  color  and  form,  if  sight 
gives  form,  are  referred  by  experience  to  the  objects  which  by 
touch  we  have  learned  exist  around  us.  The  same  also  is  true 
with  respect  to  smell  and  taste.  This  phase  of  the  subject  will 
be  discussed  more  fully  under  the  next  general  head. 

Direct  and  Indirect  Perception. — It  is  held  by  the  advo- 
cates of  this  view  that  perception  through  touch,  or  muscular 
resistance,  is  a  direct  cognition  of  the  external  world,  and  that  all 
other  perception  of  external  objects  is  indirect.  Thus,  when  we 
hear  a  sound  and  refer  it  by  experience  to  a  passing  carriage,  we 
are  said  to  perceive  the  carriage,  not  directly,  but  indirectly.  So 
when  we  smell  a  fragrance  and  refer  it  to  a  rose  or  pink,  we  are 
said  to  perceive  the  rose  or  pink  indirectly.  Some  of  the  cogni- 
tions of  sight  also  are  explained  in  the  same  way. 

Acquired  Perceptions. — These  indirect  perceptions  are  also 
called  acquired  perceptions.  We  acquire  the  power  of  using  one 
pense  in  place  of  another,  or  of  applying  the  knowledge  which  is 
given  by  one  sense  to  something  given  by  another  sense.  Thus, 


THE   NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  97 

when  I  hear  a  sound,  I  know  it  comes  from  a  piano,  a  flute,  or  a 
person ;  and  the  sound  awakens  the  perception  of  the  object.  So 
when  I  see  iron  glowing  in  the  furnace,  I  say  it  "  looks  hot ;" 
though  heat  is  a  perception  of  touch.  These  two  classes  of  sense- 
perceptions  are  distinguished  as  original  and  acquired.  An  orig- 
inal perception  is  that  which  is  given  by  a  single  sense  when  used 
alone ;  an  acquired  perception  is  that  which  is  given  by  using  the 
knowledge  afforded  directly  by  one  sense  as  the  sign  of  know- 
ledge which  we  gain  by  some  other  sense.  This  is  more  fully 
discussed  under  the  next  general  head — Perception  by  the  Differ- 
ent Senses. 

The  Forming  of  Percepts. — The  product  of  Perception  is 
called  a  percept.  A  percept  may  be  defined  as  the  idea  we  have 
of  any  particular  object.  Our  ideas  of  objects  are  complex,  being 
composed  of  different  elements  given  by  the  different  senses. 
Thus  my  idea  of  an  orange  embraces  its  form,  color,  weight,  hard- 
ness and  softness,  fragrance,  taste,  etc.,  some  elements  being  given 
by  one  sense  and  some  by  another.  Each  of  these  elements  is 
called  a  simple  percept ;  and  their  union  in  a  single  idea  which  we 
call  the  orange  is  a  complex  percept.  Some  writers  call  the  former 
a  percept  and  the  complex  percept  a  thing ;  but  thing  seems  to 
refer  to  the  external  object  rather  than  to  our  idea  of  it.  It  is 
thus  thought  to  be  better  to  call  one  a  percept  and  the  other  a 
complex  percept — or  simply  a  percept. 

Synthesis  of  the  Elements. — The  synthesis  of  the  different 
elements  into  one  idea  involves  an  act  of  the  understanding  and 
of  intuition.     The  bringing  of  the  elements  together  seems  to  be 
an  act  of  the  understanding ;  the  cognition  of  them  as  belonging 
to  a  substance,  and  the  distinction  of  substance  and  attribute,  in- 
volves an  act  of  the  intuitive  power.     An  act  of  perception,  ;:s  is 
shown  in  the  discussion  of  tho  intuitive  power,  is  thus  com; 
by  an  act  of  intuition.     The  mental  picture  we  form  of  the  ol 
is  given  by  ih-i  representative  element  of  the  mind.     Percept  i;>r 
furnishes  the  materials  ;  representation  makes  the  picture. 

Source  of  Knowledge.  —  Perception   is   the  source  of  our 
5 


98  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

knowledge  of  an  external  world.  It  is  the  power  by  which  the 
immaterial  spirit  comes  in  contact,  as  it  were,  with  the  external 
world  and  knows  it.  We  may,  perhaps,  conceive  of  a  being  so 
constituted  as  to  be  independent  of  sense,  and  yet  as  taking  cog- 
nizance, in  some  mysterious  manner,  of  objects  external  to  itself; 
but  not  such  a  being  is  man.  Whatever  may  be  the  power  of  the 
human  mind,  when  separated  from  the  body,  to  perceive  external 
things,  in  the  present  life  it  can  cognize  matter  only  through  the 
avenues  of  sense.  The  mind,  seated  in  its  presence-chamber,  the 
brain,  looks  out  upon  the  material  world  through  the  senses,  the 
windows  of  the  soul,  and  perceives  that  it  has  color,  and  form, 
and  actual  existence. 

Basis  of  All  Knowledge. — Perception  lies  at  the  basis  of  all 
knowledge.  All  mental  activity  begins  in  the  senses.  The  outer 
world  makes  impressions  on  our  sensesj  and  arouses  the  mind  into 
activity.  By  this  activity  we  gain  a  knowledge  of  the  world 
without,  and  also  originate  knowledge  different  from  that  of  the 
things  of  the  material  world.  Without  the  power  of  sense-per- 
ception, it  is  to  be  doubted  whether  we  could  attain  to  any  know- 
ledge whatever.  All  knowledge  does  not  come  directly  from 
perception  through  the  senses,  however.  We  have  a  knowledge 
of  external  objects,  and  we  have  also  knowledge  that  transcends 
this  knowledge  of  external  objects.  Perception  is  the  immediate 
source  of  the  first  kind  of  knowledge,  and  the  indirect  source  of 
the  second  kind  of  knowledge. 

This  Distinction  Expressed. — This  distinction  is  often  ex- 
pressed by  the  terms  cause  and  occasion.  Thus  perception  is  said 
to  be  the  cause  of  our  knowledge  of  objects,  since  it  is  the  imme- 
diate source  of  such  knowledge.  Perception  is  also  said  to  be  the 
occasion  of  the  ideas  and  truths  of  intuition ;  for,  though  in  a 
sense  necessary  to  these  ideas,  it  is  not  the  source  of  them.  Per- 
ception also  furnishes  the  understanding  with  materials  out  of 
which  it  derives  ideas  and  truths  beyond  the  sphere  of  sense.  As 
thus  attaining  a  knowledge  of  external  objects,  affording  material 
for  the  operations  of  the  understanding,  and  furnishing  the  occa- 


THE   NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  99 

sion  for  the  activity  of  the  .intuitive  power,  perception  may  be 
said  to  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  knowledge. 

IV.  PERCEPTION  BY  TE:E  DIFFERENT  SENSES. 

The  general  charaeteristic  of  the  nervous  organism  is  its  suscep- 
tibility to  impressions.  This  general  susceptibility  is  the  basis  of 
all  sensations.  There  are  five  distinct  modifications  of  the  general 
structure  or  functions  of  the  nervous  organism,  each  of  which 
gives  us  peculiar  qualities  of  bodies.  These  five  distinct  modifi- 
cations form  what  we  call  the  Senses.  There  are  thus  five  senses, 
namely;  Touch,  Sight,  Hearing,  Smell  and  Taste.  Touch  is 
nearly  identical  with  the  general  nervous  susceptibility.  While, 
however,  there  is  a  general  susceptibility  to  -impressions  all  over 
the  surface  of  the  body,  the  sense  of  Touch  is  specially  provided 
for  in  the  fingers.  The  other  senses  have  special  organs  supplied 
with  particular  nerves  for  the  perception  of  special  qualities  of 
objects. 

Knowledge  from  Each  Sense. — The  question  now  arises, — 
What  knowledge  is  given  by  the  different  senses  ?  The  investi- 
gation of  this  subject  is  of  great  importance  in  determining  the 
character  of  perception.  The  object  is  to  discover  the  use  and 
value  of  each  one  of  the  senses.  What  is  given,  for  instance,  in 
Hearing  ?  Do  we  hear  an  object,  or  do  we  hear  the  sound  merely  ? 
Can  we  tell,  primarily,  the  distance  and  direction  of  the  sounding 
body,  or  are  these  the  result  of  experience  and  judgment?  What 
is  given  in  Sight?  Do  we  perceive  primarily  only  color,  or  can 
we  see  surface  extension,  or  even  trinal  extension  ?  Can  we  per- 
ceive through  the  eye  the  relative  distance  of  objects,  or  is  that  a 
matter  of  experience  ?  These  and  similar  questions  we  now  pro- 
ceed to  consider. 

PERCEPTION  BY  TOUCH. — The  Organs  of  Touch  are  the  fingers. 
These  are  endowed  with  a  special  sensitiveness  to  external  im- 
pressions. When  my  fingers  touch  an  object,  I  experience  a  feel- 
ing. This  feeling  is  felt  in  the  fingers  at  the  place  of  contact. 
All  that  I  cognize,  however,  is  a  mere  feeling.  It  is  purely  sub- 


100  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

jective,  pertaining  to  the  organism,  and  not  to  anything  external 
to  the  organism.  If  repeated,  I  could  distinguish  it  from  former 
feelings ;  but  I  would  not  know  that  it  was  in  any  way  related  to 
an' external  object.  In  and  of  itself,  it  would  not  suggest  the  ex- 
istence of  any  external  object.  If  I  were  motionless  and  had  no 
other  sense,  it  is  a  question  whether  I  should  ever  be  able,  by  pure 
touch  alone,  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  external  objects. 

The  cognition  of  external  objects  is  known  by  a  comparison  of 
the  sensations  produced  in  touching  the  organism  and  an  external 
body.  It  is  also  determined  by  muscular  resistance,  as  already 
explained.  Both  of  these  experiences  are  no  doubt  involved  in 
this  cognition  of  external  objects.  Either  one  might  be  able  to 
furnish  the  cognition ;  but  in  reality,  no  doubt,  they  combine  to 
produce  the  result. 

PERCEPTION  BY  SMELL. — The  Organ  of  Smell  is  the  Nose,  the 
interior  of  which  consists  of  convoluted  plates,  giving  a  large 
extent  of  surface  in  a  small  space.  Over  these  bony  plates  is 
spread  the  olfactory  nerve,  which  is  covered  by  a  mucous  mem- 
brane. This  nerve  is  susceptible  to  minute  particles  thrown  off 
from  bodies  and  borne  through  the  air  to  the  interior  of  the  nose. 

Direct  Perception. — What  we  perceive  in  smell  is  merely  the 
sensation  of  odor.  The  particles  produce  a  sensation  in  the  organ, 
and  this  is  all  that  we  primarily  perceive.  We  do  not  know 
primarily  what  caused  the  sensation,  or  whether  it  was  caused  by 
anything  objective  to  ourselves.  It  is  purely  a  subjective  phe- 
nomenon. If  we  had  no  other  senses  than  smell,  we  could  never 
know  that  the  odor  had  any  relation  to  an  objective  cause. 

Acquired  Perception. — By  experience  we  learn  to  associate 
odors  with  external  objects.  We  notice  the  presence  of  odors 
when  certain  objects  are  present,  and  thus  learn  to  attribute  the 
odor  to  the  object  which  produced  it.  The  perception  of  a  fra- 
grance, as  of  a  rose,  in  time  will  enable  us  to  cognize  the  rose 
itself.  This  is  an  acquired  knowledge,  however,  and  not  an  act 
of  pure  perception.  It  is  the  result  of  judgment  combining  the 
sensation  of  perfume  with  some  other  perception.  It  is  what  is 


THE  NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  10 » 

called  a  derived  or  an  indirect  perception.  It  will  oe  noticed 
that  we  cannot  learn  to  judge  of  the  direction  of  an  object  by  its 
odor,  nor  very  accurately  of  its  distance. 

PERCEPTION  BY  TASTE. — The  Organs  of  Taste  consist  of  the 
Tongue,  the  Palate,  and  a  portion  of  the  Pharynx.  On  these 
organs  ramify  the  filaments  of  the  gustatory  nerve,  arranged  in 
minute  papillae.  This  nerve  is  susceptible  to  certain  qualities  of 
bodies  called  their  savor. 

Direct  Perception. — What  we  perceive  in  taste,  as  in  touch 
and  smell,  is  merely  a  sensation.  The  savor  of  objects  affects  the 
nerve  of  taste  in  a  certain  way,  and  the  result  is  a  sensation. 
This  sensation  is  the  object  of  perception.  We  discriminate  one 
flavor  from  another,  and  apply  names  to  the  different  flavors,  as 
bitter,  sweet,  spicy,  pungent,  acrid,  etc.  This  is  all  that  is  directly 
given  by  taste. 

Acquired  Perception. — We  afterward  learn,  by  experience, 
to  associate  certain  sensations  of  taste  with  certain  objects,  known 
by  some  of  the  other  senses,  and  thus  to  cognize  objects  through 
their  flavors.  Thus  I  can,  with  my  eyes  shut,  tell  sugar,  or  tea,  or 
coffee,  by  their  flavor.  This,  however,  is  an  acquired  knowledge, 
and  not  the  result  of  pure  or  direct  perception.  The  cognition 
of  an  object  through  its  flavor  is  called  an  acquired  or  an  indi- 
rect perception. 

PERCEPTION  BY  HEARING. — The  Organ  of  Hearing  is  the  Ear. 
The  ear  is  a  complicated  organ,  consisting  of  several  parts.  There 
is  first  an  exterior  expanded  appendage,  contracted  into  a  small 
tube,  across  the  end  of  which  is  stretched  a  membrane  forming 
the  head  of  the  tympanum,  or  drum  of  the  ear.  In  this  drum 
there  is  a  series  of  small  bones  whose  office  it  is  to  transmit  the 
vibrations  of  the  membrane.  Beyond  the  tympanum  is  the  laby- 
rinth, a  convoluted  chamber  containing  a  watery  fluid  in  which 
the  filaments  of  the  auditory  nerve  are  spread  out. 

The  external  ear  collects  the  vibrations  of  the  air  caused  by 
sonorous  bodies ;  these  are  carried  through  the  tube  to  the  drum 
of  the  ear ;  they  are  then  transmitted  by  the  series  of  small 


102  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

bones,  and  thus  reach  the  fluid,  the  vibrations  of  which  affect  the 
auditory  nerve,  and  thence  results  the  sensation  of  sound. 

Direct  Perception. — The  sense  of  hearing  gives  us  the  idea 
of  sound.  This  idea  can  come  from  no  other  sense.  If  we  were 
born  without  the  sense  of  hearing,  we  could  never  have  the  idea 
of  sound.  No  description  or  illustration  could  convey  this  idea 
to  the  mind  of  a  person  who  was  deaf  from  infancy.  Sound  is  a 
sensation,  and  the  perception  of  sound  is  the  cognition  of  a  sensa- 
tion. Sound  itself  has  no  existence  outside  and  distinct  from  my 
sensation  of  it.  Strictly  speaking,  sound  does  not  exist  outside 
of  myself;  there  may  be  air-waves,  but  not  sound. 

Purely  Subjective. — This  cognition  is,  therefore,  purely  sub- 
jective. Not  only  is  it  subjective,  but  primarily  I  have  no  idea 
that  it  has  any  relation  to  an  object  distinct  from  myself.  I  do 
not  know,  primarily,  that  this  sensation  is  caused  by  an  external 
object,  or  that  it  bears  any  relation  to  such  an  object.  Indeed, 
frond  hearing  alone  I  would  not  know  that  there  is  anything  ex- 
ternal to  myself.  When  I  say  I  hear  a  bell,  a  bird,  a  carriage, 
etc.,  I  do  not,  strictly  speaking,  hear  these  objects,  but  rather  the 
sound  made  by  them ;  and  the  cognition  of  the  object  through  the 
sound  is  not  direct  perception,  but  a  matter  of  inference  or  judg- 
ment. In  a  secondary  sense,  however,  the  word  sound  is  applied 
to  the  air-waves  as  well  as  to  the  sensation.  It  is  transferred  from 
its  primary  or  subjective  meaning  to  a  secondary  or  objective  one. 

Distinguish  Sounds. — We  perceive  sounds  in  their  peculiar- 
ities, and  distinguish  them  according  to  their  differences  or  quali- 
ties. Thus  we  distinguish  them  in  volume,  as  loud  and  soft,  with 
many  degrees  of  the  same.  We  also  distinguish  them  as  to  pitch, 
from  very  low  to  very  high,  running  through  five  or  six  octaves, 
with  all  their  intermediate  tones.  We  also  notice  their  succes- 
sion, which  gives  us  rhythmic  measure,  the  first  element  of  music, 
as  in  the  drum,  and  in  the  metre  of  verse.  When  the  difference 
of  pitch  is  combined  with  time,  we  have  melody ;  and  when  sev- 
eral sounds  are  heard  at  the  same  time,  we  perceive  harmony 
and  discord.  The  complete  cognition  of  some  of  these  distinctions 
probably  involves  other  faculties  than  pure  perception,  however. 


THE    NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  103 

Acquired  Perception. — Having  gained  a  knowledge  of  ex- 
ternal objects  through  some  of  the  other  senses,  we  begin  to  asso- 
ciate these  sounds  with  objects,  and  thus  learn  to  refer  particular 
sounds  to  particular  objects.  We  learn  to  give  objectivity  to  our 
sensations  of  sound,  and  speak  of  them  as  belonging  to  objects,  as 
the  song  of  a  robin,  the  roar  of  the  wind,  the  voice  of  a  friehd, 
etc.  We  thus,  through  the  sense  of  hearing,  come  to  have  an 
indirect  perception  of  the  objects  of  the  external  world.  We 
know  that  the  car  is  passing,  by  its  sound ;  that  a  gun  was  fired, 
by  its  report,  etc. 

Associated  with  Ideas. — We  learn  also  to  associate  these 
sounds  with  certain  emotions,  as  the  sigh  with  sorrow,  the  groan 
with  pain,  the  laugh  with  joy,  etc.,  and  to  regard  the  sound  as  the 
expression  of  the  emotion.  We  go  even  further  than  this,  and 
form  sounds  to  represent  our  ideas  and  thoughts,  and  thus  com- 
municate with  our  fellow-men  by  means  of  language.  Sound 
thus  becomes  the  medium  of  communication  from  one  soul  to 
another ;  it  is,  as  it  were,  a  bridge  on  which  thought  and  senti" 
ment  travel  from  one  mind  and  heart  to  another.  The  soul  thus 
embodies  its  thought  and  feeling  in  sound ;  the  wealth  of  spoken 
language  is  one  of  the  marvels  of  science  and  art. 

Judge  of  Direction — We  learn  also  to  judge  of  the  direction 
of  sounding  objects  from  us.  Whether  this  is  an  original  or  an 
acquired  power  has  been  a  question ;  that  is,  whether  a  child 
knows  primarily  the  direction  of  a  sounding  object,  or  acquires 
the  power  of  judging  its  direction.  It  is,  no  doubt,  an  acquired 
power;  for  if  sound  was  not  originally  cognized  an  objective,  it 
could  not  have  been  cognized  as  having  direction.  How  we  judge 
of  the  direction  of  sounds  is  a  mystery ;  but  it  is  supposed  by 
some  to  be  due  to  our  having  two  ears,  and  to  the  ability  of 
turning  the  head  in  different  directions,  though  this  explanation 
is  not  entirely  satisfactory. 

Judge  of  Distance — We  also  learn  to  judge  of  the  distance 
of  objects  from  us  by  their  sound.  This  is  evidently  due  to  the 
different  degrees  of  intensity  of  the  sound ;  the  degree  being 


104:  MENTAL   SCIEXCE. 

noticed  by  our  having  previously  associated  the  sound  with  the 
object  and  being  familiar  with  each.  The  ability  to  judge  of  dis- 
tance and  direction  may  be  cultivated  to  a  high  degree  of  accur- 
acy. Napoleon,  it  is  said,  was  seldom  mistaken  with  respect  to 
the  direction  and  distance  of  a  cannonade.  The  Indian  of  our 
northwestern  prairies,  by  applying  his  ear  to  the  ground,  will 
detect  the  approach  of  a  body  of  cavalry  at  a  distance  beyond 
the  reach  of  vision,  and  distinguish  their  tread  from  that  of  a 
herd  of  buffaloes. 

PERCEPTION  BY  SIGHT. — The  Organ  of  Sight  is  the  Eye.  It 
is  a  complicated  organ,  consisting  of  two  humors  and  a  lens 
through  which  the  rays  of  light  pass  to  the  inner  surface,  the 
back  part  of  which  is  covered  with  a  fine  network  expansion  of 
the  optic  nerve  called  the  retina.  At  the  centre  of  the  retina  is 
a  small  yellow  spot  which  is  especially  sensitive  to  light,  and  is 
chiefly  employed  in  direct  vision.  The  rays  of  light  coming  from 
an  object  cross  one  another  in  their  progress  through  the  eye,  and 
form  an  inverted  image  or  picture  of  the  object  on  the  retina. 
The  impression  of  this  image  or  picture  of  the  object  is  in  some 
mysterious  way  the  condition  of  our  perception  of  the  object. 

Conditions  of  Vision. — The  several  conditions  for  an  act  of 
vision  are ; — first,  an  eye  with  its  sensitive  retina ;  second,  an 
object  with  a  certain  amount  of  light  issuing  from  it;  third,  the 
power  of  adjusting  the  eye  to  more  or  less  light  by  a  change  in 
the  pupil ;  fourth,  muscular  movements  in  adapting  the  eyes  to 
the  direction  and  distance  of  the  objects  perceived.  These  circum- 
stances enter  into  the  act  of  perceiving,  and  assist  in  explaining 
the  process.  Understanding  this,  we  proceed  to  explain  what 
we  perceive  through  the  sense  of  sight  primarily,  and  what  are 
our  acquired  perceptions. 

Sight  Gives  Color. — First,  sight  gives  us  the  sensation  and  per- 
ception of  color.  This  idea  can  be  obtained  by  no  other  sense ; 
without  sight  we  could  never  have  any  idea  of  color.  This  idea 
is  originally  purely  subjective,  like  that  of  sound.  There  is,  of 
course,  some  peculiarity  of  the  external  object  that  produces  this 


THE   NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  105 

sensation ;  but  what  that  condition  is,  we  do  not  know  from  sight. 
We,  of  course,  refer  our  sensation  of  color  to  objects,  but  whether 
we  did  so  at  first  or  not,  is  a  question.  If  we  had  no  other  sense 
than  sight,  it  is  a  question  whether  we  would  ever  know  that  color 
had  any  relation  to  anything  beyond  or  outside  of  ourselves. 

The  Sensation  of  Color. — The  sensation  of  color  is  due  to  the 
action  on  the  retina  of  rays  of  light  of  a  different  wave-length. 
Thus,  if  a  certain  number  of  waves  impinge  on  the  retina  in  a 
unit  of  time,  the  sensation  is  red;  if  about  twice  the  number  in 
the  same  time,  the  sensation  is  violet;  and  the  other  colors  of  the 
spectrum  originate  in  a  similar  manner.  If  two  or  more  of  the 
simple  colors  of  the  spectrum  act'  upon  the  same  spot  of  the  retina 
simultaneously,  it  may  produce  the  sensation  of  a  mixed  color. 
Some  suppose  that  there  are  three  kinds  of  nerve  fibres  in  the 
retina,  the  excitation  of  which  gives  the  three  primary  colors,  red, 
green,  and  violet.  The  sensations  of  the  other  colors  are  produced 
by  the  different  degrees  in  which  these  fibres  are  brought  into 
united  activity.  This  knowledge  is  given  by  natural  philosophy, 
however,  and  not  by  psychology.  We  are  not  conscious,  in  an 
act  of  perception,  of  any  of  these  facts. 

Extension  and  Form. — Sight,  according  to  our  present  ex- 
perience, gives  us  the  cognition  of  extension  and  form.  Whether 
this  is  a  direct  or  an  acquired  perception  is,  however,  a  question. 
Is  the  percept  of  color  primarily  perceived  as  extended  ?  Is  there 
a  visual  image  in  the  perception  of  color,  which  the  mind  per- 
ceives as  distinct  from  and  beyond  the  organ  of  sense  ?  In  other 
words,  do  we,  by  the  eye,  primarily  perceive  the  extension  and 
form  of  objects  ?  This  is  a  difficult  question  to  decide,  and  one 
upon  which  philosophers  are  not  agreed.  We  shall  give  argu- 
ments on  both  sides  of  the  question,  and  endeavor  to  reach  a  cor- 
rect conclusion  in  respect  to  it. 

Color,  and  not  Extension. — It  is  supposed  by  some  that  color  is 

merely  a  physiological  affection  of  the  nervous  organism,  like 

sound.     We  do  not  perceive  sound  as  extended ;  and  the  same  has 

been  supposed  to  be  true  of  color.     Both  these  sensations  are  pro- 

5* 


106  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

duced  by  the  vibrations  of  a  medium,  one  of  air,  the  other  of 
ether :  the  vibrations  of  air  affect  the  auditory  nerve  and  give  the 
sensation  of  sound ;  the  vibrations  of  ether  affect  the  optic  nerve 
and  give  the  sensation  of  color.  Sound  is  not  perceived  as  ex- 
tended; what  reason  have  we  to  suppose  that  color  is?  These 
considerations  seem  to  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  we  originally 
perceived  color  without  the  perception  of  extension.  Several 
reasons,  however,  may  be  given  in  favor  of  the  perception  of  color 
as  extended. 

Portion  of  the  Retina. — In  vision  a  certain  portion  of  the  retina 
in  length  and  breadth  is  affected.  The  picture  covers  a  certain 
part  of  the  sensitive  surface  of  the  retina,  and  this  seems  to  be  a 
condition  of  perceiving  surface  extension.  In  objection  to  this,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  same  thing  may  be  asserted  of  taste  and 
smell,  in  which  there  is  no  perception  of  extension.  To  this  we 
reply  that  in  those  senses  an  indefinite  portion  of  the  surface  is 
affected,  while  in  sight  the  picture  covers  a  distinct  and  definitely 
marked  outline.  In  touch  I  can  distinguish  the  shape  of  a  small 
object  placed  on  the  palm  of  my  hand,  perceiving  whether  it  is 
round  or  square ;  and  the  blind  detect  the  shape  of  the  letters 
with  the  ends  of  their  fingers.  So  it  is  thought,  that  the  delicately 
organized  retina  is  susceptible  to  the  shape  of  the  picture  upon  it, 
and  perhaps  even  to  the  shades  of  color  which  indicate  solidity. 

Reflection  from  Objects. — Second,  the  fact  that  light  comes  to  us 
reflected  from  external  objects  in  straight  lines  is  not  without 
weight  in  determining  this  question.  Extension,  surface  expan- 
sion, seems  to  be  the  necessary  condition  for  color;  and  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  conceive  that  what  we  know  to  be  a  condition  for  the 
existence  of  color,  is  not  given  along  with  the  perception  of  color. 
In  this  respect,  color  is  entirely  different  from  sound.  Color  de- 
pends on  the  size  of  the  object,  on  the  amount  of  surface  expan- 
sion ;  sound  has  no  such  dependence.  The  size,  so  to  speak,  of  a 
sound,  is  not  measured  by  the  size  of  the  sounding  body.  Increase 
the  size  of  a  string,  and  it  does  not  necessarily  increase  the  size 
of  the  sound  ;  but  the  extent  of  color  varies  directly  with  the  size 
of  the  object  which  affords  the  sensation. 


THE   NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  107 

Color  and  Extension  Inseparable. — Third,  the  impossibility  of 
our  conceiving  of  color  without  having  an  idea  of  it  as  extended 
seems  to  be  a  conclusive  argument.  I  conceive  of  sound,  flavor, 
etc.,  without  any  notion  of  extension ;  but  what  conception  can  I 
have  of  color  without  the  conception  of  it  as  extended?  Can  I 
conceive  of  such  a  conception  ?  can  I  have  such  a  conception  ? 
Are  we  not  thus  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  color  is  primarily 
conceived  as  extended  ? 

In  reply  to  this  consideration,  Dr.  Brown  says  that  it  is  a  mere 
habit  of  association,  and  does  not  prove  anything.  If  we  had 
always  seen  color  associated  with  convexity,  we  would  not  be  able 
to  separate  our  idea  of  color  from  convexity.  This  cannot  be 
admitted,  however.  If  we  had  never  experienced  color  except  as 
associated  with  convexity,  it  would  be  an  easy  matter  to  transfer 
the  quality  to  a  plane  surface,  or  to  a  concave  surface,  or  to  any 
imaginable  form,  just  as  now  we  can  give  any  color  to  any  new 
form  that  we  may  see,  or  even  to  a  new  form  that  we  may  imagine. 
The  arguments  therefore  seem  to  be  in  favor  of  sight  giving  us 
primarily  extension  and  figure. 

Trinal  Extension. — Sight  also  at  present  seems  to  give  us, 
not  only  surface  extension,  but  also  trinal  extension.  It  is  a  ques- 
tion, however,  whether  this  is  an  original  or  an  acquired  per- 
ception. Do  we  by  the  eye  originally  see  objects  as  possessing 
thickness  as  well  as  length  and  breadth?  This  is  also  a  question 
difficult  to  decide.  We  incline  to  the  opinion  that  the  perception 
of  trinal  extension  is  acquired  by  experience.  Primarily  we  per- 
ceive objects  as  having  only  surface  extension.  The  trunk  of  a 
tree,  for  instance,  would  seem  merely  like  a  ribbon  of  light;  we 
should  not  know  that  it  had  solidity.  How  then,  we  inquire,  is 
this  perception  acquired? 

Idea  How  Acquired. — In  looking  at  objects  we  notice  a  varia- 
tion of  light  and  shade  in  their  appearance.  At  first  we  would 
not  understand  what  this  variation  of  light  and  shade  means.  We 
know  the  forms  of  these  objects  by  touch;  we  then  learn  the 
meaning  of  this  variation  of  light  and  shade  in  respect  to  form; 


108  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

and  learning  to  interpret  light  and  shade,  we  thus  learn  to  cognize 
the  form  of  objects  through  sight.  It  is  as  in  a  painting,  where, 
though  all  the  colors  are  on  a  flat  surface,  the  variations  of  color 
make  things  appear  as  if  they  were  solid.  It  is  probable  we  are 
aided  in  the  perception  of  the  solidity  of  objects  by  the  varying 
effort  and  angle  under  which  the  axes  of  the  eyes  are  concentrated 
upon  different  parts  of  the  object,  the  parts  more  remote  requiring 
a  different  angle  from  those  nearer.  The  sense  of  touch  is  thus 
the  schoolmaster  of  the  eye  in  respect  to  trinal  extension,  and  the 
power  of  perceiving  it  through  the  eye  is  an  acquired  one. 

Perception  of  Distance. — We  also  by  the  eye  perceive  the 
distance  of  objects  from  us  and  from  one  another.  It  is  a  ques- 
tion, however,  whether  this  is  an  original  or  an  acquired  percep- 
tion. The  majority  of  philosophers  seem  to  regard  it  as  an 
acquired  perception.  Those  who  hold  this  view  maintain  that  all 
that  we  originally  perceive  is  the  sensation  of  color,  and  that  we 
learn  by  experience  to  refer  it  to  objects  external  to  ourselves. 
The  following  arguments  seem  to  favor  this  view. 

Distance  an  Acquired  Perception. — First,  it  is  said  that  facts 
show  that  sight  does  not  give  distance.  What  we  see  at  first 
seems  to  be  in  contact  with  the  eye,  and  the  belief  that  it  is  not,  is 
acquired  by  experience.  This  is  said  to  be  shown  in  persons 
operated  on  for  cataract  and  restored  to  sight.  Dr.  Cheselden 
says  that  the  boy  from  whom  he  removed  a  cataract  thought  at 
first  everything  he  saw  touched  his  eyes.  It  is  also  said  that  per- 
sons released  from  a  dungeon  have  no  perception  of  the  distances 
of  objects. 

Second,  it  is  also  adduced  in  favor  of  this  position  that  we  are 
often  mistaken  in  our  judgment  of  distances.  Mont  Blanc,  when 
it  first  dawns  on  the  sight,  seems  only  a  mile  or  two  away,  while  it 
may  be  really  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  distant.  As  I  sit  in  my 
room,  I  think  I  see  a  cow  feeding  in  the  meadow,  and  wondering 
why  she  does  not  change  her  position,  I  go  to  the  window  and  find 
that  what  I  took  for  a  cow  in  the  field  is  really  a  speck  on  the 
window  pane.  It  has  been  supposed  that  such  mistakes  indicate 
that  we  do  not  primarily  perceive  objects  as  distant. 


THE   NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  109 

Distance  a  Direct  Perception. — There  are  also  some  considera- 
tions on  the  other  side  of  the  question.  First,  the  fact  that  we 
do  now  so  clearly  see  objects  as  distant  from  us  is  regarded  as  a 
proof  that  we  did  originally  so  see  them.  Second,  the  little  child 
seems  to  reach  out  for  things,  as  a  burning  lamp,  as  soon  as  it 
begins  to  notice  anything.  It  does  not  reach  up  to  its  eyes,  as  we 
might  expect  it  to  do,  if  the  primary  cognition  was  a  mere  affec- 
tion of  the  organism.  Third,  the  young  of  animals,  also,  as  soon 
as  they  are  born,  seem  to  see  things  as  external  to  themselves,  and 
govern  themselves  accordingly.  The  chicken  runs  for  the  mother 
hen,  and  the  calf  follows  the  cow  with  the  eye,  and  goes  in  the 
direction  in  which  she  is  seen.  Fourth,  the  mistakes  in  judging 
of  the  exact  distance  of  objects  has  no  bearing  on  the  question,  as 
it  is  not  the  exaCT  distance  of  objects,  but  the  fact  that  they  are 
perceived  as  beyond  ourselves  and  at  relative  distances,  with 
which  we  are  concerned. 

Idea  How  Acquired. — If  we  do  not  primarily  perceive  objects 
as  distant  from  us,  and  as  relatively  distant  from  one  another, 
then  the  power  of  doing  so  is  evidently  an  acquired  one.  Slowly 
and  by  a  process  of  education  in  which  touch  plays  an  important 
part,  we  learn  to  refer  the  visual  sensation  to  external  objects. 
The  intensity  of  light  varies  with  the  distance  of  a  body.  This 
variation  in  the  intensity  of  light  is  noticed  and  associated  with 
the  distances  of  objects  learned  by  touch,  and  we  thus  learn  to 
judge  of  their  distance  by  sight.  We  are  also  aided  in  this  per- 
ception of  distance  by  the  muscular  changes  which  adapt  the  lines 
of  vision  of  the  two  eyes  to  the  object  when  near  or  more  remote. 
These  changes  may  be  distinctly  noticed  by  looking  at  objects 
nearer  and  more  remote,  and  observing  the  movements  of  the  eye. 

QUESTIONS  ON  SIGHT. — There  are  several  questions  relating  to 
sight  which  naturally  arise  in  this  connection.  These  questions 
will  be  briefly  considered. 

Perception  of  One  Object. — The  first  question  is,  how  do  we 
gee  objects  as  single  with  two  eyes?  Since  there  are  two  pictures, 
one  on  each  retina,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  we  should  see  objects 


110  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

double.  Several  answers  have  been  given  to  this  question.  Some 
think  that  only  one  eye  is  used  in  vision,  the  office  of  the  second 
being  to  strengthen  or  reinforce  the  first.  Others  hold  that  the 
mind  actually  perceives  two  objects,  but  passes  so  rapidly  from 
one  to  the  other  that  the  impression  is  made  of  seeing  only  one. 
Others  again  teach  that  the  impressions  are  carried  to  a  common 
point  of  meeting  where  they  are  fused  into  one. 

The  correct  explanation,  probably,  is  that  in  looking  at  a  single 
object  with  both  eyes,  the  centres  of  the  retinal  images  fall  upon 
the  centres  of  the  "  yellow  spots  "  of  the  two  eyes,  or  upon  points 
similarly  situated  to  these  spots,  and  that  this  is  the  condition  of 
single  vision, — probably  so  learned  by  experience  as  controlled 
by  touch.  To  illustrate,  hold  two  pencils  in-line  before  the  eye 
six  or  twelve  inches  apart ;  now  while  we  are  looking  at  either 
one,  the  other  will  be  seen  double,  for  the  reason  that  the  retinal 
images  are  not  in  similar  parts  of  the  eye  in  relation  to  the  line  of 
vision. 

Perceiving  Objects  Erect. — Why  is  it  that  we  perceive 
objects  as  erect  when  the  images  are  inverted  on  the  retina?  In 
explanation  of  this  question,  it  must  be  remembered  that  we  are 
not  conscious  of  the  visual  image  in  perception,  but  of  the  lumi- 
nous object  from  which  the  rays  proceed.  These  objects  we  have 
found  to  be  in  a  certain  position  by  touch ;  hence  we  cognize  them 
in  that  position  through  the  visual  sensation.  Again,  in  running 
the  eye  over  an  object,  as  a  tree,  from  base  to  top,  we  are  not  con- 
scious of  the  different  images  on  the  retina,  but  of  the  muscular 
movements  necessary  to  bring  the  parts  successively  on  the  yellow 
spot  of  the  retina.  We  go  upward  for  the  top  of  a  tree ;  hence 
we  cognize  the  top  of  a  tree  as  above  rather  than  below.  These 
facts  seem  to  indicate  the  correct  explanation.  Objects  naturally 
appear  to  the  eye  in  the  position  we  have  found  them  by  touch. 

V.  THE  QUALITIES  OF  BODIES. 

In  Perception  we  cognize,  not  matter  itself,  but  the  qualities 
of  matter.  Though  by  a  law  of  thought  we  are  compelled  to 


THE   NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  Ill 

assume  for  matter  a  substantive  existence,  yet  we  know  it  only 
through  those  peculiarities  or  properties  which  are  revealed  to  us 
by  the  senses.  These  qualities  of  matter  are  various,  some  being 
perceived  through  one  sense  and  some  through  another.  They 
may  all,  however,  be  embraced  under  two  general  classes  which 
have  been  named  Primary  Qualities  and  Secondary  Qualities. 

The  Primary  Qualities. — The  Primary  Qualities  of  bodies 
are  those  which  are  necessary  to  the  very  existence  of  matter,  or 
at  least  to  our  conception  of  it.  They  are  inseparably  connected 
with  matter,  so  that  we  cannot  in  thought  divest  it  of  these  quali- 
ties without  destroying  our  conception  of  matter.  Thus,  if  matter 
exists  at  all,  it  must  have  extension,  size,  figure,  etc.  We  cannot 
think  these  attributes  away  from  material  things,  and  leave  the 
things  themselves  existing. 

Criteria  of  Primary  Qualities. — The  criteria  by  which  we  deter- 
mine the  primary  qualities  of  bodies  may  be  briefly  stated  as 
follows : 

1.  They  are  essential  to  the  existence  of  matter.     That  is,  mat- 
ter could  not  exist  without  these  qualities. 

2.  They  are  known  a  priori,  and  not  from  experience.     That  is, 
our  knowledge  of  them  is  not  given  by  perception;  they  are 
known  by  intuition  to  be  the  necessary  conditions  for  material 
existence. 

3.  They  are  known  as  such  or  in  themselves.     That  is,  they  are 
known  to  exist  independently  of  any  effect  on  the  nervous  organ- 
ism. 

Enumeration  of  Primary  Qualities. — The  Primary  Qualities  are 
Extension,  Figure,  Size,  Divisibility,  Density,  and  Impenetrabil- 
ity. Several  of  these  qualities  are  subordinate  to  or  implied  in 
extension.  Besides  these,  since  objects  exist  in  space,  they  are 
susceptible  of  Situation  and  Motion,  which  are  sometimes  em- 
braced among  the  primary  qualities. 

The  Secondary  Qualities. — The  Secondary  Qualities  are 
those  which  are  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  matter,  but 
that  are  accidental  or  contingent.  They  are  qualities  which  may 


112  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

or  may  not  be  possessed  by  any  object.  We  may,  by  an  act  of 
thought,  divest  a  body  of  any  one  of  these  attributes  without  de- 
stroying the  existence  of  the  body.  To  take  away  a  primary 
quality  is  to  destroy  the  body ;  to  take  away  a  secondary  quality 
will  not  destroy  the  body,  but  merely  change  its  nature.  Thus  a 
body  may  or  may  not  be  hard  or  soft,  rough  or  smooth,  have 
color  or  fragrance,  etc. 

Criteria  of  Secondary  Qualities.- — The  criteria  of  the  secondary 
qualities  may  be  briefly  stated  as  follows: 

1.  They  are  accidental  and  not  essential  to  the  existence  of 
matter.     The  quality  can  be  removed  and  the  object  still  exist. 

2.  They  are  known  only  through  experience,  or  a  posteriori. 
Our  knowledge  of  them  is  given  by  perception,  and  not  rnerelv 
occasioned  by  perception. 

3.  They  are  known  only  through  the  affection  of  the  senses. 
We  cognize  them  through  the  sensation  which  they  produce  by 
the  impression  on  the  organism. 

Enumeration  of  Secondary  Qualities. — The  Secondary  Qualities 
are  Hardness  or  Softness,  Roughness  or  Smoothness,  Solidity  or 
Fluidity,  Color,  Sound,  Flavor,  Odor,  etc.  These  qualities,  it  is 
seen,  have  a  relation  to  our  senses,  and  are  known  only  through 
sensation. 

Division  of  Secondary  Qualities. — The  secondary  qualities 
consist  of  two  classes.  There  are  some  qualities  which,  though 
only  known  to  us  through  the  senses,  have  still  an  existence  as 
qualities  of  external  objects  independent  of  our  senses.  Others 
are  known,  not  as  qualities  of  bodies,  but  only  as  affections  of 
sense.  Thus  hardness,  roughness,  weight,  etc.,  are  qualities  be- 
longing to  the  bodies  themselves ;  while  color,  flavor,  sound,  etc., 
are  merely  affections  of  the  senses.  The  former  qualities  are 
perceived  in  the  objects ;  the  latter  are  perceived  only  as  sen- 
sations. The  former  are  objective,  belonging  to  the  object;  the 
latter  aie  subjective,  belonging  to  the  sentient  organism.  These 
two  classes  of  qualities  have  been  appropriately  distinguished  as 
mechanical  and  physiological. 


THE   NATURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  113 

The  Mechanical  Qualities. — The  first  class  are  qualities  of 
bodies  as  occupying  space.  They  may  all  be  included  under  the 
general  category  of  resistance,  and  are  thus  appropriately  called 
the  mechanical  properties  of  matter.  They  are  distinguished  from 
the  primary  qualities  in  that  they  are  perceived  by  an  affection 
produced  in  the  sentient  organism,  and  also  in  that  they  are  not 
essential  to  the  existence  of  matter.  They  are  distinguished  fronj 
the  physiological  in  that  they  have  a  real  objective  existence,  in- 
dependent of  the  affection  of  the  organism. 

Enumeration  of  Mechanical  Qualities. — The  mechanical  quali- 
ties are  Heavy  and  Light,  Hard  and  Soft,  Solid  and  Fluid, 
Bough  and  Smooth,  Corapressible  and  Incompressible,  Resilient 
and  Irresilient,  etc. 

The  Physiological  Qualities. — The  second  class  of  the 
secondary  qualities  are  the  qualities  of  bodies  as  related  to  our 
sentient  organism.  They  relate  to  bodies  only  as  capable  of  pro- 
ducing certain  sensations  in  us.  As  properties  of  bodies,  they  are 
not  directly  perceived,  but  only  inferred  as  the  supposed  causes  of 
the  various  affections  produced  in  us  by  external  objects.  What 
we  directly  perceive  are  only  the  subjective  affections  of  our  senti- 
ent organism.  When  I  perceive  the  color,  smell,  or  taste  of  an 
orange,  all  that  I  perceive  is  a  certain  affection  of  my  own  organ- 
ism. 

Enumeration  of  Physiological  Qualities. — These  physiological 
qualities  are  Color,  Sound,  Flavor,  Odor,  Temperature,  Tactual 
Sensations,  and  some  other  affections  of  a  similar  nature. 

Qualities  Corresponding  in  Objects. — What  the  peculiar 
properties  in  the  objects  are  which  are  the  exciting  cause  of  these 
sensations  is  not  known.  My  cognition  does  not  extend  to  them; 
I  only  know  the  effect  produced  in  my  sentient  organism.  Thus 
in  the  perception  of  sound,  what  I  perceive  is  the  affection  of  my 
organism,  and  not  any  quality  of  the  sounding  body.  It  is  true 
that  we  refer  the  effect  produced  to  the  object  as  the  producing 
cause  of  it,  but  no  one  can  suppose  that  the  taste  of  an  object,  for 
instance,  is  the  same  as  the  quality  of  the  object  which  gives  rise 


114  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

to  the  taste.  Since,  however,  we  have  but  one  name  for  the  sen- 
sation and  its  cause,  the  name  of  the  sensation  is  often  used  to 
denote  the  quality  in  the  object.  The  name  of  the  sensation  is 
thus  transferred  from  the  affection  to  the  property  in  the  object 
producing  it.  It  is  only  in  this  popular  sense,  therefore,  that  we 
may  be  said  to  perceive  these  qualities  of  objects. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  CULTURE  OF    PERCEPTION. 

T  PAVING  explained  the  general  character  of  the  perceptive 
-1 — *-  powers,  we  now  proceed  to  discuss  the  methods  of  giving 
culture  to  these  powers.  We  shall  speak  of  the  Neglect  of  Cul- 
ture, the  Importance  of  this  Culture,  the  Difference  of  Perceptive 
Power,  the  Time  for  Culture,  and  the  Methods  of  Culture. 

I.  NEGLECT  OP  CULTURE. — The  culture  of  the  perceptive 
powers  is  largely  neglected.  The  powers  of  observation  in  chil- 
dren are  not  trained  as  they  should  be ;  and  the  neglect  of  child- 
flood  is  perpetuated  in  the  habits  of  advancing  years.  In  fact, 
hardly  any  faculty  is  more  neglected  in  our  systems  of  education 
than  the  faculty  of  observation ;  certainly  for  no  one  of  the  facul- 
ties of  children  are  less  provisions  made  for  culture  and  training. 

Poor  Observers. — The  result  of  this  neglect  is  that  the  people 
of  the  present  day  are  poor  observers.  Indeed,  we  perceive  dis- 
tinctly comparatively  few  of  the  facts  and  phenomena  of  the 
natural  world  around  us.  Nature  spreads  out  her  facts  before  us 
in  rich  profusion,  but  we  close  our  eyes  to  them  or  turn  away  from 
them :  she  places  them  under  our  feet,  and  we  stumble  over  them 
or  tread  them  in  the  dust  unobserved.  Having  eyes  we  see  not 
and  ears  we  hear  not,  the  interesting  facts  with  which  nature  has 
surrounded  us.  Indeed,  in  respect  to  our  observation  of  the  things 
of  the  natural  world,  it  may  be  truly  said  of  us  as  teachers,  as 
Christ  said  of  the  Pharisees,  that  we  are  "  blind  guides." 

Examples  of  the  lack  of  observational  power  are  to  be  found 
among  all  classes  of  persons.  How  large  a  number  of  young 
people  to-day  cannot  explain  the  difference  between  an  oak  and  a 
beech,  or  distinguish  between  granite  and  marble.  Very  few 

(115) 


116  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

persons  can  tell  the  difference  between  the  number  of  legs  of  a  fly 
and  of  a  spider ;  and  I  have  known  farmers'  boys  and  girls  who 
could  not  tell  whether  the  ears  of  a  cow  are  in  front  of  her  horns, 
above  her  horns,  below  her  horns,  or  behind  her  horns! 

Modern  Education. — Modern  education  tends  to  the  neglect 
of  the  culture  of  the  perceptive  powers.  In  ancient  times  peo- 
ple studied  nature  much  more  than  at  present.  Being  without 
books,  they  were  compelled  to  depend  upon  their  eyes  and  ears 
for  knowledge ;  and  this  made  the  senses  active,  searching,  and 
exact.  At  the  present  day,  we  study  books  for  a  knowledge  of 
external  things ;  and  we  study  them  too  much  or  too  exclusively, 
and  thus  neglect  the  cultivation  of  the  senses.  We  get  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  material  world  second-hand,  instead  of  fresh  from  the 
open  pages  of  the  book  of  nature.  Is  it  not  a  great  mistake  to 
spend  so  much  time  in  school  and  jret  not  know  the  difference 
between  the  leaf  of  a  beech  and  of  an  oak ;  or  not  be  able  to  dis- 
tinguish between  specimens  of  marble,  quartz,  and  granite  ? 

The  Educated. — The  neglect  of  the  culture  of  the  perceptive 
powers  is  shown  by  the  scholars  of  the  present  times.  Very  few 
educated  men  are  good  observers ;  indeed,  the  most  of  them  are 
sadly  deficient  in  this  respect.  This  arises  from  the  fact  that 
their  perceptive  powers  were  not  trained  in  youth.  They  Avere 
taught  to  think  and  remember ;  but  they  were  not  taught  to  use 
their  eyes  and  ears.  In  modern  education,  books  are  used  too 
much  like  spectacles,  and  the  result  is  a  blunting  of  the  natural 
powers  of  perception.  In  this  respect,  one  is  reminded  of  the 
French  students  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  who,  in  order  to  escape 
being  drafted  into  the  army,  used  spectacles  to  make  themselves 
near-sighted.  Our  scholars  have  become  near-sighted,  like  these 
students,  by  the  habit  of  looking  at  nature  through  the  printed 
page. 

The  Uneducated. — As  illustrative  of  the  same  fact,  it  may  be 
remarked  that  the  uneducated,  as  a  rule,  are  better  observers  than 
the  educated.  Having  to  depend  for  knowledge  largely  upon 
their  senses,  they  acquire  the  habit  of  accurate  observation.  They 


THE  CULTURE  OF  PERCEPTION.          117 

may  not  always  be  able  to  read  books,  but  they  learn  to  read  the 
open  volume  of  nature  with  an  accurate  eye  and  a  sympathetic 
heart.  The  untutored  Indian  will  trace  his  way  through  the 
forest  by  the  moss  on  the  trees,  pursue  his  escaped  captive  by  the 
broken  twigs  or  the  displaced  leaves,  and  learn  the  presence  of 
his  enemies  or  friends  by  the  faintest  film  of  smoke  against  the 
sky.  Mrs.  Gage  tells  of  the  old  negress  who  predicted  a  storm 
on  a  fair  morning  by  "the  talking  of  the  winds  and  waves  over 
there,"  and  of  the  drenching  shower  in  which  the  young  people 
were  caught,  who,  thinking  they  knew  better  than  an  old  colored 
woman,  did  not  heed  her  advice  to  remain  at  home. 

II.  IMPORTANCE  OF  CULTURE. — The  importance  of  the  culture 
of  the  perceptive  powers  will  hardly  be  questioned.  Still,  a  few 
remarks  on  the  subject  may  be  of  service  in  impressing  the  idea 
of  its  value  on  the  mind  of  the  teacher,  and  induce  him  to  make 
some  special  provisions  for  such  culture  in  the  instruction  of  the 
school. 

Basis  of  Knowledge. — Perception,  we  remark  first,  is  the 
basis  of  common  knowledge.  The  most  of  our  ordinary  knowl- 
edge consists  of  facts  which  are  obtained  through  the  senses. 
These  facts  constitute  the  fabric  of  our  common  thought  and  con- 
versation. We  talk  of  persons,  places,  and  things  which  we  have 
noticed — knowledge  which  we  have  derived  through  perception. 
Our  powers  of  description  depend  largely  upon  our  powers  of 
observation,  for  in  order  to  describe  well  we  must  observe  mi- 
nutely and  accurately.  The  man  of  large  and  accurate  powers  of 
observation  is  usually  the  man  of  interesting  facts  and  incidents, 
and  makes  the  congenial  companion  or  entertaining  talker. 

Basis  of  Science. — Perception  is  also  the  basis  of  science,  that 
is,  of  the  physical  sciences.  These  sciences  begin  in  facts,  and 
rise  to  their  classification,  the  causes  which  produce  them,  and  the 
laws  which  govern  them.  The  facts  of  these  sciences  are  given 
by  perception ;  thought  takes  these  facts,  and  weaves  them  into 
the  fabric  of  science.  Thought  is  the  architect  in  the  domain  of 
science:  facts  are  the  stones  and  bricks  with  which  it  works. 


118  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Thought  takes  this  material  and  builds  up  the  temple  of  knowl- 
edge, lofty,  beautiful,  and  grand. 

The  great  scientist  must  be  a  close  and  accurate  observer. 
Linnaeus  must  have  studied  the  world  of  facts  with  the  keenest 
perception  to  have  been  able  to  form  his  artificial  system  of  classi- 
fication. Cuvier  was  as  searching  in  his  vision  as  he  was  far- 
reaching  in  his  power  of  grand  generalization.  To  classify  the 
turtles  of  North  America,  Agassiz  gave  days  and  nights  to  the 
minutest  dissections  and  comparisons.  The  most  careful  and 
thorough  observations  are  required  to  reach  the  conclusions  of 
modern  physics  and  astronomy.  The  advance  of  modern  science 
is  largely  due  to  the  accuracy  of  the  observer. 

Use  in  lAterature. — Careful  observation  is  of  great  value 
even  in  literature.  Nearly  all  the  great  writers  have  been  close 
observers  of  nature.  Homer  shows  a  sympathetic  love  of  the 
natural  world,  and  his  pages  glow  with  beauties  drawn  from  his 
observation.  Shakspeare  must  have  read  the  fields  around  Strat- 
ford with  a  loving  and  searching  eye  for  their  beauties,  for  his 
verse  breathes  of  the  freshness  of  the  field  and  the  forest.  The 
streams  ripple  through  his  lines,  the  flowers  blush  with  beauty  in 
his  similes,  and  the  moonlight  falls  asleep  upon  fragrant  banks 
beneath  the  golden  stars  above,  while  "  soft  stillness  and  the  night 
become  the  touches  of  sweet  harmony."  Chaucer,  Cowper, 
Thomson,  Burns,  Scott,  and  Dickens,  were  all  close  observers  of 
nature;  and  their  pages  are  redolent  with  the  breath  of  the  ver- 
nal landscape.  If  England  should  be  sunk  beneath  the  sea, 
English  scenery  would  still  live  in  the  pages  of  her  immortal 
writers. 

Use  to  the  Poet  and  Orator. — The  power  of  perception  is  of 
great  value  also  to  the  poet  and  orator.  This  thought  may  be 
emphasized  by  the  following  quotation  from  Mr.  Emerson :  "  The 
poet,  the  orator,  bred  in  the  woods,  whose  senses  have  been 
nurtured  by  their  fair  .and  appeasing  changes,  year  after  year, 
without  design  or  heed,  shall  not  lose  their  lessons  in  the  roar  of 
cities  and  the  broil  of  politics.  Long  hereafter,  amid  agitation 


THE    CULTURE   OF   PERCEPTION.  119 

and  terror  in  national  councils,  these  solemn  images  shall  re- 
appear in  their  morning  lustre,  as  fit  symbols  for  the  language 
of  the  tour.  At  the  call  of  a  noble  sentiment,  again  the  woods 
wave,  the  pines  murmur,  the  river  rolls  and  shines,  and  the  cattle 
low  upon  the  mountains,  putting  the  spells  of  persuasion,  the 
keys  of  power,  into  his  hands." 

Facts  of  Interest. — We  should  cultivate  the  perceptive  pow- 
ers for  the  interest  of  the  facts  which  they  afford  us.  The  objects 
of  the  material  world  are  full  of  interest  and  beauty.  Nature 
presents  herself  as  a  book  to  be  read  ;  the  "  Book  of  Nature"  is  no 
unmeaning  metaphor.  It  contains  many  a  vivid  page  as  inter- 
esting to  us  as  a  romance.  In  the  spring-time,  it  is  a  volume 
bound  in  green  and  gold ;  in  summer  it  presents  many  a  gorgeous 
page  to  our  raptured  vision ;  while  the  sere  and  yellow  leaves  of 
autumn  and  the  snowy  pages  of  winter  teach  a  never-to-be-for- 
gotten lesson.  It  is  a  book  too  that  can  always  be  read  with 
interest  by  those  who  have  learned  its  alphabet.  How  full  of 
interest  is  Nature's  stony  book,  whose  pages  are  the  everlasting 
rocks !  How  delightful  is  Nature's  starry  book,  whose  pages  are 
glittering  with  the  jewels  of  the  sky! 

The  Book  of  Nature  is  no  poetic  fiction.  Longfellow,  in  Lia 
tribute  to  Agassiz,  says, 

"Then  Nature,  the  old  nurse,  took 

The  boy  upon  her  knee, 
Saying,  '  Here  is  a  story  book 

Thy  Father  hath  written  for  thee  !'  " 

And  he  read  from  out  the  book  many  a  tale  of  divine  wisdom 
which  we  may  now  read  in  his  translation  of  the  divine  symbols. 
The  interest  of  this  grand  old  volume  may  be  seen  in  every 
department  of  nature;  in  the  shining  crystals,  the  blooming 
flowers,  the  buzzing  insects,  etc. ;  and  it  is  the  teacher's  duty  to 
open  the  eyes  of  the  pupils  to  the  interesting  pages  of  this  book, 
and  teach  them  to  read  the  beautiful  lesson  there  recorded. 

III.  DIFFERENCES  OF  PERCEPTIVE  POWER. — There  is  a 
marked  difference  in  the  perceptive  powers  of  different  indi- 


120  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

viduals,  as  in  the  other  powers  of  the  mind.  Some  persons  are 
much  closer  observers  than  others.  Two  persons  will  look  at  the 
same  object,  and  one  can  tell  you  many  things  in  respect  to  it 
that  escaped  the  notice  of  the  other.  This  difference  appears  in 
many  facts,  and  is  strikingly  illustrated  in  the  finding  of  four- 
leaved  clovers.  There  are  persons  who  have  never  been  able  to 
find  a  single  specimen  of  clover  with  four  leaves,  while  others 
will  go  out  in  the  yard  and  cull  them  by  the  handful. 

Difference  Due  to  Nature. — Much  of  this  difference  in  per- 
ceptive power  is  due  to  nature;  minds  naturally  differ  in  the 
power  of  observation  as  in  their  other  faculties.  There  seem  to 
be  two  distinct  classes  of  minds — the  perceptive  mind  and  the 
reflective  mind.  The  perceptive  mind  operates  objectively;  the 
reflective  mind  seems  to  bend  inward  and  act  subjectively.  One 
is  attracted  by  objects  and  is  interested  in  things ;  the  other 
lingers  among  its  ideas  and  is  most  interested  in  thoughts. 

Difference  Due  to  Culture. — Much  of  this  difference,  how- 
ever, is  due  to  culture.  The  senses  become  sharpened  by  use. 
This  is  illustrated  by  men  who  are  proficient  in  natural* science. 
Hugh  Miller  could  stand  by  the  rocky  pages  of  his  native  Scot- 
land, and  read  them  as  accurately  as  we  can  read  a  book.  Agas- 
siz  would  bring  a  grasshopper  before  his  class  and  point  out 
scores  of  interesting  things  about  it,  holding  the  attention  of  his 
audience  as  if  he  were  reading  from  the  pages  of  a  romance. 
The  same  fact  is  also  illustrated  by  the  description  of  various 
things  in  which  a  person  has  had  some  interest.  Thus  girls  will 
describe  articles  of  dress  much  more  minutely  than  boys ;  while 
the  latter  excel  in  describing  such  objects  as  horses.  A  trained 
detective  becomes  Argus-eyed  in  the  routine  of  his  profession. 

IV.  THE  TIME  FOR  CULTURE. — Youth  is  the  time  for  the 
culture  of  the  perceptive  powers.  In  youth  all  the  senses  are  un 
usually  active.  Life  seems,  as  it  were,  to  begin  in  the  senses. 
Children  desire  to  see,  to  hear,  to  feel,  to  handle,  to  examine. 
This  activity  of  the  senses  is  generally  known  as  curiosity ;  and 
children  are  often  criticised  for  their  curiosity.  Parents  often 


THE   CULTURE   OF   PEECEPTION.  121 

misunderstand  this  spirit,  and  regard  it  as  mischief.  It  is  not 
mischief,  however,  in  any  bad  sense;  it  is  merely  the  desire  for 
knowledge.  Little  children  tumble  things  upside  down,  rum- 
mage in  bureau  drawers,  and  do  many  other  things  annoying 
to  their  parents ;  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  this  is  done 
in  the  pursuit  of  knowledge.  The  child  is  acquiring  its  educa- 
tion, and  is  learning  faster  than  when  it  goes  to  school  or  college. 

Duty  of  Teachers. — Parents  and  teachers  should  gratify  this 
curiosity  in  children.  It  is  the  voice  of  nature  and  should  be 
heeded.  Teachers  could  often  sit  at  the  feet  of  nature  and  learn 
lessons  of  her  in  the  education  of  the  young.  Children  are  often 
kept  in  school,  studying  the  dry  pages  of  text-books,  when  they 
should  be  out  conning  the  more  attractive  pages  on  which  the 
hand  of  nature  has  written  her  countless  lessons  of  interest  and 
beauty.  The  ability  to  read  the  book  of  nature  correctly  is 
worth  more  to  many  persons  than  the  power  to  peruse  the  pages 
of  a  school  reader.  A  most  valuable  part  of  education  consists 
in  that  training  which  gives  the  power  of  wresting  from  nature 
her  stores  of  knowledge.  The  power  to  acquire  for  ourselves,  as 
well  as  to  understand  and  remember  what  has  been  acquired,  is 
one  of  the  grand  ends  of  culture. 

V.  METHODS  OF  CULTURE. — Having  spoken  of  the  import- 
ance and  neglect  of  the  culture  of  the  perceptive  powers,  we 
shall  now  give  a  few  directions  in  respect  to  the  methods  by 
which  these  powers  may  be  cultivated.  The  subject  is  a  broad 
one,  and  would  require  a  volume  to  give  it  adequate  develop- 
ment. Only  a  few  general  statements  can  be  made  in  this  place. 

Cultivated  by  Exercise. — The  perceptive  powers  can  be  cul- 
tivated by  exercise.  Exercise  is  the  great  law  of  culture.  This 
law  is  universal;  all  development  comes  from  exercise.  The  law 
applies  to  both  body  and  mind.  The  arm  of  the  laborer  and  the 
leg  of  the  pedestrian  become  strong  by  use.  Neglect  exercise 
and  we  lose  power,  either  mental  or  physical.  Put  the  arm  in  a 
sling,  and  it  becomes  weak ;  let  the  mind  be  inactive,  and  it  be- 
comes imbecile  and  incapable  of  exertion. 
6 


122  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Illustration. — To  train  the  perceptive  powers,  therefore,  they 
must  be  exercised.  By  exercise  the  eye  of  the  sailor  perceives  a 
vessel  in  the  far  distant  horizon  which  a  landsman  can  hardly 
see  with  a  spy-glass.  A  watchmaker  can  detect  a  slight  injury 
to  the  delicate  works  of  the  watch,  while  another  would  be  un- 
able to  see  anything  wrong  with  it.  Persons  whose  business  it  is 
to  test  the  qualities  of  teas  by  tasting  them  become  so  skillful 
that  they  can  distinguish  hundreds  of  varieties.  It  is  said  that 
the  tasters  of  liquors  become  so  expert  that  they  can  tell  where 
the  grapes  grew  out  of  which  the  wines  or  brandies  were  made. 
The  reading  of  the  blind  with  their  raised  letters  also  illustrates 
what  a  delicacy  can  be  acquired  by  the  sense  of  touch. 

Should  be  Judicious. — This  exercise  should  be  judicious  in 
kind  and  quantity.  The  objects  observed  should  be  adapted  to 
the  age  and  capacity  of  the  pupils.  They  should  be  such  as  to 
attract  the  attention  and  please  and  interest  the  mind.  The 
mind  should  not  be  overtaxed  nor  wearied  in  the  work;  too 
much  exercise  may  blunt  the  senses  instead  of  improving  them. 
By  using  the  fingers  with  lack  of  care,  the  blind  may  impair  the 
delicacy  of  the  finger-tips  in  reading  the  raised  letters.  The 
tasters  of  liquors  must  be  temperate  men  to  preserve  that  nice 
sense  by  which  they  distinguish  the  fine  shades  of  difference  be- 
tween the  varioxis  brands  of  the  importers. 

Observe  with  Attention. — We  should  acquire  the  habit  of 
observing  with  attention.  Many  persons  look  at  objects  with  a 
careless,  inattentive  eye.  We  should  guard  against  the  habit  of 
careless  looking.  We  should  fix  the  mind  upon  the  object  before 
us;  we  should  concentrate  the  attention  upon  that  at  which  we 
are  looking.  Attention,  in  respect  to  perception,  has  been  com- 
pared to  a  burning-glass :  hold  the  sun-glass  between  the  sun  and 
a  board,  and  the  concentrated  rays  will  burn  a  hole  through  the 
latter.  So  attention  concentrates  the  rays  of  perceptive  power 
and  enables  the  mind  to  penetrate  below  the  surface  of  things. 

Illustration. — The  difference  between  attentive  and  inatten- 
tive observation  is  readily  illustrated  by  the  habits  of  indi- 


THE  CULTURE  OF  PERCEPTION.          123 

viduals.  People  observe  with  most  attention  those  things  in 
which  they  have  the  most  interest.  Some  people  coming  from 
church,  can  tell  you  the  text,  the  divisions  of  the  sermon,  and 
are  able  to  repeat  a  portion  of  the  discourse.  Others  can  tell 
you  who  were  at  church,  what  dress  or  bonnet  Mrs.  Smith  wore, 
and  who  had  on  something  in  the  newest  style  or  fashion.  The 
story  of  the  lost  camel  and  the  dervish,  found  in  many  of  our 
school  readers,  presents  a  striking  illustration  of  attentive  ob- 
servation. 

Observe  Minutely. — To  train  the  powers  of  observation  we 
should  practice  observing  minutely.  We  should  analyze  the  ob- 
jects which  we  look  at  into  their  parts,  and  notice  these  parts. 
Objects  present  themselves  to  us  as  wholes ;  our  definite  knowl- 
edge of  them  is  gained  by  analysis,  by  separating  them  into  the 
elements  which  compose  them.  We  should  therefore  give  atten- 
tion to  the  details  of  whatever  we  are  considering;  and  thus  cul- 
tivate the  habit  of  observing  with  minuteness. 

Illustration. — A  few  illustrations  of  minute  observation  may 
serve  to  impress  what  is  meant.  We  all  recognize  the  faces  of 
our  friends ;  but  how  few  of  us  can  describe  them.  Some  per- 
sons, however,  after  meeting  a  man  but  a  single  time,  will  tell  the 
color  of  the  hair,  the  color  of  the  eyes,  the  side  on  which  the  hair 
is  parted,  the  peculiarities  of  mouth,  nose,  cheek,  etc.,  describing 
each  feature  and  peculiarity  with  minuteness.  The  same  is  true 
in  respect  to  the  dress  of  ladies  and  gentlemen.  It  is  related  of  a 
teacher  that  if,  when  hearing  a  class,  some  one  rapped  at  the 
door,  he  would  look  up  as  the  visitor  entered  and  from  a  single 
glance  could  tell  his  appearance  and  dress,  the  kind  of  hat  he 
wore,  kind  of  neck-tie,  collar,  vest,  coat,  shoes,  etc.  The  skillful 
banker,  also,  in  counting  money  with  wondrous  rapidity,  will 
detect  and  throw  from  his  pile  of  bills  the  counterfeits  which,  to 
the  ordinary  eye,  seem  to  be  without  spot  or  blemish. 

Object  Lessons. — The  perceptive  powers  are  cultivated  by 
means  of  Object  Lessons.  The  design  of  object  lessons  is  twofold, 
— culture  and  knowledge.  The  primary  object,  however,  is  the 


124:  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

culture  of  the  senses.  The  method  of  imparting  this  culture  is  to 
teach,  not  with  books,  but  with  the  real  objects,  with  things  which 
pupils  can  see  and  handle  for  themselves.  We  should  require 
pupils  to  discover  facts  for  themselves.  There  should  be  an 
"observation  class"  in  every  school.  In  this  way  pupils  may  be 
taught  to  observe  the  facts  of  nature  and  acquire  the  power  of 
quick  and  accurate  perception. 

By  Draiviiiff. — The  art  of  Drawing  is  well  adapted  to  give 
culture  to  the  perceptive  powers.  This  art  requires  us  to  look 
closely  at  objects,  to  examine  them  in  detail,  and  to  acquire  dis- 
tinct and  definite  ideas  of  them.  Thus,  let  a  person  who  has  not 
had  any  practice  in  drawing  attempt  to  outline  a  state  or  country 
of  which  he  thinks  he  has  a  very  correct  idea,  and  he  will  realize 
how  much  more  closely  he  must  examine  it  than  he  has  done  in 
the  ordinary  study  of  geography.  So,  in  drawing  a  leaf  of  the 
maple  or  oak  or  beech,  one  will  be  surprised  at  the  increased 
accuracy  of  observation  required.  The  study  of  drawing  is  there- 
fore adapted  to  train  to  habits  of  close  and  minute  observation. 

By  Natural  Hisfo  //. — The  study  of  Natural  History  will 
also  give  culture  to  the  power  of  perception.  This  is  evident  from 
the  nature  of  these  sciences.  They  deal  with  facts,  and  in  study- 
ing them  we  must  observe  these  facts  for  ourselves.  To  become 
skilled  in  these  sciences  it  is  necessary  to  examine  closely  plants, 
animals,  and  minerals,  to  become  familiar  with  their  form,  color, 
structure,  peculiarities,  etc.  This  gives  constant  exercise  to  the 
perceptive  faculties,  and  secures  the  habit  of  careful  and  attentive 
observation.  In  proof  of  the  value  of  these  studies,  we  find  that 
naturalists  are  close  and  minute  observers.  Agassiz,  as  already 
stated,  would  take  a  grasshopper  and  discourse  for  hours  on  the 
beauties  and  wonders  of  its  structure  and  habits;  and  Hugh 
Miller  could  read  the  history  of  creation  in  the  hieroglyphics  of 
nature  found  in  the  Old  Red  Sandstone  of  Scotland. 

Formulas  for  Observation. — The  perceptive  powers,  when 
naturally  poor,  may  be  aided  by  a  formula  for  observation.  By 
a  formula  for  observation  is  meant  a  systematic  outline  or  ar- 


THE   CULTURE   OF    PERCEPTION". 


125 


rangement  of  things  which  are  worth  observing.  Such  a  formula 
would  be,  of  great  value  to  one  who  does  not  observe  closely.  It 
suggests  to  him  what  he  should  look  at,  and  examine  carefully, 
and  will  enable  him  to  remember  what  he  has  seen.  A  formula 
similar  to  the  following  is  suggested  for  a  traveller: 

f  f  1.  Land  and  Water. 

2 
1.  Physical  Features.  ^  „' 


Formula  for  a 
Traveller. 


L4.  Minerals. 
"1.  Looks. 

2.  Language. 

3.  Dress. 

2.  The  People.   •  4.  Manners. 

5.  Morals. 

6.  Education. 
.7.  Employment. 

{1.  Dwellings. 
2.  Churches. 
o.  school-nouses. 
4.  Public  Buildings. 

SPECIAL,  LESSONS. — In  our  schools  there  should  be  special 
lessons  arranged  to  give  culture  to  all  the  senses.  Such  lessons 
come  appropriately  under  the  head  of  Object  Lessons.  Every 
public  school  should  be  furnished  with  objects  suitable  to  give 
such  instruction  and  culture ;  and  teachers  should  not  neglect  so 
important  a  duty. 

Sense  of  Touch. — The  sense  of  touch  should  be  trained  so  as 
to  detect  the  texture  of  cloth,  the  quality  of  flour,  the  shape  of 
objects,  etc.  Great  skill  can  be  obtained  in  this  way.  The  ex- 
perienced merchant  can  tell  the  quality  of  goods  by  his  delicate 
touch,  and  the  miller  knows  the  quality  of  his  flour  by  feeling  it. 
The  sense  of  muscular  resistance,  in  estimating  the  weigh  of  ob- 
jects, should  also  be  cultivated.  With  a  little  practice,  the 
weight  of  books,  chairs,  and  other  objects,  even  to  the  fraction  of 
tin  ounce,  can  be  determined  by  "hefting  them." 

Sense  of  Siff Jit. — The  sense  of  sight  should  also  receive  care- 
ful training.  First  the  pupil  should  be  trained  to  distinguish 
all  the  primary  and  secondary  colors;  and  afterwards  he  should 
be  drilled  on  their  different  shades  and  tints.  Exercises  in  the 


126  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

harmony  of  colors,  and  their  application  to  dress,  the  furnishing 
of  rooms,  etc.,  would  be  of  great  value  to  the  student.  Much 
may  be  done  in  this  way  to  sharpen  the  eye  and  increase  the 
delicacy  and  accuracy  of  vision.  The  teacher  should  find  out  all 
who  are  color-blind,  either  partly  or  totally,  and  make  an  effort 
to  remedy  this  defect.  The  weight  of  objects,  horses,  cattle,  and 
even  of  persons,  can  be  told  within  a  few  pounds  by  the  sight 
when  it  is  properly  trained. 

Sense  of  Hearing. — The  sense  of  hearing  should  also  receive 
training.  The  pupil  should  be  exercised  upon  the  sounds  of  the 
musical  scale  until  the  various  skips  can  be  readily  told.  The 
practice  of  naming  the  notes  struck  on  the  organ  or  piano  is  also 
a  good  drill.  Pupils  should  be  encouraged  to  listen  to  the  songs 
of  birds,  so  that  they  can  distinguish  one  from  another  and  de- 
scribe them.  Every  bird  of  the  forest  or  meadow  should  be 
known  by  its  song.  The  noises  of  insects  also  afford  a  good  sub- 
ject for  the  exercise  of  hearing.  Every  person  should  be  familiar 
with  a  large  list  of  words  which  indicate  the  various  sounds,  and 
have  clear  ideas  of  the  differences  of  these  sounds. 

Smell  and  Taste. — It  might  be  well  also  to  give  some  culture 
to  the  goosser  senses  of  smell  and  taste.  It  would  be  well  if  each 
person  was  familiar  with  the  principal  odors  so  that  he  could  de- 
tect and  name  them.  In  some  kinds  of  business,  such  skill  is  in- 
valuable. A  refined  sensibility  in  respect  to  perfumes  is  also  of 
value  in  cultivated  society.  The  ability  to  detect  different  flavors 
is  also  not  unworthy  of  some  general  culture.  In  certain  kinds 
of  business,  as  the  selection  of  teas,  it  becomes  a  necessity. 

Conclusion.- — In  conclusion  it  is  suggested  that  teachers 
should  appreciate  the  value  of  the  culture  of  the  perceptive 
powers,  and  endeavor  to  do  something  to  afford  this  culture. 
Let  it  be  remembered  that  by  training  the  powers  of  observation 
of  pupils  we  lead  them  to  acquire  definite  ideas  of  things,  enable 
them  to  store  their  minds  with  fresh  and  interesting  knowledge, 
lay  the  foundation  for  literary  or  business  success,  and  thus  do 
much  to  enhance  their  happiness  in  life  and  add  to  the  sum  of 
human  knowledge. 


THE  MEMORY. 


CHAPTER  L 

THE   NATURE   OF   THE   MEMORY. 

THE  MEMORY  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  we  retain 
and  recall  knowledge.  It  is  the  power  by  which  we  are  en- 
abled to  hold  fast  to  our  mental  acquisitions  and  recall  them  to 
mind  when  we  wish  to  use  them.  The  power  of  holding  knowl- 
edge is  called  Retention ;  the  power  of  reproducing  knowledge  ia 
called  Recollection. 

The  Term  Memory. — The  term  Memory  is  derived  from  the 
Latin  memor,  mindful.  It  is  used  by  some  writers  as  identical 
with  retention ;  thus  they  speak  of  a  strong  memory  and  a  tardy 
recollection.  This  distinction  in  the  use  of  the  term,  however,  is 
not  correct;  the  term  memory  is  properly  used  to  embrace  the 
entire  faculty  of  retaining  and  recalling. 

Elements  of  Memory. — As  thus  denned,  the  Memory  seems 
to  embrace  but  two  elements ;  those  of  retention  and  recollection. 
There  are,  however,  two  other  elements  which  enter  into  an  act 
of  memory;  namely,  representation  and  recognition.  The  mind 
not  only  retains  and  recalls  knowledge,  but  it  presents  it  in  the 
form  of  pictures  and  recognizes  it  as  a  part  of  its  past  experi- 
ence. There  are  thus  four  elements  hi  the  faculty  of  Memory ; 
Retention,  Recollection,  Representation,  and  Recognition. 

Elements  Distinguished. — These  four  elements,  though 
usually  united  in  a  complete  act  of  the  memory,  are  both  logic- 
ally and  psychologically  distinguished.  It  is  one  act  or  power 
of  the  mind  to  retain  knowledge,  another  to  call  it  up  out  of  un- 

(127) 


128  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

consciousness,  another  to  hold  it  in  the  mind  in  the  form  of  vivid 
pictures,  and  still  another  to  recognize  the  object  pictured  as  a 
matter  of  previous  experience.  The  closest  relation  seems  to 
exist  between  recollection  and  representation ;  indeed,  it  may  be 
asked  whether  what  is  recalled  is  not  necessarily  represented. 
It  is  manifest,  however,  that  the  capacity  or  energy  to  recall  is 
not  identical  with  the  power  by  which  we  represent  what  is  re- 
called. All  the  four  elements,  though  intimately  related,  pre- 
sent distinct  mental  acts  and  indicate  distinct  mental  capacities 
or  energies. 

Different  Views  of  Memory. — Some  writers  treat  the  entire 
subject  under  the  head  of  Kepresentation,  regarding  retention 
and  recollection,  not  as  elements  of  the  faculty  of  Memory,  but 
merely  as  conditions  of  representation.  These  writers  usually 
regard  the  representative  element  as  performing  two  offices — the 
representing  of  both  the  old  and  the  new — and  thus  as  embrac- 
ing the  memory  and  the  imagination.  Others,  holding  the  same 
general  view,  ignore  retention  even  as  a  condition  of  recollection 
or  representation.  Others,  again,  seem  to  regard  mental  repro- 
duction as  the  principal  element  in  the  faculty,  and  refer  to  repre- 
sentation and  recognition  as  merely  incidental  to  it.  The  correct 
view  seems  to  be  to  give  each  one" of  the  four  elements  a  distinct 
place  in  the  faculty. 

Hamilton's  Vieiv. — Sir  William  Hamilton  regards  the  first 
three  elements  as  so  entirely  distinct  that  he  treats  them  as  dis- 
tinct faculties,  naming  them  the  Conservative,  the  Reproductive, 
and  the  Representative  powers.  The  fourth  element,  that  of 
recognition,  seems  to  have  escaped  his  notice,  as  he  does  not  dis- 
cuss it  nor  refer  to  it.  Under  the  Representative  power,  he  in- 
cludes the  power  of  forming  exact  transcripts  of  past  experience, 
and  also  the  power  of  representing  the  new,  or  the  Imagination. 

THE  ELEMENTS  OF  MEMORY. 

The  Memory,  as  we  have  explained,  embraces  four  distinct 
elements — Retention,  Recollection,  Representation,  and  Recogni- 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  129 

tion.  We  now  proceed  to  discuss  each  one  of  these  elements  in 
detail. 

I.  RETENTION. — Retention  is  the  power  by  which  we  retain 
knowledge.  It  holds  fast  to  that  which  we  have  acquired,  and 
prevents  its  escaping  from  the  mind.  It  is  a  conservative  ele- 
ment; it  conserves  or  preserves  knowledge,  not  in  but  out  of 
consciousness.  Sir  William  Hamilton  calls  it  the  Conservative 
power  of  the  mind,  and  treats  ft  as  a  distinct  faculty,  coordinate 
with  Perception,  Recollection,  etc. 

To  What  Compared. — The  element  of  retention  may  be  com- 
pared to  a  mental  storehouse  in  which  we  store  away  our  knowl- 
edge until  we  wish  to- use  it.  It  has  also  been  compared  to  a 
treasury  in  which  we  place  our  ideas  and  thoughts  for  preserva- 
tion. The  ancient  writers  compared  it  to  a  tablet  on  which 
characters  were  stamped  or  engraved.  Gassendi  likens  it  to  a 
piece  of  cloth  or  paper  which  is  capable  of  receiving  numerous 
folds,  a~nd  retains  those  longest  in  which  it  has  been  oftenest  laid. 
These  comparisons,  however,  are  merely  illustrations  of  the 
faculty,  and  do  not  philosophically  explain  it. 

Method  of  Retaining. — How  knowledge  is  retained  in  the 
mind,  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  explain.  Yet  that  it 
should  not  be  retained,  is  equally  difficult  to  understand.  Ham- 
ilton says  that  "the  problem  most  difficult  of  solution  is  not  how 
a  mental  activity  endures,  but  how  it  vanishes."  It  may  be  said 
that  our  ideas  are  not  retained  in  the  sense  in  which  a  hook  re- 
tains a  hat  or  coat  ready  to  be  taken  down  when  wanted.  We  are 
not  to  conceive  the  mind  to  be  a  convenient  receptacle  in  which 
all  manner  of  thoughts  and  feelings  may  be  stored  away,  like 
guns  in  an  armory,  or  old  clothes  in  the  clothes-press.  What  we 
mean  by  the  mind  being  retentive  is  the  power  by  which  it  pre- 
vents knowledge  from  vanishing  away  so  that  it  may  reproduce 
what  it  has  once  known. 

Objections  to  Retention. — Some  authors  discard  the  element 
of  retention,  considering  the  memory  merely  as  a  reproducing 
power.  The  reason  for  this  view  is  that  whatever  energy  the 
6* 


130  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

mind  possesses  in  respect  to  retaining  knowledge,  it  exercises,  not 
in  but  out  of  consciousness.  Even  Sir  William  Hamilton,  who 
raises  the  element  into  the  importance  of  a  distinct  faculty,  says, 
"  Retention  is  a  condition  of  representation ;  and  it  is  only  by  an 
extension  of  the  term  that  it  can  be  called  a  faculty,  that  is,  an 
active  power."  "  It  is  more  a  passive  resistance  than  an  energy, 
and  ought,  therefore,  perhaps  to  receive  rather  the  appellation  of 
a  capacity."  Dr.  Porter  says  that  the  doctrine  of  a  retentive 
faculty  is  purely  figurative. 

Reasons  for  Retention. — Notwithstanding  these  views,  there 
seem  to  be  good  reasons  for  regarding  the  mind  as  possessing  the 
power  to  retain  knowledge,  and  thus  as  embracing  an  element 
of  retention.  In  favor  of  this  view  several  considerations 
will  be  presented.  First,  the  phenomenon  of  retention  is  natural, 
on  the  ground  of  the  self-energy  of  the  mind.  The  possibility  of 
the  conservation  of  the  activities  of  the  mind  is  involved  in  the 
conception  of  the  power  of  self-activity. 

Second,  the  power  to  retain  is  implied  in  the  power  to  recall. 
If  there  were  no  power  to  hold  knowledge,  how  could  there  be 
any  reproduction  of  knowledge?  If  nothing  were  retained  in  the 
mind,  there  would  be  nothing  to  recall.  I  cannot  recall  that 
which  was  never  in  the  mind.  Third,  the  power  to  retain  is 
implied  in  the  common  expression  "commit  to  memory."  We 
commit  our  ideas  and  thoughts  to  something  that  takes  charge  of 
and  preserves  them. 

Fourth,  consciousness  shows  that  the  operation  of  trying  to  fix 
a  thing  in  the  mind  and  the  recalling  of  it  are  quite  different. 
The  effort  to  commit  is  not  the  same  as  the  effort  to  recall.  In 
one  case  we  seem  to  work  from  without  inward ;  in  the  other 
from  within  outward.  Fifth,  this  distinction  is  sustained  by 
many  eminent  philosophers.  Plato  considered  the  memory 
merely  as  the  faculty  of  conservation.  Aristotle  distinguished 
memory  as  the  faculty  of  reproduction.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
regards  it  as  a  distinct  faculty  coordinate  with  recollection.  And 
many  of  those  philosophers  who  discard  it  in  their  formal  state- 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  131 

ments,  unconsciously  acknowledge  its  existence  by  the  use  of  such 
expressions  as  a  "tenacious  memory,"  etc. 

Hamilton's  Argument. — Hamilton's  argument  in  favor  of 
retention  will  be  briefly  stated.  We  are  conscious  of  certain 
cognitions  as  acquired,  and  we  are  conscious  of  these  cognitions 
as  resuscitated.  That  in  the  interval,  when  out  of  conscious- 
ness, these  cognitions  do  continue  to  subsist,  is  an  hypothesis 
which  we  are  not  only  warranted  but  necessitated  to  establish. 
The  sphere  of  our  conscious  modification  is  only  a  small  circle  in 
the  centre  of  a  far  wider  sphere  of  action  and  passion.  Thus  in 
sight  we  may  not  be  conscious  of  all  the  minute  parts  of  an  ob- 
ject, but  these  together  make  up  the  object  of  vision.  In  hear- 
ing, the  noise  of  each  wave  may  not  be  heard,  but  the  sum  of 
these  unheard  noises  makes  up  the  murmur  of  the  sea  of  which 
we  are  conscious.  Thus  there  are  latent  modifications  of  con- 
sciousness of  which  we  are  unconscious. 

Physiological  Explanations. — Some  of  the  older  writers 
endeavored  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  retention  by  various 
physiological  hypotheses,  as  for  example,  the  hypotheses  of  per- 
manent material  impressions  on  the  brain,  or  of  permanent  dis- 
position in  the  nervous  fibres  to  repeat  the  same  oscillatory 
movements,  or  of  particular  organs  for  the  different  functions  of 
memory,  or  of  particular  parts  of  the  brain  as  repositories  of  the 
various  classes  of  ideas,  or  of  a  particular  fibre  as  the  instrument 
of  every  several  notion.  But  all  these  suppositions  are  useless, 
and  show  an  ignorance  of  the  true  nature  of  the  mind.  The  act 
of  retention  is  a  psychical  and  not  a  physiological  one,  and  is  due 
to  the  inherent  energy  of  the  self-active  spirit. 

II.  RECOLLECTION. — Recollection  is  the  power  by  which  we 
recall  knowledge.  It  brings  knowledge,  which  has  been  lying 
dormant  in  the  mind,  into  consciousness,  and  enables  us  to  re- 
know  what  we  have  previously  experienced.  Hamilton  calls,  it, 
a  resuscitative  power;  it  resuscitates  or  brings  to  life  that  which 
seems  to  lie  buried  in  unconsciousness.  Knowledge  lies. sleeping, 
as  it  were,  in  the  tomb  of  unconsciousness ;  Recollection  awakens 
it  and  calls  it  forth  into  life. 


132  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

Illustration. — The  action  of  the  Recollection  can  be  readily  il- 
lustrated. Thus  a  word,  a  strain  of  music,  the  face  of  a  friend, 
which  I  do  not  now  think  of,  may  be  recalled  to  mind  so  that  I 
have  a  vivid  conception  of  them.  The  word  Niagara  is  spoken, 
and  lo,  before  my  mind  rises  a  picture  of  the  grand  cataract — 
the  rushing  torrent,  the  deep  plunge  of  water,  the  deafening 
roar,  the  cloud  of  mist  rising  out  of  and  hanging  over  the  abyss, 
and  the  graceful  rainbow  crowning  all  with  its  glorious  arch  of 
beauty. 

Relation  to  Retention. — The  relation  of  the  two  elements, 
Retention  and  Recollection,  may  be  readily  seen.  Retention 
holds  knowledge;  Recollection  brings  it  forth  out  of  unconscious- 
ness into  consciousness.  Retention  may  be  compared  to  a  store- 
house in  which  knowledge  is  placed  for  safe-keeping ;  and  Recol- 
lection to  an  errand-boy  that  is  sent  in  to  bring  out  what  is 
needed.  Retention  may  be  likened  to  a  well  in  which  are  pre- 
served the  streams  of  knowledge  which  flow  therein ;  and  Recol- 
lection to  the  bucket  which  is  let  down  to  bring  up  the  knowl- 
edge as  we  wish  to  use  it.  The  former  is  a  condition  for  the 
latter;  the  latter  is  the  complement  of  the  former. 

Unequal  'in  Degree. — Retention  and  Recollection  seldom 
exist  in  equal  degrees  in  the  same  mind.  This  difference  is  due 
partly  to  nature  and  partly  to  culture.  Some  minds  are  quick 
and  ready;  what  they  know  seems  to  be  always  at  the  surface, 
or,  as  we  say,  "  on  the  end  of  the  tongue."  Other  minds  are  slow 
to  recall  what  they  know,  and  usually  reproduce  the  past  with 
conscious  effort.  The  ready  memory  is  often  not  very  tenacious, 
while  the  slow  memory  is  usually  strong  in  its  hold  on  its  facts. 
The  pupil  that  commits  a  lesson  readily  may  forget  it  in  a  day 
or  two;  the  student  who  acquires  with  labor  often  retains  much 
longer.  "Easy  come,  easy  go,"  we  often  find  to  be  as  true  of 
knowledge  as  of  money.  The  study  of  facts,  committing  of 
verbal  lessons,  frequent  use  of  knowledge  in  conversation — all 
these  tend  to  increase  the  readiness  of  the  memory.  The  neglect 
of  facts,  lack  of  conversation,  the  study  of  principles,  etc.,  tend 
to  produce  tardiness  of  the  memory. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  133 

Voluntary  and  Involuntary. — Recollection  operates  both 
involuntarily  and  voluntarily.  One  thought  may  succeed  another 
without  any  voluntary  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  person ;  every 
one  is  familiar  with  the  train  of  thought  in  which  ideas  and 
images  seem  to  chase  one  another  through  the  mind.  Our 
thoughts  may  also  be  called  out  of  unconsciousness  by  a  direct 
and  intentional  effort  of  the  will.  The  former  is  called  invol- 
untary or  spontaneous  recollection ;  the  latter  has  been  called  by 
some  writers  reminiscence,  or  recollection  proper. 

Possibility  of  Recalling. — The  possibility  of  voluntary  re- 
collection has  been  questioned.  How  can  we,  it  is  asked,  seek  in 
the  memory  for,  or  try  to  recall,  that  of  which  we  have  no  re- 
collection ?  Does  not  the  fact  that  we  will  to  recall  anything 
imply  that  we  have  already  remembered  what  we  wish  to  remem- 
ber? This  has  been  regarded  as  a  philosophical  puzzle;  but  it  is 
so  only  to  the  philosopher  who  rejects  the  element  of  retention. 
The  simple  fact  is  that  we  are  conscious  of  having  acquired  some- 
thing which  is  not  now  in  consciousness,  but  which  we  are  trying 
to  recall  out  of  unconsciousness  into  consciousness.  Thus,  suppose 
I  have  for  the  moment  forgotten  a  name,  and  try  to  recall  it ;  the 
effort  to  recall  implies  that  I  am  conscious  that  I  have  retained 
the  name  and  believe  that  I  can  recall  it. 

III.  REPRESENTATION. — In  an  act  of  memory  we  not  only 
retain  and  recall,  but  there  is  also  a  representation  of  that  which 
we  recall.  The  object  or  event  stands  out  before  the  mind  in  the 
form  of  an  image  or  picture,  or  in  some  mental  product,  corres- 
ponding to  the  original  experience.  The  power  that  thus  repre- 
sents knowledge  is  called  the  representative  element  of  the 
memory. 

Illustration. — To  illustrate  this  element,  suppose  I  recall  my 
boyhood's  home.  I  see  it  as  clearly  in  my  "  mind's  eye  "  as  I  did 
when  a  boy  with  the  eye  of  sense.  It  stands  before  my  mind  as 
a  picture, — its  yard,  garden,  orchard,  and  fields,  the  old  barn  witli 
its  hay-mow,  stables,  etc.  I  see  it  all  again  as  distinctly  as  if  I 
were  at  the  spot  looking  upon  it, — father,  mother,  sister,  brother, 


134  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  companions  of  my  youth,  and  the  sports  of  childhood, — all 
these  pass  before  my  mental  vision  like  the  pictures  in  a  pano- 
rama. 

Relation  to  Recollection. — The  act  of  representation,  though 
closely  related  to,  is  distinct  from  the  act  of  recollection.  The 
one  is  a  drawing  out  process,  a  recalling  something  out  of  uncon- 
sciousness into  consciousness ;  the  other  is  a  representation  of  that 
which  is  recalled.  Recollection  is  a  condition  of  representation ; 
we  must  first  recall  before  we  can  represent.  That  which  is 
represented  was  first  retained  by  the  conservative  energy  of  the 
mind ;  it  was  then  recalled  out  of  consciousness  by  the  reproduc- 
tive power;  the  elements  thus  recalled  are  constructed  into  a 
picture  or  into  some  form  corresponding  to  the  original  cognition. 
It  is  not  assumed  that  knowledge  is  retained  as  a  picture,  and  re- 
stored as  a  picture ;  but  that  it  is  recreated  in  the  form  of  a  pic- 
ture or  some  other  mental  product  when  it  is  recalled. 

Relation  to  Imagination. — The  representative  element  gives 
us  an  exact  transcript  of  the  past.  In  this  respect  it  differs  from 
Imagination,  which  combines  our  mental  images  of  the  past  into 
new  products.  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton  regards  the  representative 
element  in  memory  and  imagination  as  the  same  power  differently 
applied.  He  treats  it  as  a  distinct  faculty  with  the  two  offices, — 
that  of  representing  the  actual  and  also  the  ideal.  The  latter,  in 
connection  with  comparison,  he  regards  as  the  power  which 
writers  call  the  Imagination.  The  truth  is,  the  memory  and  the 
imagination  both  employ  a  representative  element;  one  repre- 
sents the  actual,  the  other  the  ideal. 

Not  Restricted  to  Pictures. — The  representative  element  in 
memory  is  not  restricted  to  the  representation  of  pictures.  It  em- 
braces the  entire  domain  of  mental  activity.  The  products  of  all 
the  senses,  indeed  every  product  of  the  mind,  may  be  recalled  and 
represented.  Thus,  we  can  conceive  of  a  sound,  as  well  as  an  object 
of  sight.  The  music  we  have  heard  comes  floating  through  the 
mind  as  distinctly  as  if  we  were  at  present  listening  to  it.  We 
may  also  conceive  of  a  feeling,  a  flavor,  a  perfume,  etc.,  which 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  135 

have  been  objects  of  past  experience.  We  may  also  recall  and 
represent  an  abstract  or  general  idea,  a  thought,  a  process  of 
reasoning,  etc.  Every  mental  product  that  may  be  retained  and 
recalled,  may  be  represented,  that  is,  may  be  re-conceived.  Every 
conception  which  the  mind  forms  of  a  past  experience  or  former 
mental  product  is  regarded  as  due  to  the  representative  element 
of  the  memory. 

The  Object  of  Representation. — What  is  the  object  given  in 
the  act  of  representation  ?  What  is  the  nature  of  that  which  is 
represented  ?  A  general  remark  has  already  been  made  on  this 
subject ;  but  to  give  a  clear  and  definite  conception  of  it,  we  shall 
consider  the  matter  somewhat  in  detail. 

A  Mental  Object. — The  object  given  in  representation  is  a  men- 
tal object.  It  is  not  a  real  object  which  we  remember,  but  some- 
thing of  the  mind's  own  creation.  It  is  thus  a  mental  and  not  a 
material  object  that  is  the  product  of  the  representative  power. 
It  is  a  product  of  the  mind,  and  has  a  psychological,  but  not  a 
material  existence ;  it  exists  in  and  for  the  soul  alone.  As  such, 
it  is  not  only  a  product  of  the  mind,  but  an  object  for  the  mind  to 
contemplate  and  recognize. 

A  New  Object. — The  object  given  in  representation  is  a  new 
object.  It  is  not  an  old  experience  repeated,  but  a  new  represen- 
tatioiTof  an  old  experience.  The  mental  object  given  in  represen- 
tation is  neither  a  material  object  nor  an  old  percept  of  an  object ; 
but  a  new  mental  product  of  a  transcript  more  or  less  exact  of 
the  object  or  percept.  It  is  a  re-creation  or  re-production  of  some- 
thing we  have  experienced  before;  but  not  the  same  identical 
experience. 

Experience  of  Sense. — The  representative  power  may  operate  in 
the  domain  of  each  one  of  the  senses.  Its  most  vivid  conceptions 
are  those  of  sight,  where  the  product  is  in  the  form  of  a  picture 
with  distinct  outline,  color,  etc.  But  it  may  also  represent  a 
sound,  as  the  note  of  a  bird,  the  voice  of  a  friend,  or  a  remem- 
bered strain  of  music.  It  can  also  represent  a  flavor,  a  fragrance, 
the  sensation  of  warmth  or  cold,  etc.  Though  the  primary  idea 


136'  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

of  representation  is  that  of  images,  yet  in  a  larger  sense  the  re- 
membered product  of  every  sense  is  a  representation. 

Other  Products. — The  representative  power  operates  in  the  do- 
main of  the  understanding  also.  Our  ideas  and  thoughts  are  not 
only  recalled,  but  are  also  held  up  before  the  mind  in  distinct 
conceptions.  In  the  larger  sense  of  the  term,  both  abstract  and 
general  ideas  are  represented;  so  also  are  truths,  judgments, 
trains  of  reasoning,  etc.,  which  may  be  recalled  to  mind.  In  the 
same  sense,  the  higher  intuitive  ideas  and  truths,  the  emotions 
and  volitions,  are  held  before  the  mind  by  this  element  of  the 
memory.  As  we  have  before  stated,  every  product  of  the  mind, 
every  object  of  consciousness  that  is  recalled,  may  be  represented 
in  a  form  corresponding  to  the  primary  experience. 

An  Intellectual  Object. — The  mental  object  in  representation  is 
an  intellectual  object.  Whatever  is  recalled  and  represented  is  thus 
recreated  by  an  act  of  the  intellect — whether  it  be  an  idea,  an  emo- 
tion, or  a  volition.  We  can  recall  and  represent  an  act  of  the 
intellect,  or  of  the  sensibilities,  or  of  the  will;  each  of  these  is  an 
experience  originally  known  by  consciousness,  and  as  such  may 
be  recalled  and  represented  to  the  mind ;  but  in  this  representa- 
tion there  is  an  intellectual  act;  and  the  representation  before  the 
mind  of  the  emotion  or  volition  is  itself  an  intellectual  product. 
The  product  of  representation  is  thus  intellectual  in  its  nature. 
A  feeling  or  volition  is  converted  into  a  product  of  the  intellect 
in  the  act  of  its  being  recalled  and  represented. 

IV.  RECOGNITION. — The  three  elements  of  the  memory  now 
considered,  provide  for  the  retaining,  the  recalling,  and  the  repre- 
senting of  past  experience.  An  act  of  memory  is  not  completed, 
however,  until  the  image,  or  mental  product,  recalled  and  repre- 
sented, is  recognized  as  pertaining  to  our  past  experience.  The 
mind  not  only  recalls  and  represents  its  products ;  but  it  knows 
them  as  transcripts  or  representations  of  some  former  act  or  affec- 
tion of  consciousness.  It  recognizes  them  as  things  or  representa- 
tions of  things  it  has  known  before ;  and  this  act  of  recognition 
completes  an  act  of  memory. 


THE   NATURE   OF   MEMORY.  137 

An  Act  of  Knowledge. — The  act  of  recognition  is  an  act  of 
knowledge;  it  is  a  knowing  of  the  mental  object  represented. 
Indeed,  there  is  a  kind  of  dual  act  of  knowing.  That  which  is 
recalled  and  represented  is  known,  not  only  in  itself  as  a  mental 
product,  but  also  in  relation  to  my  experience  at  some  previous 
time.  I  know  the  thing  that  is  before  my  mind,  and  know  it  also 
as  a  something  of  previous  cognition.  Thus,  in  recalling  a  per- 
son or  a  tree,  I  not  only  know  them  as  objects,  but  know  them 
also  as  objects  previously  perceived  by  me.  The  same  is  true  of  a 
mental  act  or  a  feeling.  I  cognize  them  as  replaced  in  thought, 
and  I  also  cognize  them  as  a  previous  experience  of  conscious- 
ness. 

Importance  of  Recognition. — The  importance  of  this  act  of 
recognition  will  be  readily  seen.  Without  it  we  could  not  distin- 
guish between  the  products  of  memory  and  imagination.  Images 
of  my  previous  perceptions  may  arise  out  of  the  background  of 
the  past,  picture  after  picture  may  be  represented  on  the  mental 
canvas ;  how  am  I  to  know  whether  they  are  products  of  memory 
or  creations  of  the  imagination  ?  Only  as  I  recognize  them  as  facts 
of  past  experience.  The  landscape  before  my  mind  is  recognized 
as  one  which  I  previously  saw :  it  is  a  product  of  memory.  The 
ideal  image  before  my  mind  is  not  recognized  as  a  fact  of  my 
past  eyperience;  it  is  a  product  of  imagination.  The  act  of 
recognition  is  thus  the  crowning  act  of  memory.  Indeed,  it  is  pot 
merr.o'ry  in  its  full  and  complete  sense  until  the  object  recalled  is 
teftogaized  and  receives  the  stamp  of  previous  experience. 

A  Subjective  Element. — The  element  of  recognition  adds  the 
element  of  self  to  the  mental  object.  It  links  the  subjective  ele- 
ment to  the  objective.  Besides  the  cognition  of  a  mental  image 
or  product,  there  is  the  cognition  of  ourselves  as  related  to  it  in 
time  and  place.  We  not  only  know  the  object  as  recalled,  but 
we  know  ourselves  as  perceiving  that  of  which  it  is  a  copy, 
and  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  originally  perceived. 
All  the  circumstances  may  not  be  known ;  but  usually  several  of 
them  are  distinctly  recalled,  and  we  know  ourselves  as  making 
the  original  cognition  in  these  circumstances. 


1£8  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Operates  With  Objects. — The  element  of  recognition  operates 
with  respect  to  a  new  percept  of  an  old  object,  as  well  as  with  a 
recalled  representation  of  it.  Thus  a  thing  seen  or  heard  the 
second  time  is  recognized  as  having  been  seen  or  heard  before. 
The  man  I  meet  to-day  I  recognize  as  the  man  I  met  yesterday ; 
and  the  melody  I  hear  to-day  is  known  to  be  the  same  that  I 
heard  a  week  ago  at  the  opera.  A  repeated  perception  of  an 
object  is  thus  recognized,  as  well  as  a  mental  representation  of 
the  perception  of  the  object. 

Varies  in  Certainty. — This  recognition  may  be  more  or  less 
distinct  and  positive.  Our  knowledge  in  memory  may  vary  from 
the  most  distinct  and  positive  cognition  to  the  vaguest  and  most 
uncertain  impressions.  All  the  circumstances  may  stand  out 
clearly  before  the  mind — the  time  when,  the  place  where,  the 
events  just  before  and  after,  the  adjacent  and  surrounding  objects; 
or  these  things  may  be  only  partly  remembered,  and  confusion 
and  uncertainty  exist  in  the  mind.  This  uncertainty  may  be  so 
great  that  we  may  sometimes  distrust  our  own  recollections. 

Uncertainty  May  Diminish. — This  uncertainty  may  often 
be  reduced  to  a  less  degree,  or  even  changed  to  certainty.  This 
may  be  done  by  a  review  of  and  meditation  upon  the  circum- 
stances. We  try  to  recall  some  of  the  details,  we  search  among 
the  circumstances,  we  meditate  upon  the  subject,  and  thus  try  to 
"refresh  our  memory."  We  may  even  reason  about  the  matter, 
bringing  our  judgment  to  bear  in  aiding  the  memory.  The  ob- 
ject which  was  first  vaguely  recalled,  now  begins  to  stand  out 
distinctly  and  vividly  before  the  mind.  A  moment  ago  we 
thought  it  was  so  and  so ;  now  we  are  positive  that  it  was.  All 
doubt  has  vanished,  and  we  are  as  confident  in  our  recognition 
as  we  are  in  the  truth  of  an  axiom.  We  may  thus  often  pass 
from  a  condition  of  doubt  in  respect  to  the  revelations  of  the 
memory,  to  one  of  entire  certainty. 

Recognition  Not  Comparison. — The  recognition  of  a  mental 
product  is  not  an  act  of  comparison.  At  first  thought  it  may 
eeem  as  if  we  compared  the  mental  product  given  in  representa- 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  139 

tion  with  some  previous  product  of  the  mind.  This,  however,  is 
not  possible.  There  is  only  one  object  in  consciousness  in  an  act 
of  memory ;  and  thus  there  is  nothing  with  which  to  compare  it. 
In  order  for  a  comparison  to  be  made,  there  must  be  at  least  two 
objects  in  the  mind.  It  might  seem  possible  to  compare  a  present 
material  object  with  our  recollection  of  it;  but  even  in  the  mere 
perception  of  an  object  the  recognition  is  immediate.  In  an  act 
of  memory  the  recognition  is  an  act  of  knowledge  direct  and  im- 
mediate, and  not  the  result  of  comparison. 

Element  of  Belief. — The  element  of  recognition  is  attended 
with  belief.  We  believe  what  we  recognize  as  a  fact  of  previous 
experience  to  be  so.  Dr.  Reid  says,  "  This  belief,  which  we  have 
from  distinct  memory,  we  account  real  knowledge,  no  less  certain 
than  if  it  was  grounded  on  demonstration ;  no  man,  in  his  wits, 
calls  it  in  question,  or  will  hear  any  argument  against  it.  The 
testimony  of  witnesses  in  cases  of  life  and  death  depends  upon  it, 
and  all  the  knowledge  of  mankind  of  past  events  is  built  on  this 
foundation.  There  are  cases  in  which  a  man's  memory  is  less 
distinct  and  determinate,  and  where  he  is  ready  to  allow  that  it 
may  have  failed  him ;  but  this  does  not  in  the  least  weaken  its 
credit,  when  it  is  perfectly  distinct." 

The  Importance  of  Memory. — On  this  subject  Dr.  Haven 
makes  the  following  judicious  remarks:  "The  importance  of 
memory  as  a  power  of  the  mind,  is  shown  by  the  simple  fact,  that, 
but  for  it,  there  could  be  no  consciousness  of  continued  existence, 
none  of  personal  identity,  for  memory  is  our  only  voucher  for  the 
fact  that  we  existed  at  all  at  any  previous  moment.  Without 
this  faculty,  each  separate  instant  of  life  would  be  a  new  existence, 
isolated,  disconnected  with  aught  before  or  after;  nay,  there 
would,  in  that  case,  scarcely  be  any  consciousness  of  even  the 
present  existence,  for  we  are  conscious  only  as  we  are  cognizant  of 
change,  says  Hamilton,  and  there  is  involved  in  it  the  idea  of  the 
latest  past  along  with  the  present.  /  Memory  then  is  essential  to  all 
intelligent  mental  action,  whether  intellectual,  sensational,  or 
voluntarv.  The  ancients  seem  to  have  been  aware  of-  this,  when 


140  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

they  gave  it  the  name  ^w?//?  (from  ^v^oj-,  /Ltvao^ai'),  appellations 
of  the  mind  itself,  as  being,  in  fact,  the  chief  characteristic  faculty 
of  the  mind." 

THE  LAWS  OF  MEMORY. 

Having  explained  the  elements  which  enter  into  an  act  of  mem- 
ory, we  are  now  prepared  to  consider  the  laws  by  which  the  mem- 
ory operates.  These  laws  pertain  particularly  to  the  operation  of 
the  first  two  elements, — Retention  and  Recollection. 

I.  NATURE  OF  THE  LAWS. — By. the  Laws  of  Memory,  we  mean 
the  regular  mode  or  order  according  to  which  the  memory 
operates.  The  thoughts  which  we  retain  and  recall  are  not  re- 
tained and  recalled  by  chance.  The  memory  is  not  a  lawless 
activity,  doing  its  work  in  a  hap-hazard  sort  of  way.  There  is  a 
reabon  why  one  thing  is  remembered  rather  than  another,  and 
this  system  or  order  by  which  the  faculty  operates  is  what  we 
mean  by  the  Laws  of  Memory.  We  shall  first  speak  of  the  Laws 
of  Recollection. 

Law  of  Association.— -All  the  laws  of  recollection  are  em- 
braced under  the  principle  of  the  Association  of  Ideas.  Nearly 
every  idea  or  thought  that  arises  in  the  mind  is  connected, 
directly  or  indirectly,  with  some  previous  idea  or  thought.  The 
relation  may  be  immediate  or  remote ;  but  some  connection  there 
usually  is  between  a  mental  product  now  present  to  the  mind,  and 
some  mental  product  which  preceded  it.  This  mental  product 
previously  in  the  mind  is  supposed  to  be  the  cause  or  occasion  of 
the  idea  or  thought  now  present  to  the  mind.  The  fact  that  one 
idea  or  thought  thus  tends  to  awaken  some  other  idea  or  thought, 
implies  a  law  of  mental  activity,  which  has  been  called  the  Law 
of  Association. 

Basis  of  Recollection. — This  law  of  association  is  the  basis  of 
mental  reproduction.  One  idea  or  feeling  in  the  mind  calls  up 
some  other  idea  or  feeling  with  which  it  is  in  some  way  related. 
Our  ideas  seem,  as  it  were,  to  be  tied  together  by  the  invisible 
thread  of  association,  so  that  as  one  comes  up  out  of  unconscious- 
ness, it  draws  another  with  it.  Thoughts  seem  to  exist  somewhat 


THE   NATURE    OF    MEMORY.  141 

in  clusters  like  the  grapes  of  a  bunch,  so  that  in  bringing  out 
one,  we  bring  the  entire  cluster  with  it.  This  fact  explains  Avhat 
we  mean  by  a  "train  of  thought;"  one  thought  after  another 
conies  before  the  mind  like  the  cars  of  a  railroad  train,  each  being 
united  or  coupled  to  its  fellow  by  the  tie  of  association.  The  law 
of  association  is  thus  the  tie,  the  thread,  the  golden  links,  by 
which  our  thoughts  are  united  in  an  act  of  reproduction. 

Source  of  All  Recollection. — Whether  all  mental  reproduc- 
tion is  in  accordance  with  this  law  is  a  question.  In  other  words, 
it  is  a  question  whether  purely  spontaneous  memory  is  possible ; 
memory  independent  of  the  law  of  association.  Does  any  idea  or 
thought  ever  occur  to  the  mind  not  suggested  by  some  previous 
idea  or  thought?  Writers  on  mental  science  usually  teach  us 
that  spontaneous  memory  is  not  possible.  An  eminent  writer 
says,  "  Every  thought  which  occurs  to  the  mind  is  connected  with 
and  suggested  by  something  which  preceded  it."  Another  writer 
says,  "  What  is  recalled  at  any  moment  ....  is  always 
recalled  by  means  of  the  cognitions  and  feelings  which  the  soul 
possessed  the  moment  previous." 

Recollection  Spontaneous. — This  view  is  not  regarded  as 
correct.  Reproduction  without  the  law  of  association  is  believed 
to  be  possible.  The  memory  may  act  with  pure  spontaneity,  and 
something  arise  out  of  unconsciousness  that  was  not  suggested  by 
some  previous  idea  or  thought.  Further,  it  is  here  maintained 
that  not  only  is  this  true  of  spontaneous  memory,  but  that  we 
can,  by  a  direct  effort  of  the  will,  revive  some  past  experience, 
independently  of  the  law  of  association.  The  mind  usually  acts 
in  accordance  with  the  law  of  association;  but  it  is  not  a  slave  to 
this  law.  The  mind  is  a  free  spirit,  and  can  snap  the  chain  of 
association,  turn  the  current  of  thought  into  a  new  channel,  or 
start  a  new  train  of  thought  at  its  will. 

The  Term  Suggestion. — The  term  suggestion  is  preferred  by 
some  writers  to  that  of  association.  It  is  claimed  that  the  phrase 
"  association  of  ideas  "  implies  that  the  ideas  have  previously  co- 
existed in  the  mind,  and  that  the  one  recalls  the  other  on  account 


142  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

of  that  previous  coexistence.  Such  a  previous  association  is  not 
always  a  fact;  one  idea  will  suggest  another  with  which  it  has 
never  been  previously  associated.  An  object  seen  for  the  first 
time  will  remind  me  of  some  other  object,  though  the  two  could 
never,  by  the  supposition,  have  been  previously  associated.  It  is 
thus  held  that  one  idea  suggests  another  by  virtue  of  some  law  of 
the  mind,  and  that  the  proper  expression  is  the  law  of  suggestion 
rather  than  the  law  of  association. 

Association  Preferred. — It  must  be  admitted  that  thoughts 
excite  or  recall  one  another  without  a  previous  association.  But 
in  such  cases  there  will  be  found  some  relation  between  them ; 
and  the  term  association  is  used  to  express  this  relation,  and  does 
not  mean  to  assert  invariably  a  previous  association.  The  most 
of  our  thoughts,  however,  do  occur  through  the  principle  of  pre- 
vious association ;  and  this  seems  to  be  the  underlying  principle 
of  all  reminiscence.  Besides  this,  the  expression  "laAV  of  associa- 
tion" has  become  established  by  the  usage  of  philosophers,  and 
it  would  need  much  stronger  objections  than  the  one  stated  to  set 
it  aside. 

Law  of  Relation  of  Ideas. — This  general  principle  or  law  of 
association  is  based  on  the  broader  principle  of  relation ;  and  it 
would  probably  be  most  accurate  to  say  that  the  memory  operates 
by  the  principle  of  the  relation  of  ideas.  The  principal  relations 
concerned  in  an  act  of  recollection  are  the  following ;  Similarity, 
Contrast,  Cause  and  Effect,  Contiguity  in  Time  and  Place. 
These  four  relations  are  usually  known  as  the  Primary  Laws  of 
Memory. 

II.  PRIMARY  LAWS  OF  MEMORY. — The  Primary  Laws  of 
Memory  are  those  which  act  or  tend  to  act  universally  with  all 
persons.  They  are  especially  the  laws  of  reproduction,  though 
they  also  aid  in  the  retaining  of  knowledge.  These  laws  have 
been  usually  regarded  as  four;  namely,  Similarity,  Contrast, 
Cause  and  Effect,  Contiguity  in  Time  and  Place.  A  brief  dis- 
cussion of  each  of  these  laws  will  be  presented. 

Law  of  Similarity. — It  is  a  law  of  the  memory  that  similar 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  143 

objects  of  thought  tend  to  recall  one  another.  This  law  is  often 
expressed, — "  like  reminds  us  of  like."  Illustrations  of  the  law 
will  occur  to  every  mind.  Thus  a  person  I  meet  on  the  street 
reminds  me  of  a  similar  person  I  may  have  met  years  before ;  a 
farm-house  reminds  me  of  the  home  of  my  childhood ;  one  tune 
recalls  to  mind  a  tune  similar  to  it ;  the  landscape  near  my  home 
calls  to  mind  a  similar  landscape  that  I  saw  in  a  foreign  tour,  etc. 
So  sounds  will  suggest  similar  sounds,  colors  similar  colors,  tastes 
similar  tastes,  etc. 

Similarity  not  Complete. — In  these  cases  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  similarity  be  complete.  A  single  point  of  resemblance  is 
sufficient  to  awaken  the  conception  of  objects  in  other  respects 
quite  dissimilar.  A  person  with  blue  eyes  may  remind  me  of 
another  person  with  blue  eyes,  while  in  other  respects  they  may 
be  entirely  unlike  each  other.  A  single  feature  of  a  landscape, 
— a  tree,  a  rock,  or  a  grove — will  bring  before  the  mind  the  pic- 
ture of  another  landscape  widely  different  in  all  other  respects. 
"An  article  of  dress,"  as  Haven  says,  "peculiar  to  the  Eliza- 
bethan age,  or  to  the  court  of  Louis  XIV.,  reminds  us  of  the 
lordly  dames  and  courtiers,  or  gallant  warriors,  of  those  periods." 

Law  of  Contrast. — It  is  a  law  of  the  memory,  that  dissimilar 
objects  of  thought  tend  to  recall  one  another.  Thus  cold  re- 
minds us  of  heat,  light  of  darkness,  joy  of  sorrow,  sickness  of 
health,  the  splendor  of  wealth  of  the  wretchedness  of  poverty,  etc. 
On  the  same  principle,  the  giant  reminds  us  of  the  dwarf  and 
the  dwarf  of  the  giant,  the  white  man  of  the  negro  and  the  negro 
of  the  white  man.  The  greater  the  extremes,  the  more  efficiently 
the  law  operates ;  as  a  very  long  nose  reminds  us  of  a  very  short 
one,  a  very  dark  complexion  of  a  very  light  one,  a  very  slender 
person  of  a  very  stout  one,  a  very  homely  person  of  a  very  beauti- 
ful one. 

Cause  and  Effect. — It  is  a  law  of  the  memory  that  things  re- 
lated as  cause  and  effect  suggest  one  another.  This  law  operates 
in  both  directions ;  that  is,  the  cause  may  suggest  the  effect  and 
the  effect  the  cause.  Thus  the  knife  will  remind  us  of  the  wound 


144  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

made  by  it,  and  the  wound  will  remind  us  of  the  knife.  Fire 
makes  us  think  of  heat  and  heat  of  fire ;  slavery  suggests  the  civil 
war  and  the  civil  war,  slavery ;  taxes  recall  the  war  of  the  Revo- 
lution and  the  Revolution,  taxes.  Even  a  cup  of  tea  may  awaken 
the  memory  of  the  struggles  of  our  forefathers  in  their  overthrow 
of  the  power  of  the  mother  country. 

What  the  Law  Embraces. — This  law  embraces  all  relations 
similar  to  cause  and  effect,  including  secondary  causes,  occasions, 
accompanying  circumstances,  etc.  Thus  attending  a  theatre  may 
remind  one  of  the  death  of  Lincoln ;  the  stubbornness  of  King 
George,  of  the  speech  of  Patrick  Henry,  etc.  It  also  embraces 
such  relations  as  means  and  ends, — as  a  machine  and  its  use  or 
the  end  to  be  attained  by  it.  Thus  a  cannon  reminds  one  of  war ; 
a  locomotive,  of  a  moving  train  of  cars ;  a  mill-stone,  of  a  barrel 
of  flour  or  a  loaf  of  bread. 

Contiguity  in  Time  and  Place. — It  is  a  law  of  the  mem- 
ory, that  things  associated  in  time  and  place  suggest  one  another. 
Thus  Waterloo  suggests  Napoleon  and  Wellington,  Runnymede 
reminds  us  of  King  John  and  the  Barons,  the  Sistine  Chapel  re- 
calls Michael  Angelo  and  his  immortal  frescoes,  the  Vatican 
reminds  one  of  Raphael  and  the  Transfiguration.  This  law  is 
especially  operative  in  historical  facts:  thus  Oxford  reminds  us 
of  the  burning  of  Latimer  and  Ridley ;  Faneuil  Hall,  of  Otis  and 
Warren ;  Philadelphia,  of  Independence  Hall  and  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  etc. 

Laws  WorJc  Together. — These  four  laws  of  memory  may 
operate  together  in  producing  any  train  of  thought.  One  link  of 
the  chain  may  be  given  by  one  law,  another  by  another  law,  and 
some  links  may  be  supplied  by  more  than  one  law.  Sometimes  it 
is  difficult  to  tell  what  law  was  operative  in  bringing  to  mind  any 
particular  fact  or  event;  and  sometimes  it  would  seem  as  if  the 
thought  arose  spontaneously  without  any  one  of  the  laws. 

No  Invariable  Relations. — These  laws  do  not  act  with  a 
fixed  and  invariable  uniformity, — that  is,  there  is  no  fixed  and 
invariable  relation  between  the  objects  of  our  recollections.  The 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  145 

same  laws  of  association  do  not  give  rise  to  the  same  train  of 
thought  starting  from  the  same  initial  point  at  different  times. 
Starting  at  any  point,  one  series  of  recollections  may  rise  at  one 
time,  another  at  another  time,  and  still  another  series  at  some 
other  time.  There  is  thus  no  fixed  and  invariable  order  to  our 
thoughts,  except  when  a  certain  order  has  been  established  by 
committing  a  series  of  objects,  as  in  learning  an  oration  or  a 
poem. 

III.  THE  SECONDARY  LAWS. — The  Secondary  Laws  are  usu- 
ally regarded  as  principles  which  modify  the  action  of  the  Prim- 
ary Laws.  The  primary  laws  explain  the  tendency  of  certain 
classes  of  objects  to  recur  to  the  mind ;  the  secondary  laws  ac- 
count for  one  object  in  any  of  these  classes  rather  than  another. 
This  relation  of  the  secondary  laws  to  the  primary  laws  will  be 
better  understood  by  regarding  them  as  laws  of  retention,  as  the 
others  are  laws  of  recollection.  The  Primary  Laws  are  thus  re- 
garded as  laws  of  recollection,  and  the  Secondary  Laws  as  laws  of 
retention. 

Enumeration  of  the  Laws. — The  principal  of  the  Secondary 
Laws  are  as  follows :  1.  Continuance  of  Attention ;  2.  Frequency 
of  Repetition ;  3.  Vividness  of  Feeling ;  4.  Recentness  of  Acquisi- 
tion ;  5.  Exclusiveness  of  Association ;  6.  Natural  Mental  Differ- 
ences ;  7.  State  of  the  Mind ;  8.  State  of  the  Body ;  9.  Profes- 
sional Habits.  All  of  these  laws  seem  to  be  conditions  of 
acquisition  and  retention,  and  as  such  modify  the  action  of  the 
primary  laws,  accounting  for  one  conception  rather  than  another 
in  a  train  of  recollections. 

1.  Continuance  of  Attention. — The  continuance  of  the  at- 
tention upon  any  object  of  thought  tends  to  fix  it  permanently  in 

'  the  memory.  The  longer  I  look  at  anything,  the  clearer  is  my 
conception  of  it ;  and  clearness  of  conception  is  a  condition  of 
retention.  Continuance  of  attention  seems  to  deepen  the  impres- 
sion of  the  object  on  the  mind,  as  the  continued  pressure  of  the 
die  on  a  tablet  makes  a  deep  and  permanent  impression  on  it. 

2.  Frequency  of  Repetition. — Frequency  of  repetition  alsc 

7 


146  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

tends  to  fix  an  object  of  thought  in  the  memory.  A  paragraph 
read  over  once  makes  some  impression  on  the  mind ;  read  several 
times  it  becomes  a  permanent  possession.  A  stanza  of  poetry  is 
committed  by  repeating  it  over  and  over.  The  lecturer  must  re- 
view his  oration  or  lecture  occasionally  or  it  will  slip  from  his 
memory.  The  man  who  tells  his  anecdotes  or  repeats  his  pet 
quotations  frequently,  has  them  at  his  tongue's  end.  In  the  same 
way,  frequent  reviews  of  the  lessons  of  the  school-room  tend  to 
make  the  acquisition  permanent. 

3.  Vividness  of  Feeling. — Vividness   of   feeling   exerts    a 
strong  influence  on  retention.     The  event  which  excites  the  deep- 
est emotion,  whether  of  joy  or  sorrow,  makes  the  deepest  impres- 
sion on  the  mind  and  is  the  longest  remembered.     The  earliest 
recollections  of  childhood  are  those  which  awakened  the  liveliest 
feelings  of  happiness  or  sorrow ;  as  the  gift  of  a  toy,  the  loss  of  a 
pet,  etc.     The  poem  or  essay  or  historical  incident  which  touched 
our  hearts  most  deeply  is  most  easily  committed  and  retained.     A 
man  in  circumstances  of  danger  will  remember  the  most  trifling 
incidents  that  occurred.     The  criminal  on  trial  for  his  life  has 
been  known  to  retain  the  most  vivid  remembrance  of  the  words 
of  the  witnesses,  the  appearance  of  those  present  in  the  court- 
room, etc. 

4.  Recentness  of  Acquisition. — Recentness   of  acquisition 
has  also   a  modifying  influence   on   the  memory.     The  lesson 
learned  to-day  is  clearer  in  the  mind  than  the  lesson  of  yesterday. 
The  poem  committed  a  year  ago  is  not  so  easily  recalled  as  the 
one  recently  learned,  unless  it  has   been  frequently  reviewed. 
The  lapse  of  time  seems  to  weaken  the  impression  on  the  mind, 
and  sometimes  the  object,  once  distinctly  known,  seems  to  fade 
entirely  out  of  the  memory. 

5.  Exclusiveness  of  Association. — Exclusiveness  of  associa- 
tion is  also  a  condition  of  retaining  and  recollecting.     The  song 
which  we  heard  sung  by  only  one  person,  is,  when  heard  again, 
much  more  likely  to  bring  to  mind  that  person,  than  if  it  had 
been  associated  with  several  other  singers.     The  bond  of  union  is 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  147 

relatively,  if  not  absolutely  stronger  when  there*  is  only  one  thread 
of  association,  than  when  there  are  several.  This  law  seems  to 
be  more  intimately  connected  with  the  primary  laws,  than  the 
rest  of  the  laws  of  retention,  as  it  is  a  circumstance  of  the  several 
laws  of  association. 

6.  Natural  Mental  Differences. — Natural    differences   of 
mind  cannot  be  overlooked  in  considering  the  power  of  retention 
and  recollection.     Minds  differ  absolutely  and  relatively  in  re 
spect   to   the  power   of   memory.     Some   memories    are   much 
stronger  than  others  for  almost  every  object  of  thought;  some 
retain  one  class  of  objects,  as  names,  dates,   etc.,   better  than 
another,  even  when  the  general  power  seems  no  greater.     Tastes 
differ  also,  and  this  accounts  for  some  of  the  differences  in  the 
memories  of  different  persons. 

7.  State  of  Mind. — The  condition  of  the  mind  at  the  time  of 
acquisition  has  much  to  do  with  the  tenacity  of  the  memory. 
Sometimes  the  mind  is  clear  and  bright,  and  we  commit  with 
great  ease  and  readiness ;  at  other  times  the  mind  seems  dull  and 
sluggish,  and  we  retain  with  labor  and  recall  with  effort.     In 
grief,  mental  exhaustion,  or  pre-occupation,  the  passing  events 
make  a  very  slight  impression  on  the  mind  and  are  not  usually 
retained. 

8.  State  of  Body. — The  state  of  the  body  has  also  a  strong 
influence  on  the  memory.     Some  days  we  can  commit  a  lesson 
much  more  readily  than  at  other  times;  and,  in  some  conditions 
of  the  body,  our  thoughts  and  words  flow  very  slowly  and  we 
recall   with  effort  some  of  the  most  familiar  facts.     A  slight 
derangement  of  any  of  the  bodily  functions,  or  even  the  condition 
of  the  atmosphere,  will  sometimes  seem  to  affect  the  memory. 
When  wearied  with  physical  exercise,  the  memory  operates  with 
diminished  vigor;  when  the  body  feels  strong  and  vigorous,  the 
memory  retains  and  recalls  with  the  greatest  readiness. 

.9.  Professional  Habits. — Professional  and  business  habits 
determine  largely  what  we  commit  and  recall.  The  physician 
remembers  matters  pertaining  to  disease  and  surgical  operations; 


148  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

and  the  lawyer  has  his  mind  stored  with  the  incidents  and  plead- 
ings of  celebrated  trials.  The  sailor  can  talk  of  storms  and  ship- 
wrecks; the  hunter  of  thrilling  incidents  of  the  forest;  the  politi- 
cian remembers  the  political  history  of  his  times  and  the  records 
of  public  men  and  parties.  The  memory  of  each  person  is  largely 
determined  by  the  business  he  follows  an4  the  habit  of  mind 
created  thereby. 

IV.  THE  OXE  PRIMARY  LAW. — Attempts  have  been  made  by 
various  writers  on  philosophy  to  reduce  the  several  primary  laws 
to  one  general  principle  which  shall  embrace  them  all.  This 
subject  is  of  sufficient  interest  to  call  for  a  brief  discussion.  The 
one  principle  which  seems  to  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  these  laws  is 
that  of  the  relation  of  ideas,  and  may  be  called  the  Law  of  Re- 
lation. 

The  Laiv  of  Relation. — The  several  primary  laws  of  mem- 
ory may  all  be  embraced  under  the  one  general  principle  of 
relation.  This  general  law  may  be  stated  formally  as  follows :  It 
is  a  law  of  the  memory  that  related  objects  of  thought  tend  to  recall 
one  another.  A  more  subjective  statement  of  the  law  is, — It  is  a 
law  of  the  mind  that  it  naturally  tends  to  think  of  related  objects  of 
thought.  Still  another  statement  of  the  law  is, —  One  mental  state 
tends  to  reproduce  some  related  mental  state. 

Basis  of  the  Law. — The  reason  for  this  law  is  found  in  the 
natural  constitution  of  the  mind.  One  of  the  fundamental  acts 
of  the  mind  is  comparison,  or  the  conception  of  relations.  All 
mental  activity  tends  to  related  thought ;  our  knowledge  of  things 
is  largely  a  conception  of  relations.  All  mental  action  is  in 
accordance  with  this  law  of  the  relation  of  ideas ;  you  cannot 
conceive  of  thinking,  or  of  knowledge  as  the  product  of  thought, 
without  the  idea  of  relations.  Relations  tend  to  system ;  and  the 
mind  is  thus  not  chaotic  in  its  operations,  but  systematic  and 
orderly.  This  activity  in  the  sphere  of  related  thought  operates 
not  only  in  the  reproduction  of  the  old,  but  also  in  the  evolution 
of  the  new.  This  systematic  method  of  recalling  things  according 
to  some  relations  between  them,  is  what  we  mean  by  the  law  of 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  149 

memory;  and  the  statement  given  explains  the  nature  of  and 
reason  for  the  law. 

The  Various  Relations. — The  most  prominent  relations  of 
objects  are  those  named  in  the  Primary  Laws, — similarity,  con- 
trast, cause  and  effect,  and  contiguity  in  time  and  place.  The 
memory  operates  by  other  relations  also,  as  that  of  whole  and 
parts,  means  and  ends,  etc. ;  but  these  may  be  regarded  as  em- 
braced under  the  four  laws  already  considered.  Thus  the  law  of 
whole  and  parts  may  be  embraced  under  that  of  contiguity ;  and 
means  and  ends  under  cause  and  effect. 

Applies  to  all  Relations. — The  law  applies  not  only  to  things 
logically  related,  but  also  to  things  actually  related  or  associated 
in  the  mind.  It  embraces  the  association  of  continuity  and  conse- 
cution, that  is,  things  associated  in  the  same  instant  of  time  or  in 
consecutive  instants.  Thus  the  words  of  a  sentence,  a  series  of 
sounds,  the  letters  of  the  alphabet,  etc.,  suggest  one  another  be- 
cause they  have  been  actually  related  in  repetition.  When  there 
is  a  relation  of  thought  as  well  as  of  juxtaposition,  the  series  is 
much  more  readily  recalled,  as  the  words  of  a  sentence  are  much 
more  easily  reproduced  in  their  natural  order  than  if  the  same 
words  were  thrown  together  by  chance. 

Applies  to  feelings. — This  law  also  explains  how  a  feeling 
can  suggest  an  object,  or  an  object  a  feeling.  The  two  have  been 
conjoined  in  an  actual  experience,  and  the  recurrence  of  the  one 
tends  to  recall  to  mind  the  other.  Thus  the  feeling  with  which  I 
read  a  poem  or  hear  a  fine  piece  of  music,  when  it  recurs,  tends 
to  bring  to  mind  the  poem  or  the  music ;  so  a  feeling  of  disgust 
associated  with  an  object,  when  renewed,  may  recall  the  object. 
In  each  of  these  cases,  too,  the  object  will  tend  to  reawaken  the 
original  feeling.  For  the  same  reason,  also,  two  objects  which 
have  been  associated  with  the  same  feeling  may  recall  one 
another,  through  the  common  link  of  this  similar  emotion. 

Law  of  Redintegration. — Hamilton  and  some  other  writers 
embraced  the  several  primary  laws  under  a  general  principle, 
;which  he  calls  the  law  of  redintegration.  The  principle  may  be 


150  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

stated  thus :  Objects  that  have  been  previously  united  as  parts  of  the 
same  mental  state  tend  to  recall  one  another.  A  law  quite  similar 
to  this  had  been  previously  announced  by  Aristotle,  which 
Hamilton  states  as  follows :  "  Thoughts  which  have  at  any  time, 
recent  or  remote,  stood  to  each  other  in  the  relation  of  coexistence,  or 
immediate  consecution,  do,  when  severally  reproduced,  tend  to  repro- 
duce each  other"  This  is  the  principle  of  prior  coexistence  and 
immediate  consecution. 

Application  of  This  Laiv. — This  principle  of  prior  coexist- 
ence or  redintegration,  applies  readily  to  the  law  of  contiguity,  if 
indeed  it  be  not  another  expression  of  the  same  law.  The  law 
of  cause  and  effect  is  also  readily  comprehended  under  this  prin- 
ciple, since  things  related  as  cause  and  effect  are  usually  united 
in  some  previous  mental  state.  In  endeavoring  to  bring  the  law 
of  similars  under  this  principle,  it  is  assumed  that  the  single 
feature  in  any  object,  as  A,  which  reminds  us  of  some  other  object, 
as  B,  containing  that  feature,  does  so  because  this  common  feature 
was  previously  united  in  the  conception  B  with  the  rest  of  B ; 
so  that  when  I  see  A,  I  fix  my  attention  on  this  common  feature 
and  then  complete  my  conception  by  thinking  of  the  rest  of  B, 
and  thus  of  the  whole  of  B.  In  applying  the  law  to  opposites,  it 
is  assumed  that  they  are  complements  of  each  other,  that  neithe^r 
is  complete  without  the  other,  as  we  cannot  have  the  idea  of  long 
without  the  idea  of  short,  and  they  are  thus  parts  of  a  larger 
whole,  and  the  one  recalls  the  other  by  the  completion  of  the 
entire  sphere  of  thought  of  which  each  is  a  part. 

Principle  of  Emotions. — The  application  of  this  law  of  co- 
existence or  redintegration  to  similars  and  opposites  is  evidently 
not  very  satisfactory.  Dr.  Brown  endeavors  to  explain  it  by  the 
influence  of  sensations  and  emotions.  Thus  one  object  recalls  a 
similar  object  with  which  it  has  never  coexisted  by  the  fact  that 
both  have  coexisted  with  the  same  or  a  similar  emotion.  So 
opposites  reproduce  each  other '  by  the  common  feeling  with 
which  each  was  experienced;  as  a  person  with  a  long  nose  re- 
minds one  of  a  person  with  a  short  nose,  on  account  of  the  com- 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  151 

mon  feeling  of  surprise  or  wonder  each  awakens.  In  this  case, 
the  tie  or  link  was  a  common  emotion.  Prof.  Mahan  carries  out 
this  idea  of  Dr.  Brown's,  and  makes  the  common  emotion  the  sole 
ground  or  law  of  association. 

Law  of  Similar  Action. — Dr.  Porter,  in  his  attempt  to  re- 
duce the  several  laws  to  one  comprehensive  principle,  announces 
the  following  law :  "  The  mind  tends  to  act  again  in  a  manner 
similar  to  any  in  which  it  has  acted  before"  A  simpler  statement 
of  the  same  principle  is, —  One  mental  state  tends  to  reproduce  some 
similar  mental  state.  This  law  will  not,  however,  explain  all  the 
cases  of  the  phenomena  of  mental  reproduction.  It  fails  in  its 
application  to  opposites,  and  is  not  clear  in  its  application  to  all 
the  cases  of  the  other  primary  laws.  The  same  is  true  of  Hamil- 
ton's law  of  Redintegration  and  also  the  law  of  Aristotle.  The 
one  principle,  simple  and  comprehensive,  which  seems  to  cover  all 
the  cases,  is  that  of  the  relation  of  ideas,  as  has  been  previously 
explained.  The  simple  law  is  that  one  mental  state  tends  to  repro- 
duce some  related  mental  state. 

III.  REMARKS  ON  THE  MEMORY. 

There  are  several  questions  of  a  general  character,  usually  dis- 
cussed by  writers  on  the  memory,  to  which  attention  is  appropri- 
ately called  in  this  place.  Among  these  are  the  relation  of 
memory  to  intellectual  strength,  the  failure  of  memory,  the  mem- 
ory of  the  aged,  and  effects  of  disease  on  the  memory. 

Strong  Memory  and  Weak  Mind. — The  question  has  often 
btfen  asked  whether  the  power  of  memory  may  be  regarded  as  a 
test  of  intellectual  ability.  In  reply  to  this  question,  we  remark 
first,  that  a  strong  memory  is  often  found  in  connection  with  weak 
mental  powers  in  other  respects.  Persons  deficient  in  the  powers 
of  judgment  and  reasoning  will  often  be  found  to  possess-  an 
unusual  talent  for  retaining  words  and  facts.  Thus  "  Blind  Tom," 
who  is  regarded  as  almost  an  idiot,  can  reproduce  a  piece  of 
music,  heard  for  the  first  time,  with  great  accuracy;  and  it  is  said 
that  he  can  tell  the  name  of  nearly'  every  hotel  at  which  he  has 


152  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ever  stopped,  and  also  the  names  of  the  landlords.  Many  other 
instances,  equally  remarkable,  can  be  cited. 

Strong  Mind  and  Memory. — It  is  also  true  that  persons 
with  unusually  vigorous  minds  are  often  endowed  with  a  remark- 
able gift  of  memory.  Thus  it  is  said  of  Pascal,  who  possessed 
intellectual  powers  of  the  highest  order,  that  he  forgot  nothing 
that  he  had  ever  read  or  thought.  Leibnitz  and  Euler  were  not 
less  celebrated  for  their  intelligence  than  for  their  memory ;  and 
both  could  repeat  the  whole  of  the  ^neid.  Ben  Jonson,  the 
dramatist,  could  repeat  all  that  he  had  ever  written,  and  whole 
books  that  he  had  read.  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  Themistocles,  and 
Dugald  Stewart,  are  also  mentioned  as  remarkable  examples  of 
the  power  of  memory  accompanying  great  strength  of  intellect. 

No  Fixed  Relation. — The  relation  of  the  memory  to  intellect- 
ual strength  is  thus  not  fixed  and  invariable ;  and  the  power  of 
memory  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  measure  of  intellectual  ability. 
A  weak  mind  in  other  respects  may  have  a  strong  memory.  Such 
cases  are  so  frequent  that  it  gives  rise  to  the  belief  that  a  strong 
memory  indicates  a  deficiency  in  some  other  power  of  the  mind. 
This  is  not  regarded  as  correct,  however,  since  men  of  good  intel- 
lectual abilities  often  manifest  unusual  power  of  memory.  The 
rule  is  that  the  strength  of  memory  is  proportioned  to  the  general 
strength  of  mind,  though  it  is  a  rule  subject  to  many  and  striking 
exceptions. 

Failure  of  Memory. — Failure  of  memory  usually  accompan- 
ies the  failure  of  the  other  mental  powers.  A  decline  of  mental 
vigor  is  usually  first  manifested  by  a  deficiency  of  the  memory. 
In  advancing  years,  there  is  often  a  difficulty  in  recalling  proper 
names  and  dates,  and  sometimes  even  words  in  general.  Emerson 
was  perhaps  one  of  the  most  notable  examples  of  this ;  his  conver- 
sation for  the  last  two  or  three  years  of  liis  life  was  embarrassing 
and  painful  on  account  of  his  failure  to  recall  names.  The  mem- 
ory of  old  people  often  partly  fails,  while  the  mind,  in  other  re- 
spects, seems  to  retain  its  full  vigor. 

Cause  of  Failure. — The  cause  of  the  decline  of  memory  may 


THE  NATURE  OF  MEMORY.  153 

be  twofold.  First,  it  is  probably  due  in  part  to  some  change  in 
the  condition  of  the  brain  itself;  the  memory  seems  to  be  espe- 
cially dependent  on  the  condition  of  the  brain.  Second,  it  is  partly 
due  to  some  change  in  the  conditions  of  remembering.  There  is 
less  vividness  of  conception ;  the  senses  are  not  so  sensitive  and 
active  as  they  were  in  early  years,  and  thus  the  impression  made 
on  the  mind  is  not  so  deep  and  permanent.  There  is  also  a  lack 
of  interest  in  the  things  about  us  on  account  of  their  loss  of 
novelty.  The  events  taking  place  belong  to  a  new  generation 
and  have  lost  their  interest,  and  the  impression  is  thus  slight  and 
transient.  On  account  of  this  loss  of  interest,  also,  they  are  not  so 
often  reverted  to,  there  is  no  desire  to  dwell  upon  them ;  hence 
they  lack  frequency  of  coexistence,  which  is  one  of  the  conditions 
of  retention. 

Memory  of  the  Aged. — With  old  persons  the  remembrance 
of  the  past  is  usually  vivid  and  distinct.  Unobservant  of  passing 
events,  the  old  man  dwells  with  pleasure  on  the  past.  He  re- 
members the  events  and  incidents  of  his  early  life, — the  sports 
and  companions  of  his  childhood,  the  triumphs  of  his  young  man- 
hood, the  achievements  of  his  vigorous  prime  of  life,  etc.  All 
these  come  crowding  upon  his  memory;  he  lives  his  life  over 
again  in  his  recollections,  and  finds  his  highest  happiness  in  re- 
calling and  relating  the  incidents  of  his  early  years. 

Effects  of  Disease. — The  memory  is  often  affected  by  disease. 
Sometimes  after  a  sickness,  the  knowledge  of  a  certain  class  of 
objects,  or  of  certain  persons,  or  of  a  particular  language,  or  of  a 
certain  class  of  words  of  a  language,  as  substantives,  is  lost  to  the 
mind.  In  other  cases  a  certain  portion  of  the  life  is  obliterated 
from  the  memory.  Cases  of  injury  to  the  brain  have  been  fol- 
lowed by  the  loss  of  a  language,  or  of  the  names  of  objects,  while 
the  names  of  adjectives  were  easily  remembered.  Dr.  Abercrom- 
bie  mentions  a  surgeon  who  so  far  recovered  from  a  fall  as  to  give 
directions  in  respect  to  his  treatment,  but  for  several  days  lost  all 
idea  of  having  a  wife  and  children.  One  of  the  most  remarkable 
cases  is  that  of  Mr.  Tennent,  who,  on  recovering  from  a  trance, 


154  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

had  !ost  all  the  knowledge  acquired  during  his  past  life,  and  was 
obliged  to  begin  his  studies  at  the  alphabet,  and  yet  whose  knowl- 
edge suddenly  returned  to  him  a  few  months  afterward. 

Disease  Excites  Memory. — Sometimes  disease  produces  the 
opposite  effect,  by  bringing  back  to  the  mind  things  long  since 
forgotten.  Persons  in  severe  sickness  or  at  the  point  of  death, 
have  been  known  to  converse  in  a  language  which  they  had  not 
spoken  since  youth.  Coleridge  tells  of  a  German  servant-girl, 
who  in  her  sickness  repeated  passages  of  Latin,  Greek,  and 
Hebrew  which  she  had  heard  her  master  repeat  as  he  walked  in 
his  study.  Dr.  Rush  mentions  the  case  of  an  Italian  in  Kew 
York,  who  in  the  beginning  of  his  sickness  spoke  English,  in  the 
middle  of  it  French,  and  on  the  day  of  his  death  only  Italian.  A 
clergyman  of  Philadelphia  relates  that  it  was  not  unusual  for  the 
Germans  and  Swedes  of  his  congregation,  when  near  death,  to 
speak  and  pray  in  their  native  languages,  which  they  may  not 
have  heard  for  fifty  years. 

Inference  Drawn. — Some  have  inferred  from  these  facts  that 
all  knowledge  is  indestructible;  that  whatever  we  have  known 
may  at  some  time  be  brought  back  to  mind.  Coleridge  and 
others  have  derived  from  them  the  doctrine  of  future  retribution. 
Whatever  may  be  thought  of  these  inferences,  it  is  certain  that 
the  fact  that  our  past  lives  may  be  recalled,  and  the  tendency  of 
the  mind  to  revert  to  the  scenes  -and  incidents  of  our  early  life, 
suggests  to  us  the  importance  of  a  well-spent  life.  A  mind  stored 
with  pleasant  recollections  "  will  cast  a  cheerful  radiance  over  the 
past,  brighten  the  uncertain  iuture  in  those  hours  of  gloom  and 
despondency  when  the  shadows  lengthen  upon  the  path  of  our 
earthly  pilgrimage,  and  life  is  drawing  to  a  close." 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  MEMORY. 

T  PAVING  explained  the  nature  of  the  memory,  we  shall  now 
-  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  its  cirlture.  This  subject 
can  be  conveniently  discussed  under  two  general  heads, — The 
Nature  and  Importance  of  the  Culture  of  the  Memory,  and  the 
Methods  of  Cultivating  the  Memory. 

I.  NATURE  AND  IMPORTANCE  OF  CULTURE. — Under  this  head 
we  shall  consider  the  following  topics:  1.  Importance  of  the  Cul- 
ture of  the  Memory ;  2.  Neglect  of  the  Culture  of  the  Memory ; 
3.  Differences  of  the  Power  of  Memory ;  4.  Time  for  the  Culture 
of  the  Memory. 

Importance  of  Culture. — The  importance  of  a  good  memory 
is  universally  acknowledged.  It  is  of  great  value  in  every  de- 
partment of  life, — in  business,  in  study,  in  science,  in  every 
avocation  or  profession.  The  man  who  can  carry  the  details  of 
his  business  in  his  memory  finds  it  not  only  a  great  convenience, 
but  an  economy  of  time  and  labor.  In  the  study  of  history, 
literature,  the  languages,  etc.,  a  retentive  memory  is  invaluable ; 
indeed,  no  profound  attainments  can  be  made  in  these  depart- 
ments without  it.  In  natural  history  it  is  also  indispensable ;  the 
naturalist  must  carry  in  his  memory  an  accumulation  of  details 
in  order  to  recognize  the  objects  already  described,  to  form  his 
classification,  or  to  discover  new  objects  not  yet  observed  or 
described. 

Neglect  of  Culture. — There  has  been  a  tendency,  in  modern 
times,  to  neglect  the  culture  of  the  memory.  The  ordinary 
scholar  of  to-day  is  not  so  remarkable  for  his  memory  as  the  in- 
telligent man  in  ancient  times.  The  multiplication  of  books 

(155) 


156  MENTAT   SCIEXCE. 

tends  to  diminish  the  use  and  thus  the  power  of  memory.  For- 
merly, the  ability  to  repeat  from  memory  the  contents  of  entire 
manuscripts  was  a  valuable  accomplishment,  and  many  men  were 
able  to  do  it ;  to-day  men  depend  on  finding  the  knowledge  they 
may  wish  to  use  in  books,  rather  than  on  holding  it  in  their  mem- 
ories. The  reading  of  a  large  number  of  books  also  tends  to 
weaken  the  power  of  memory ;  the  mind  is  spread  over  so  large  a 
surface  that  it  does  not  grasp  anything  with  sufficient  distinctness 
to  make  a  permanent  impression. 

Neglect  in  Modern  Education. — Modern  education  tends  some- 
what to  the  neglect  of  the  culture  of  the  power  of  memory.  The 
old  schoolmasters  gave  lessons  that  required  the  activity  of  the 
memory ;  the  modern  teacher  takes  more  especial  pains  to  culti- 
vate the  understanding.  Formerly  the  test  of  excellence  at 
school  was  the  amount  acquired;  now  the  test  is  largely  the 
power  of  reasoning.  Memory  studies  have  given  place  to  thought 
studies;  pupils  are  thus  taught  to  rely  on  their  reason,  and  to 
value  the  culture  of  thought  power  more  than  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge.  Though  this  may  be  an  improvement  over  the  old 
method,  the  fact  is  evident  that  there  is  a  tendency  in  modern 
education  to  neglect  the  culture  of  the  memory. 

Differences  of  Memory. — In  the  culture  of  the  memory,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  there  are  great  differences  in  the 
natural  power  of  this  faculty.  Minds  differ  more  strikingly  in 
this  respect  than  in  any  other  faculty ;  or  at  least  the  differences 
are  more  apparent  than  in  the  other  faculties.  They  differ,  too, 
both  in  respect  to  general  power  and  special  objects.  Some  per- 
sons remember  anything  better  than  other  persons ;  some  remem- 
ber one  class  of  objects,  as  dates  and  names,  while  there  is  no 
superiority  in  general  power. 

Cause  of  the  Difference. — This  difference  is  due  partly  to  nature 
and  partly  to  culture.  Some  persons  can  tell  the  day  of  the 
month  or  week  of  nearly  every  prominent  event  of  their  lives, 
without  making  any  special  effort  to  remember  them.  Such 
manifestations  of  the  power  of  memory  as  that  of  Euler,  Pascal, 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE    MEMORY.  157 

etc.,  are  due  totan  unusual  natural  gift  of  this  capacity.  Natural 
differences  of  taste  create  a  difference  in  the  power  of  the  memory, 
as  we  remember  those  things  best  in  which  we  feel  the  liveliest 
interest.  The  difference  is  due  sometimes  also  to  culture.  Edu- 
cation often  determines  the  taste,  and  thus  affects  the  retentive 
poAver  of  the  memory.  If  early  associations  have  directed  the 
mind  in  the  study  of  language,  history,  etc.,  the  person  will 
naturally  excel  in  the  acquirement  of  these  branches. 

Instances  of  Remarkable  Memory. — Historians  and  writers 
on  mental  philosophy  mention  some  remarkable  examples  of  the 
power  of  memory.  Cyrus,  it  is  said,  knew  the  names  of  all  his 
officers — Pliny  says,  of  all  his  soldiers.  Themistocles  could  name 
every  one  of  the  twenty  thousand  citizens  of  Athens.  Hortensius, 
after  sitting  all  day  at  an  auction,  could  at  night  recall  every 
article  sold,  the  purchaser,  and  the  price.  Dr.  AVallis,  while  in 
bed  in  the  dark,  extracted  the  square  root  of  a  number  of  fifty- 
three  places  to  twenty-seven  terms,  and  repeated  the  result  twenty 
days  afterwards.  Euler,  blind  from  early  life,  carried  in  his 
memory  a  table  of  the  first  six  powers  of  the  series  of  natural 
numbers  up  to  one  hundred.  Two  of  his  pupils,  in  calculating  a 
converging  series,  found,  on  reaching  the  seventeenth  term,  that 
their  results  differed  by  a  unit  at  the  fiftieth  figure ;  and  to  decide 
the  question  he  made  the  calculation  mentally,  and  his  result  was 
found  to  be  correct. 

Hamilton  tells  us  that  Muretus  saw  at  Padua  a  young  Corsi- 
can  who  could  repeat  thirty -six  thousand  names,  in  the  order  in 
which  they  were  given  to  him,  or  repeat  them  in  the  reverse 
order,  or  begin  at  any  point  in  the  list  and  repeat  both  ways. 
The  celebrated  Magliabecchi,  librarian  of  the  Duke  of  Tuscany, 
it  is  said,  could  name  all  the  authors  who  had  written  upon  any 
subject,  giving  the  name  of  the  book,  the  words,  and  often  the 
page.  A  gentleman  of  Florence,  to  test  his  memory,  lent  him  a 
manuscript  to  read,  and  afterward,  pretending  to  have  lost  it,  re- 
quested him  to  endeavor  to  recall  it,  which  he  did  with  great 
exactness.  It  is  also  stated  that  upon  being  asked  by  the  Gran  1 


158  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Duke  if  he  could  procure  for  him  a  copy  of  a  certain  book,  he 
replied,  "No,  sir,  it  is  impossible;  there  is  but  one  in  the  world; 
that  is  in  the  Grand  Seignior's  library  at  Constantinople,  and  is 
the  seventh  book,  on  the  seventh  shelf,  on  the  right  hand  as  you 
go  in." 

Time  for  Culture. — The  special  time  for  the  culture  of  the 
memory  is  youth.  The  habits  of  the  mind  are  then  formed ;  and 
the  power  of  memory  depends  largely  upon  mental  habits, — upon 
the  habits  of  attention,  concentration,  systematic  thought,  etc. 
Careless  habits  of  reading,  study,  and  observation  manifest  them- 
selves in  impaired  powers  of  retention.  The  mental  dissipation 
of  novel  and  newspaper  reading  exercises  a  pernicious  influence 
on  the  memory;  and  young  people  should  be  carefully  guarded 
against  acquiring  them. 

This  training  of  the  memory  should  be  continued  through  life. 
The  tendency  of  advancing  years  is  to  lead  to  forgetfulness.  The 
habit  of  conversation  and  an  occasional  review  of  one's  knowledge 
will  keep  the  acquisitions  somewhat  fresh  and  make  them  more 
easily  recalled.  The  daily  practice  of  systematic  reading  and 
study,  with  frequent  reviews  of  what  is  read,  will  aid  in  preserv- 
ing the  memory  comparatively  strong  into  good  old  age. 

II.  METHODS  OF  CULTURE. — Under  methods  of  cultivating  the 
memory,  we  shall  present  the  various  methods  of  increasing  the 
power  of  the  memory,  and  show  their  application  to  the  several 
studies  which  depend  more  particularly  on  this  faculty. 

By  Exercise. — The  faculty  of  memory,  like  every  other 
faculty  of  the  mind,  is  cultivated  by  exercise.  This  exercise 
should  be  judicious  in  kind  and  quantity.  The  things  to  be  re- 
membered should  be  adapted  to  the  age  and  mental  ability  of  the 
pupil.  There  should  be  facts  for  the  young  mind  and  principu-.- 
for  the  older  mind.  Care  should  be  taken  also  that  the  mind  is 
not  overtaxed;  for,  like  an  overstrained  muscle,  the  mind  may 
be  weakened  by  excessive  labor.  Cramming  weakens  the  mem- 
ory, as  physical  cramming  weakens  the  stomach.  Students  who 
have  been  overtaxed  with  their  studies,  often  find  that  the 


THE   CULTURE    OF   THE    MEMORY.  159 

memory  seems  to  fail;  and  only  absolute  rest  for  a  time  will 
restore  the  vigor  of  the  faculty. 

Grasp  Clearly. — The  pupil  must  be  trained  to  grasp  the 
subjects  of  thought  clearly.  Clear  conception  is  the  fundamental 
condition  of  tenacious  retention.  The  mind  thus  gets  the  object 
within  its  grasp,  obtains  a  firm  hold  of  it,  and  is  enabled  to 
keep  it  in  its  possession.  That  which  is  only  partly  cognized,  or 
which  is,  as  it  were,  merely  touched  by  the  mental  fingers,  soon 
slips  away.  The  lessson  which  has  been  completely  mastered,  is 
retained  with  comparative  ease;  the  lesson  which  was  only  half 
learned,  soon  vanishes. 

How  to  Grasp  Clearly. — To  give  distinct  ideas  to  the  mind, 
objects  and  illustrations  are  of  value,  especially  to  the  young. 
The  concrete  method  of  teaching  is  thus  adapted  to  the  training 
of  the  memory.  The  writing  out  of  what  we  wish  to  remember 
will  also  aid  in  clearness  of  mental  conception.  The  eye  will 
aid  the  ear,  and  the  mind  will  be  doubly  impressed  by  the  use  of 
both  senses.  The  oral  expression  of  what  we  wish  to  remember, 
is  a  good  test  of  clearness  of  conception ;  and  aids  also  in  giving 
those  clear  and  definite  ideas  of  a  subject  which  are  readily 
retained. 

Continued  Attention. — The  habit  of  continuity  of  attention 
must  also  be  acquired.  The  longer  the  mind  dwells  upon  an 
object,  the  more  deeply  it  seems  to  be  impressed  on  the  memory. 
Attention,  in  relation  to  the  memory,  seems  to  operate  like  the 
die  upon  a  waxen  tablet ;  the  longer  the  pressure  is  continued, 
the  deeper  and  more  permanent  the  character  becomes.  The 
mind  that  flits  from  one  thing  to  another,  seldom  has  a  clear  and 
distinct  remembrance  of  anything;  the  concentrated  energy  of 
the  mind  on  a  few  objects  of  thought  makes  them  a  permanent 
possession. 

Gives  Clear  Conceptions. — Attention  to  objects  of  thought 
affords  clear  conceptions  of  things,  which  is  one  of  the  fundu- 
mental  conditions  of  a  good  memory.  Attention  gives  the  mind 
distinct  and  well-marked  mental  pictures  of  objects,  and  clear 


160  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

and  adequate  ideas  of  the  more  abstract  subjects  of  thought;  and 
•without  clearness  and  definiteness  knowledge  soon  vanishes.  A 
careless  and  inattentive  mind  becomes  a  sort  of  dim,  cracked 
looking-glass,  reflecting  things  in  all  kinds  of  blurred  and 
crooked  fashions,  so  that  what  it  does  remember  will  lack 
accuracy.  One  of  the  first  rules,  therefore,  for  the  cultivation  of 
the  memory,  is  to  give  due  attention  to  things. 

Vividness  of  Feeling* — The  feelings  exercise  a  strong  influ- 
ence upon  the  memory.  The  more  vivid  the  feeling  in  respect  to 
any  object  or  event,  the  longer  it  will  be  remembered.  The  in- 
cidents of  childhood  that  gave  us  the  highest  joy  or  deepest 
sorrow,  as  a  visit,  a  new  toy,  the  loss  of  a  pet  or  a  parent,  are 
never  forgotten.  The  event  that  occurred  during  excitement  is 
flashed  deep  into  the  memory  in  all  its  details,  and  is  a  perma- 
nent possession.  The  railroad  accident  or  the  storm  at  sea  im- 
presses the  most  trivial  and  unimportant  events  indelibly  on  our 
memory. 

Value  in  Education. — This  principle  should  be  employed  in 
giving  culture  to  the  memory  of  students.  There  should  be  an 
effort  to  awaken  interest  in  what  is  to  be  remembered.  A  listless 
habit  of  mind  will  acquire  few  permanent  impressions ;  ideas  that 
come  into  the  mind  when  we  are  in  an  apathetic  state,  make  no 
permanent  lodgment  there.  We  should,  therefore,  endeavor  to 
awaken  a  lively  interest  in  that-  which  is  the  subject  of  study. 
Lessons  should  be  made  attractive,  the  minds  of  pupils  should  be 
made  to  glow  with  a  feeling  of  interest  in  their  studies,  a  deep 
feeling  of  earnestness  should  be  aroused,  and  every  means  possi- 
ble made  use  of  to  cultivate  a  desire  to  know  and  a  fondness  for 
acquisition.  "  Love,  in  fact,  is  the  parent  of  memory." 

By  Repetition. — Frequent  repetition  is  one  of  the  means  of 
strengthening  the  memory.  Repetition,  as  already  explained,  is 
one  of  the  conditions  of  acquisition  and  retention.  A  lesson,  an 
oration,  or  a  poem,  is  fixed  in  the  memory  by  frequently  repeating 
it.  Repetition  seems  to  impress  the  idea,  as  the  repeated  pressure 
of  the  die  on  the  tablet  deepens  the  characters  impressed.  The 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE    MEMOEY.  16] 

mind  tends  to  repeat  a  mental  state  or  series  of  mental  states  in 
which  it  has  often  been  found. 

Repetition  Intelligent. — This  repetition  should  be  intelligent  and 
attentive;  not  the  mere  mechanical  repeating  of  words  with  a 
wandering  mind.  "Learning  by  heart"  is  often  a  mere  learning 
by  sense  or  sound,  and  not  by  the  mind.  The  parrot-like  repeti- 
tion of  words  may  impair  rather  than  strengthen  the  memory. 
The  mind  must  accompany  the  word,  if  we  wish  to  acquire 
quickly  and  permanently.  In  repeating  a  poem  "learned  by 
rote,"  when  brought  to  a  stand-still,  we  often  have  to  go  back 
over  a  stanza,  till  we  fall  in  with  "  the  swing  of  the  rhythm  and 
are  carried  over  the  sticking  place." 

Knowledge  Reviewed. — Knowledge  should  thus  be  frequently 
reviewed.  The  recitation  of  a  lesson  impresses  the  subject  more 
deeply  than  when  it  is  not  recited.  Frequent  reviews  are  also 
valuable  in  this  respect ;  a  constant  review  of  the  leading  facts 
and  principles  of  a  study  should  be  kept  up,  in  connection  with 
the  lesson  in  advance.  A  habit  of  reviewing  one's  knowledge 
occasionally,  after  leaving  school,  should  be  adopted.  The  history 
should  be  thought  over,  the  poem  repeated,  and  the  books  re- 
read, if  we  would  keep  our  knowledge  fresh  and  accurate. 

State  of  Mind  and  Body. — To  acquire  and  retain  well,  the 
body  and  mind  should  be  in  a  healthy  condition.  Coleridge 
says  that  the  requisites  of  a  good  memory  are  sound  logic,  a1 
healthy  digestion,  and  a  quiet  conscience.  The  first  refers  to  the 
condition  of  the  intellect,  the  second  to  the  condition  of  the  body, 
and  the  third  to  the  condition  of  the  moral  nature;  and  all  of 
these  are  concerned  in  and  affect  the  memory.  When  the  mind 
is  depressed  or  its  free  activity  interfered  with,  the  power  of  mem- 
ory is  weakened ;  when  the  intellect  works  clearly  and  with  vigor, 
the  memory  will  be  strong  and  ready.  So  also  when  the  body  is 
suffering  with  disease  or  pain,  the  attention  will  be  distracted  and 
things  make  but  a  slight  impression  on  the  memory ;  but  when 
there  is  that  exuberance  of  feeling  which  flows  from  good 
health,  the  mind  seizes  with  vigor  and  holds  with  tenacity  what- 


162  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ever  is  presented  to  it.  A  disturbed  conscience  also  produces  that 
disquiet  that  distracts  the  attention  and  impairs  the  power  of 
memory ;  while  a  clear  and  quiet  conscience  gives  that  calm  and 
peaceful  condition  of  the  mind  that  is  conducive  to  the  best  efforts 
of  the  memory. 

By  Association. — To  train  the  memory,  we  should  accustom 
it  to  habits  of  systematic  and  related  thought.  Such  an  associa- 
tion is  the  foundation  of  a  good  memory.  Without  this,  the 
memory  is  like  a  chest  of  drawers  full  of  tossed  and  tumbled 
articles,  where  the  right  one  is  hard  to  find.  With  it,  it  is  like 
the  wise  business  man  who  has  boxes,  and  drawers,  and  compart- 
ments, and  pigeon-holes  for  his  different  papers, — a  place  for 
everything  and  everything  in  its  place, — where  he  can  lay  his 
hand  upon  what  he  needs  whenever  it  is  wanted.  The  three  laws 
of  association,  especially  useful  in  cultivating  the  memory,  are 
those  of  similarity,  contiguity  in  time  and  place,  and  cause  and 
effect.  The  memory  operates  spontaneously  according  to  these 
laws ;  but  we  should  endeavor,  by  a  special  effort,  to  associate  our 
knowledge  by  the  natural  laws  of  acquisition  and  retention. 

Law  of  Similarity. — Knowledge  should  be  associated  by  the 
law  of  similarity.  This  is  one  of  the  simplest  of  the  primary  laws 
of  memory,  and  one  which  controls  the  earliest  activity  of  the 
mind.  The  aim  of  the  student  and  teacher  should  be  to  aid 
nature  in  the  action  of  this  law,  so  that  it  may  become  a  fixed 
habit  of  the  mind.  The  principle  may  be  applied  in  remember- 
ing a  great  variety  of  objects.  Words  similarly  spelled  or  pro- 
nounced may  be  grouped  together,  similar  words  in  different 
languages  may  be  compared,  cities  of  nearly  the  same  popula- 
tion and  states  and  counties  of  nearly  the  same  size  may  be 
associated,  and  attention  called  to  historic  events  occurring  on 
the  same  day  or  during  the  same  year.  The  habit  of  associating 
similar  things  will  enable  one  to  remember  many  facts  that  would 
otherwise  slip  away  from  the  memory. 

Time  and  Place. — The  law  of  contiguity  in  time  and 
pJace  can  also  be  employed  in  strengthening  the  memory.  This 


THE   CULTUKE   OF   THE   MEMORY.  163 

law  applies  especially  to  the  remembering  of  the  facts  of  history. 
Events  occurring  at  the  same  time,  or  on  some  given  day,  or  dur- 
ing some  particular  period,  may  be  linked  together  by  the  tie  of 
time.  Thus  we  can  easily  remember,  that  Adams  and  Jefferson 
died  on  the  same  Fourth  of  July,  1826 ;  that  Lee  retreated  from 
Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg  fell  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  1863 ;  that 
the  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing  and  the  capture  of  Island  Num- 
ber Ten  occurred  on  the  same  day,  etc.  So  also  events  occurring 
at  the  same  place,  or  in  the  same  city  or  country,  may  be  so 
associated  that  they  will  recall  one  another. 

Eras  and  Epochs. — So  also  the  events  and  persons  of  an  age  or 
era  may  be  readily  remembered  by  being  associated.  The  Eliza- 
bethan era  will  readily  give,  not  only  the  approximate  date  of  the 
time  of  Elizabeth,  but  also  of  Mary  Queen  of  Scots,  Raleigh, 
Sidney,  Shakspeare,  the  Spanish  Armada,  etc.  Associating  the 
Augustan  age  with  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era,  we  can 
readily  remember  when  Antony,  Cleopatra,  Cicero,  Virgil,  etc., 
lived.  Remembering  that  Socrates  was  the  teacher  of  Plato, 
Plato  of  Aristotle,  and  Aristotle  of  Alexander,  by  remembering 
the  date  of  either  one  we  can  approximate  the  dates  of  the  others 
with  sufficient  accuracy  for  all  practical  purposes. 

Cause  and  Effect. — The  law  of  cause  and  effect,  including 
means  to  ends,  should  be  used  to  aid  and  strengthen  the  memory. 
This  law  will  be  found  especially  valuable  in  remembering  the 
facts  of  history  which  bear  this  relation.  To  relate  the  Revolu- 
tion and  the  facts  which  led  to  it  as  the  cause,  will  aid  in  fixing 
these  events  in  the  mind.  The  Protectorate  of  Cromwell  and  the 
revolution  which  led  to  it  are  best  remembered  in  their  connection 
of  cause  and  effect.  The  events  associated  with  the  battles  of 
Solferino  and  Magenta  are  better  understood  and  more  easily  re- 
tained when  read  in  their  relation  to  a  United  Italy.  The  habit 
of  linking  historic  facts  in  this  way  will  greatly  facilitate  the 
study  of  history. 

Classifying  Knowledge. — The  memory  can  be  aided  by 
the  careful  classification  of  knowledge.  The  habit  of  writing 


164  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

outlines  of  the  subjects  studied  or  read,  gives  systematic  arrange- 
ment to  facts  and  principles,  which  greatly  facilitates  the  power 
of  acquisition.  It  gives  a  bird's  eye  view  of  the  entire  subject, 
enables  us  to  see  the  relation  of  the  parts,  and  impresses  the 
mind  both  on  account  of  a  clearer  conception  of  the  subject  and 
a  view  of  the  relations. 

Kinds  of  Outlines. — These  outlines  may  be  either  logical  or 
topical.  Many  subjects  will  admit  of  a  logical  relation  of  the 
parts,  so  that  one  part  is  seen  to  be  contained  in  and  to  grow  out 
of  another  part.  Some  subjects  will  admit  of  only  a  topical  re- 
lation of  facts,  but  even  a  topical  connecting  of  facts  increases 
the  clearness  of  view  and  enables  the  eye  to  aid  the  thought  in 
fixing  the  impression. 

Special  Artifices. — There  are  some  special  artifices  which  have 
been  found  useful  in  remembering  a  certain  class  of  objects  or 
words.  The  two  most  convenient  and  practical  are  those  of 
verse  and  key-words.  Thus  the  number  of  days  of  the  month  is 
most  conveniently  remembered  by  the  couplet,  "Thirty  days 
hath  September,  etc."  The  couplet,  "  To  be  easy  all  night,  Let 
your  supper  be  light,"  serves  to  impress  a  law  of  health  that 
many  people  are  apt  to  forget.  An  arrangement  of  the  kings  of 
England  in  verses  similar  to  the  following,  probably  assists  the 
memory  of  the  youthful  learner : 

"First  William  the  Norman,  then  William  his  son, 
Henry,  Stephen,  and  Henry,  then  Richard  and  John. 
Next  Henry  the  third,  Edwards  one,  two,  and  three ; 
And  again  after  Richard,  three  Henrys  we  see,"  etc. 

Use  of  Key-Words. — Key-words  are  often  valuable  in  remem- 
bering a  series  of  abstract  terms.  Thus  the  word  vibgyor  gives 
the  order  of  the  colors  of  the  spectrum,  and  also  the  formation 
of  the  secondary  colors  from  the  primary,  and  thus  also  the  com- 
plementary colors.  The  term  Die  will  give  the  order  of  the 
three  styles  of  Grecian  architecture,  the  Doric,  Ionic,  and  Corin- 
thian, and  aid  in  remembering  them  by  the  relative  order  of  or- 
namentation. The  term  Tisp  I  have  found  valuable  in  fixing  the 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   MEMORY.  165 

four  kinds  of  dissyllabic  feet,  the  Trochee,  Iambus,  Spondee,  and 
Pyrrhic ;  and  also  the  term  Daat,  for  the  principal  trisyllabic  feet, 
suggesting  by  the  order  of  the  letters  the  name  of  each. 

Use  of  Sentences. — A  list  of  names  in  their  order  can  be  re- 
membered by  a  sentence,  the  initials  of  whose  words  correspond 
with  the  initials  of  the  series  to  be  remembered.  Thus  young 
persons  studying  history  can  fix  the  names  and  order  of  the 
presidents  of  the  United  States  by  the  following  sentence : 
"  Will  a  jolly  man  make  a  jolly  visitor?  Honor  the  person  that 
finds  pleasure  by  losing  jolly  guests  having  great  ancestors."  A 
still  better  sentence  is  the  following :  "  Washington  and  Jefferson 
made  many  a  joke ;  Van  Buren  had  trouble  plenty  to  find  poor 
bank-notes.  Let  Johnson  go  home  greatly  agitated."  The  sen- 
tence, "  I  seize  a  sieve,"  will  enable  one  to  remember  the  order  of 
the  e  and  i  in  the  two  words  seize  and  sieve. 

Systems  of  Mnemonics. — Systems  of  Mnemonics  have  been 
invented  from  time  to  time,  and  recommended  by  various  persons. 
They  consist  in  some  arrangement  for  making  an  artificial  associ- 
ation between  something  used  as  a  key  and  that  which  is  to  be 
remembered.  To  illustrate,  suppose  we  commit  a  series  of  objects, 
numbering  them  from  one  to  one  hundred.  Suppose  number  one 
is  a  pump,  number  two  a  bear,  number  three  a  goose,  etc.  Now 
to  apply  this  to  the  kings  of  England,  we  might  associate  James 
I.  with  the  pump,  Charles  I.  with  the  bear,  Charles  II.  with  the 
goose,  etc.  The  association  might  be  impressed  by  a  humorous 
relation;  as,  "James  pumps  water  on  a  bear  which  swallows 
Charles  I.  while  Charles  II.  rides  away  on  a  goose." 

Value  of  Mnemonics. — In  favor  of  such  a  system  it  may  be 
said  that  wonderful  feats  may  be  performed  by  it  in  the  remem- 
bering of  abstract  terms  and  dates.  But  the  disadvantages  are 
greater  than  the  advantages.  It  trains  the  mind  to  an  artificial 
relation,  and  thus  weakens  its  power  by  neglecting  to  cultivate 
the  natural  method  of  association.  The  kings  of  England,  for 
instance,  should  be  remembered  by  their  actual  relation  to  one 
another  and  to  historic  events.  The  mere  recollection  of  their 


166  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

names  is  of  little  value  to  the  student.  Besides,  unless  we  are  in 
constant  use  of  the  system,  the  key  itself  will  vanish  from  the 
memory,  and  then  everything  goes  with  it. 

III.  APPLICATION  IN  TEACHING. — All  of  the  principles  to 
which  we  have  called  attention  will  be  found  of  great  value 
to  the  student  and  teacher.  A  few  suggestions  for  the  applica- 
tion of  these  principles  in  the  work  of  instruction  will  be  of  in- 
terest to  teachers. 

The  Alphabet. — In  teaching  the  alphabet,  the  letters  may  be 
associated  with  forms  that  are  similar  to  them ;  as  the  letter  O 
with  a  ring  or  hoop,  the  letter  A  with  a  harrow,  the  letter  X  with 
a  saw-horse,  etc.  Letters  that  are  similar  may  be  compared  and 
those  that  are  dissimilar  contrasted.  Teachers  and  writers  of 
primers  have  found  it  useful  to  associate  letters  with  words ;  as 
"  A  for  an  Apple,  B  for  a  Book,  C  for  some  Candy,  and  D  for  a 
Duke."  Such  illustrations  attract  the  attention,  awaken  an  in- 
terest, and  connect  by  the  thread  of  association, — all  of  which 
are  means  of  remembering. 

In  Orthography. — The  law  of  association  can  be  employed 
in  the  study  of  orthography.  Words  of  similar  orthography 
should  be  associated ;  as,  fast,  quick,  and  fast,  to  abstain  from 
food.  Words  of  similar  pronunciation  and  unlike  orthography 
may  be  associated,  the  correct  spelling  being  impressed  by  the 
contrast ;  as,  choir  and  quire,  there  and  their,  vein,  vain,  and  vane. 

Words  whose  orthography  it  is  difficult  to  remember  may  be 
associated  with  other  words  similarly  spelled.  Thus,  to  remem- 
ber whether  the  i  or  e  comes  first  in  piece,  it  may  be  associated 
with  pie  in  the  expression  "  a  piece  of  pie."  A  lady  remembered 
that  there  were  two  e's  together  in  agreeable  by  being  told  to 
associate  it  with  the  fact  that  there  were  two  agreeable  gentlemen 
present  when  she  asked  the  question.  The  word  Alice  is  a  key 
to  the  relative  position  of  i  and  e,  in  such  words  as  conceive  and 
believe,  when  preceded  by  I  or  by  c;  from  which  we  can  remember 
that  e  precedes  i  after  the  sound  of  s,  and  i  precedes  e  after  all 
other  consonants.  Some  such  artifices  of  association  are  especially 


THE   CULTUKE   OF   THE   MEMOEY.  167 

valuable  in  those  peculiar  cases  in  which  .we  are  confused  in  the 
spelling  of  particular  words. 

In  Geograpliy. — The  principle  of  association  is  especially 
valuable  in  the  study  of  geography.  In  this  way  the  size  of 
states,  the  population  of  cities,  etc.,  can  be  associated  and  readily 
retained.  Thus  take  Pennsylvania,  46,000  square  miles,  for  a 
standard ;  and  we  have  approximately,  New  York=Pennsylva- 
nia ;  Louisiana=Pennsylvania ;  Nevada=2  times  Pennsylvania ; 
Texas=5  times  Pennsylvania;  England=H  times  Pennsylvania ; 
Scotland— f  of  Pennsylvania ;  Irelaud=f  of  Pennsylvania ; 
France=4?  times  Pennsylvania;  Switzerland^^  of  Pennsylva- 
nia ;  Denmark=;l  of  Pennsylvania ;  etc. 

Or  again:  England=Alabama  (50,000);  Scotland=Maine 
(30,000) ;  Ireland=Indiana  (33,000)  ;  Cuba^Tennessee  (42,000); 
France=4  times  Alabama  (50,000) ;  Brazil=United  States= 
Sahara  Desert,  etc.  Taking  Philadelphia  as  a  standard,  we  may 
remember  that  the  population  of  the  following  cities  is  about  the 
same:  Berlin,  Vienna,  Liverpool,  St.  Petersburg,  Calcutta. 

Outlines  of  Subjects. — The  classification  of  geographical  facts 
by  an  outline  is  also  of  special  value  in  learning  geography.  It 
enables  us  to  classify  our  knowledge,  which  is  a  condition  of  re- 
membering it.  An  outline  will  also  suggest  facts  which  otherwise 
would  not  be  recalled.  It  is  especially  valuable  with  classes  in 
the  recitation,  enabling  them  to  obtain  their  knowledge  from  any 
book,  and  to  recall  what  might  otherwise  have  slipped  the  memory. 

In  History. — These  principles  are  especially  applicable  in 
studying  and  teaching  history.  History  is  purely  a  memory 
study ;  and  whatever  we  may  do  to  aid  the  memory  will  enhance 
our  knowledge  of  history.  The  memory  can  be  aided  in  the 
study  of  history  by  associating  the  facts  in  accordance  with  two 
of  the  primary  laws  of  memory,  those  of  cause  and  effect  and 
contiguity  in  time  and  place. 

Cause  and  Effect. — First,  facts  should  be  associated,  so  far  as 
possible,  by  the  law  of  cause  and  effect.  The  mind  naturally 
associates  the  events  of  history  with  the  causes  which  produced 


168  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

them,  and  also  looEs  forward  from  the  facts  to  the  results  which 
flow  from  them ;  and  such  an  association  tends  to  fix  the  events 
permanently  in  the  memory.  Thus,  we  may  see  the  relation  of 
the  corruptions  of  the  people  of  Home  and  the  dissensions  of  the 
rulers  to  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire ;  the  preaching  of  Peter 
the  Hermit  to  the  Crusades ;  the  extravagance  and  corruption  of 
the  French  rulers  to  the  French  Revolution ;  the  French  Revolu- 
tion to  the  wealth  of  the  French  people;  the  persecution  of  the 
Puritans  to  the  settlement  of  New  England ;  the  settlement  and 
annexation  of  Texas  to  the  Mexican  war ;  etc. 

Same  Time  or  Place. — Second,  facts  occurring  at  the  same  time 
or  place  may  be  remembered  by  associating  them  together.  Thus 
Hannibal  and  Scipio,  the  two  great  opposing  generals,  died  the 
same  year,  183  B.  C. ;  the  fall  of  Greece  and  Carthage  occurred 
on  the  same  year,  146  B.  C. ;  Francis  I.  and  Henry  VIII.  both 
died  in  1547  ;  Charles  V.  and  Mary  Tudor  both  died  in  1558 ; 
the  fall  of  Granada  and  discovery  of  America  occurred  in  1492 ; 
the  battles  of  New  Orleans  and  Waterloo  were  fought  in  1815. 
So  also  we  may  associate  events  occurring  an  exact  number  of 
centuries  apart;  as  Mexico  conquered  by  the  Spaniards  in  1521 
and  her  independence  secured  in  1821 ;  or  Bacon's  Rebellion  in 
1676,  and  the  Declaration  of  Independence  in  1776. 

Eras  and  Epoclis. — Third,  there  should  be  a  classification  of 
facts  into  epochs  or  eras.  In  every  country  there  are  great  lead- 
ing events  which  stand  as  historic  centres  or  nuclei  around  which 
revolve  the  minor  events.  Fixing  the  time  of  the  principal  or 
central  events,  we  have  a  key  to  the  dates  of  the  facts  related  to 
them  and  growing  out  of  them.  Thus,  the  Age  of  Pericles,  the 
Age  of  Augustus,  the  Age  of  Elizabeth,  the  Crusades,  the  Refor- 
mation, etc.,  coordinate  events  and  persons  in  a  way  to  be  easily 
remembered.  In  the  history  of  the  United  States,  such  divisions 
as  discoveries,  settlements,  the  French  and  Indian  war,  the  Revo- 
lution, the  Civil  War,  etc.,  will  serve  to  group  the  events  of  the 
country  in  a  way  to  facilitate  their  acquisition  and  retention. 


THE  IMAGINATION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 

THE  IMAGINATION  is  the  faculty  by  which  we  form  ideal 
conceptions.  It  is  the  power  of  forming  mental  images  by 
uniting  different  parts  of  objects  given  by  perception,  and  also  of 
creating  ideals  of  objects  different  from  anything  we  have  per- 
ceived. Thus,  I  can  conceive  of  a  flying  horse  by  uniting  my 
ideas  of  wings  and  a  horse ;  or  I  can  imagine  a  landscape  or  a 
strain  of  music  different  from  anything  I  have  ever  seen  or  heard. 
Imagination  may  thus  be  defined  as  the  power  of  ideal  creation. 

Origin  of  Term. — The  term  Imagination  is  derived  from 
imago,  an  image.  The  etymology  of  the  term  indicates  that  its 
office  is  the  formation  of  images ;  and  this  was  the  primary  idea 
of  the  faculty,  as  the  simplest  products  of  imagination  are  images, 
or  pictures  of  objects.  But  it  is  not  restricted  to  mere  picture 
making,  for  it  can  conceive  of  ideals  in  every  department  of  men- 
tal activity.  Thus  it  can  conceive  of  a  sound  or  a  feeling  as  well 
as  a  statue  or  a  landscape. 

The  Representative  Element. — The  Imagination  consists  of 
two  elements;  a  power  which  represents  and  a  power  which 
determines  what  to  represent.  The  representative  element  of  the 
imagination  is  regarded  as  the  same  as  the  representative  element 
of  the  memory,  but  differently  applied.  In  the  memory,  the 
images  are  formed  according  to  the  real  and  actual ;  in  the  imagi- 
nation they  are  formed  according  to  the  ideal  and  possible.  The 
representative  power  in  the  memory  gives  an  exact  transcript  of 
8  (169) 


170  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

some  previous  cognition;  the  imagination  rises  above  the  office 
of  a  mere  copyist,  and  originates  and  represents  new  products. 
But  in  both  cases.the  representative  element  seems  to  be  the  same 
power  working  under  different  circumstances.  In  the  former 
case,  memory  determines  what  it  represents ;  in  the  latter  case  a 
•creative  power  of  the  mind  uses  it  to  body  forth  new  ideals. 

Relation  to  Memory. — The  faculty  of  imagination  is  closely 
related  to  the  memory,  though  there  is  an  essential  difference 
between  them.  In  an  act  of  memory  there  is  first  a  conservation 
or  retention  of  knowledge ;  second,  a  recalling  or  reproduction  of 
past  experience ;  third,  a  picturing  or  representation  of  what  is 
recalled  out  of  unconsciousness ;  and  fourth,  a  recognition  of  what 
is  recalled  and  represented  as  something  of  past  experience.  The 
materials  of  the  representation  are  supplied  by  the  recollection  of 
what  has  been  previously  experienced  and  preserved  in  the  mind. 
Retention  and  recollection  lie  back  of  and  determine  the  represen- 
tation. In  imagination  the  power  of  ideal  creation  lies  back  of 
and  determines  the  representation.  We  represent,  not  what  we 
have  retained  and  recalled,  but  what  the  mind  itself  originates. 
In  memory  the  representation  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  elements 
of  memory; 'so  in  imagination  we  may  regard  the  representation, 
as  well  as  the  power  which  determines  the  representation,  as  an 
element  of  imagination. 

Illustration  of  Each. — To  illustrate,  I  think  of  the  home  of  my 
boyhood.  It  is  pictured  before  my  mind  as  if  I  were  a  boy  again 
beholding  it.  I  see  the  house,  the  garden,  the  barn,  the  orchard, 
just  as  they  were  when  I  was  a  lad  at  home.  It  is  a  picture  of 
memory;  the  materials  being  supplied  by  recollection,  and  the 
image  formed  by  the  representative  element.  In  imagination  I 
can  tear  down  the  old  homestead  and  build  a  new  one,  enlarge 
the  barn,  plant  a  new  orchard,  etc.,  and  thus  cause  a  picture  of 
a  new  and  more  beautiful  home  to  stand  distinctly  before  my 
mind.  This  is  a  picture  of  the  imagination.  The  materials  may 
be  supplied  partly  by  the  memory  and  partly  by  the  creative 
power  of  the  mind ;  but  they  are  all  united  into  a  single  product 
by  the  plastic  power  of  Imagination. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  171 

I.  THE  PRODUCTS  OF  IMAGINATION. — The  products  of  the 
imagination  are  twofold ;  New  Combinations  and  New  Creations. 
By  New  Combinations  we  mean  the  combination  of  past  percep- 
tions into  new  forms,  so  that  though  the  product  may  be  new  as  a 
whole,  the  parts  of  which  it  is  composed  may  be  old.  By  New 
Creations  we  mean  mental  products  in  which  not  only  the  ideal 
as  a  whole,  but  each  of  its  parts,  shall  be  new.  These  difference" 
actually  exist  in  the  products  of  the  imagination,  and  need  a 
name ;  and  it  seems  proper  to  distinguish  them  as  New  Combina- 
tions and  New  Creations. 

New  Combinations. — The  imagination  has  the  power  of  com- 
bining old  perceptions  into  new  forms,  giving  us  products  which 
as  wholes  are  not  found  in  nature.  Thus  it  may  combine  differ- 
ent parts  of  actual  landscapes,  forming  an  ideal  landscape  such  as 
we  have  never  seen.  Or,  it  may  unite  the  ideas  of  a  horse  and 
wings,  giving  the  conception  of  a  flying  horse.  Pegasus,  the 
flying  horse  of  Grecian  mythology,  is  a  product  of  the  imagina- 
tion. A  mountain  of  gold,  a  land  flowing  with  milk  and  honey, 
are  also  examples  of  ideals  consisting  of  a  combination  of  old 
conceptions. 

New  Creations. — The  imagination  can  also  form  ideals 
which  are  not  composed  of  previous  perceptions,  but  which, 
though  similar  to,  are  different  from  and  superior  to  our  percep 
tions.  Thus  it  can  form  an  ideal  landscape  in  which  none  of  the 
parts  are  copies  of  any  landscape  we  have  seen,  but  which  is  in 
every  respect  an  original  product.  It  can  imagine  strains  of 
music  not  found  in  nature  or  in  the  works  of  any  musician.  It 
can  form  ideals  of  beauty  that  are  different  from  and  superior  to 
anything  found  in  nature.  Such  products  may  be  properly  called 
new  creations. 

Difference  Illustrated. — This  difference  may  be  illustrated 
in  the  fine  arts  of  painting,  sculpture,  music,  poetry,  etc.  Thus 
an  artist  may  paint  a  picture  in  which  the  grove,  the  river,  the 
meadow,  the  moss-covered  bridge,  etc.,  are  copies  of  things  he  has 
sketched  from  nature ;  or  he  can  paint  a  picture  in  which  these 


172  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

features,  as  well  as  the  whole  picture,  are  ideals,  so  that  not  one 
object  in  the  painting  is  a  copy  of  anything  he  has  seen.  The 
sculptor  can  unite  in  a  statue  lips,  forehead,  nose,  head,  neck,  etc., 
each  feature  being  a  copy  of  what  he  may  have  seen  in  different 
persons ;  or  he  can  give  us  a  statue  in  which  every  feature  as  well 
as  the  whole  figure  is  his  ideal  of  beauty.  If  we  examine  some 
pieces  of  music  we  shall  find  that  though  new  as  a  whole,  they 
are  made  up  of  old  strains  borrowed  from  different  authors ;  but 
when  Beethoven  composed,  there  came  welling  up  from  the  depths 
of  his  wonderful  imagination,  melodies  and  harmonies  never 
heard  before  by  human  ear.  The  former  are  mostly  new  combina- 
tions of  the  old ;  the  latter  are  new  creations. 

The  Elements  Associated. — These  two  elements  are  often 
associated  in  the  same  production.  Thus  one  portion  of  a  work 
may  be  merely  a  combination  of  old  percepts,  while  other  portions 
are  pure  ideal  creations.  Much  of  the  work  of  imagination  con- 
sists in  improving  on  or  idealizing  nature.  Many  portraits  are 
not  exact  copies  of  the  face,  but  are  touched  up  by  the  fancy  of 
the  artist  towards  an  ideal  of  perfection  which  the  real  face 
merely  suggests.  Even  in  the  description  of  a  real  object  or  an 
actual  landscape,  imagination  supplies  many  missing  links,  and 
gives  a  vividness  and  glow  to  the  picture  that  pure  memory  can- 
not afford.  In  many  of  our  so-called  pictures  of  memory,  the 
memory  is  not  sufficiently  exact  to  supply  all  the  details,  and 
these  are  filled  out  by  the  imagination.  Fact  and  fancy  are  thus 
often  united  both  in  our  recollections  and  in  our  imaginations. 

Important  Distinction. — This  distinction  between  new  com- 
binations and  new  creations  is  a  very  important  one,  and  if 
clearly  understood  will  prevent  the  mistakes  and  misunderstand- 
ings that  have  occurred  among  writers  on  this  subject.  The  test 
of  a  new  combination  is  that  the  parts  are  percepts, — an  exact 
image  of  something  previously  experienced :  the  test  of  a  new 
creation  is  that  no  element  is  a  percept, — an  exact  transcript  of 
any  previous  experience.  My  mental  picture  of  a  horse,  for  ex- 
ample, may  be  an  exact  transcript  of  some  horse  I  have  seen ;  if 


THE   NATUKE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  173 

BO,  it  is  a  picture  of  memory.  It  may  be  unlike  any  one  horse, 
but  composed  of  parts  of  different  horses  I  have  seen ;  it  is  then 
a  new  combination.  It  may  be  not  only  new  as  a  whole,  but  no 
part  of  it  may  be  an  exact  transcript  of  any  horse  I  have  seen ;  it 
is  then  a  new  creation.  Imagination  is  thus  seen  to  be  more  than 
a  power  to  combine  old  perceptions,  as  some  have  erroneously 
taught. 

II.  FORMS  OF  IMAGINATION. — Imagination  may  act  in  different 
ways,  and  give  us  products  which  differ  in  respect  to  their  har- 
mony, dignity,  etc.  These  differences  enable  us  to  distinguish 
several  distinct  forms  of  the  imaginative  faculty.  These  forms 
may  be  embraced  under  three  general  classes ;  those  of  Phantasy, 
Fancy,  and  Imagination  proper. 

The  Phantasy. — The  imagination  can  combine  the  parts  of 
objects  in  entire  disregard  of  the  laws  of  harmony  and  unity, 
giving  us  products  such  as  never  occur  in  nature.  Thus  it  may 
place  the  chimney  of  a  house  upon  the  hump  of  a  camel,  the  head 
of  a  donkey  on  the  neck  of  a  man,  or  the  head  of  a  man  on  the 
shoulders  of  a  horse.  These  products  are  grotesque  or  fantastic; 
and  this  form  of  imagination  has  been  called  Phantasy.  This  is 
the  form  which  gives  us  the  caricatures  in  illustrations  and  de- 
scriptions, and  is  the  source  of  the  various  forms  of  wit  and 
humor. 

The  Fancy. — The  imagination  can  unite  objects  or  ideas 
under  the  more  natural  laws  of  association  in  forms  attractive  to 
the  feelings  and  approved  by  the  taste,  yet  without  the  higher 
ends  of  ideal  creation.  This  form  of  the  imagination  has  been 
called  Fancy.  It  gives  us  many  of  the  images  of  literature  which 
claim  our  admiration,  but  which  lack  the  unity,  dignity,  and  per- 
fection of  the  products  of  the  higher  imagination.  Many  of  our 
poets  deal  largely  with  images  of  the  fancy.  Longfellow's  com- 
parison of  the  moon  to  a  school-boy's  paper  kite  is  a  mere  fancy. 
The  imagination  of  children  and  young  poets  inclines  to  the 
fanciful.  Shakspeare's  earlier  writings  partake  more  of  the  fancy 
than  his  later  productions. 


174  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Imagination  Proper. — When  this  faculty  combines  and 
creates  according  to  the  higher  laws  of  thought  and  taste,  embody- 
ing pure,  lofty,  and  noble  products  in  ideal  forms,  we  have  the 
Imagination  proper.  This  is  the  artistic  power  of  the  mind,  the 
power  that  gives  us  poetry,  eloquence,  music,  sculpture,  architect- 
ure, etc.  Here  we  find  the  power  of  genius,  the  gift  divine  which 
gave  immortality  to  Shakspeare  and  Milton,  to  Raphael  and 
Michael  Angelo,  to  Demosthenes  and  Cicero.  Out  of  this  form 
of  the  imagination  have  arisen  the  great  poems  and  fictions,  the 
great  paintings  and  statues,  all  those  works  of  art  which  command 
the  admiration  of  the  world,  and  crown  their  authors  with  the 
chaplet  of  an  undying  fame. 

I.  THE  LAWS  OP  THE  IMAGINATION. 

Having  given  a  general  idea  of  the  imagination,  we  shall  now 
consider  some  of  the  circumstances  or  laws  of  its  activity.  These 
circumstances  or  laws,  we  shall  find,  are  quite  similar  to  those 
which  we  have  already  discussed  under  the  memory.  This  simi- 
larity is  not  a  matter  of  surprise,  since  they  are  both  representative 
powers,  and  seem  to  involve  the  activity  of  a  common  representa- 
tive element. 

Imagination  Involuntary. — First,  we  remark  that  many 
of  the  products  of  imagination  are  entirely  involuntary.  They 
arise  of  themselves,  without  any  effort  of  the  will,  uncalled  for 
and  unwished.  We  often  sit  in  a  meditative  or  half-dreaming 
mood,  when  thoughts,  memory,  and  imagination  all  seem  to 
operate  involuntarily.  In  a  "  train  of  thought,"  so-called,  which 
seems  to  move  forward  without  an  act  of  volition,  much  of  it  will 
be  purely  imaginary, — past  thoughts,  new  ideas  and  fancies,  all 
seem  to  be  blended  together.  The  day-dreams  of  childhood  and 
youth  are  usually  not  the  result  of  an  intentional  effort  of  the 
mind ;  the  fancy  builds  its  air-castles  sometimes  almost  against 
the  protest  of  the  judgment.  Some  minds  are  so  constituted  that 
the  imagination  is  constantly  excited  to  activity  by  what  they 
see  and  hear;  every  object  of  nature  seems  to  suggest  an  image 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  175 

or  an  analogy.  This  is  the  poetic  mind  described  by  Longfellow  : 
"  His  thoughts  were  twin-born ;  the  thought  itself,  and  its  figura- 
tive resemblance  in  the  outer  world.  Thus,  through  the  quiet, 
still  waters  of  his  soul  each  image  floated  double,  'swan  and 
shadow.' " 

Imagination  Voluntary. — The  imagination  is  also  volun- 
tary, as  well  as  involuntary.  Though  images  and  figures  often 
spring  up  involuntarily  in  the  mind,  yet  they  may  also  be  produced 
by  a  direct  effort  of  the  will.  We  may  build  our  air-castles,  con- 
struct our  figures,  produce  our  imaginary  incidents,  or  create  an 
image  of  beauty,  intentionally.  Thus  in  writing,  a  person  may 
hold  himself  down  to  a  plain  statement  of  facts  and  principles,  or 
he  may  adorn  his  composition  with  the  light  of  fancy.  The 
essayist  can  adapt  his  style  to  his  subject,  being  simple  or  orna- 
mental at  his  will.  The  orator  often  relieves  the  monotony  of  a 
dry  statement  or  abstract  argument  by  a  brilliant  metaphor,  a 
flash  of  wit,  or  a  sparkling  analogy.  The  eloquent  peroration 
often  glows  with  the  figures  and  feelings  that  the  speaker  calls  up 
out  of  the  depths  of  a  vivid  imagination. 

Principle  of  Suggestion. — The  imagination  operates  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  law  of  association  and  suggestion.  Many  of 
our  fancies  are  suggested  by  sensible  objects  or  by  other  images 
or  fancies.  The  principle  of  analogy  is  usually  operative  in  the 
forming  of  the  images  of  the  imagination.  As  the  real  images  of 
the  memory  suggest  one  another,  so  do  they  suggest  the  unreal  or 
ideal  images  of  the  imagination.  One  image  calls  out  another 
image,  one  fancy  another  fancy,  one  strain  of  music  another 
strain,  one  poetic  thought  another,  etc.  It  is  in  this  way  that 
many  of  the  figures  of  poetry  arise.  The  freshness  of  morning 
suggests  childhood  and  youth,  and  we  say,  "Youth  is  the  morn- 
ing of  life ;"  the  delicate  whiteness  of  the  lily  reminds  us  of  purity 
of  character,  and 'we  say,  "She  is  pure  as  a  lily;"  the  oak  re- 
minds us  of  endurance,  and  we  say,  "  He  stood  like  the  oak  on  the 
mountain ;"  the  lion  becomes  the  type  of  courage,  and  we  say, 
"  He  is  the  lion  of  the  tribe  of  Judah." 


176  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

Often  Spontaneous. — Though  the  law  of  association  is  usu- 
ally operative  in  an  act  of  the  imagination,  yet  it  may  operate 
with  spontaneity.  Many  of  our  imaginings  are  not  only  involun- 
tary, but  are  purely  spontaneous ;  that  is,  they  are  not  suggested 
by  any  ideas  or  objects.  In  other  words,  they  are  not  a  part  of  a 
train  of  associated  ideas  and  images,  but  arise  in  the  mind  with 
pure  spontaneity.  It  is  not  necessary,  as  some  have  taught,  that 
every  act  of  the  imagination  should  have  been  determined  by 
some  antecedent  act  of  the  mind.  The  mind  has  the  power  of 
creating  an  image  of  beauty,  a  picture  of  a  landscape,  or  a  stanza 
of  poetry,  unsuggested  and  at  its  own  will,  without  its  being  con- 
ditioned by  something  immediately  preceding  it  in  the  mind.  In 
this  respect  it  is  like  the  memory,  which,  though  often  controlled 
by  the  laws  of  association,  may  also  act  independently  of  them. 
It  is  thus  manifest  that  the  imagination  is  not  bound  down  to  an 
inexorable  law  of  antecedence  and  consequence  in  its  operations, 
but  is  a  free  and  spontaneous  activity. 

Ambiguity  of  Suggestion. — Care  must  be  used  in  employing 
the  term  suggestion  in  respect  to  mental  products,  or  it  will  lead 
us  into  a  serious  error  in  regard  to  the  mind's  operations.  This 
error  consists  in  conceiving  of  the  mind  as  a  passive  instrument 
operated  upon  by  id<ias,  these  ideas  causing  it  to  produce  other 
ideas.  Such  a  conception  is  totally  false.  The  mind  is  a  self 
activity  and  a  cause  of  its  own  ideas.  It  operates  by  certain  laws 
inherent  in  its  own  nature.  One  of  these  laws  is  that  having  one 
idea  in  the  mind,  it  naturally  passes  to  a  similar  idea  or  one  re- 
lated to  it.  The  true  statement  is  that  the  mind  passes  in  its  crea- 
tions from  one  idea  to  a  similar  or  a  related  idea;  and  this  is  all 
we  mean  by  ideas  suggesting  one  another.  The  idea  is  passive, 
has  no  power  to  suggest ;  it  is  the  mind  that  acts  and  passes  from 
idea  to  idea  by  the  laws  of  its  own  being. 

Sensible  Forms. — The  tendency  of  the  imagination  is  to  clothe 
its  conceptions  in  sensible  forms.  The  most  of  its  creations  are 
embodied  or  manifested  in  elements  afforded  by  the  senses.  The 
senses  give  us  our  ideas  of  form,  color,  sound,  motion,  etc. ;  and 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  177 

these  are  the  materials  most  frequently  used  by  the  imagination 
in  its  creations.  The  larger  part  of  its  ideals,  no  matter  how 
elevated  or  refined,  are  put  forth  in  some  one  or  more  of  these 
elements  of  the  senses.  Thus  our  ideals  of  a  statue,  a  landscape, 
a  strain  of  music,  etc.,  are  all  related  to  objects  of  sense.  A  fig- 
ure of  rhetoric  is  the  expression  of  the  relation  of  one  object  tc 
another,  or  the  representation  of  an  abstract  or  spiritual  element 
in  sensible  form;  as,  "The  rose  is  the  queen  of  flowers,"  or, 
"  Truth  is  the  king  of  virtues." 

Abstract  to  Concrete. — The  imagination  tends  naturally  to 
convert  abstract  ideas  and  thoughts  into  sensible  forms.  It  is 
this  faculty,  more  than  any  other,  that  tends  to  carry  over  our 
abstract  notions  from  the  world  of  abstraction  to  the  world  of 
sense.  Thus  we  speak  of  purity  as  a  crown,  of  lowliness  as  a  lad- 
der, of  modesty  as  a  jewel,  of  the  attraction  of  the  earth  as  the 
"  elastic  thread  of  gravity,"  etc.  By  this  power  the  orator  makes 
the  abstract  and  intangible  stand  before  the  mind's  eye  in  sensible 
forms.  The  faculty  of  imagination  thus  "  bodies  forth  the  forms 
of  things  unknown  "  and,  as  it  were,  "  gives  to  airy  nothings  a 
local  habitation  and  a  name." 

Not  Restricted  to  Sight. — The  imagination  is  not  restricted 
to  any  one  class  of  objects  of  sense.  Though  it  seems  more  fre- 
quently to  fashion  its  products  after  the  ideas  afforded  by  sight, 
yet  it  is  not  merely  a  picture-making  faculty.  It  deals  with 
objects  of  sound  as  well  as  of  sight.  We  can  conceive  the  song 
of  a  bird,  or  a  melody  on  a  flute,  or  melodies  and  harmonies,  in- 
dependent of  any  instrument,  all  different  from  any  we  have  ever 
heard.  The  musician  imagines  how  his  music  will  sound  before 
he  expresses  it  in  notes  or  plays  it  on  an  instrument.  Through 
the  mind  of  deaf  old  Beethoven  floated  melodies  and  harmonies 
more  enchanting  than  had  ever  before  fallen  on  human  ear. 

Acts  in  All  the  Senses. — The  imagination  is  not  restricted  to 
sight  and  sound,  but  it  may  deal  with  the  products  of  all  the 
senses.  Thus  we  can  in  imagination  enjoy  the  taste  of  a  good 
dinner,  or  the  fragrance  of  a  flower,  or  experience  the  feeling  of 


178  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

lassitude,  pain,  etc.  The  gelidi  fontes  of  Virgil,  it  has  been  said, 
awakens  a  feeling  of  delicious  coolness,  as  well  as  an  image  of 
sparkling  beauty. 

II.  LIMITS  AND  SPHERE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 

Having  given  this  general  description  of  the  nature  and  lawa 
of  the  imagination,  we  shall  now  proceed  to  discuss  its  limits  and 
the  sphere  of  its  activity. 

I.  LIMITS  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. — The  imagination  has  a  cer- 
tain range  of  activity,  beyond  which  it  cannot  operate.  It  is 
thus  limited  in  its  operations;  and  it  is  proper  to  understand  just 
what  these  limitations  are. 

Limited  by  Space. — The  imagination  is  limited  in  its  opera- 
tions by  the  condition  of  space.  First,  we  cannot  imagine  space 
not  to  exist ;  the  imagination  cannot  annihilate  space.  Second,  it 
cannot,  in  any  of  its  operations,  step  outside  of  spatial  conditions ; 
whatever  I  conceive  must  be  in  space.  Third,  if  its  conceptions 
relate  to  a  material  object,  such  object  must  possess  some  of  the 
elements  of  space. 

Limited  by  Matter. — The  imagination  is  limited  by  the  sev- 
eral laws  of  material  existence.  This  follows  from  the  relation 
of  matter  to  space,  as  the  condition  of  its  being.  As  limited  by 
the  elements  of  space,  the  imagination  is  necessarily  limited  by  all 
the  essential  qualities  of  matter  determined  by  space.  It  can 
vary  these  qualities,  but  it  cannot  conceive  of  a  body  that  does 
not  possess  the  primary  qualities  of  bodies.  Moreover,  it  cannot 
create  a  new  primary  quality  of  bodies.  It  can  conceive  of  a 
body  without  some  of  the  secondary  qualities,  but  it  is  doubtful 
whether  it  can  create  a  new  secondary  quality.  Given  the  two 
primary  colors,  blue  and  yellow,  it  is  doubtful  whether  we  could 
ever  imagine  the  result  of  their  combination,  green;  though  Humo 
thought  we  could.  We  may  vary  the  combinations  and  relations 
of  the  secondary  qualities,  conceive  of  imaginary  bars  of  gold 
floating  in  water,  or  pieces  of  cork  sinking,  like  bars  of  lead,  to 
the  bottom ;  but  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  can  create  any  new 
property,  such  as  color,  form,  weight,  flavor,  etc. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  179 

lAmited  by  Time. — The  imagination  is  limited  by  the  condi- 
tion of  time,  as  well  as  of  space.  Whatever  it  represents  or  con- 
ceives must  be  in  the  sphere  of  time.  All  of  its  creations  must 
be  either  past,  present,  or  future.  It  cannot  imagine  an  event 
outside  of  time ;  but  in  this  sphere  it  has  unlimited  range.  It 
can  imagine  past  events  as  actually  taking  place,  put  itself  amid 
scenes  that  occurred  thousands  of  years  ago,  or  sweep  forward  on 
bolder  wing  and  picture  what  may  take  place  thousands  of  years 
to  come.  But  it  cannot  transcend  these  limits  and  originate 
events  anterior  or  subsequent  to  time,  or  conceive  events  that  are 
not  related  by  the  element  of  time. 

Limited  by  the  Mind. — The  imagination  is  limited  by  the 
general  laws  of  mind  as  revealed  in  consciousness.  We  cannot, 
by  the  imagination,  create  a  new  faculty,  or  conceive  of  a  spirit- 
ual existence  having  faculties  entirely  different  from  those  of  the 
human  mind.  We  may  modify  the  action  of  these  faculties  ;  in- 
crease or  diminish  their  power;  invert,  mix,  and  confuse  these 
activities ;  or  we  may  even  destroy  one  or  more  of  the  faculties 
altogether.  Thus,  we  may  imagine  a  sub-consciousness,  or  a  dual 
consciousness,  by  which  a  person  may  carry  on  two  independent 
lines  of  mental  activity ;  but  we  cannot  imagine  a  mind  without 
any  consciousnesss  whatever.  We  may  conceive  of  a  mind  that 
can  remember  objects  and  not  names,  or  names  and  not  objects ; 
or  a  mind  that  can  reason  inductively  and  not  deductively,  and 
vice  versa;  or  one  that  reaches  all  truths  by  intuition  instead  of 
reasoning.  All  this  can  be  done,  but  to  create  new  powers  or 
lines  of  activity  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  imagination. 

II.  SPHERE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. — Having  seen  the  limits 
of  the  imagination,  we  proceed  to  consider  the  sphere  of  its 
operations,  or  to  inquire  what  is  its  sphere  within  these  limits. 
In  general,  we  remark  that  its  sphere  embraces  the  entire  range 
of  mental  activity.  This  subject  will  be  made  clear  by  the  fol- 
lowing details. 

Material  Existences. — The  imagination  deals  especially  with 
material  existences.  The  objects  of  the  physical  world  are  the 


180  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

materials  with  which*  it  works,  and  out  of  which  it  fashions-  many 
of  its  products.  These  objects  of  sense  are  moulded  into  every 
conceivable  form  by  the  plastic  power  of  this  faculty.  The  man- 
ner in  which  it  operates  with  this  material  will  be  noticed. 

Vary  the  Size. — The  imagination  can  vary  the  size  of  objects 
at  its  will.  We  can  conceive  of  objects  small  or  large  without 
respect  to  the  limits  of  reality.  Thus  we  can  conceive  of  a  mouse 
as  large  as  an  elephant,  or  an  elephant  as  small  as  a  mouse,  a  bird 
as  large  as  a  whale,  or  a  whale  as  small  as  a  minnow,  etc.  It  can 
create  horses  small  enough  for  the  tiniest  fairy  to  ride,  or  swallows 
large  enough  to  carry  a  family  across  the  Atlantic.  An  oak-tree 
may  be  made  to  grow  under  a  glass  thimble,  having  acorns  no 
larger  than  pinheads,  or  a  bean-stalk  may  be  led  up  beyond  the 
clouds  into  a  fairy-land  of  fierce  ogres  and  golden-egged  hens. 

Vary  the  Position. — The  imagination  can  vary  the  position 
of  objects  at  pleasure.  In  nature  material  objects  sustain  certain 
natural  relations  to  one  another.  Thus  mountains  hold  certain 
relations  to  valleys,  woods  to  meadows,  rivers  to  lowlands,  etc. ; 
but  the  imagination  is  not  restricted  to  any  such  arrangements. 
It  can  put  a  mountain  in  the  centre  of  a  valley,  slope  a  prairie 
on  a  hillside,  plant  a  garden  in  a  desert,  and  combine  trees,  rocks, 
fountains,  streamlets,  etc.,  in  a  manner  never  seen  in  nature.  It 
can  change  the  natural  position  of  the  parts  of  organic  beings, 
putting  the  nose  at  the  back  of  the  head,  the  eyes  at  the  elbows, 
the  ears  at  the  knees,  etc. 

Vary  the  Form. — The  imagination  can  vary  the  forms  of 
objects  at  its  pleasure.  It  can  modify  the  shape  of  trees,  animals, 
flowers,  clouds,  etc.,  producing  forms  more  beautiful  or  grotesque 
than  nature  affords.  Thus  it  can  make  a  willow  as  straight  as  a 
pine ;  or  give  to  a  spruce-tree  branches  as  spreading  as  those  of 
an  oak.  It  can  create  a  rose  with  triangular  or  elliptical  petals, 
make  crows  with  graceful  forms  and  voices  like  a  nightingale's, 
form  COAVS  as  light-footed  as  gazelles,  and  conceive  of  horses  as  ugly 
and  awkward  as  an  elephant.  The  forms  of  objects  are  as  flexible 
in  the  hands  of  imagination,  as  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  potter. 


THE    NATURE    OF   THE,  IMAGINATION.  181 

Vary  the  Color. — The  imagination  can  vary  the  color  of 
objects  at  its  pleasure.  We  can  imagine  a  green  sky,  blue  fields, 
red  foliage  on  the  trees,  white  grass  in  the  meadows,  or  black 
snow  on  the  hill-sides.  We  can  touch  the  cheek  with  the  most 
delicate  pink  or  the  healthy  glow  of  the  rose,  make  the  eye  as 
dark  as  midnight  or  give  it  a  heavenly  blue,  paint  the  evening 
sky  with  golden  colors  arid  robe  the  summer  landscape  with  all 
the  splendors  of  autumn. 

Idealize  Objects. — The  imagination  can  idealize  nature  or 
conceive  of  it  under  forms  more  perfect  or  beautiful  than  those  in 
which  it  appears  to  us.  Thus,  we  can  picture  an  ideal  horse  more 
symmetrical  than  any  we  have  ever  seen,  or  conceive  of  an  ideal 
of  female  loveliness  more  perfect  than  any  we  have  ever  met. 
The  ideals  of  grace  which  the  sculptor's  hand  embodies  in  mar- 
ble, are  superior  to  anything  nature  has  ever  presented  to  him. 
The  artist  does  not,  as  was  said  of  the  Grecian  painter,  assemble 
all  the  most  celebrated  beauties  that  he  might  borrow  a  charm 
from  each,  and  combine  them  into  a  perfect  figure ;  but  from  the 
models  he  sees  in  nature  he  forms  an  ideal  of  beauty  which  trans- 
cends anything  found  in  nature.  Nature  seems  to  be  aiming  at 
an  ideal  of  beauty  which  she  never  reaches ;  the  imagination  of 
the  artist  mounts  up  to  this  ideal  and  thus,  as  we  say,  idealizes  the  . 
realities  of  nature.  The  Apollo  Belvidere,  the  Venus  de  Medici, 
the  Madonnas  of  Raphael,  are  all  superior  to  anything  that  the 
artists  ever  saw ;  though  they  may  have  been  suggested  by  per- 
sons that  the  artists  had  seen. 

Create  Neiv  Objects. — The  imagination  can  create  new  objects 
in  space  different  from  anything  we  have  ever  seen.  We  can 
imagine  new  animals,  new  plants,  new  strains  of  music,  new  fig- 
ures of  rhetoric,  etc.  Cuvier's  imagination,  aided  by  his  judg- 
ment, created  a  new  animal  from  a  single  fossil  bone.  The  geo- 
logist has  never  seen  the  pterodactyl,  and  yet  he  gives  us  a 
picture  of  this  wonderful  monster.  So  we  might  conceive  of  a 
new  plant,  a  new  flower,  or  a  new  species  of  tree,  differing  from 
those  we  know  quite  as  much  as  those  known  differ  from  one 
another. 


182  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Seen  in  the  Arts. — This  creative  power  of  imagination  is  espe- 
cially noticeable  in  the  arts.  Every  great  work  of  art  is,  to  a 
certain  extent,  a  creation.  The  sweet  melodies  of  Mozart  and 
the  wonderful  harmonies  of  Beethoven  never  were  heard  in 
nature;  they  were  born  in  the  imagination  of  these  great  musi- 
cians. The  characters  of  Shakspeare  came  from  the  brain  of  this 
"  myriad-minded "  genius  without  a  type  in  nature ;  and  they 
stand  out  as  real  as  if  they  were  actual  characters  of  history. 
The  "  Conception  "  of  Murillo  and  the  "  Transfiguration "  of 
Raphael  are  neither  a  copy  nor  an  idealization  of  the  actual ; 
they  are  the  creations  of  a  heaven-born  genius. 

Ideals  of  Form. — The  imagination  can  deal  with  the  ele- 
ments of  space  independently  of  material  objects.  We  can  con- 
ceive of  every  variety  of  form,  not  filled  with  matter,  but  as  forms 
of  pure  space.  All  the  geometrical  elements  may  be  thus  con- 
ceived. The  ideal  line,  surface,  or  volume,  is  not  a  real  material 
thing.  These  elements  can  be  combined  by  the  imagination,  in  a 
countless  variety  of  forms,  not  as  imitations  of  or  copies  of  any- 
thing seen  in  nature,  but  by  the  mind's  own  power  of  original 
conception.  Thus  we  may  have  circles,  ellipses,  cycloids,  spirals, 
spheres,  spheroids,  etc.,  ad  infinitum. 

Ideal  Events. — The  imagination  also  deals  with  events  as 
occurring  in  time,  and  modifies  them  at  its  pleasure.  It  can  pic- 
ture actual  events  as  they  were  supposed  to  occur,  rearrange  them 
for  dramatic  effect,  or  sweep  them  away  altogether,  and  substi- 
tute for  them  events  of  its  own  creation.  It  can  stand  with  the 
Almighty  when  "  in  the  beginning "  he  spake  light  into  being, 
listen  to  the  converse  of  Adam  and  Eve  when  they  walked  in 
primeval  innocence,  go  with  Moses  up  Sinai's  height  to  receive 
the  tables  of  the  law,  bow  with  the  wise  men  at  the  shrine  of  the 
holy  babe  of  Bethlehem,  or  stand  by  the  cross,  thrilled  with 
compassion  by  the  sublime  words,  "  It  is  finished."  It  can  draw 
the  veil  of  the  future,  and  paint  glowing  pictures  of  the  glory  of 
the  republic,  weep  at  its  decadence  and  the  downfall  of  liberty, 
follow  loved  ones  to  the  darkness  of  the  tomb  and  even  into  the 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  183 

land  of  silence,  catch  glimpses  of  the  celestial  beauty  of  the  New 
Jerusalem,  and  join  in  the  chorus  of  the  redeemed  as  they  sur- 
round the  throne  of  Jehovah. 

Ideals  of  Mental  Products. — The  imagination  can  deal  also 
with  spiritual  existences  as  well  as  material  ones.  It  can  conceive 
not  only  of  the  products  of  the  senses,  but  of  the  action  and  pro- 
ducts of  all  the  faculties  of  the  mind.  Thus  we  can  conceive  of 
a  judgment,  a  process  of  reasoning,  an  axiom  of  mathematics,  a 
truth  of  science,  etc.  We  may  not  be  able  to  define  just  how  the 
imagination  operates  with  these  abstractions,  but  that  it  does  so  is 
a  fact  that  must  be  admitted.  So  also  we  can  conceive  of  the 
products  of  the  sensibilities.  I  can  imagine  joy  and  grief,  affec- 
tion and  hatred,  melancholy  and  cheerfulness,  ambition  and 
pride.  I  can  imagine  my  heart  bounding  with  joy  or  cast  down 
with  sorrow,  thrilling  with  some  beautiful  strain  of  music,  or 
elevated  and  awed  by  some  grand  scene  of  nature.  So  also  I  can 
imagine  an  act  of  the  will,  a  choice  between  motives,  the  execu- 
tive volition,  and  the  act  resulting  from  it. 

Ideals  of  Character. — The  imagination  is  especially  interested 
in  creating  and  embodying  the  moral  and  social  attributes  of  the 
soul  which  constitute  character.  Here  we  find  its  highest  sphere 
of  activity,  and  in  this  sphere.it  has  attained  its  highest  achieve- 
ments. It  is  in  this  that  the  great  dramatic  and  epic  writers 
have  been  especially  distinguished.  Homer  and  Virgil  delight 
us  with  their  poetical  images,  their  moral  sentiments,  and  descrip- 
tions of  natural  scenery ;  but  it  is  in  their  characterizations  that 
they  call  forth  the  highest  tributes  of  our  hearts  and  judgments. 
Here  lies  the  power  of  the  great  novelists, — Dickens,  Thackeray, 
Scott,  and  others.  It  is  Milton's  Satan  and  Goethe's  Mephisto- 
pheles  that  render  their  works  immortal.  It  is  in  the  creation  of 
character  that  Shakspeare  stands  so  pre-eminently  above  all  other 
writers;  and  these  creations  move  before  us  with  all  the  reality 
of  the  characters  of  history.  His  Hamlet,  Macbeth,  and  Othello, 
are  as  real- to  us  as  Caesar,  Richard  III.  or  Henry  VIII;  and  we 
almost  forget  that  Ariel,  Caliban,  and  Portia  are  mere  creations 
of  the  poet's  brain. 


184  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

III.  OTHER  VIEWS  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 

Writers  seem  to  differ  more  in  their  views  of  the  nature  and 
functions  of  the  imagination  than  of  any  other  faculty.  It  will 
be  interesting  and  instructive  to  notice  some  of  these  views. 

Hamilton's  View.- — Sir  William  Hamilton  regards  the  imag- 
ination as  a  complex  power,  the  basis  of  which  is  representation. 
He  defines  the  Kepresentative  faculty  as  "  the  power  the  mind 
has  of  holding  up  vividly  before  itself  the  thoughts  which  by  the 
act  of  representation,  it  has  recalled  into  consciousness."  The 
term  Imagination,  he  adds,  which  denotes  most  nearly  the  repre- 
sentative process,  does  so,  "not  without  an  admixture  of  other 
processes."  The  imagination  is  thus  not  a  simple  faculty ;  it  con- 
sists of  the  "representative  power  plus  the  process  to  which  I 
would  give  the  name  comparison"  He  objects  to  the  terms 
Productive  and  Reproductive  Imagination,  and  claims  that  the 
"imagination  creates  nothing,  that  is,  produces  nothing  new." 
He  says  that  there  are  three  principal  orders  in  which  the  imag- 
ination represents  ideas:  1.  The  natural  order;  2.  The  logical 
order ;  3.  The  poetical  order.  The  previous  discussion  will  enable 
the  student  to  point  out  the  errors  of  this  view. 

Brown's  View. — Dr.  Brown  resolves  the  imagination  into 
simple  suggestion,  accompanied  with  desire  and  judgment.  We 
think  of  a  mountain,  we  think  of  gold,  and  unite  these  two  ideas 
into  the  complex  conception  of  a  mountain  of  gold.  This  may 
be  purely  spontaneous ;  or  it  may  be  the  result  of  desire,  the 
judgment  deciding  what  we  shall  unite;  but  in  both  cases  the 
process  is  essentially  the  same.  Dr.  Brown  says  "we  may  term 
this  state  or  series  of  states  Imagination  or  Fancy,  and  the  term 
may  be  convenient  for  brevity ;  but  we  must  not  forget  that  it  is 
still  the  name  of  a  state  that  is  complex  and  not  a  distinct  faculty 
of  the  mind."  This  is  really  a  denial  of  the  faculty  of  imagina- 
tion altogether,  and  an  application  of  the  term  to  a  complex  pro- 
cess arising  from  the  combined  operation  of  several  different 
faculties. 

Active  and  Passive. — Dr.   Way  land  distinguishes   between 


THE  NATURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  185 

what  he  calls  Active  and  Passive  Imagination.  "We  have  the 
power  to  originate  images  and  pictures  for  ourselves,  and  we  have 
the  power  to  form  them  as  they  are  presented  in  language.  The 
former  may  be  called  Active  and  the  latter  Passive  Imagination." 
The  active,  he  holds,  always  includes  the  passive,  but  the  passive 
does  not  include  the  active,  since  we  often  see  persons  who  "  can 
enjoy  the  products  of  the  imagination  who  cannot  create  them." 

This  difference  in  imaginative  power,  though  admitted,  is  a 
difference  of  degree  and  not  of  kind.  It  is  not  that  one  person 
has  a  different  imagination  from  another ;  but  that  one  has  more 
imagination  than  another.  Such  a  difference  is  not  confined  to 
the  faculty  of  the  imagination,  but  is  common  to  all  the  faculties. 
A  person  may  be  able  to  follow  a  complicated  demonstration  who 
might  not  have  been  able  to  originate  it ;  but  it  does  not  follow 
on  this  account  that  he  has  a  different  kind  of  reasoning  faculty 
from  the  one  who  produced  it. 

A  Combining  Power. — It  has  been  held  by  a  large  number 
of  writers  that  the  imagination  is  merely  the  power  of  combina- 
tion ;  that  it  does  not  include  a  creative  element.  It  is  said  that 
all  the  elements  which  enter  into  a  product  of  the  imagination 
existed  previously,  and  that  all  that  the  imagination  does  is  to 
unite  them  into  one  whole.  Thus  a  painting  is  a  mere  combina- 
tion of  forms  and  colors,  an  oratorio  of  sounds,  an  epic  poem  of 
words  or  ideas  previously  existing  in  the  mind.  The  elements  of 
a  poem  like  Paradise  Lost — its  streams,  flowers,  rivers,  angels,  and 
deities, — were  all  in  the  mind  of  the  poet  before  he  began  to  write, 
and  all  that  the  imagination  did  was  to  combine  them  into  one 
harmonious  whole. 

Objection  to  this  View. — This  view  of  imagination,  which  is 
very  common,  is  not  only  inadequate  but  incorrect.  Its  error  is 
the  greater,  not  that  it  states  what  is  entirely  untrue,  but  that  it 
fails  to  state  the  whole  truth  and  the  greater  truth.  Every  work 
of  art  is  in  a  sense  a  combination,  just  as  every  process  of  reason- 
ing is  a  combination.  "We  unite  sounds  in  music,  words  in  a 
poem,  colors  in  a  painting,  etc. ;  but  do  sounds,  and  words,  and 


186  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

colors,  make  these  productions  works  of  art?  Every  one  can 
unite  these  elements ;  but  not  every  one  can  be  a  poet,  painter,  or 
musician.  It  is  the  manner  in  which  we  unite  them  that  gives  a 
creation  of  beauty ;  and  this  power  of  ideal  conception  which  uses 
these  dead  elements  to  express  its  living  ideals,  is  the  work  of  the 
imagination.  It  is  the  beautiful  image  of  the  poet  which  he  uses 
words  to  describe  that  is  the  work  of  the  imagination,  and  not  the 
mere  combination  of  words.  It  is  the  ideal  landscape  that  is  the 
work  of  the  imagination,  and  not  the  mere  combination  of  colors 
on  the  canvas.  The  view  is  false  in  that  it  lifts  up  into  promin- 
ence a  merely  incidental  circumstance,  and  forgets  or  ignores  the 
essential  element. 

Imagination  Creative. — The  imagination,  as  previously 
stated,  is  a  creative  as  well  as  a  combining  power.  It  is  not  a 
mere  copyist  of  nature ;  it  can  create  forms  of  excellence  and 
beauty  which  transcend  anything  found  in  nature.  The  eye  has 
never  seen  a  perfect  circle,  the  hand  cannot  construct  one,  but  the 
imagination  can  conceive  it.  The  most  delicate  tracery  of  art 
cannot  make  a  straight  line ;  but  there  is  in  the  mind  a  concep- 
tion of  one  that  is  perfectly  straight.  The  artist  may  have  seen  a 
face  or  form  of  rare  beauty ;  but  there  is  in  his  soul  an  ideal 
beauty  of  form  and  feature  far  transcending  anything  he  ever  be- 
held. Any  one  can  take  different  strains  which  he  has  heard  and 
unite  them  into  a  tune  that  may  be  new  as  a  whole;  but  the 
imagination  of  genius  can  give  us  melodies  and  harmonies  that 
both  in  wholes  and  in  parts  have  never  been  heard  before. 

A  Plastic  Power. — The  imagination  can  combine  objects  of 
sense  into  new  forms,  but  it  can  do  more  than  this.  The  objects 
of  sense  are,  in  most  cases,  merely  the  materials  with  which  it 
works.  The  imagination  is  a  plastic  power,  moulding  the  things 
of  sense  into  new  forms  to  express  its  ideals;  and  it  is  these  ideals 
that  constitute  the  real  products  of  the  imagination.  The  objects 
of  the  material  world  are  to  it  like  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  pot- 
ter; it  shapes  them  into  forms  according  to  its  own  ideals  of 
grace  and  beauty. 


THE   NATUKE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  187 

Creates  the  Fine  Arts. — The  creative  power  of  the  imagina- 
tion is  especially  seen  in  the  fine  arts.  In  the  imagination  of  the 
poet  arise  visions  of  loveliness  such  as  no  mortal  eye  hath  seen, 
and  it  bodies  them  forth  in  the  living  words  of  the  tender  sonnet, 
the  stirring  drama,  or  the  sublime  epic.  The  imagination  of  the 
sculptor  sees  forms  of  beauty  sleeping  in  a  cold  block  of  marble, 
and  with  hammer  and  chisel  he  cuts  away  the  rubbish  which  im- 
prisons his  ideal,  and  there  stands  before  us  a  form  of  loveliness 
which  commands  the  admiration  of  the  world.  There  come  float- 
ing through  the  mind  of  the  musician  strains  of  surpassing 
beauty,  as  if  echoes  from  the  choirs  of  the  celestial  world,  and 
they  are  revealed  and  preserved  in  the  immortal  melodies  and 
harmonies  of  a  Mozart  or  Beethoven.  He  who  sees  no  more  than 
a  mere  combination  in  these  creations  of  the  imagination,  misses 
the  essential  element  and  elevates  into  significance  that  which  is 
merely  incidental. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 

T  ["AVING  discussed  the  nature  of  the  imagination,  we  now 
•* — *-  proceed  to  consider  the  method  of  developing  this  power. 
In  order  to  impress  the  mind  with  the  importance  of  this  culture, 
we  shall  first  speak  of  the  value  of  the  imagination  and  then  of 
the  methods  of  cultivating  it. 

I.  VALUE  OP  THE  IMAGINATION. — The  imagination  is  of  great 
value  to  us  in  every  department  of  life.  It  contributes  largely  to 
the  happiness  of  man,  and  is  the  source  of  some  of  his  most  im- 
portant achievements.  To  it  literature  and  the  fine  arts  owe  their 
origin,  and  even  science  and  philosophy  are  largely  indebted  to 
this  power.  Indeed,  no  faculty  is  capable  of  greater  intellectual 
achievements  or  is  the  source  of  more  exquisite  and  refined  en- 
joyments. Some  of  the  advantages  of  this  faculty  will  be  briefly 
noticed. 

Of  General  Value. — The  imagination  is  of  general  service  to 
man  in  every  department  of  life.  In  the  beautiful  language  of 
Dr.  Haven,  "  It  gives  vividness  to  our  conceptions,  it  raises  the 
tone  of  our  entire  mental  activity,  it  adds  force  to  our  reasoning, 
casts  the  light  of  fancy  over  the  sombre  plodding  steps  of  judg- 
ment, gilds  the  recollections  of  the  past  and  the  anticipations  of 
the  future  with  a  coloring  not  their  own.  It  lights  up  the  whole 
horizon  of  thought,  as  the  sunrise  flashes  along  the  mountain  tops 
and  lights  up  the  world.  It  would  be  but  a  dreary  world  with- 
out this  light." 

Value  to  Tliought. — The  imagination  is  of  great  service  to 
the  thinker,  to  whom  it  is  generally  supposed  to  be  of  the  least 
value.  In  mathematics,  it  gives  sensible  forms  to  abstract  truth, 

(188) 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  189 

enabling  us  to  hold  before  our  minds  the  diagram  as  a  visible 
representation  of  the  quantity  upon  which  we  reason.  The  inven- 
tor puts  his  machine  together  in  imagination  before  his  idea  is 
realized  in  wood  and  iron.  The  general  fights  his  battles  on  the 
plains  of  imagination  before  he  marshals  his  regiments  for  the 
real  conflict.  The  astronomer  could  hardly  pursue  his  investiga- 
tions among  the  stars,  did  not  imagination  give  him  a  picture  of 
the  celestial  phenomena. 

To  Inductive  Thought. — Imagination  is  especially  useful  in 
inductive  thought.  It  aids  the  mind  in  rising  from  the  facts  to 
the  cause  which  produces  or  the  law  which  controls  them.  We 
see  the  facts,  but  the  law  stands  above  them;  and  Imagination, 
taking  Thought  by  the  hand,  runs  up  the  ladder  of  facts  and  finds 
the  law  shining  in  the  overarching  sphere  of  the  ideal  above. 
The  cause  or  law  often  begins  in  a  mere  hypothesis ;  and  these 
hypotheses  are  largely  due  to  the  imagination.  They  arise  by 
what  Laplace  calls  "  a  great  guess,"  or  what  Plato  so  beautifully 
designates  as  "  a  sacred  suspicion  of  truth."  They  are  the  results, 
as  Thomson  says,  of  "an  active  imagination  supplied  with 
materials  by  a  clear  understanding  carefully  developed,  that 
gives  the  power  of  penetrating  nature  before  the  -evidence  is  un- 
folded." "  The  torch  of  imagination,"  says  Mu'ller,  "  is  as  neces- 
sary for  him  who  searches  for  truth  as  the  lamp  of  study. 
Kepler  held  both  and  more  than  this ;  he  had  the  star  of  faith  to 
guide  him  in  all  things  from  darkness  to  light." 

To  the  Poet. — Imagination  is  the  soul  of  poetry.  A  poem  is 
filled  with  ideal  conceptions.  To  the  poetic  mind,  the  forms 
of  nature  become  symbols  of  thought  and  feeling;  arid  insensate 
matter  is  transformed  into  living  objects  by  the  touch  of  the  poet's 
genius.  The  stars  become  "the  forget-me-nots  of  the  angels," 
"  the  morn  in  russet  mantle  clad  walks  o'er  the  dew  of  yon  high 
eastern  hill,"  the  darkness  falls  from  the  wings  of  passing  night, 
and  the  mooniight  falls  asleep  upon  a  bank  of  flowers.  The 
imagination  of  the  epic  and  dramatic  poet  becomes  peopled  with 
new  characters  and  incidents.  Lucifer,  the  son  of  the  morning, 


190  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

rebels  against  God;  Hamlet  dreams  away  his  melancholy  life; 
Titania  comes  out  of  fairy-land  with  her  sportive  tricks ;  Portia 
speaks  her  golden  words  concerning  mercy ;  and  the  May  Queen 
touches  the  heart  with  tender  feelings  by  her  early  death. 

To  tlie  Artist. — Imagination  is  also  the  source  of  the  fine  arts. 
By  it  the  sculptor  conceives  forms  of  beauty  which,  when  realized 
in  marble,  become  the  treasures  of  the  world.  The  Venus  of  the 
Tribune,  the  Apollo  Belvidere,  the  Faun  of  Praxiteles,  the  Venus 
de  Milo,  will  cause  the  heart  to  thrill  with  admiration  for  ages  to 
come.  By  it  the  painter  forms  his  ideals  of  beauty  which  even 
the  canvas  can  only  faintly  express ;  and  yet,  when  thus  realized, 
they  fill  the  soul  with  celestial  visions  of  loveliness.  The  frescos 
of  the  Vatican,  the  Transfiguration  of  Raphael,  the  Immaculate 
Conception  of  Murillo,  reveal  the  Avonderful  creations  of  the  artist's 
imagination.  So  too,  from  the  depths  of  the  musician's:  imagina- 
tion come  melodies  and  harmonies  that  seem  to  echo  with  the 
strains  of  the  angelic  world,  and  awaken  in  the  soul  of  the  listener 
emotions  of  the  infinite. 

To  tlie  Orator. — Imagination  is  the  soul  of  oratory.  By  it 
the  orator  presents  his  thoughts  in  concrete  form,  visible  to  the 
eye  as  well  as  audible  to  the  ear.  By  its  aid  he  reaches  the  secret 
springs  of  feeling,  commands  those  skillful  touches  that  thrill  the 
soul  as  by  magic,  and  plays  upon  the  minds  and  hearts  of  his 
audience  like  a  great  musician  sweeping  his  harp-strings,  moving 
them  to  laughter  or  tears,  to  indignation  or  enthusiasm,  at  his 
will.  It  gives  the  orator  an  ideal  of  what  his  argument  should 
be,  toward  which  he  ever  aspires  if  he  attains  to  true  eloquence, 
such  as  has  rendered  the  names  of  Demosthenes,  Burke,  and 
Webster  immortal. 

To  Other  Minds. — This  faculty  is  of  benefit  not  merely  to 
the  poet,  the  artist,  and  the  orator,  but  to  every  mind.  It  gives 
a  light  and  beauty  to  the  incidents  of  life  that  might  otherwise  be 
dry,  sombre,  and  repulsive.  It  gilds  the  present  with  an  ideal 
beauty,  paints  the  future  with  hues  of  joy  and  brightness,  hangs 
ithe  star  of  hope  in  the  sky  of  coming  manhood,  and  enables  us  to 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  191 

look  beyond  the  darkness  of  the  grave,  and  catch  glimpses  of  the 
bliss  and  beauty  of  the  life  to  come.  Life  would  often  be  dull 
and  dreary,  and  heaven  little  more  than  an  abstraction,  were  it 
not  for  the  bright  visions  of  joy  this  faculty  reveals  to  us. 

Value  to  Character. — Imagination  is  of  especial  value  in  the 
formation  and  development  of  character.  By  it  we  obtain  new 
ideals  of  life, — ideals  of  what  we  hope  and  wish  to  be, — and  these 
ideals  are  the  types  to  which  we  endeavor  to  mould  ourselves.  If 
the  type  is  pure  and  noble,  we  grow  purer  and  nobler  as  we 
endeavor  to.  realize  it ;  if  it  is  low  and  ignoble,  we  grow  more  and 
more  debased  as  \ve  follow  it.  Life  is  thus  artistic ;  we  are  all 
artists,  the  artists  of  character,  ever  trying  to  realize  our  ideals 
of  that  which  is  purer  and  better  and  nobler  than  ourselves.  We 
carve,  not  in  wood  or  marble,  but  in  mind  and  heart ;  we  mould, 
not  in  clay  or  plaster,  but  in  plastic  and  immortal  soul;  we 
shape,  not  the  dead,  cold  marble  which  will  crumble  to  dust,  but 
the  warm,  active  spirit  that  will  survive  the  wreck  of  matter  and 
the  crush  of  worlds.  We  are  largely  what  our  ideals  of  character 
make  us. 

Of  Great  Value. — Dr.  Haven,  in  discussing  this  subject,  has 
a  paragraph  so  full  of  beautiful  thought  that  it  is  worthy  of  being 
committed  to  memory.  "  Especially  is  it  of  value  in  forming  and 
holding  before  the  mind  an  ideal  of  excellence  in  whatever  we 
pursue,  a  standard  of  attainment,  practicable  and  desirable,  but 
loftier  far  than  anything  we  have  yet  reached.  To  present  such 
an  ideal  is  the  work  of  the  imagination,  which  looks  not  upon  the 
actual,  but  the  possible,  and  conceives  that  which  is  more  perfect 
than  the  human  eye  hath  seen,  or  the  human  hand  wrought.  No 
man  ever  yet  attained  excellence  in  any  art  or  profession,  who 
had  not  floating  before  his  mind,  by  day  and  by  night,  such  an 
ideal  and  vision  of  what  he  might  and  ought  to  be  and  to  do.  It 
hovers  before  him,  and  hangs  over  him,  like  the  bow  of  promise 
and  of  hope,  advancing  with  his  progress,  ever  rising  as  he  rises, 
and  moving  onward  as  he  moves;  he  will  never  reach  it,  but 
without  it  he  would  never  be  what  he  is." 


192  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

II.  METHODS  OF  CULTIVATING  THE  IMAGINATION. — Having 
discussed  the  importance  of  the  culture  of  the  imagination,  we 
now  proceed  to  present  a  few  thoughts  on  the  methods  by  which 
this  culture  may  be  given.  The  imagination  may  receive  culture 
in  at  least  four  ways :  first,  by  exercise ;  second,  by  the  study  of 
nature ;  third,  by  the  study  of  the  fine  arts ;  and  fourth,  by  the 
creation  of  imaginary  productions. 

1.  By  Exercise. — The  general  law  of  cultivating  the  imag- 
ination is  that  of  exercise.  Every  activity  of  the  mind  is  devel- 
oped by  being  brought  into  activity;  and  the  imagination  is 
cultivated  in  accordance  with  this  general  law.  This  exercise  is 
often  given  involuntarily,  as  in  the  case  of  those  who  become  dis- 
tinguished in  literature,  influenced  by  natural  taste  or  by  some 
early  circumstances.  Such  exercise  can  also  be  given  intention- 
ally and  in  accordance  with  a  well-matured  system;  and  it  is 
suggested  that  it  be  so  given.  Care  should  be  taken  that  this 
exercise  be  judicious,  and  subject  to  good  taste  and  the  authority 
of  reason. 

Exercise  Judicious. — The  exercise  of  the  imagination  of  the 
young  should  be  judicious  in  kind  and  quantity.  The  dull  and 
torpid  imagination  should  be  stimulated ;  the  over-active  imag- 
ination should  be  curbed  and  directed.  The  boy  with  sluggish 
fancy  may  be  led  to  read  such  books  as  will  awaken  his  mind 
to  imaginative  thought ;  while  care  should  be  taken  that  the 
dreamy  lad  does  not  confine  his  reading  to  works  of  fiction  and 
thus  over-stimulate  his  naturally  active  imagination.  Care  should 
also  be  taken  to  prevent  day-dreaming  and  the  cherishing  of 
visionary  fancies  that  lead  to  discontent  and  a  distaste  for  the 
practical  affairs  of  every-day  life.  Visions  of  high  attainments  in 
after  life  may  be  encouraged  and  incited,  and  the  examples  of 
eminent  men  'may  be  held  up  as  ideals  for  imitation  and  emula- 
tion. The  books  that  young  people  read  should  be  selected  with 
care,  so  that  the  ideals  early  implanted  in  the  mind  may  be  of  a 
noble  and  exalted  character. 

Subject  to  Taste. — The  exercise  of  the  imagination  should  be 


THE   CULTURE   OF  THE  IMAGINATION.  193 

subject  to  good  taste.  The  faculty  should  not  be  permitted  to 
run  riot  among  the  productions  of  literature  and  art,  and  become 
•warped  by  false  or  unworthy  models.  Only  the  best  and  most 
refined  works  of  the  imagination  should  be  placed  before  the 
minds  of  the  young.  The  great  masters  of  art  and  literature? 
whose  productions  are  in  accordance  with  the  cultivated  taste  of 
mankind,  should  be  the  models  after  which  we  should  endeavor 
to  mould  the  youthful  imagination.  We  should  aim  to  cultivate 
a  refined  and  elevated  taste  in  the  young,  that  will  give  beauty 
and  excellence  to  their  own  imaginings,  and  enable  them  to  judge 
of  and  appreciate  the  creations  of  the  great  writers  and  artists. 

Subject  to  Reason. — The  exercise  of  the  imagination  should 
be  subject  to  the  guidance  of  the  reason.  In  the  human  soul 
there  is  a  power  which  comprehends  the  beautiful  and  gives  us 
our  ideals  of  beauty.  These  ideals  are  independent  of  those  pre- 
sented in  art,  and  superior  to  those  perceived  in  nature.  They 
are  the  products  of  the  higher  reason,  and  are  the  soul's  highest 
guide  to  artistic  conception  and  expression.  Towards  these  high 
ideals  the  imagination  should  work,  endeavoring  to  conform  its 
products  to  the  types  of  excellence  that  the  reason  affords.  The 
creations  of  art  thus  become  inspired  with  an  inner  life  and  a  liv- 
ing soul,  and  rise  to  a  plane  of  perfection  they  could  not  other- 
wise reach. 

2.  By  the  Study  of  Nature. — In  order  to  afford  culture  to 
the  imagination,  we  should  give  it  exercise  among  the  varied 
objects  of  the  natural  world.  Here  we  shall  find  a  wealth  of 
material  to  excite  and  direct  the  activity  of  this  faculty.  Nature 
seems  to  have  slept  like  a  dream  of  beauty  in  the  imagination  of 
the  great  Artificer ;  God  put  forth  his  creative  hand,  and  the 
thoughts  of  his  soul  became  the  facts  of  the  world.  -These  works 
of  the  divine  artist  reveal  his  beautiful  imaginings.  The  domain 
of  nature  is  thus  boundless  in  her  wealth  of  artistic  expression; 
her  beauties  of  form,  color,  and  sound,  are  infinite  in  variety.  This 
means  of  culture  is  of  especial  value,  since  every  one  has  ready 
access  to  it.  Nature's  picture-galleries  are  always  open  to  us; 
9 


194  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

her  objects  of  beauty  invite  our  study  without  money  and  without 
price.  Her  halls  of  statues  are  never  under  lock  and  key ;  they 
can  be  visited  at  any  time  without  our  being  required  to  obtuin 
permission  of  owner  or  keeper. 

Ideals  of  Beauty. — The  study  of  nature  gives  us  ideals  of 
beauty.  The  objects  of  the  natural  world  are  an  embodiment  of 
beautiful  ideals, — of  ideals  formed  in  the  mind  of  the  Creator  be- 
fore he  put  forth  his  creative  hand.  These  ideals  were  the  pat- 
terns or  types  after  which  nature  was  moulded;  and  the  objects 
of  nature  thus  furnish  our  minds  with  forms  of  loveliness  fash- 
ioned after  divine  ideals.  We  do  not  always  find  perfection  in 
nature;  the  objects  of  the  natural  world  are  not  always  the  reali- 
zation of  the  perfection  of  the  divine  ideals ;  but  they  are  at  least 
typical  of  the  perfect  beauty  of  the  conceptions  of  the  divine 
Artist,  and  suggest  to  us  ideals  higher  than  those  which  they 
embody. 

TJiese  Become  Types. — These  ideals  of  nature  linger  in  the 
mind,  and  become  types  of  our  own  ideal  conceptions.  The  land- 
scapes of  nature  are  the  patterns  of  our  own  ideal  landscapes ;  the 
colors  of  the  autumn  woods  train  to  the  perception  of  richness  of 
coloring  in  art;  the  shady  forest,  the  sloping  meadow,  the  rip- 
pling streamlet,  the  heaving  ocean,  all  are  the  models  of  the  ideal 
conceptions  of  the  artist.  The  memory  may  thus  become  a  grand 
picture-gallery,  with  its  walls  hung  with  pictures  of  nature  which 
are  the  models  of  our  own  ideal  conceptions.  • 

Such  Ideals  Stimulate. — These  beautiful  pictures  of  nature 
not  only  serve  as  types  for  our  ideal  conceptions,  but  they 
stimulate  the  imagination  to  activity.  The  perception  of  beauty 
excites  the  imagination  to  the  creation  of  beauty.  The  relation 
between  a  pi'cture  of  memory  and  a  picture  of  the  imagination  is 
so  intimate  that  the  former  excites  the  imagination  to  activity  to 
create  the  latter.  It  is  thus  that  varied  scenery  tends  to  give  an 
imaginative  cast  to  the  mind.  A  mind  developed  amid  the  same- 
ness of  a  prairie  landscape,  would  not  naturally  incline  to  imagin- 
ative production.  Rocks,  hills,  mountains,  woods,  sea-shore,  etc., 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  195 

stimulate  the  mind  to  the  conception  of  forms  of  grace  and  sub- 
limity, and  train  to  artistic  preferences  and  longings. 

Example  of  Artists. — The  truth  of  these  statements  is  illus- 
trated by  the  example  of  artists.  They  are  especially  susceptible 
to  the  beauty  of  the  works  of  nature ;  and  they  make  them  the 
basis  of  their  own  productions.  The  painter  travels  and  sketches, 
and  fills  his  portfolio  with  choice  bits  of  natural  scenery.  The 
sculptor  never  misses  a  fine  face  or  graceful  pose,  but  is  ever  fur- 
nishing his  memory  with  forms  of  grace  and  loveliness.  The  true 
poet  is  in  deep  sympathy  with  nature,  and  catches  inspiration 
from  her  varied  forms  and  her  exquisite  combinations.  Bryant's 
Thanatopsis,  Shelley's  Skylark,  Shakespeare's  Tempest  and  Twelfth 
Night,  all  attest  the  influence  of  nature  on  the  imagination. 

Things  to  Observe. — Nature  is  full  of  objects  which  incite  the 
mind  to  activity  and  become  our  ideals  of  beautiful  imaginings. 
We  should  fill  our  memories  with  pictures  of  her  beauties — her 
flowers,  trees,  streamlets,  cascades,  lakes  and  rivers,  autumn 
woods,  meadows  of  spring  time,  mountain  scenery,  sunrises  and 
sunsets,  starry  nights,  moonlight  evenings,  the  arching  sky,  the 
fleecy  clouds,  the  ocean,  a  thunderstorm,  etc.  Each  one  of  these 
objects,  with  illustrations  from  the  poets,  would  furnish  the 
material  for  an  essay,  in  which  it  could  be  shown  how  nature 
gives  activity  and  culture  to  the  imagination. 

Spiritualize  Nature. — We  should  not  only  observe  the  ob- 
jects and  facts  of  nature,  but  endeavor  to  spiritualize  them  ;  we 
should  endeavor  to  trace  the  analogies  between  the  natural  and 
the  spiritual  world.  The  objects  of  the  material  world  are  but 
the  thoughts  of  the  Creator,  and  they  reveal  the  beauty  and  imag- 
inings of  the  divine  mind.  Every  form  of  beauty  is  thus  a  type 
of  some  ideal;  and  it  is  our  privilege  to  trace  these  analogies,  and 
seek  the  thought  of  which  the  fact  is  the  symbol.  We  can  thus 
idealize  nature,  using  the  concrete  object  to  illustrate  the  abstract 
thought.  The  poet's  mind  transmutes  form  and  color  into 
thought  and  feeling,  and  sees  the  "  facts  of  the  world  but  as  the 
thoughts  of  the  Creator."  The  lowly  daisy  becomes  the  symbol 


196  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

of  modesty ;  the  snow-white  lily,  the  type  of  purity ;  the  strong 
old  oak,  the  emblem  of  majesty  and  grandeur ;  and  the  starry 
sky  the  floor  of  heaven  "  inlaid  with  patines  of  pure  gold." 

3.  By  the  Study  of  Art» — We  may  also  cultivate  the  imagina- 
tion by  the  study  of  the  fine  arts.  Works  of  art  as  the  products 
of  the  imagination,  give  exercise  to  the  imagination,  and  thus  train 
it  to  a  healthful  activity.  That  which  came  from  the  mind  of  the 
creator  gives  kindred  exercise  to  the  mind  of  the  beholder.  Fre- 
quent exercise  in  this  way  begets  a  habit  of  imaginative  activity, 
that  enables  one  to  create  ideal  conceptions  of  his  own. 

Afford  Ideals. — These  works  of  art  become  ideals  for  our 
own  imaginations.  They  are  the  types  of  beauty  towards  which 
we  shape  our  own  creations  of  beauty.  The  masterpieces  of 
Greek  art  will  be  models  in  sculpture  as  long  as  the  world  en- 
dures. The  paintings  of  Raphael  and  the  frescos  of  Michael 
Angelo  will  shape  the  taste  and  genius  of  artists  for  centuries  to 
come.  Every  student  of  the  fine  arts  endeavors  to  fill  his  mind 
with  the  masterpieces  of  the  great  artists ;  and  they  lift  his  soul  up 
to  the  appreciation  of  the  divine  element  which  makes  them  "  a 
thing  of  beauty  "  and  "  a  joy  forever." 

Afford  Inspiration. — These  masterpieces  of  art  not  only  fur- 
nish ideals,  but  they  stimulate  the  imagination  to  activity.  We 
catch  inspiration  from  the  contemplation  of  the  productions  of 
inspired  genius ;  we  light  the  torch  of  our  own  imagination  by  a 
contact  with  the  bright  flame  that  burns  in  other  minds ;  we  de- 
rive new  vigor  of  conception  by  a  communion  with  those  rare 
spirits  that  have  embodied  themselves  in  their  productions.  Such 
souls  lift  us  up  into  a  higher  realm — the  realm  of  a  supernal 
beauty ;  they  feed  the  mind,  as  it  were,  with  the  nectar  of  the 
gods,  and  stimulate  it  to  diviner  activities  and  attainments. 
Homer  has  made  great  poets  as  well  as  produced  immortal 
epics ;  and  Shakespeare  will  kindle  the  flame  of  genius  in  poetic 
minds  as  long  as  the  world  endures. 

Prose  Writings. — The  imagination  can  be  cultivated  by  the 
study  of  imaginative  prose  writings.  The  fairy  tales  of  the 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  197 

nursery  direct  the  young  mind  in  its  early  fancyings.  Fables 
and  allegories  continue  this  work,  as  the  mind  becomes  more 
thoughtful  and  the  taste  more  mature.  Then  come  novels  and 
romances,  with  their  incidents  and  developments  of  character,  in- 
troducing the  mind  into  an  ideal  world,  as  real,  for  the  time,  as 
the  actual  world  about  us.  Scott  and  Dickens  and  Thackeray 
give  inspiration  and  direction  to  the  power  of  ideal  creation  in 
literature;  the  imaginative  prose  of  Ruskin,  Irving,  and  Haw- 
thorne, also  trains  to  beauty  of  thought  and  artistic  expression ; 
and  the  imaginative  parts  of  orations  like  Webster's  "  When  my 
eyes  shall  be  turned  for  the  last  time,"  etc.,  committed  to  memory 
and  frequently  recited,  will  cultivate  the  taste  for  those  flights  of 
eloquence  which  touch  the  heart  of  the  world  as  with  a  spell  of 
magic. 

Poetical  Writings. — Poetical  writings  are  especially  adapted 
to  give  culture  to  this  faculty,  for  poetry  is  the  embodiment  of 
the  ideals  of  the  imagination.  The  scenes  which  are  described 
awaken  the  reader's  imagination  into  activity  to  picture  them. 
The  imaginary  incidents,  if  properly  conceived,  may  be  made  to 
move  before  the  mind  like  the  pictures  of  a  panorama.  The 
figures  of  rhetoric,  studied  and  fixed  in  the  memory,  incite  our 
own  minds  to  activity,  and  become  types  for  our  own  creations. 
The  beautiful  simile  or  metaphor,  as  "  Behold  how  far  that  little 
candle  throws  his  beams;  So  shines  a  good  deed  in  a  naughty 
world,"  nestles  in  the  memory  and  begets  a  similar  production 
when  we  write  or  speak.  The  striking  personification,  as  "  Night's 
candles  are  burnt  out,  and  jocund  day  stands  tiptoe  on  the  misty 
mountain  top,"  will  teach  us  to  give  life  and  beauty  to  our 
abstract  thoughts,  and  make  our  speech  striking  and  impressive. 

4.  By  Creating  Ideal  Productions. — The  imagination  is 
also  to  be  cultivated  by  creating  ideals  for  ourselves.  This  is  the 
highest  activity  of  the  imagination,  and  that  which  produces  the 
best  results,  both  in  culture  and  art.  It  is  this  culture  which 
gives  us  our  poets,  painters,  sculptors,  and  composers  of  music. 
It  is  such  training  that  fills  our  halls  and  libraries  with  the  pro 


198  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

ducts  of  the  fine  arts,  and  gives  to  genius  the  crown  of  immortality. 
Much  of  this  excellence  is  attained  only  by  the  native  gift  of 
genius,  but  much  also  can  be  accomplished  by  cultivation. 
Though  the  old  adage  tells  us  that  "  poets  are  born,  not  made," 
yet  a  high  degree  of  artistic  power  might  be  attained  by  many 
who  now  seem  to  be  entirely  deficient  in  this  respect. 

In  Literature. — The  student  should  be  required  to  create 
imaginative  literary  productions.  They  may  begin  with  the  rela- 
tion of  imaginary  incidents,  and  proceed  to  the  creation  of  fairy 
tales,  allegories,  novelettes,  etc.  They  should  also  learn  the 
nature  of  poetical  Hgures,  the  simile,  metaphor,  etc.,  and  practice 
creating  original  ones.  Every  young  person  should  learn  the  art 
of  verse-making,  as  it  trains  the  ear  and  taste  to  appreciate  poetry 
as  well  as  gives  culture  to  the  power  of  ideal  thought  and  expres- 
sion. Many  of  the  eminent  prose  writers  trained  their  literary 
taste  by  the  practice  of  poetical  composition.  It  is  in  literature 
that  the  student  will  find  the  best  field  for  the  culture  of  the  im- 
agination, as  it  is  open  to  every  one  who  can  read  and  use  lan- 
guage. 

In  Other  Arts. — Some  practice  in  imaginative  creation  may 
be  had  also  in  several  of  the  other  arts.  Students  of  music  should 
be  encouraged  to  compose  melodies  and  harmonies,  as  well  as  to 
execute  them.  There  could  also  be  given  some  exercises  in  con- 
ceiving ideal  landscapes  and  describing  them  in  words.  If  there 
is  the  power  of  executing  pictures  with  the  pencil  or  brush,  the 
culture  will  be  so  much  the  better.  The  conceiving  of  forms  of 
grace  in  the  sculptor's  art  may  also  give  exercise  to  this  power; 
though  it  needs  the  clay  or  plaster  to  mould  these  ideals  in  order 
to  be  of  much  value  in  imaginative  culture. 

In  ScJiool  Studies. — A  few  of  the  school  studies  may  be  used 
to  give  culture  to  the  imagination,  especially  geography  and  his- 
tory. In  geography  the  student  may  be  led  to  picture  before  his 
mind  the  flowing  river,  the  heaving  ocean,  the  wide-extended 
prairie  with  its  waving  flowers,  the  broad  desert  with  its  caravans 
of  horses  and  camels,  the  Esquimaux  of  the  icy  North  with  their 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION.  199 

huts  of  snow,  the  inhabitants  of  the  tropics  with  their  peculiari- 
ties of  dress  and  religion,  etc.  So  in  history  the  events  can  be 
made  to  pass  before  the  mind  like  the  scenes  of  a  panorama — the 
expeditions  of  the  discoverers,  the  landing  of  the  early  settlers, 
the  marching  of  armies,  the  movements  of  the  forces  on  the  field 
of  battle,  etc.  When  taught  in  this  manner,  and  this  is  the  way 
in  which  these  studies  should  be  taught,  they  afford  excellent 
culture  to  the  imagination. 

Concluding  Remark. — In  conclusion,  we  urge  upon  teachers 
and  educators  the  importance  of  such  culture.  Let  the  teacher 
call  the  attention  of  the  pupil  to  the  beauty  and  grandeur  of 
nature,  fill  his  memory  with  fine  quotations  of  poetry,  have  him 
commit  and  recite  the  eloquent  passages  in  the  great  orators,  visit 
picture  galleries  and  halls  of  statuary,  and  endeavor  to  form  in 
his  own  mind  ideals  of  beauty  and  to  express  them  in  language. 
Such  culture  will  refine  the  taste,  elevate  the  character,  give  a 
source  of  exquisite  enjoyment  in  after  life,  and  do  much  for  the 
development  of  that  highest  object  of  education — a  pure,  refined, 
and  noble  manhood  and  womanhood. 


THE  UNDERSTANDING. 
I.  ABSTRACTION. 
II.  CONCEPTION. 

III.  JUDGMENT. 

IV.  REASONING. 


THE  UNDERSTANDING. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING. 

HHHE  UNDERSTANDING  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which 
-L  we  compare  objects  of  thought  and  derive  abstract  and  gen- 
eral ideas  and  truths.  It  is  the  elaborative  power  of  the  mind ; 
it  takes  the  materials  furnished  by  the  other  faculties  and  works 
them  up  into  new  products.  It  is  the  thinking  power  of  the 
mind ;  the  faculty  which  gives  us  what  has  been  called  thought- 
knowledge,  in  distinction  from  sense-knowledge.  It  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  mental  architect  among  the  faculties ;  it  transforms 
the  material  furnished  by  the  senses  and  the  reason,  into  new 
products,  and  thus  builds  up  the  temples  of  science  and  philosophy. 
Different  Names. — This  faculty  has  been  variously  named  by 
writers  on  mental  science.  Locke  called  it  the  Reflective  Power, 
or  Reflection,  because  the  mind  seems  to  bend  in  upon  itself  and 
examine  the  materials  in  the  mind  and  operate  upon  them.  Kant 
called  it  the  Understanding,  in  which  he  was  followed  by  Cole- 
ridge and  others.  Sir  William  Hamilton  calls  it  the  Elaborative 
Power;  while  Dr.  Porter  uses  the  simple  name,  Thought  or 
Thought  Power.  It  seems  appropriate  to  designate  the  faculty 
by  some  technical  name;  and  the  term  Understanding  is  that 
towards  which  the  best  writers  on  philosophy  seen  to  be  inclin- 
ing. 

Its  Products. — The  products  of  the  Understanding  are  Vv-ro- 
fold,  ideas  and  thoughts.  An  idea,  as  already  explainsd,  is  a 
mental  product  which  when  expressed  in  words  does  not,  give  a 

(201) 


202  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

proposition ;  a  thought  is  a  mental  product  which  embraces  the 
relation  of  two  or  more  ideas.  The  ideas  of  the  understanding 
are  of  two  general  classes ;  abstract  ideas  and  general  ideas.  The 
thoughts  are  also  of  two  general  classes ;  those  pertaining  to  con- 
tingent truth  and  those  pertaining  to  necessary  truth.  In  contin- 
gent truth  we  have  facts,  or  immediate  judgments,  and  general 
truths,  including  laws  and  causes,  derived  from  particular  facts; 
in  necessary  truth  we  have  axioms,  or  self-evident  truths,  and 
the  truths  derived  from  them  by  reasoning,  called  theorems. 

Forms  of  Activity. — The  understanding  embraces  four  dis- 
tinct forms  of  activity,  giving  rise  to  several  distinct  classes  of 
products.  These  are  Abstraction,  Generalization,  Judgment,  and 
Reasoning.  Abstraction  is  the  power  of  forming  abstract  ideas. 
Generalization  or  Conception  is  the  power  of  forming  general 
ideas.  Judgment  is  the  power  of  comparing  one  object  directly 
with  another ;  as,  a  man  is  an  animal.  Reasoning  is  the  process 
of  comparing  two  objects  of  thought  through  their  relation  to  a 
third ;  as,  A  equals  B,  but  B  equals  C,  hence  A  equals  C.  It 
infers  general  truths  from  particulars  by  Induction;  and  partic- 
ular truths  from  generals  by  Deduction. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis. — These  operations  of  the  under- 
standing involve  two  elements;  synthesis  and  analysis.  These 
two  elements  run  through  every  process  and  product  of  the 
understanding.  Some  of  the  processes  are  principally  or  entirely 
analytic;  some  are  principally  or  entirely  synthetic;  while  in 
others  the  two  elements  are  combined.  Thus  Abstraction  is 
mainly  analytic ;  Generalization  is  mainly  synthetic ;  Judgment 
is  either  analytic  or  synthetic ;  while  Reasoning  is  either  a  syn- 
thesis of  particulars  in  Induction,  or  an  evolution  of  the  partic- 
ular from  the  general  in  Deduction. 

Comparison  the  Basin. — The  one  word  which  expresses  the 
operation  of  the  Understanding  more  nearly  than  any  other  is 
Comparison.  Comparison  enters  prominently  into  every  oper- 
ation ;  and  in  judgment  and  reasoning  it  is  the  essential  element. 
Abstraction  seems  to  be  purely  analytic;  but  there  must  be  a 
9* 


THE  NATURE   OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING.  203 

comparison  of  the  different  qualities,  or  of  the  object  and  its 
quality,  to  distinguish  between  them,  in  order  that  any  quality  or 
property  may  be  drawn  from  the  object.  In  forming  a  general 
notion,  we  compare  the  common  attributes  of  objects  in  order 
to  see  that  they  are  common,  before  we  unite  them  into  a  general 
concept.  The  very  essence  of  a  judgment  is  a  comparison  of  the 
two  related  ideas ;  and  in  reasoning  the  conclusion  is  derived  by 
comparing  the  premises.  It  is  thus  seen  that  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  operations  of  the  understanding  is  that  of  com- 
parison. 

Relation  of  Elements. — The  relation  of  Comparison  to  An- 
alysis and  Synthesis  may  be  readily  understood.  Comparison 
is  a  process  of  thought — it  is  a  distinct  form  of  mental  activity ; 
Analysis  and  Synthesis  are  not  distinct  forms  of  mental  activity, 
but  elements  that  enter  into  these  various  activities.  The  general 
form  of  the  thought-process  is  comparison ;  analysis  and  synthesis 
are  modes  of  its  operation.  Comparison  is  the  thought-process ; 
analysis  and  synthesis  are  the  mechanical  processes.  Comparison 
is  the  queen,  presiding  over  all  the  various  activities ;  analysis 
and  synthesis  are  her  handmaidens,  who  obey  her  orders  and  aid 
her  in  her  operations. 

Having  presented  this  general  view  of  the  Understanding,  we 
shall  now  proceed  to  discuss  the  several  operations, — Abstraction, 
Generalization,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE    NATURE    OF  ABSTRACTION. 

A  BSTRACTION  is  the  power  of  forming  abstract  ideas.  It 
^£jL  is  the  power  of  drawing  a  quality  away  from  an  object  and 
making  of  it  a  distinct  object  of  thought.  Thus  the  drawing 
away  of  some  quality  of  a  flower,  as  its  color  or  fragrance,  and 
thinking  of  this  quality  independently  of  the  flower  in  which  it 
was  perceived,  is  an  act  of  abstraction.  The  term  abstraction  is 
derived  from  ab,  from,  and  traho,  I  draw,  and  means  literally  a 
drawing  from. 

Illustration  of  Abstraction. — The  process  of  abstraction 
may  be  made  clear  by  an  illustration.  Suppose  I  have  some 
object  on  my  table,  as  a  red  rose.  I  may  fix  my  attention  upon 
the  color  of  this  rose,  in  distinction  from  its  form  or  fragrance  or 
any  other  quality.  This  is  not  an  act  of  abstraction ;  it  is  merely 
analytic  perception ;  I  have  not  drawn  away  a  quality  or  formed 
an  abstract  notion.  But  suppose,  now,  I  draw  this  quality  of 
color  away  from  the  rose  to  which  it  belongs,  allowing  the  object 
to  fade  away  from  my  mind,  and  think  only  of  this  color  red, 
without  regard  to  any  object ;  I  shall  then  have  a  new  product 
of  thought,  which  is  called  an  abstract  notion  or  idea.  I  have 
drawn  away,  abstracted,  a  quality  from  the  substance  in  which  it 
was  found ;  and  it  stands  in  my  mind  as  a  distinct  idea.  The 
power  of  forming  such  ideas  is  abstraction ;  and  the  process  itself* 
is  also  called  abstraction. 

Positive  and  Negative. — The  process  of  abstraction  may  be 
regarded  as  either  a  positive  or  a  negative  operation.  Thus  I 
may  positively,  by  a  distinct  act  of  the  mind,  withdraw  one 
quality  of  an  object  from  all  the  other  qualities  with  which  it  is 

(204) 


THE  NATURE   OF   ABSTRACTION.  205 

associated.  This  is  abstraction  in  its  positive,  or  active  aspect. 
I  may  also  fix  my  attention  upon  some  one  quality  of  an  object, 
and  allow  the  other  qualities  to  pass  away  from  my  thoughts  or 
drop  out  of  my  mind.  This  is  abstraction  in  its  negative  or 
passive  aspect.  In  both  cases  we  have  a  quality  considered  apart 
from  its  object,  and  thus  an  abstract  notion.  The  active  aspect 
is  the  one  under  which  the  process  should  be  generally  viewed, 
as  the  mind  more  frequently  operates  in  that  way  than  in  the 
other. 

The  Power  Questioned — It  may  be  questioned  whether  the 
mind  has  this  power  of  considering  a  quality  distinct  from  the 
object  in  which  it  is  perceived.  A  little  reflection,  however,  will 
make  it  clear  that  it  does  possess  this  power.  If  we  admit  that 
we  have  general  conceptions,  these  conceptions  must  be  made  up 
of  common  attributes;  and  the*e  attributes  are  considered  apart 
from  the  objects  in  which  they  were  perceived.  If  we  could  not 
abstract,  we  could  not  generalize ;  for  abstraction  is  a  condition 
of  generalization.  Besides,  we  remember  that  all  that  we  per- 
ceive of  an  object  is  its  qualities;  and  the  process  of  abstraction 
consists  in  fixing  the  attention  on  one  quality  while  the  other 
qualities  drop  out  of  the  mind.  When  these  pass  away,  the 
object  passes  with  them,  and  we  have  but  a  single  quality  lefb  as 
an  object  of  thought.  All  conception  of  qualities  by  themselves, 
separated  from  an  object,  involves  an  operation  of  abstraction. 

I.  PRODUCTS  OF  ABSTRACTION. — The  products  of  Abstraction 
are  abstract  ideas,  that  is,  ideas  of  qualities  in  the  abstract.  Such 
ideas  are  called  Abstracts.  Thus  my  idea  of  some  particular 
color,  of  hardness,  or  softness,  or  sweetness,  is  an  abstract.  Ab- 
stract ideas  have  been  wittily  called  "the  ghosts  of  departed 
qualities."  They  may  more  appropriately  be  regarded  as  the 
spirits  of  which  the  objects  from  which  they  are  derived  are  the 
bodies.  In  other  words,  they  are,  figuratively  speaking,  "  the  dis- 
embodied spirits  of  material  things." 

Abstracts  are  Meal. — Abstract  ideas  are  realities.  They  are 
not  mere  figments  of  the  fancy;  they  are  actual  thought  pro- 


206  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ducts.  The  basis  of  their  existence  is  the  objects  from  which 
they  were  drawn;  and  they  are  as  real  as  these  objects  them- 
selves. Every  abstract  idea  can  be  realized  in  some  concrete 
object.  Thus  the  idea  of  some  color,  abstracted  from  a  rose,  can 
be  realized  in  the  rose ;  the  form  of  a  horse  can  be  realized  in  the 
horse,  etc.  A  concrete  thing  is  thus  the  basis  of  an  abstract  idea, 
and  the  latter  is  as  real  as  the  former.  The  abstract  idea,  how- 
ever, exists  independently  of  the  concrete  object;  and  remains 
even  when  the  latter  passes  away.  The  rose  dies,  but  my  idea  of 
its  color  and  fragrance  continues. 

Ideal  Abstracts. — We  can  also  abstract  the  qualities  of  an 
imaginary  object  as  well  as  a  real  one.  Thus  the  melancholy  of 
Hamlet  may  be  considered  apart  from  his  indecision  or  his 
philosophy,  and  each  may  be  considered  apart  from  our  mental 
picture  of  the  form  and  appearance  of  the  ideal  character.  In 
such  cases,  the  abstract  quality  is  no  more  real  than  the  ideal 
object  from  which  it  is  drawn.  In  the  one  case  the  quality  has 
an  actual  existence  in  the  object;  in  the  other  case  it  has  merely 
an  ideal  existence. 

Abstracts  are  Particular. — Pure  abstract  ideas  are  indi- 
vidual." My  idea  of  an  attribute  drawn  from  some  particular 
object,  as  some  particular  shade  of  red,  is  evidently  particular 
rather  than  general.  It  is  that  special  shade  of  red  or  blue 
which  I  perceive  in  the  object,  and  no  other.  The  shape,  size, 
etc.,  of  any  particular  object  are  singular  notions.  This  position 
should  be  emphasized,  because  of  the  prevalence  of  the  opinion 
that  all  abstract  notions  are  general,  or  because  of  the  general 
tendency  to  confound  the  two.  Mr.  Stewart  says,  "  A  person  who 
had  never  seen  butv  one  rose,  might  yet  have  been  able  to  con- 
sider its  color  apart  from  its  other  qualities ;  and,  therefore,  there 
may  be  such  a  thing  as  an  idea  which  is  at  once  abstract  and  par- 
ticular." 

Abstract  General  -Ideas. — Many  of  our  abstract  notions 
embrace  more  than  is  found  in  any  one  object,  and  are,  therefore, 
general.  Similar  qualities  abstracted  from  different  objects  tend 


THE   NATURE   OF   ABSTRACTION.  207 

to  commingle,  and  the  abstract  idea  which  was  at  first  particular 
becomes  general.  This  is  true  to  so  large  an  extent  that  some 
writers  seem  to  regard  all  abstract  ideas  as  the  product  of  gen- 
eralization. The  fact  is  that  the  greater  part  of  our  abstract 
ideas  are  now  general,  though  a  very  large  portion  of  them  must 
have  had  their  origin  as  particulars.  Such  ideas  are  more  than 
pure  abstracts;  they  are  the  result  of  abstraction  and  general- 
ization. 

Relation  to  Percepts. — The  relation  of  an  abstract  to  a  per- 
cept is  readily  seen.  A  percept  is  concrete;  it  is  a  notion  of  the 
object  or  thing  perceived.  An  abstract  is  abstract ;  it  is  a  notion 
of  a  quality  drawn  away  from  the  object  in  which  it  was  per- 
ceived. Thus  when  I  think  of  a  stone,  the  idea  is  concrete ;  but 
when  I  think  of  its  weight,  size,  or  hardness,  separated  from  the 
stone,  the  idea  is  abstract.  My  idea  of  a  man  is  concrete ;  but 
my  idea  of  his  learning,  wisdom,  wealth,  etc.,  is  abstract.  "  If  I 
contemplate  God,"  says  Dr.  McCosh,  "the  notion  is  concrete, — 
it  is  God  with  all  his  perfections  known  to  me ;  but  if  I  meditate 
on  his  infinity,  his  justice,  or  his  benevolence,  my  idea  is  ab- 
stract." 

A  Further  Distinction. — Another  distinction  is,  that  a  per- 
cept can  usually  be  represented  as  an  image ;  an  abstract  cannot 
usually  be  so  represented.  We  may  form  a  mental  picture  of 
color  or  form,  but  we  can  form  no  mental  image  of  such  notions 
as  justice,  peace,  property,  government,  religion,  etc.  The  imagi- 
nation may  give  us  a  symbol  of  some  of  these  abstract  ideas, — as 
a  woman  with  a  pair  of  scales  for  Justice, — and  such  products 
are  of  great  interest  and  use  in  poetry,  oratory,  etc. ;  but  these 
products  are  ideals  of  the  fancy  and  not  the  thought-products  of 
the  understanding. 

II.  OTHER  VIEWS  OF  ABSTRACTION. — There  are  two  other 
views  of  abstraction  which  have  been  quite  extensively  held  by 
writers  on  mental  philosophy.  These  may  be  distinguished  as 
the  Limited  View  and  the  Wider  View. 

The  Limited  View. — The  term  abstraction  is  often  used  in  a 


208  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

more  limited  sense  than  that  here  given  to  it.  It  is  by  some 
writers  regarded  as  that  act  of  the  mind  by  which  we  fix  the  at- 
tention upon  one  of  the  several  parts,  properties,  or  qualities  of 
an  object,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  the  others.  Thus,  I  may  think 
of  the  cover  of  a  book,  the  handle  of  a  door,  the  spring  of  a 
watch,  etc.,  in  distinction  from  the  other  parts  which  make  up 
the  complex  whole  of  these  objects.  This  is  a  very  common  view 
of  the  nature  of  abstraction.  It  is  the  view  of  Mill  and  his 
school  of  philosophy;  and  even  Sir  William  Hamilton  seems 
almost  to  drop  into  this  view  when  he  says,  "  Attention  and  ab- 
straction are  only  the  same  process  viewed  in  different  relations. 
They  are,  as  it  were,  the  positive  and  negative  poles  of  the  same 
act."  In  other  places,  however,  he  makes  it  clear  that  he  does 
not  regard  this  as  real  abstraction. 

Objection  to  the  View. — It  is  a  question,  however,  whether  this 
is  really  abstraction.  In  its  favor  it  may  be  said  that  the  mind 
is  drawn  away  (ab-traho)  from  the  several  qualities  of  the  object 
in  order  to  fix  it  upon  the  one ;  and  that  this  is  an  act  of  ab- 
straction. In  objection,  however,  it  is  urged,  that  there  is  no 
new  faculty  employed  beyond  perception,  and  no  new  product 
formed.  It  is  merely  an  act  of  attention  and  analysis,  and 
might,  with  propriety,  be  called  analytic  perception.  There  is 
no  abstract  idea  formed,  for  the  part  considered  is  still  regarded 
as  a  part  of  the  object  in  which  it  is  perceived.  In  popular  lan- 
guage this  may  be  called  abstraction ;  but  it  seems  hardly  to  be 
what  we  mean  by  it  in  a  philosophic  sense.  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton says  that  in  such  an  act  we  may  indeed  be  said  to  prescind, 
but  not  to  abstract. 

The  Wider  View. — The  term  abstraction  is  sometimes  used 
to  denote  the  entire  process  of  forming  abstract  general  notions, 
and  even  of  classifying  objects  according  to  these  conceptions.  It 
seems  thus  to  have  been  regarded  by  Stewart,  Wayland,  Mahan, 
and  others.  The  terms  abstract  and  general,  as  applied  to  notions, 
are  used  by  some  of  these  writers  as  convertible.  All  abstract 
notions  seem  to  be  regarded  by  them  as  general,  embracing  many 
particulars. 


THE   NATURE   OF   ABSTRACTION.  209 

Objection  to  this  View. — This  view  would  destroy  the  existence 
of  this  faculty  altogether,  or  resolve  it  into  the  faculty  of  gen- 
eralization ;  and,  as  a  consequence,  it  would  destroy  also  the  dis- 
tinction between  an  abstract  and  a  general  idea.  The  general 
idea  is,  in  a  sense,  an  abstract  notion ;  but  it  is  more  than  a  pure 
abstract.  It  is  formed  by  a  synthesis  of  particular  abstracts,  and 
thus  involves  more  than  pure  abstraction.  In  forming  a  general 
notion,  we  put  together  abstracts ;  and  this  putting  together  is  a 
process  of  synthesis  in  addition  to  abstraction.  -General  notions 
are  thus  in  a  sense  abstract;  but  all  abstract  notions  are  not 
general.  A  pure  abstract,  as  we  have  previously  seen,  is  indi- 
vidual and  particular. 

Caution  on  the  Subject. — Care  should  be  taken  to  distinguish 
between  abstract  ideas  and  general  ideas.  This  distinction  seems 
to  have  been  overlooked  by  Locke  and  his  followers,  although  it 
has  been  clearly  made  by  others.  Stewart  says, — "The  words 
Abstraction  and  Generalization  are  commonly,  but  improperly, 
used  as  synonymous ;  and  the  same  inaccuracy  is  frequently  com- 
mitted in  speaking  of  abstract  or  general  ideas,  as  if  the  two  ex- 
pressions were  convertible."  Hamilton  remarks, — "  We  can  rivet 
our  attention  on  some  particular  mode  of  a  thing,  as  its  smell, 
its  color,  its  figure,  its  size,  etc.,  and  abstract  it  from  the  others. 
This  may  be  called  Modal  Abstraction.  The  abstraction  we  have 
now  been  considering  is  performed  on  individual  objects,  and  is 
consequently  particular.  There  is  nothing  necessarily  connected 
with  generalization  in  abstraction;  generalization  is  indeed  de- 
pendent on  abstraction,  which  it  supposes ;  but  abstraction  does 
not  involve  generalization.  I  remark  this  because  you  will 
frequently  find  the  terms  abstract  and  general,  applied  to  notions, 
used  as  convertible." 


CHAPTER  III. 

NATURE   OF    GENERALIZATION,  OR    CONCEPTION. 

ENERALIZATION,  or  CONCEPTION,  is  the  power  of  form- 
ing  general  ideas.  It  is  the  power  of  grasping  the  common 
qualities  of  objects  and  uniting  them  into  a  single  notion  compre- 
hending them  all.  It  is  thus  the  power  of  combining  the  indi- 
vidual into  the  general;  of  uniting  the  manifold  into  one;  of 
binding  a  plurality  of  common  attributes  into  a  single  notion. 

A  General  Idea. — A  general  idea  is  one  that  embraces  many 
particulars,  and  may  be  applied  in  general  to  any  one  of  these 
particulars.  It  differs  from  the  particular  idea  in  that  the  latter 
relates  to  only  one  particular  object,  while  the  former  may  be  ap- 
plied to  all  the  individuals  of  the  class.  Thus  my  idea  of  my 
father  is  particular,  and  applies  to  only  one  person ;  but  my  idea 
of  a  father  is  general,  and  embraces  all  persons  who  bear  the  re- 
lation indicated. 

The  Term  Conception. — The  power  of  forming  general  ideas 
is  called  Conception.  The  term  is  from  con,  with,  and  capio,  I 
take,  and  means  a  taking  or  binding  together.  This  is  the  proper 
term  for  the  name  of  the  faculty.  It  is  the  term  now  almost  uni- 
versally employed  by  writers  on  logic ;  and  also  by  many  of  our 
best  writers  on  mental  science.  The  products  of  conception  are 
called  concepts.  The  term  Concept  is  thus  the  correct  and  tech- 
nical name  for  a  general  idea. 

I.  THE  PROCESS  OF  CONCEPTION. — The  process  of  conception 
or  generalization  consists  of  several  distinct  steps  or  mental  pro- 
cesses. This  process  by  which  we  form  our  general  ideas  we 
shall  now  describe  and  illustrate. 

JBasis  of  Conception. — The  basis  of  the  process  is  perception. 

(210) 


NATURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  211 

The  mind  begins  with  the  perception  of  individuals.  We  learn 
their  properties  of  color,  form,  size,  etc.,  by  the  different  senses, 
and  uniting  these  qualities  in  the  single  object  we  obtain  a  clear 
and  definite  idea  of  individuals.  This  act  of  perception,  though 
necessary  to,  is  not  a  part  of  the  process  of  generalization ;  but 
rather  an  essential  condition  of  the  process.  Attention  is  called 
to  it  here  in  order  to  give  a  clearer  view  of  the  process  of  con- 
ception. 

Forming  the  Concept. — As  we  acquire  our  ideas  of  indi- 
viduals, we  begin  to  compare  these  objects,  or  our  perception  of 
them.  We  notice  their  resemblances  and  differences,  wherein 
they  agree  and  disagree,  are  alike  and  unlike.  We  then  drop 
out  of  consideration  the  points  in  which  they  differ,  and  fixing 
our  attention  upon  the  points  in  which  they  are  alike,  we  bind 
the  common  attributes  together  into  one  general  notion  embrac- 
ing them  all.  This  gives  us  a  new  mental  product,  a  new  idea, 
which  is  called  a  general  idea  or  concept. 

Naming  the  Concept. — This  new  idea  must  be  distinguished 
and  preserved  by  a  word.  We  therefore  give  it  some  name,  as 
man,  horse,  etc.  "  A  conception  without  a  name,"  says  Atwater, 
"  is  like  an  unfenced  crop,  or  a  volatile  odor."  Our  first  names 
are  of  individuals,  as  mamma,  papa,  etc.  These  are  the  names 
of  our  perceptions,  or  of  particular  objects.  The  most  of  the 
names  we  use  in  writing  or  speaking  are  general  in  their  nature, 
applying  to  many  objects  of  a  class.  The  proper  nouns  of 
grammar  name  our  perceptions;  the  common  nouns  name  our 
general  ideas. 

The  Process  Illustrated. — The  process  may  be  illustrated 
by  the  formation  of  any  general  notion,  as  horse.  We  begin  with 
the  idea  of  particular  horses,  as  the  horses  of  our  father  and  our 
neighbors ;  we  compare  them  with  each  other  and  with  different 
objects,  and  notice  their  similarities  and  differences.  We  see 
that,  though  they  differ  in  many  particulars,  they  are  more  like 
one  another  than  they  are  like  any  other  objects ;  so  in  view  of 
their  many  resemblances  we  drop  out  of  consideration  their 


212  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

differences,  and  bind  these  common  attributes  into  one  general 
notion  and  call  it  horse.  In  the  same  way  we  form  our  general 
notion  of  cow,  dog,  sheep,  bird,  etc. 

Another  Illustration. — The  process  may  be  illustrated  also 
in  the  forming  of  the  general  idea  of  color.  We  begin  by  ob- 
serving particular  shades  of  the  different  colors  as  seen  in  different 
objects.  We  get  one  shade  of  red  in  one  object,  another  shade  in 
another  object,  etc.,  and  thus  obtain  several  particular  shades  of 
red.  We  do  the  same  with  the  other  colors,  blue,  green,  yellow, 
etc.  We  also  compare  these  different  shades ;  we  see  that,  though 
the  various  shades  of  red  differ,  they  are  more  like  one  another 
than  they  are  like  the  shades  of  blue  or  green,  etc.;  so  in  view  of 
such  similarity,  we  bind  all  these  shades  together  into  one  con- 
cept, and  thus  get  our  general  idea  of  red.  In  a  similar  manner 
we  get  our  general  idea  of  blue,  g-seen,  yellow,  etc.  We  then  begin 
to  compare  these  different  colors ;  and  though  they  differ,  yet  they 
are  more  like  one  another  than  they  are  like  stones,  or  stars,  or 
trees,  or  any  other  objects ;  so  in  view  of  some  common  points  of 
resemblance  we  bind  them  all  together  into  one  general  concept, 
and  name  it  color. 

Forming  HigJier  Concepts. — We  may  also  combine  general 
notions  and  rise  to  higher  generalizations.  We  can  generalize 
from  classes,  as  well  as  from  individuals.  Thus,  the  concept  of 
color  is  formed  by  combining  the  several  colors,  violet,  indigo, 
blue,  green,  yellow,  orange,  and  red,  each  one  of  which  is  itself  a 
general  idea.  This  relation,  expressed  in  the  form  of  an  equation, 
gives  us,  color  =  V+I  +  B+G  +  Y  +  O  +  K.  jn  the  same 
way,  comparing  dogs,  cows,  horses,  etc.,  we  get  the  higher  con- 
ception quadruped;  or,  in  mathematical  language,  quadruped  = 
dogs  +  cows  +  horses  +  etc.  Thus  also,  we  have  biped  =  bird  -f 
man  +  6tc.;  animal  =  biped  +  quadruped  +  etc. 

II.  REMARKS  ON  THE  PROCESS. — This  description  and  illustra- 
tion of  the  method  of  forming  our  general  notions  will  give  the 
student  a  clear  idea  of  the  process.  A  few  remarks  upon  the 
subject,  however,  may  serve  to  make  some  parts  of  the  process  a 


NATURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  21E 

little  more  distinct.  The  process  of  generalization,  as  described, 
will  be  seen  to  consist  of  three  distinct  steps;  comparison,  analy- 
sis, and  synthesis. 

Tlie  First  Step. — The  first  step  in  the  process  is  that  of  com- 
parison. As  we  acquire  our  ideas  of  individual  objects,  we  begin 
to  compare  them,  or  our  perceptions  of  them.  This  process  is  an 
instinctive  one;  it  is  a  natural  habit  of  the  mind  manifesting  it- 
self in  earliest  childhood.  We  are  constantly  noticing  the  simi- 
larities and  differences  of  objects,  and  observing  agreements  or 
disagreements  among  them.  This  is  an  act  of  judgment;  so 
that  judgment  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  process  of  generalization. 

The  Second  Step. — The  second  step  is  that  of  analysis.  We 
separate  the  similar  qualities  from  those  which  are  dissimilar; 
and  this  is  a  process  of  analysis.  We  also  draw  away  the  similar 
attributes  from  the  objects  in  which  they  are  found,  if  we  have 
not  done  so  before  the  comparison  and  previous  analysis.  This 
is  a  process  of  abstraction,  an  analytic  process,  as  already  ex- 
plained. These  two  steps,  comparison  and  analysis,  are  pre- 
paratory or  preliminary  steps  to  the  great  step  which  is  to  follow. 
Were  we  to  stop  here,  no  general  idea  would  be  formed.  These 
two  processes  of  analysis  and  comparison  really  provide  the  ma- 
terials for  the  more  important  step  which  follows. 

The  Third  Step. — The  third  step  is  that  of  synthesis.  The 
mind  new  takes  the  materials  that  have  been  furnished  and 
fashioned  by  comparison  and  analysis,  and  unites  them  into  one 
single  mental  product,  giving  us  the  general  notion  or  concept. 
The  mind,  as  it  were,  brings  together  these  several  attributes 
into  a  bunch  or  package,  and  then  ties  a  mental  string  around  it, 
as  we  would  bunch  a  lot  of  roses  or  cigars.  This  is  the  final  and 
important  step  in  the  process ;  it  is  the  real  process  of  conception, 
or  the  taking  together  (con-capid)  into  one. 

Not  Always  Formal. — A  formal  description  of  generalization 
regards  it  as  composed  of  these  several  distinct  steps ;  but  in  the 
actual  formation  of  the  concept,  these  steps  are  not  always  kept 
so  distinct  as  described.  It  is  not  always  easy  to  determine  which 


214  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

of  the  first  two  steps,  comparison  or  analysis,  precedes  In  many 
cases,  there  seems  to  be  a  perception  of  some  general  likeness  or 
unlikeness  before  any  abstracting  takes  place ;  in  other  cases,  the 
process  of  abstracting  seems  to  precede  comparison.  Sometimes, 
also,  we  may  fix  upon  some  quality  which  is  strikingly  char- 
acteristic of  the  class,  and  group  together  all  the  objects  possessing 
this  characteristic;  as  the  vertebral  column  in  zoology,  or  the 
form  of  the  flower  in  botany.  Again,  the  process  seems  to  pro- 
ceed in  a  mixed  and  confused  sort  of  manner,  or,  as  Hamilton 
says,  from  the  confused  to  the  clear  and  definite. 

A.  Synthetic  Process. — It  is  thus  seen  that  generalization,  or 
conception,  is  a  synthetic  process.  In  its  final  and  crowning  act, 
it  unites,  combines,  binds  together.  Thus  special  colors  are  com- 
bined into  the  notion  of  color  in  general ;  particular  animals  are 
united  into  a  general  idea  of  animals,  etc.  Our  conceptions  are 
thus  seen  to  embrace  wider  and  wider  circles  of  thought,  as  we 
go  from  particulars  to  generals,  or  from  the  less  general  to  the 
more  general. 

An  Ascending  Process. — Generalization  is  an  ascending  pro- 
cess. The  broader  concept  is  regarded  as  higher  than  the  nar- 
rower concept ;  a  concept  is  considered  as  higher  than  a  percept ; 
a  general  idea  stands  above  a  particular  idea.  We  thus  go  up 
from  particulars  to  generals;  from  percepts  to  concepts;  from 
lower  concepts  to  higher  concepts.  Beginning  down  with  par- 
ticular objects,  we  rise  from  them  to  the  general  idea  of  their 
class.  Having  formed  a  number  of  lower  classes,  we  compare 
them  as  we  did  individuals,  and  generalize  them  into  higher 
classes.  We  perform  the  same  process  with  these  higher  classes, 
and  thus  proceed  until  we  are  at  last  arrested  in  the  highest 
class,  that  of  being.  Having  reached  the  pinnacle  of  generaliza- 
tion, we  may  descend  the  ladder  by  reversing  the  process  through 
which  we  ascend. 

III.  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  CONCEPT. — The  products  of  gen- 
eralization are  general  ideas  called  concepts.  We  have  already 
discussed  the  method  of  forming  conceptions,  and  we  shall  now 


NATUKE    OF    GENEKALIZATION.  215 

consider  the  nature  of  the  concept  itself.  The  subject  is  one  of 
real  importance,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  the  existence 
of  general  notions  is  denied  by  some  philosophers. 

Definition  of  a  Concept. — A  concept  is  a  general  idea.  It 
is  a  general  notion  which  has  in  it  all  that  is  common  to  its  own 
class.  It  is  a  general  scheme  which  embraces  all  the  individuals 
of  the  class,  while  it  resembles  in  all  respects  none  of  its  class. 
Thus  my  conception  of  a  quadruped  has  in  it  all  four-footed 
animals,  but  it  does  not  correspond  in  all  respects  to  any  partic- 
ular animal ;  my  conception  of  a  triangle  embraces  all  triangles, 
but  does  not  agree  in  details  with  any  particular  triangle.  The 
general  conception  cannot  be  made  to  fit  exactly  any  particular 
object,  but  it  teems  with  many  particulars.  These  points  may  be 
illustrated  with  the  concepts  horse,  bird,  color,  animal,  etc. 

Cannot  be  Imaged. — A  concept  cannot  be  represented  by  ji 
concrete  image.  This  is  evident  from  its  being  general  rather 
than  particular.  If  its  color  or  size  or  shape  is  fixed  by  an 
image,  it  is  no  longer  general  but  particular.  The  concept,  how- 
ever, may  be  individualized  in  some  object  of  sense,  and  is  so 
individualized  when  we  apply  it  to  the  different  objects  of  the 
class  which  it  embraces.  Some  particular  object  may  be  taken 
as  the  representative  of  the  class,  and  this  may  be  in  the  mind 
when  we  use  the  general  term.  So  also  the  imagination  may 
form  an  ideal  object  to  stand  as  the  representative  of  a  class  of 
objects,  and  this  ideal  may  accompany  the  use  of  the  general 
term.  These  mental  products  are  not,  however,  to  be  regarded 
as  concepts ;  the  former  is  a  remembered  percept,  and  the  latter 
is  a  figment  of  the  imagination. 

Relation  to  Percepts. — The  difference  between  a  concept  and 
a  percept  will  be  clear  from  what  has  been  said.  A  percept  is  a 
mental  product  of  a  real  thing;  a  concept  is  a  mere  idea  or 
notion  of  the  common  attributes  of  things.  A  percept  represents 
some  particular  object ;  a  concept  is  not  particular,  .but  general. 
A  percept  can  be  described  by  particulars ;  a  concept  can  be  de- 
scribed only  by  generals.  The  former  can  usually  be  repre- 


216  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

sented  by  an  image;  the  latter  cannot  be  imaged,  it  can  only  be 
thought. 

Concrete  and  Abstract. — There  are  two  distinct  classes  of 
concepts  which  may  be  distinguished  as  concrete  and  abstract.  In 
forming  concepts  we  may  unite  the  common  elements  of  objects  or 
the  common  elements  of  qualities.  Thus  I  can  form  a  concept 
from  individual  flowers  that  will  contain  these  individuals  ;  as, 
rose ;  or  I  can  form  a  concept  from  individual  qualities  that  will 
contain  these  qualities;  as,  red.  The  former  class  of  concepts 
may  be  called  concrete;  the  latter,  abstract.  The  individualiza- 
tion  of  a  concrete  concept  leads  to  a  particular  object ;  as,  man, 
bird,  horse,  etc.;  the  individualization  of  an  abstract  concept  leads 
to  a  particular  quality;  as,  wisdom,  color,  virtue,  etc. 

Broad  and  Narrow  Conceptions. — In  generalization,  we 
begin  with  individuals  and  combine  them  into  classes.  We  then 
compare  these  cbsses  and  unite  them  into  broader  classes,  then 
again  unite  these  classes  into  still  broader  classes,  and  so  on  as 
far  as  the  process  can  be  carried.  Thus  we  classify  individual 
objects  into  dogs,  lions,  horses,  men,  birds,  etc.;  then  unite  dogs, 
lions,  and  horses  into  quadrupeds,  and  men  and  birds  into  bipeds ; 
and  then  unite  quadrupeds  and  bipeds  into  some  higher  class,  as 
vertebrates,  etc.  Now  the  class  is  broader  than  the  individual, 
and  each  new  class  in  the  series  is  broader  than  the  previous 
class,  since  it  contains  more  objects. 

HigJier  and  Lower  Conceptions. — Now  in  these  cases  the 
broader  conception,  which  includes  the  others,  is  called  the 
higher  conception ;  and  the  narrower  ones  which  are  included  are 
called  lower  conceptions.  In  the  process  of  combining  lower 
conceptions  into  higher  ones,  we  lay  aside  the  specific  differences ; 
and  in  resolving  higher  conceptions  into  lower  ones,  we  bring  in 
the  specific  differences.  Thus  the  conception  man  has  fewer 
marks  than  European  or  African,  since  these  latter  have  all  the 
marks  of  man,  besides  the  individual  marks  which  distinguish 
them  from  each  other.  The  higher  the  class,  therefore,*  the 
greater  the  extent  and  the  less  the  content. 


NATURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  217 

Relation  of  Conceptions. — In  any  series  of  higher  and 
lower  conceptions,  each  higher  is  a  genus  to  those  next  below  it ; 
out  of  which  it  was  formed  by  generalization.  The  classes  or 
conceptions  next  below  are  called  the  species.  Thus  horses,  cows, 
dogs,  etc.,  are  the  species  of  the  genus  quadruped.  In  ascending 
and  descending  the  series  of  related  conceptions,  any  genus  be- 
comes a  species  of  the  next  higher  class,  and  any  species  becomes 
a  genus  of  the  next  lower  class.  The  highest  class,  which  is 
never  a  species,  is  called  Summum  Genus;  the  lowest  class,  which 
is  never  a  genus,  is  called  Infima  Species. 

Content  and  Extent. — Since  a  concept  is  formed  by  the 
«union  of  the  common  attributes  of  individuals,  it  thus  embraces 
both  attributes  and  individuals.  The  attributes  of  a  concept  con- 
stitute what  is  called  its  content;  the  individuals  it  embraces  con- 
stitute its  extent.  The  power  of  including  objects  is  called  its  ex- 
tension; the  power  of  including  attributes  is  called  its  intension. 
The  extension  of  a  concept  is  also  called  its  breadth;  the  inten- 
sion of  a  concept  is  called  its  depth  and  also  its  comprehension. 

Relation  of  Extension  and  Intension. — The  two  properties 
of  extension  and  intension  are  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  each  other ; 
the  greater  the  extension  the  less  the  intension,  and  vice  versa. 
This  will  "be  seen  from  the  consideration  that  the  higher  the  con- 
cept the  more  individuals  it  contains,  but  the  fewer  common 
properties.  We  lay  aside  the  distinctive  marks  of  lower  con- 
ceptions as  we  rise  to  higher  conceptions.  Thus  by  laying  aside 
the  distinctive  marks,  equilateral,  isosceles,  and  scalene,  we  arrive 
at  the  higher  conception  triangle,  which  has  greater  extension  but 
less  intension  than  isosceles  triangle  or  scalene  triangle.  So  the 
concept  man  has  more  extension  than  poet,  orator,  or  statesman, 
since  it  embraces  more  individuals ;  and  less  intension,  since  we 
must  lay  aside  the  distinctive  attributes  of  poet,  orator,  and  states- 
man, in  order  to  unite  them  in  the  common  class  man. 

Distribution  of  Concepts. — A  concept,  or  term,  is  said  to  be 
distributed  when  it  is  used  in  its  fullest  sense.  Thus  in  the 
proposition,  all  men  are  mortal,  the  term  man  is  distributed,  or 
10 


218  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

used  distributively.  In  the  proposition,  some  men  are  poets,  the 
term  man  is  undistributed.  Such  concepts,  or  terms,  are  also  dis- 
tinguished as  universal  and  particular. 

IV.  THE  QUALITIES  OF  CONCEPTS. — There  are  several  qual- 
ities or  attributes  belonging  to  concepts  that  enable  us  to  arrange 
them  into  distinct  classes.  A  knowledge  of  these  qualities  or 
characteristics  is  so  important  in  understanding  the  nature  of  the 
concept  and  the  method  of  cultivating  the  power  of  conception, 
that  they  will  be  briefly  considered. 

Clear  and  Obscure  Conceptions. — A  concept,  or  any  idea, 
is  dear  when  we  can  distinguish  it  from  all  other  ideas.  When 
we  cannot  thus  distinguish  it  from  other  ideas,  it  is  said  to  be 
obscure.  Thus  in  twilight  we  often  see  objects,  but  are  unable 
to  distinguish  them  from  one  another;  in  this  case  our  cognition 
of  them  is  obscure.  As  the  light  gradually  increases,  our  view 
of  the  objects  becomes  so  well  defined  that  we  can  distinguish 
them  from  one  another,  and  the  cognition  becomes  clear.  The 
same  distinction  may  exist  in  respect  to  our  abstract  and  general 
ideas.  Many  of  our  general  notions,  through  inattention  or  in- 
experience, arc  obscure.  Thus  a  large  number  of  persons  are 
unable  to  distinguish  Logic  from  Psychology  or  Metaphysics,  or 
a  court  of  law  from  a  court  of  chancery.  Such  conceptions  are 
obscure  to  those  who  are  not  familiar  with  these  matters. 

Distinct  and  Confused  Conceptions. — A  concept  is  said  to 
be  distinct  when  we  can  distinguish  its  marks  or  attributes. 
Thus,  we  have  a  distinct  knowledge  of  the  concept  man  when  we 
know  its  marks  to  be  animality  and  rationality.  A  concept  is 
confused  when,  though  we  may  be  able  clearly  to  distinguish  it 
from  other  concepts,  we  are  unable  to  distinguish  its  marks. 
Thus,  if  we  could  distinguish  the  concept  man  from  other  con- 
cepts, and  did  not  know  its  marks,  the  concept  would  be  confused. 
A  concept  may  thus  be  clear  and  yet  confused.  Many  concepts 
are  confused  on  account  of  our  lack  of  knowledge,  and  may  be 
made  distinct  by  further  study  or  investigation.  Such  ideas  as 
space,  time,  and  color  are  essentially  indistinct,  since  it  is  impos- 
sible for  us  to  distinguish  their  attributes. 


NATURE    OF    GENERALIZATION.  219 

Adequate  and  Inadequate  Conceptions. — A  concept  is  said 
to  be  adequate  when  we  can  apprehend  not  only  the  marks  of  the 
conception,  but  the  marks  of  the  marks.  Thus,  that  my  idea  of 
man  may  be  adequate,  I  must  not  only  distinguish  the  attributes 
animality  and  rationality,  but  I  must  also  know  the  marks  of  these 
attributes, — the  former  being  life  and  sensation,  the  latter  the 
intuition  of  supersensual  truths  and  the  power  of  thinking  in  the 
light  of  such  truths.  When  in  a  conception  we  cannot  distin- 
guish the  marks  of  the  marks,  then  it  is  said  to  be  inadequate. 
Thus  a  conception  can  be  distinct  and  yet  inadequate,  at  the 
same  time. 

Rotative  and  Symbolical  Conceptions. — A  notative  con- 
ception is  one  whose  name  suggests  its  marks ;  as,  quadruped,  tri- 
angle, octagon.  A  symbolical  conception  is  one  whose  name 
serves  merely  as  a  symbol  of  the  idea,  and  does  not  suggest  the 
marks  of  the  concept ;  as  church,  family,  senate.  This  attribute  or 
distinction  of  a  conception  arises  from  the  terms  employed  to  ex- 
press them,  rather  than  from  the  concept  itself.  Most  persons 
use  terms  as  symbolic,  not  thinking  of  the  marks  suggested  by 
these  terms.  A  knowledge  of  etymology  will  change  many 
terms  and  their  conceptions  from  symbolic  to  notative. 

Absolute  and  Relative  Conceptions. — Conceptions  are  also 
distinguished  as  absolute  and  relative.  An  absolute  term  or  notion 
is  one  that  does  not  imply  any  other  conception ;  as,  stone,  book, 
water.  A  relative  conception  is  one  which  implies  some  related 
conception.  Thus  son  implies  a  father,  king  a  subject,  debtor  a 
creditor,  etc.  A  pair  of  relatives,  like  father  and  son,  are  called 
correlatives.  In  all  relative  conceptions  there  is  some  ground  of 
relation ;  in  father  and  son  it  is  the  family ;  in  king  and  subject  it 
is  government. 

Contrary  and  Contradictory  Conceptions. —  Contrary  con- 
ceptions are  those  that  embrace  attributes  just  the  opposite  of  one 
another.  Thus  wise  and  foolish,  hard  and  soft,  love  and  hatred, 
light  and. darkness,  are  contrary  conceptions.  Contradictory  con- 
ceptions are  those  in  which  the  attributes  of  one  are  a  denial  of 


220  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  attributes  of  the  other ;  as  man  and  not-man,  ego  and  non-ego, 
organic  and  inorganic,  wise  and  unwise,  kind  and  unkind,  holy  and 
unholy.  Contradictory  terms  may  mean  merely  the  denial  of  the 
presence  of  the  positive  attribute,  or  they  may  imply  the  possess- 
ion of  the  opposite  attribute.  A  contradictory  in  form  is  thus 
often  a  contrary  in  meaning ;  and  the  tendency  is  for  pure  con- 
tradictories to  become  contraries.  The  terms  contrary  and  contra- 
dictory are  often  applied  indifferently  to  the  term  or  conception 
opposite  to  the  positive  one. 

Classes  of  Contradictories. — Contradictories  are  of  two  kinds ; 
substantive,  as  man  and  not-man ;  and  attributive,  as  wise  and  un- 
wise. Substantive  contradictories  include  between  them  all  being, 
actual  and  possible.  Thus  man  and  not-man  embrace  the  whole 
universe  of  being;  as  not-man  includes  everything  not  included 
in  man.  The  attributive  contradictory  denies  an  attribute  which 
might  belong  to  an  object,  as  an  unkind  man,  but  it  cannot  be 
said  to  embrace  everything  not  included  in  kind. 

Positive  and  Negative  Conceptions. — Of  these  contradictory 
conceptions,  one  is  called  a  positive  and  the  other  a  negative  con- 
ception. A  positive  conception  is  one  which  possesses  positive 
marks ;  as,  man,  wise,  material,  etc.  A  negative  conception  is  one 
in  which  there  is  an  asserted  absence  of  these  positive  marks ;  as, 
not-man,  unwise,  immaterial.  The  term  naming  the  concept  is  in 
the  negative  form,  and  the  form  of  the  term  indicates  the  nega- 
tive character  of  the  concept.  The  primary  idea  of  the  negative 
term  is  to  merely  deny  the  attribute ;  but  such  terms  usually 
imply  not  merely  the  absence,  but  the  opposite  of  the  marks  of 
the  positive.  Thus  unkind  means  not  merely  a  lack  of  kind- 
ness, but  a  presence  of  the  opposite  of  kindness.  The  same  is 
true  of  such  terms  as  wise  and  unwise,  temperate  and  intemperate. 
The  relation  between  a  positive  and  a  negative  conception  is,  in 
the  form  of  the  term,  that  of  contradictories ;  but  in  sense,  it  is 
often  that  of  contraries.  When  the  concept  means  merely  the 
absence  of  the  positive' attributes,  it  is  appropriately  called  a 
privative  concept;  as,  unloved,  unlearned,  not-fast,  not-large,  noi- 


NATURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  221 

bright.     This  explanation,  it  is  thought,  will  make  clear  a  dis- 
tinction of  terms  which  the  logicians  have  usually  left  obscure. 

The  Terms  Illustrated. — The  following  illustrations  will 
make  clear  the  relation  of  some  of  these  conceptions  : 

CONTRARY  CONCEPTS.  CONTRADICTORY  CONCEPTS. 

wise         :        foolish  man        :        iiot-man 

hard        :        soft  ego          :        non-ego 

love         :        hatred  kind        :        not-kind 

light        :        darkness  holy        :        unholy 

below      :        above  wise        :        unwise 

Relation  Illustrated. — Contrary  conceptions  are  more  widely 
separated  than  contradictories,  according  to  the  primary  idea  of 
contradictories.  This  arises  from  the  primary  idea  of  the  nega- 
tive being  merely  a  privative.  Their  relation  may  be  seen  by 
the  following  examples  : 

POSITIVE.  NEGATIVE.  CONTRARY: 

wise  unwise  foolish 

loved  unloved  hated 

learned  unlearned  ignorant 

fast  not-fast  slow 

large  not-large  small 

many  not-many  few 

These  negatives  are  mainly  privatives,  signifying  merely  the 
absence  of  the  positive  attribute.  The  distinction  between 
privatives  and  negatives  is  not  fixed  and  immovable,  but  varies 
with  the  fluctuations  of  language.  Many  writers  seem  to  confuse 
these  privative  and  negative  terms ;  and  their  definitions  of  con- 
tradictories and  contraries  will  not  always  hold  when  tested  by 
examples. 

V.  UNFOLDING  CONCEPTIONS. — There  are  certain  attributes 
of  concepts  and  certain  relations  existing  between  them  that 
enable  us  to  unfold  and  distinguish  them  clearly,  distinctly,  and 
adequately.  The  principal  methods  of  doing  this  are  Logical 
Division,  Logical  Analysis,  and  Logical  Definition 

Logical  Division. — If  we  take  any  class  and  divide  it  into 
the  several  conceptions  combined  in  it,  the  process  is  called  Log- 


222  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ical  Division.  Logical  Division  divides  a  genus  into  its  proxi- 
mate and  constituent  species.  We  may  begin  at  any  genus,  and 
separate  it  into  its  species,  then  take  any  of  these  species,  and 
separate  it  into  sub-species,  and  thus  continue  until  we  pass 
through  infima  species  to  individuals.  The  proximate  species 
into  which  a  genus  is  divided,  are  called  coordinate  species.  Any 
species,  in  relation  to  any  subdivision  of  a  coordinate  species,  or 
in  relation  to  any  division  coordinate  to  its  genus,  is  called  dis- 
parate. Thus  quadruped  and  biped  are  coordinate  under  animal; 
lion,  dog,  and  horse  under  quadruped;  while  lion  is  disparate  with 
biped  or  with  any  division  of  dog,  as  terrier. 

Logical  Analysis. — If  we  take  any  conception  and  divide  it 
into  the  marks  or  attributes  which  compose  it,  the  process  is 
called  Logical  Analysis,  or  Partition.  Thus,  if  we  take  the  con- 
cept man,  and  separate  it  into  the  marks  animality  and  ration- 
ality, we  are  giving  a  logical  analysis  of  it.  So  also  we  may 
analyze  a  triangle  into  the  several  elements, — a  plane  figure, 
rectilineal  lines,  three  sides,  and  three  angles.  A  concept  is  re- 
garded as  a  complex  unit  made  up  of  several  attributes  or  prop- 
erties ;  and  logical  analysis  unfolds  these  properties.  Logical 
analysis  has  to  do  with  the  content  of  a  concept,  while  logical 
division  has  to  do  with  its  extent.  The  former  ascertains  its  in- 
tension ;  the  latter,  its  extension. 

Logical  Definition. — If  we  take  a  concept  and  put  it  into  a 
higher  concept,  and  then  point  out  the  difference  between  it  and 
the  other  conceptions  contained  in  this  higher  concept,  we  are 
said  to  define  it,  and  the  process  is  called  Logical  Definition. 
The  differences  which  distinguish  the  concept  from  other  concepts 
of  the  same  genus  are  called  specific  differences,  or  the  differentia. 
A  logical  definition  therefore  defines  by  genus  and  specific  differ- 
ences, or  by  genus  and  differentia.  Thus  to  define  man,  we 
place  the  concept  into  the  higher  concept,  animal,  and  then  give 
the  differentia,  rationality,  having  the  definition  "Man  is  a 
rational  animal."  So  in  defining  a  triangle,  we  say  "  A  triangle 
is  a  polygon  of  three  sides,"  in  which  "  polygon  "  is  the  genus  and 


NATUKE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  223 

"  three  sides  "  the  differentia.  A  logical  definition  is  thus  based 
on  logical  division  and  logical  analysis,  and  is  the  only  perfect 
definition  of  a  general  notion  or  term. 

VI.  THE  VALUE  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. — From  what  has  now 
been  stated,  the  value  of  general  ideas  will  be  readily  appre- 
ciated.    It  may  be  briefly  stated  that  they  are  the  basis  of  lan- 
guage and  of  science. 

The  Basis  of  Language. — Generalization  lies  at  the  basis  of 
language:  only  as  man  can  form  general  conceptions  is  it  pos- 
sible for  him  to  form  a  language.  The  brute  can  never  speak,  as 
Max  Miiller  says,  because  he  cannot  form  a  general  notion.  To 
give  each  individual  or  particular  idea  a  name  peculiar  to  itself 
would  be  impracticable  and  indeed  impossible;  the  mind  would 
soon  become  overwhelmed  with  its  burden  of  names.  Nearly  all 
the  ordinary  words  of  our  language  are  general  rather  than  par- 
ticular. The  individuals  distinguished  by  particular  names,  ex- 
cepting persons  and  places,  are  comparatively  few.  Most  objects 
are  named  only  by  common  nouns;  nearly  all  of  our  verbs 
express  general  actions;  our  adjectives  denote  common  qualities, 
and  our  adverbs  designate  classes  of  actions  and  qualities.  There 
are  very  few  words  in  the  language,  besides  the  names  of  persons 
and  places,  that  do  not  express  general  ideas. 

The  Basis  of  Science. — This  power  of  generalization  lies  also 
at  the  basis  of  science.  Had  we  no  power  of  forming  general 
ideas,  each  particular  object  would  be  a  study  by  itself,  and  we 
should  thus  never  pass  beyond  the  very  alphabet  of  knowledge. 
Judgments,  except  in  the  simplest  form,  would  be  impossible; 
and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  even  the  simplest  form  of  the  syllo- 
gism could  be  constructed.  No  general  conclusion  could  be 
drawn  from  particulars,  nor  particular  conclusion  from  generals  ; 
and  thus  neither  inductive  nor  deductive  reasoning  would  be  pos- 
sible. The  classifications  of  science  could  not  be  made;  and 
knowledge  would  end  at  the  very  threshold  of  science. 

VII.  EXISTENCE  or  GENERAL  IDEAS. — The  existence  of  general 
ideas  has  been  denied  by  some  writers.     They  maintain  that  we 


224  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

have  general  terras,  but  no  general  ideas.  They  teach  that  in  the 
use  of  general  terras  the  notion  in  the  mind  is  always  particular 
Thus  when  we  use  the  term  triangle,  if  we  have  any  mental  pro- 
duct, it  is  of  some  particular  triangle ;  so  when  we  use  the  word 
horse,  there  is  no  mental  product  unless  we  think  of  some  partic- 
ular horse.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  Nominalism,  and  those  who 
hold  such  views  are  called  Nominalists. 

Reply  to  Nominalism. — To  this  view  we  reply,  first,  that  it 
contradicts  consciousness.  We  are  conscious  that  when  we  use 
a  general  term,  as  man,  in  the  proposition  "  man  is  mortal,"  we 
do  not  think  of  any  particular  man,  neither  of  John  Smith,  nor 
of  George  Washington,  nor  of  any  other  man;  and  yet  the 
proposition  has  a  definite  meaning  to  us.  There  must  therefore 
be  some  mental  product  corresponding  to  the  term  man,  or  else 
we  should  not  know  what  we  were  saying.  So  with  the  term 
mortality,  we  know  what  we  mean  by  it,  and  yet  no  particular 
mortality  presents  itself  to  the  mind. 

Further  Reply. — Besides,  we  know  there  is  a  difference  be- 
tween conceptions  themselves.  Thus,  man,  white  man,  black  man, 
are  distinctly  discriminated,  and  without  thinking  of  any  partic- 
ular man  in  order  to  do  so.  I  can  say  "  All  poets  are  imagina- 
tive ;"  but  I  will  not  say  "  All  men  are  imaginative,"  for  I  know 
that  it  is  not  true.  I  thus  distinguish  between  all  men  and  all 
poets;  and  I  know  that  when  I  use  these  terms  all  men  and  all 
poets,  1  do  not  think  of  any  particular  man  or  of  any  particular 
poet.  So  we  understand  what  we  mean  when  we  say  a  "  triangle 
is  not  a  parallelogram ;"  but  in  order  to  do  so,  I  do  not  need  to 
have  some  particular  triangle  or  parallelogram  in  my  mind.  It 
is  thus  evident  that  these  general  terms  mean  something  to  us ; 
and  also  that  we  need  not  have  any  particular  image  in  our 
minds  when  we  use  them.  There  may  be  a  mental  product  with- 
out an  image. 

Type  of  a  Concept. — It  has  been  said  by  the  Nominalist 
that  when  we  use  general  terms  we  think  of  some  individual ; 
and  this  individual  stands  as  a  type  or  representative  of  the  class. 


NATURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  225 

Thus  I  may  take  the  image  of  a  duck  as  the  type  of  a  swimming 
bird,  or  the  image  of  a  horse  for  a  quadruped.  This  is  probably 
often  done,  though  not  generally ;  and  this  type  may  be  either 
a  remembered  percept  or  a  product  of  the  imagination.  If, 
however,  the  Nominalist  assumes  that  it  represents  the  class,  he 
virtually  admits  the  existence  of  the  class,  and  that  we  have  an 
idea  of  the  class,  or  else  the  type  would  not  be  known  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  a  class.  Only  that  which  we  know  will  admit  of  a 
representation  to  our  minds. 

The  Concept  not  an  Image. — The  Nominalist  errs  in  sup- 
posing that  we  can  have  no  ideas  without  images.  This  is  a  fatal 
error:  what  image  do  we  form  of  virtue,  wisdom,  justice,  etc.?  A 
judgment  is  a  mental  product,  and  yet  it  is  not  an  image  to  us. 
We  say  two  things  are  equal;  does  any  one  hold  that  we  have  no 
idea  of  equal  unless  we  can  form  some  mental  image  of  it  ?  The 
very  question  shows  the  absurdity  of  such  a  position.  The  con- 
cept is  a  mental  product,  but  not  a  mental  image. 

VIII.  CLASSIFICATION. — Generalization  gives  rise  to  Classi- 
fication. The  intimate  relation  of  classification  to  conception, 
and  its  importance  in  science,  make  a  brief  discussion  of  it  appro- 
priate. 

Nature  of  Classification. — By  Classification  we  mean  the 
process  of  arranging  objects  into  classes.  The  basis  of  this  pro- 
cess is  generalization:  in  arranging  objects  into  classes,  the  mind 
forms  a  notion  of  the  class,  and  this  is  a  conception.  The  power 
of  forming  the  class  idea  is  generalization  or  conception  ;  the  ap- 
plication of  this  idea  in  arranging  objects  is  classification.  The 
difference  between  generalization  and  classification  is  that  the 
former  refers  to  the  mental  process,  and  the  latter  to  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  objects.  We  can,  however,  use  the  word  classifica- 
tion, referring  to  the  mental  process,  but  then  it  is  equivalent  to 
conception. 

Scientific  Classification. — Scientific  Classification  is  the  same 
in  principle  as  that  which  is  applied   to  ordinary  things;  the 
difference  is  that  the  former  is  more  accurate  than  classification 
10* 


226  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

applied  to  common  knowledge.  It  involves  more  radical  distinc- 
tions in  the  objects  classified,  and  a  larger  number  of  similar 
attributes  and  properties  in  those  that  are  arranged  together. 
Thus,  if  we  class  animals  according  to  color,  we  would  bring  large 
and  small,  bipeds  and  quadrupeds  together;  placing  the  most 
dissimilar  in  the  same  group,  while  those  most  nearly  related 
would  often  be  separated.  But  to  class  by  intrinsic  attributes, 
like  a  vertebral  column  or  the  structure  of  the  teeth,  will  bring 
together  those  objects  that  have  an  intrinsic  relation  to  one 
another. 

Early  Attempts. — The  earliest  attempts  at  classification  were 
rude  and  imperfect.  Prominent  characteristics  were  seized  upon, 
and  the  objects  were  loosely  brought  together.  Thus  the  vege- 
table world,  at  an  early  day,  was  divided  into  trees,  shrubs,  and 
herbs.  Theophrastus  classed  plants  according  to  size,  use,  place 
of  growth,  lactescence,  and  generation;  and  Dioscorides  arranged 
them  according  to  their  qualities;  as,  aromatic,  alimentary,  medi- 
cinal, and  vinous.  The  early  classification  of  animals  was  also 
rude  and  unscientific.  Man  has  stumbled  and  blundered  on  his 
pathway  from  common  knowledge  to  scientific  knowledge. 

Progress  of  Classifying. — The  first  classifications  were 
founded  on  the  more  prominent  characteristics,  and  were  loose 
and  imperfect.  As  observation  became  more  accurate,  the  in- 
herent relationships  were  noticed,  mistakes  were  corrected,  and 
the  classifications  were  more  in  accordance  with  the  real  nature 
and  structure  of  the  objects  classified.  In  this  way,  as  time 
passed  by,  the  classifications  of  the  material  world  became  less 
and  less  artificial,  and  more  and  more  scientific.  Finally,  the 
real  relations  were  discovered,  and  the  classifications  became  the 
accepted  and  final  facts  of  science.  The  three  kingdoms  of 
nature  were  arranged  in  species,  genera,  classes,  orders,  etc., 
ranging  from  the  highest  division  down  to  the  lowest,  which  em- 
braces the  individuals. 

Application  to  New  Objects. — After  forming  a  class  from 
the  objects  known,  new  objects  similar  to  these  were  referred  to 


NATURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  227 

this  class.  The  classes  thus  grew  in  the  number  of  objects  em- 
braced, and  also  in  common  attributes.  Of  course  mistakes  were 
often  made,  which  subsequent  experience  had  to  correct.  The 
natives  of  the  Pacific  Islands  classed  the  goats,  which  Captain 
Cook  took  there,  among  hogs,  calling  them  horned  hogs;  while 
they  classed  the  horse  among  dogs,  calling  it  a  large  dog.  When 
the  Romans  first  saw  an  elephant,  they  classed  it  among  oxen, 
calling  it  Bos  Lucas  or  Lucanus,  a  Lucanian  ox,  from  the  name 
of  the  territory  where  they  first  saw  it. 

Scientific  Genius. — The  great  classifications  of  science  are  the 
result  of  high  scientific  genius.  Scientific  classification  requires 
a  deep  insight  into  nature,  in  order  to  find  the  correct  principles 
of  classification.  It  was  many  centuries  before  we  reached  even 
the  artificial  classification  of  Linnaeus  in  botany ;  and  this  at  last 
gave  way  to  the  natural  system  of  Jussieu  and  Tournefort.  It 
was  not  until  the  great  genius  of  Cuvier  applied  itself  to  the 
animals  of  the  globe  that  we  attained  to  the  grand  classification 
of  the  animal  kingdom  which  the  science  of  zoology  now  presents 
to  us.  The  history  of  mineralogy  bears  witness  to  the  same  fact 
of  the  triumphs  of  scientific  genius  in  the  discovery  of  the  laws 
of  relationship  which  led  to  the  present  classification. 

Classes  in  Nature. — The  classes  of  science  seem  to  have  an 
existence  in  nature.  Such  classes  as  mammalia,  crustacese, 
rosaceae,  eruciferae,  etc.,  seem  to  exist  in  nature  herself.  They 
have  a  deeper  significance  than  our  common  concepts,  and  seem 
to  have  a  reality  in  the  divine  order  of  things.  Some  scientists 
assume  that  the  classes  of  natural  history  represent  divine  ideas, 
ideas  that  were  in  the  mind  of  the  Creator  when  he  put  forth  his 
creative  hand.  They  hold  that  the  objects  of  the  material  world- 
were  constituted  after  these  pattern  ideas  or  plans  of  structure. 
It  is  thus  said  that  we  find  the  classes  of  natural  history  in  nature, 
and  that  the  object  of  science  is  to  discover  the  ideas  of  the 
creative  mind.  Believing  thus,  the  scientist  may  exclaim  with 
Kepler,  "0  God,  I  but  think  thy  thoughts  after  thee!" 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  JUDGMENT. 

"TUDGMENT  is  the  power  of  perceiving  the  agreement  or  dig- 
*-*  agreement  of  two  objects  of  thought.  Its  office  is  com- 
parison ;  it  compares  one  object  directly  with  another,  and  gives 
us  a  mental  product  called  a  judgment.  The  expression  of  a 
judgment  in  words  is  called  a  proposition.  The  term  judgment 
is  thus  used  to  name  both  the  faculty  and  its  product. 

Illustration. — The  faculty  of  judgment  may  be  illustrated  in 
the  formation  of  the  proposition  "  snow  is  white."  Here  snow  is 
one  idea,  and  white  is  another  idea ;  judgment  compares  these  two 
ideas,  and  affirming  their  agreement,  gives  us  the  mental  product, 
which,  when  expressed  in  words,  forms  the  proposition  "  snow  is 
white."  The  office  of  the  faculty  may  be  illustrated  also  in  such 
propositions  as  "  the  rose  is  a  flower,"  "  a  bird  is  an  animal,"  etc. 
The  two  objects  of  thought  compared  are  called  the  terms  of  the 
judgment. 

Things  Compared. — The  two  objects  of  thought  compared 
by  the  judgment  may  be  both  concepts,  or  one  may  be  a  percept 
and  the  other  a  concept.  Thus,  in  the  judgment  "  a  bird  is  an 
animal,"  both  ideas  are  concepts ;  in  the  proposition  "  Boston  is  a 
city,"  the  first  idea  is  a  percept  and  the  second  is  a  concept.  We 
may  also  compare  two  percepts ;  as,  "  Boston  is  not  Philadelphia." 
The  illustrations  we  have  given  are  those  which  are  called 
"  logical  judgments ;"  and  the  predicate  of  a  logical  judgment  is 
usually  a  concept.  The  only  comparison  in  this  logical  form 
between  two  particulars  is  that  which  gives  a  negative  judgment. 
There  may  be,  however,  another  kind  of  comparison  between  par- 
ticulars ;  as,  "  Boston  is  smaller  than  London,"  which  is  not  in 

f  228) 


NATUKE  OF  THE  JUDGMENT.  229 

the  form  of  the  ordinary  "  logical  judgment."  Such  a  comparison 
is  also  an  act  of  the  judgment.  If  we  regard  it  as  a  logical  judg- 
ment, the  second  term  of  the  comparison  is  held  to  be  "  smaller 
than  London." 

Relation  of  the  Terms. — In  the  illustrations  of  logical  judg- 
ments, it  will  be  noticed  that  the  second  object  of  thought  is 
usually  broader  than  the  first  one,  and  includes  the  first.  Thus, 
animal  in  the  judgment,  "a  bird  is  an  animal"  is  broader  than 
bird,  and  includes  bird.  Sometimes,  however,  a  part  of  a  broader 
generalization  is  compared  with  a  narrower  one ;  as  "  some  ani- 
mals are  birds."  Occasionally  both  concepts  are  of  equal  rank ; 
as,  "  man  is  a  rational  animal"  or  "  a  triangle  is  a  polygon  of  three 
sides."  In  all  "logical  definitions"  the  two  terms  are  of  equal 
rank;  the  genus  and  differentia  being  regarded  as  constituting 
one  term. 

Analytic  and  Synthetic. — Judgment  is  thus  seen  to  be  both 
analytic  and  synthetic  in  its  operation ;  and  it  may  be  neither. 
When  we  compare  a  part  with  a  whole,  or  a  narrower  with  a 
broader  conception,  the  process  is  synthetic.  When  in  the  com- 
parison we  take  a  part  of  a  conception  and  compare  it  with 
another  conception,  the  process  is  analytic.  When  we  compare 
conceptions  that  are  equal  in  extent,  the  process  is  neither 
analytic  nor  synthetic.  Thus,  in  the  proposition  "  a  bird  is  an 
animal,"  the  judgment  is  synthetic;  in  the  proposition  "some 
animals  are  birds,"  the  judgment  is  analytic;  in  the  proposition 
"A  equals  B,"  or  "a  man  is  a  rational  animal,"  the  judgment  is 
neither  analytic  nor  synthetic. 

In  one  sense  all  judgments  are  synthetic.  A  judgment  consists 
of  the  union  of  two  ideas,  and  this  uniting  is  a  process  of  syn- 
thesis. This,  however,  is  a  superficial  view  of  the  process.  Such 
a  synthesis  is  a  mere  mechanical  synthesis;  below  this  is  a 
thought-process  which  is  sometimes  analytic,  sometimes  synthetic, 
and  sometimes  neither  analytic  nor  synthetic.  Most  writers  on 
logic  take  another  view  of  analytic  and  synthetic  judgments, 
which  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  discuss. 


230  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Primitive  Judgments. — The  act  of  the  mind  described  is 
what  is  known  as  logical  judgment.  Strictly  speaking,  however, 
every  intelligent  act  of  the  mind  is  accompanied  with  a  judgment. 
To  know  is  to  discriminate,  and  therefore  to  judge.  Every  sen- 
sation or  cognition  involves  a  knowledge,  and  so  a  judgment  that 
it  exists.  The  mind  cannot  think  at  all  without  judging ;  to 
think  is  to  judge.  Even  in  forming  the  notions  which  judgment 
compares,  the  mind  judges.  Every  notion  or  concept  implies  a 
previous  act  of  judgment  to  form  it:  informing  a  concept,  we 
compare  the  common  attributes  before  we  unite  them,  and  com- 
parison is  judgment.  It  is  thus  true  that  "  Every  concept  is  a 
contracted  judgment;  every  judgment  an  expanded  concept."' 
This  kind  of  judgment,  by  which  we  affirm  the  existence  of  states 
of  consciousness,  discriminate  qualities,  distinguish  percepts,  and 
form  concepts,  is  called  primitive  or  psychological  judgment. 

Judgment  of  Intension. — The  view  of  judgment  as  now  ex- 
plained, is  that  of  comparing  two  different  concepts,  as  man  and 
animal.  This  is  a  judgment  by  extension,  as  one  concept  is  seen 
to  contain  the  other.  We  may  also  regard  judgment  as  unfolding 
the  quality  of  a  concept,  and  predicating  this  quality  of  the  con- 
cept. Thus,  if  we  analyze  the  concept  man,  it  is  seen  to  contain 
the  attribute  of  animality,  and  this  attribute  may  be  asserted  of 
man,  giving  us  the  proposition,  "man  is  an  animal."  This  is  a 
judgment  of  intension,  as  it  regards  the  intension  of  the  concept 
rather  than  its  extension.  Both  views  of  judgment  are  correct; 
the  mind  may  reach  its  judgment  either  by  extension  or  by  in- 
tension. The  method  by  extension  is  usually  the  more  natural. 

The  Proposition. — The  product  of  the  judgment  is  called  a 
judgment,  or  a  proposition.  A  proposition,  as  usually  defined,  is 
a  judgment  expressed  in  words.  The  term  proposition,  however, 
is  used  to  denote  not  only  the  expression  of  the  judgment,  but 
also  the  judgment  itself. 

Tlie  Terms. — Every  proposition  involves  two  ideas,  and  ex- 
presses their  relation  to  each  other.  These  two  notions,  or  the 
words  which  express  them,  are  called  terms  of  the  proposition, 


NATURE   OF   THE   JUDGMENT.  231 

from  the  Latin  termini,  extremes,  because  they  stand  at  the  ex- 
tremities of  the  proposition.  The  term  which  names  that  of 
which  something  is  affirmed  is  called  the  subject ;  the  term  which 
expresses  that  which  is  affirmed  of  the  subject  is  called  the 
predicate.  The  subject,  as  we  have  seen,  may  be  either  a  percept, 
a  concept,  or  an  abstract ;  the  predicate  is  usually  a  concept. 

The  Copula. — The  word,  or  words,  which  connects  the  subject 
and  predicate  and  expresses  the  relation  between  them,  is  called 
the  copula.  Thus,  in  the  proposition  "  Man  is  an  animal,"  man 
is  the  subject,  animal  is  the  predicate,  and  is  is  the  copula. 
The  copula  is  always  the  verb  to  be,  in  the  present  tense  indica- 
tive, in  an  affirmative  judgment;  and  it  is  the  same,  with  the 
negative  particle  affixed,  in  a  negative  judgment.  Thus,  "the 
earth  is  round,"  or  "  pinks  are  not  roses."  The  copula,  in  many 
cases,  is  not  directly  expressed  by  the  word  is  or  is  not,  but  is  ex- 
pressed in  some  other  phrase  which  implies  them.  When  any 
other  than  the  substantive  verb  is  used,  the  copula  is  included  in 
the  verb.  Thus  "  he  runs "  is  equivalent  to  "  he  is  running." 
When  existence  simply  is  expressed,  the  verb  to  be  is  both 
predicate  and  copula ;  as,  "  God  is,"  that  is,  "  God  is  existing." 

I.  NATURE  OF  JUDGMENTS. — Having  explained  the  general 
nature  of  the  faculty  of  judgment  and  the  expression  of  its  pro- 
duct, the  proposition,  we  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  a  little 
more  fully  the  nature  of  the  product  of  the  judgment.  This  pro- 
duct, as  already  explained,  is  also  called  a  judgment. 

Definition. — A  Judgment  is  a  mental  product  consisting  of 
the  relation  of  two  or  more  ideas.  Thus  the  mental  product  cor- 
responding to  the  proposition  "man  is  rational,"  is  a  judgment, 
man  being  one  idea  and  rational  the  other  idea.  The  terms  prop- 
osition and  judgment  are  often,  for  convenience,  used  interchange- 
ably. 

Quality  and  Quantity. — Judgments,  or  propositions,  are 
distinguished  as  to  quality  and  quantity.  By  the  quality  of  a 
judgment  we  mean  the  affirmative  or  negative  character  of  the 
judgment.  In  respect  to  quality  every  judgment  is  either  affirma- 


232  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

live  or  negative.  Thus  "a  rose  is  a  flower"  is  an  affirmative  judg- 
ment ;  "  a  rose  is  not  a  bird  "  is  a  negative  judgment.  By  the 
quantity  of  a  judgment,  is  meant  the  comprehensiveness  of  its 
subject.  In  respect  to  quantity,  every  judgment  is  either  uni- 
versal or  particular.  Thus,  "  all  birds  are  animals  "  is  a  universal 
judgment;  "some  birds  are  robins"  is  a  particular  judgment. 

Kinds  of  Judgments. — In  respect  to  quality  and  quantity, 
we  have  four  kinds  of  judgments ; — the  universal  affirmative,  uni- 
versal negative,  particular  affirmative,  and  particular  negative. 
Thus, "all  men  are  mortal"  is  a  universal  affirmative;  "  no  man 
is  an  angel "  is  a  universal  negative ; "  some  men  are  poets "  is  a 
particular  affirmative;  and  "some  men  are  not  poets"  is  a  partic- 
ular negative.  The  universal  negative  can  also  be  stated  with 
the  negative  particle  as  a  part  of  the  copula,  as  "all  men  are  not 
angels ;"  and  this  is  really  the  meaning  of  the  proposition  in  the 
first  form. 

Notation  of  Judgments. — For  the  sake  of  convenience, 
logicians  designate  the  different  kinds  of  judgments  or  propositions 
by  the  letters  A,  E,  I,  and  O.  Thus : 

1.  A,  All  A  is  B.  2.  E,  No  A  is  B. 

3.  I,  Some  A  is  B.  4.  O,  Some  A  is  not  B. 

Relation  of  Judgments. — These  four  judgments  bear  certain 
relations  to  one  another,  which  have  received  special  names. 
Thus  A  and  E  are  called  contraries;  I  and  A  contraries  E 
O  are  sub-contraries;  A  and  I  and  also  E 
and  O  are  called  subalterns;  A  and  E  are"  % 
the  subalternans,  and  I  and  O  are  the  subal-  2 
temates;  A  and  O  and  also  E  and  I  are  -g 
called  contradictories.  These  relations  will 
be  readily  understood  and  remembered  by  T  , 

*  *     *    Sub-contraries 

the  diagram  in  the  margin. 

Distribution  of  Terms. — A  term  of  a  judgment  is  said  to  be 
distributed  when  it  is  used  in  its  fullest  sense ;  that  is,  when  it  is 
applied  to  each  and  every  individual  included  under  it.  Thus  in 
the  proposition,  "All  men  are  mortal,"  the  term  men  is  dis- 


NATURE   OF   THE  JUDGMENT.  233 

tributed ;  in  the  proposition  "  Some  men  are  poets,"  the  term  men 
is  not  distributed.  In  the  proposition  "All  men  are  animals," 
the  predicate  is  not  distributed,  since  there  are  animals  beside 
men,  and  the  term  animals  is  not  used  in  its  fullest  sense. 

Distribution  in  Thought. — Distribution  generally  shows  itself  in 
the  form  of  the  expression,  but  sometimes  it  must  be  determined 
by  the  thought.  Thus  if  we  say  "  Men  are  mortal,"  we  mean  all 
men,  and  the  term  men  is  distributed.  But  if  we  say  "Books 
are  necessary  to  a  library,  "  we  mean,  not  "  all  books  "  but  "  some 
books."  The  test  of  distribution  is  whether  the  term  applies  to 
,"  each  and  every."  Thus,  when  we  say  "  men  are  mortal,"  it  is 
true  of  each  and  every  man  that  he  is  mortal. 

Laivs  of  Distribution. — The  following  principles  determine 
the  distribution  of  terms : 

1.  All  universals  distribute  the  subject. 

2.  All  particulars  do  not  distribute  the  subject. 

3.  All  negatives  distribute  the  predicate. 

4.  All  affirmatives  do  not  distribute  the  predicate. 

Reasons  for  the  Laws. — The  reason  for  the  first  and  second  is 
obvious;  for  in  universals  the  whole  subject  is  spoken  of,  and  in 
particulars  only  a  part  of  the  subject.  The  truth  of  the  third 
appears  in  the  fact  that  no  negative  judgment  can  hold  good 
unless  the  whole  of  the  predicate  is  cut  off  from. the  subject. 
Thus,  if  we  say  "  Some  men  are  not  poets,"  the  whole  class  of  poets 
is  cut  off  from  these  "  some  men,"  and  the  term  poets  is  thus  used 
distributively.  In  "  No  men  are  perfect,"  the  whole  of  the  class 
"  perfect "  is  cut  off  from  the  class  "  men." 

Substitutive  Judgments. — It  will  be  noticed  that  in  the  judg- 
ments given,  the  two  terms  compared  are  not  equal  in  extent, — 
the  predicate  usually  being  more  extensive  than  the  subject. 
There  is  a  class  of  judgments,  however,  in  which  the  two  terms 
compared  are  exactly  alike  in  extent;  as,  "Man  is  a  rational 
animal,"  or  "A  triangle  is  a  polygon  of  three  sides."  Such 
judgments  are  called  substitutive  judgments,  since  the  two  terms 
may  change  places,  or  be  substituted  for  each  other.  Thus  we 


234  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

may  say  "  Rational  animals  are  all  men,"  or  "polygons  of  three 
sides  are  triangles." 

Kinds  of  Substitutive  Judgments. — Substitutive  judgments  may 
be  universal;  as,  "All  men  are  rational  animals ;" particular ;  as, 
"Some  men  are  poets  ;"  or  singular;  as,  "Bryant  is  the  author 
of  Thanatopsis."  The  judgments  of  mathematics  are  Substitutive 
judgments,  as  2-)- 3  =  5,  or  4  2  =  24.  All  logical  definition:* 
are  examples  of  Substitutive  judgments,  for  the  subject  and 
predicate  are  precisely  equal  to  each  other. 

II.  DERIVED  JUDGMENTS. — Judgments  are  often  so  related 
that  one  judgment  may  be  derived  immediately  from  another 
judgment.  Such  a  process  is,  by  some  writers,  called  immediate 
reasoning ;  but  we  prefer  to  consider  it  under  the  judgment.  The 
two  principal  methods  of  deriving  one  judgment  from  another  are 
those  of  Opposition  and  Conversion. 

Opposition  of  Judf/mettts. — Opposition  exists  between  judg- 
ments having  the  same  subject  and  predicate,  but  differing  in 
quality  or  quantity,  or  both.  The  different  kinds  of  opposition 
are,  as  already  explained,  those  of  Contraries,  Sub-contraries, 
Contradictories,  and  Subalterns. 

Laivs  of  Opposition. — There  are  certain  laws  growing  out 
of  the  relation  of  the  four  kinds  of  judgments  which  show  how 
some  of  these  judgments  may  be  derived  from  the  others.  These 
laws  may  be  stated  as  follows : 

Universal  and  Particular. — 1.  If  the  universal  is  true,  the  par- 
ticular is  true.  2.  If  the  particular  is  false,  the  universal  is 
false.  3.  If  the  universal  is  false,  nothing  follows.  4.  If  the 
particular  is  true,  nothing  follows. 

Contraries. — 1.  If  one  of  two  contraries  is  true,  the  other  is 
false.  2.  If  one  of  two  contraries  is  false,  nothing  can  be  inferred. 
This  may  also  be  stated  thus :  Contraries  are  never  both  true, 
but  both  may  be  false. 

Sub-contraries. — 1.  If  one  of  two  sub- contraries  is  false,  the  other 
i;i  true.  2.  If  one  of  two  sub-contraries  is  true,  nothing  can  be  in- 
ferred concerning  the  other.  This  may  also  be  stated  thus:  Sub- 
contraries  can  never  be  both  false,  but  both  may  be  true. 


NATURE    OF    TH£     JUDGMENT.  235 

Contradictories. — 1.  If  one  of  two  contradictories  is  true,  the 
other  is  false.  2.  If  one  of  two  contradictories  is  false,  the  other 
is  true.  This  may  also  be  stated  thus :  Contradictories  can  never 
be  both  true  or  both  false,  but  always  one  is  true  and  the  other 
is  false. 

Illustrations. — These  principles  of  opposition  may  be  illus- 
trated by  such  judgments  as  "  All  men  are  mortal,"  "  Some  men 
are  poets,"  etc.;  and  also  by  the  abstract  judgments, — "  All  A  is 
B,"  "  No  A  is  B,"  "Some  A  is  B,"  and  "Some  A  is  not  B." 

NOTE. — These  related  judgments  are  now  usually  treated  in  Logic 
under  Immediate  Inference,  a  division  of  Reasoning.  We  put  them 
here  in  order  to  give  the  pupil  a  little  clearer  idea  of  the  nature  and 
use  of  these  judgments. 

III.  CONVERSION  or  JUDGMENTS. — Propositions  or  judgments 
are  converted  when  the  subject  and  predicate  change  places,  in 
such  a  manner  that  the  resulting  judgment  is  an  inference  from 
the  given  judgment.  The  resulting  judgment  is  called  the  con- 
verse; the  given  judgment  is  called  the  convertend. 

Law  of  Conversion. — The  law  of  conversion  is  that  no  term 
must  be  distributed  in  the  converse  that  is  not  distributed  in  the 
convertend.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  there  should  be  nothing 
more  affirmed  in  the  derived  judgment  than  there  is  in  the  given 
judgment.  Conversion,  according  to  this  law,  sometimes  re- 
quires a  change  in  the  quantity  or  quality  of  the  convertend. 

Kinds  of  Conversion. — There  are  three  kinds  of  conversion ; 
Simple  Conversion,  Conversion  by  Limitation,  and  Conversion  by 
Negation,  or  Contraposition.  In  Simple  Conversion  there  is  no 
change  in  either  quality  or  quantity.  In  Conversion  by  Limita- 
tion, the  quality  is  changed  from  universal  to  particular.  In 
Conversion  by  Negation  the  quality  is  changed,  but  not  the 
quantity.  Let  us  now  see  the  application  of  these  methods  to 
each  of  the  four  kinds  of  judgments. 

The  Universal  Affirmative. — T?he  Universal  Affirmative  judg- 
ment, called  A,  is  converted  by  limitation.  For  since  the  predi- 
cate is  not  distributed,  we  cannot  distribute  it  in  the  converse 
by  saying  all,  since  no  term  must  be  distributed  in  the  converse 


236  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

that  was  not  distributed  in  the  convertend.  Thus,"  all  men  are 
mortal "  by  conversion  becomes  "  some  mortals  are  men."  There- 
fore A  is  converted  by  limitation  into  I. 

The  Universal  Negative. — The  Universal  Negative,  E,  is  con- 
verted simply.  Since  both  terms  of  E  are  distributed,  they 
may  both  be  distributed  in  the  converse  without  violating  the  law 
of  conversion.  Thus, "no  men  are  angels"  becomes  by  conver- 
sion, "  no  angels  are  men."  That  is,  E  is  converted  into  E. 

The  Particular  Affirmative. — The  Particular  Affirmative,  I, 
is  also  converted  simply.  For  since  neither  term  is  distributed  in 
I,  neither  term  should  be  distributed  in  its  converse ;  and  the  con- 
verse must  therefore  be  I.  Thus,  from  "some  birds  are  robins" 
we  derive  by  conversion,  "some  robins  are  birds."  We  cannot 
say  "  all  robins  are  birds,"  for  though  it  is  true,  it  is  not  legiti- 
mately derived  from  "  some  birds  are  robins." 

The  Particular  Negative. — The  Particular  Negative  is  con- 
verted by  negation.  Thus,  from  "some  birds  are  not  robins" 
we  cannot  say  "  some  robins  are  not  birds,"  for  we  would  dis- 
tribute birds  in  the  predicate,  which  is  not  distributed  in  the  con- 
vertend. To  avoid  this  we  transfer  the  negative  particle  from 
the  copula  to  the  predicate,  so  that  the  convertend  becomes  I, 
which  is  simply  converted.  Thus,  for  "some  birds  are  not 
robins,"  we  say  "  some  birds  are  not-robins,"  or  "  some  birds  are 
things  not  robins"  from  which  we  derive  by  simple  conversion 
"  some  things  not  robins  are  birds." 

Other  Immediate  Inferences. — There  are  several  other 
methods  of  deriving  one  judgment  from  some  other  judgment, 
which  our  space  does  not  allow  us  to  consider.  For  a  further 
consideration  of  the  subject  the  student  is  referred  to  works  on 
Logic. 

NOTE. — In  the  latter  part  of  this  treatment  of  Judgment  we  have 
trenched  a  little  upon  the  domain  of  Logic ;  but  we  do  it  to  make 
Clearer  that  which  we  have  previously  discussed,  and  also  to  prepare 
students  to  understand  such  questions  as  grow  naturally  out  of  the 
subject. 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE   NATURE   OF    REASONING. 

1T>EASONING  is  the  process  of  comparing  two  objects  of 
-*•  **  thought  through  their  relation  to  a  third.  Thus,  suppose  I 
wish  to  compare  the  two  objects,  A  and  B,  and  see  no  relation 
between  these  objects,  but  perceive  a  relation  between  each  of 
them  and  some  third  object,  C ;  I  can  then  infer  a  relation  be- 
tween A  and  B  which  I  did  not  immediately  see.  That  is,  if  A 
equals  C  and  B  equals  C,  I  can  then  infer  that  A  equals  B. 
Such  an  inference  is  a  process  of  reasoning. 

Indirect  Comparison. — Reasoning  is  thus  a  process  of  indi- 
rect or  mediate  comparison;  it  compares  two  objects,  not  directly 
but  indirectly,  through  their  common  relation  to  a  third  object- 
Thus  in  the  illustration  given,  it  will  be  seen  that  A  and  B  are 
not  compared  directly  with  each  other,  but  indirectly,  through 
their  common  relation  to  C.  The  thought  goes  first  from  A  to 
C,  then  from  B  to  C,  and  then  from  A  to  B ;  or,  in  other  words, 
it  goes  over  from  A  to  B  by  passing  through  C.  C  is  thus  said 
to  mediate  between  A  and  B,  and  the  process  is  one  of  mediate 
rather  than  immediate  comparison. 

Three  Objects  of  Thought. — A  process  of  reasoning,  it  is 
seen,  embraces  three  ideas  or  objects  of  thought,  and  requires 
three  judgments  or  propositions.  Thus  in  the  argument, — "all 
men  are  mortal,  Socrates  is  a  man,  hence  Socrates  is  mortal," — 
the  three  terms  are  men,  mortal,  and  Socrates.  This  is  the  funda- 
mental form  or  principle  of  reasoning.  The  simplest  movement 
in  the  reasoning  process  is  the  comparing  of  two  objects  through 
their  relation  to  a  third. 

A  Comparison  of  Relations. — Looking  at  the  process  more 

(237) 


238  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

closely,  it  will  be  seen  that  an  inference  in  reasoning  involves  a 
comparison  of  relations.  We  infer  the  relation  of  two  objects 
from  their  relations  to  a  third  object.  We  must  thus  grasp  in 
the  mind  two  relations ;  and  from  the  comparison  of  these  two 
relations  we  infer  a  third  relation.  The  two  relations  from  which 
we  infer  a  third,  are  judgments;  hence  reasoning  may  also  be 
defined  as  the  process  of  deriving  one  judgment  from  two  other 
judgments.  We  compare  the  two  given  judgments,  and  from 
this  comparison  derive  the  third  judgment.  This  constitutes  a 
single  step  in  reasoning,  and  an  argument  so  expressed  is  called 
a  Syllogism. 

Relation  to  Judgment. — From  the  explanation  of  Reason- 
ing, the  relation  of  reasoning  and  judgment  is  very  readily  seen. 
Judgment  is  a  process  of  direct  or  immediate  comparison ;  reason- 
ing is  a  process  of  indirect  or  mediate  comparison.  Judgment 
deals  with  only  two  objects  of  thought-  reasoning  deals  with  three 
objects  of  thought.  Judgment vemploys  only  one  proposition; 
reasoning  employs  three  propositions.  Judgment  compares  only 
objects  of  thought  or  ideas;  reasoning  may  be  regarded  as  com- 
paring judgments  as  well  as  ideas.  One  infers  from  a  comparison 
of  objects  or  ideas;  the  other  infers  from  a  comparison  of  re- 
lations. 

Stewart's  View. — Mr.  Stewart,  in  comparing  judgment  and 
reasoning,  says :  "  Judgments  may  be  compared  to  blocks  of  stone 
lying  upon  the  ground,  upon  any  one  of  which  a  person  may 
elevate  himself  a  slight  distance  from  the  ground ;  while  reason- 
ing may  be  compared  to  these  same  blocks  piled  up  into  a  grand 
staircase  leading  to  some  lofty  tower."  This  makes  reasoning  a 
simple  combination  of  judgments,  the  last  step  of  the  series  being 
just  the  same  as  any  of  the  previous  steps. 

Objection  to  Stewart. — This  view  overlooks  the  very  essence 
of  reasoning,  which  consists  in  deriving  a  new  judgment  from  the 
relations  expressed  in  the  previous  judgments.  The  third  judg- 
ment, derived  from  the  other  two,  involves  a  process  of  thought 
quite  different  from  that  of  the  two  judgments  upon  which  the 


THE   NATUKE   OF    REASONING.  239 

inference  is  founded.  To  carry  out  the  figure  of  the  staircase,  the 
third  judgment,  or  inference,  should  be  indicated  by  placing  one 
block,  the  conclusion,  on  two  other  blocks,  the  premises ;  and  thus 
all  the  way  to  the  top,  as  high  as  we  may  build. 

Other  Views  of  Reasoning. — Writers  on  mental  science 
have  not  all  been  so  clear  on  the  nature  of  reasoning  as  could  be 
desired.  One  view  makes  the  process  to  consist  purely  of 
analysis.  Mr.  Haven,  who  adopts  this  view,  illustrates  it  as 
follows: — We  take  the  concept  man,  and  by  analysis  perceive 
that  it  contains  the  attribute  of  mortality,  and  thus  affirm  the 
judgment,  "Man  is  mortal."  But  the  term  man  also  expresses  a 
general  as  well  as  a  complex  notion ;  and  resolving  the  general 
notion  into  its  individual  elements,  and  taking  out  one  of  them, 
as  Socrates,  we  state  the  proposition  "  Socrates  is  a  man."  Then, 
on  the  principle  that  what  is  true  of  a  class  is  true  of  each  indi- 
vidual of  the  class,  it  follows  that  mortality,  which  was  predicated 
of  the  class,  may  be  predicated  of  Socrates.  The  affirmation  that 
"Socrates  is  mortal"  is  virtually  implied  in  the  proposition  "All 
men  are  mortal."  The  process  is  merely  one  of  analysis. 

Brown's  Illustration — Dr.  Brown  illustrates  this  view  by  re- 
ferring to  the  germ  contained  in  the  bulb  of  a  plant.  As  by 
analysis  we  may  find  in  the  bulb  of  a  plant  germ  within  germ, 
until  we  are  stopped  by  reason  of  the  imperfection  of  our  instru- 
ments ;  so  in  the  discovery  of  truth  by  reasoning,  we  are  limited 
only  by  the  analytic  power  of  the  thinker.  There  may  be  races 
of  beings,  he  thinks,  whose  senses  would  enable  them  to  perceive 
the  ultimate  embryo  in  the  plant;  and  there  may  be  created 
powers  of  a  higher  order  who  can  see  in  one  comprehensive 
thought  all  the  truths  of  which  mankind,  by  successive  analyses, 
are  enabled  to  discover  only  a  few. 

Objection  to  the  View. — It  is  sufficient  to  remark  that  this 
view  of  reasoning,  though  possessing  some  truth,  is  entirely  in- 
adequate for  the  full  explanation  of  the  subject.  It  would  ex- 
clude mathematical  reasoning  altogether,  and  would  render  mean- 
ingless many  of  the  rules  of  logic.  It  is  difficult  to .  see  how  a 


240  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

science  of  logic  could  be  constructed  on  Brown's  view  of  the 
subject.  The  simplest  and  best  conception  of  reasoning  is  that 
of  the  comparison  of  two  objects  through  their  relation  to  a  third ; 
and  this  will  include  every  form  of  mediate  reasoning. 

KINDS  OF  REASONING. — There  are  two  kinds  of  reasoning, 
called  Deductive  Reasoning  and  Inductive  Reasoning.  We 
shall  define  and  illustrate  each,  and  show  the  kind  of  truth  to 
which  each  is  adapted. 

Deductive  Reasoning. — Deductive  Reasoning  is  the  process 
of  deriving  a  particular  truth  from  a  general  truth.  Thus, from 
the  general  truth  that  "  all  metals  are  expanded  by  heat,"  I  can 
infer  the  particular  truth  that  any  particular  metal,  as  iron,  will 
be  expanded  by  heat.  The  reasoning  of  geometry  is  deductive 
reasoning.  The  formal  statement  in  deductive  reasoning  is  as 
follows : 

All  metals  are  expanded  by  heat ; 

Iron  is  a  metal ; 

Hence,  Iron  is  expanded  by  heat. 

Inductive  Reasoning. — Inductive  Reasoning  is  the  process 
of  deriving  a  general  truth  from  particular  truths.  Thus,  from 
the  particular  truths  that  "heat  will  expand  iron,"  "heat  will 
expand  zinc,"  etc.,  I  can  infer  that  "  heat  will  expand  all  metals." 
Whenever  we  derive  a  general  truth  from  particular  truths  we 
reason  by  induction.  The  reasoning  of  natural  philosophy  is 
mainly  inductive  reasoning.  The  formal  statement  in  inductive 
reasoning  is  as  follows: 

Iron,  zinc,  etc.,  are  expanded  by  heat ; 
Iron,  zinc,  etc.,  are  all  the  metals  ; 
Hence,  all  metals  are  expanded  by  heat. 

Relation  of  Induction  and  Deduction. — These  two  meth- 
ods of  reasoning  are  the  reverse  of  each  other.  One  goes  from 
particulars  to  generals ;  the  other  from  generals  to  particulars. 
One  is  a  process  of  analysis ;  the  other  is  a  process  of  synthesis. 
One  rises  from  facts  to  laws;  the  other  descends  from  laws  to 
facts.  Each  is  independent  of  the  other,  and  each  is  a  valid  and 
essential  method  of  inference. 


THE   NATURE   OF    REASONING.  241 

Kinds  of  Truth. — These  two  methods  of  reasoning  are 
adapted  to  two  different  kinds  of  truth.  These  kinds  of  truth 
are  distinguished  as  necessary  and  contingent  truths.  "  All  right 
angles  are  equal  to  one  another,"  and  "a  straight  line  is  the 
shortest  distance  from  one  point  to  another,"  are  examples  of 
necessary  truths.  "Heat  expands  all  metals,"  and  "the  planets 
move  in  elliptical  orbits,"  are  examples  of  contingent  truths, 

How  they  Differ. — These  two  classes  of  truths  differ  not  in  their 
certainty,  but  in  their  necessity.  The  contingent  truth  may  be 
just  as  certain  as  the  necessary  truth.  Thus,"  All  horned  ani- 
mals ruminate,"  "  The  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,"  etc.,  are  just  as 
certain  as  that  "  Four  times  three  are  twelve,"  or  "  The  whole  is 
greater  than  any  of  its  parts."  You  can  conceive  of  the  opposite 
of  one  without  an  absurdity ;  but  of  the  opposite  of  the  other  you 
cannot  conceive.  The  one  is  eternal  and  necessary,  subject  to  no 
contingency,  to  no  possibility  of  the  opposite ;  the  other  is  of  the 
nature  of  an  event  taking  place  in  time,  subject  to  the  possibility 
of  change,  and  may  be  supposed  to  be  different  from  what  it  is 
without  any  absurdity. 

Reasoning  Adapted  to  Truth. — These  two  classes  of  truths 
admit  of  two  different  kinds  of  reasoning.  Deductive  reasoning 
is  usually  applied  to  necessary  truth;  and  inductive  reasoning 
to  contingent  truth.  The  proof  of  necessary  truths  is  usually 
called  a  demonstration,  and  the  reasoning  demonstrative  reasoning; 
the  proof  of  contingent  truths  is  often  called  probable  reasoning. 
It  may  be  remarked,  however,  that  we  can  apply  inductive 
reasoning  to  necessary  truth,  though  it  is  seldom  done ;  and  that 
we  also  often  use  demonstrative  reasoning  in  contingent  truth ; 
though  each  has  a  sphere  which  seems  more  appropriate  to  its 
own  nature. 

THE  SYLLOGISM. 

Eeasoning,  as   now  denned,  is   the   process   of  deriving   one 
judgment  from  two  other  judgments.     The  form  in  which  a  pro- 
cess of  reasoning  is  naturally  expressed,  is  called  a  Syllogism. 
All  reasoning  can  be  and  naturally  is  expressed  in  the  form  of 
11 


242  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

the  syllogism.  It  applies  to  both  inductive  and  deductive 
reasoning,  and  is  the  form  in  which  these  processes  are  presented. 
Its  importance  as  an  instrument  of  thought  requires  that  it  re- 
ceive special  notice. 

Definition. — A  Syllogism  is  an  argument  so  expressed  that 
the  conclusion  necessarily  follows  from  the  form  of  the  statement. 
Or,  it  may  be  defined  as  a  combination  of  three  judgments,  in 
which  one  of  them  is  a  necessary  inference  from  the  other  two. 
Thus,  when  we  say  all  A  is  B,  and  all  B  is  C,  it  inevitably 
follows  that  all  A  is  C.  So  when  I  affirm  the  two  propositions, 
"  All  men  are  mortal,"  "  Socrates  is  a  man,"  it  necessarily  follows 
that  "  Socrates  is  mortal."  The  term  syllogism  is  derived  from  a 
Greek  word  signifying  a  reckoning  all  together,  or  reasoning. 

The  Three  Parts. — A  syllogism,  it  is  thus  seen,  consists  of 
three  propositions,  two  of  which  state  the  grounds  of  the  argu- 
ment, and  the  third  states  the  inference  which  flows  from  the 
other  two.  The  two  propositions  from  which  the  third  is  derived 
are  called  the  premises,  from  prae,  before,  and  mitto,  I  send ;  the 
inference  is  called  the  conclusion.  Thus,  in  the  example  above, 
"  All  men  are  mortal"  and  "  Socrates  is  a  man,"  are  the  premises, 
and  "  Socrates  is  mortal "  is  the  conclusion. 

Tlie  Terms. — Each  of  these  propositions,  it  is  seen,  contains 
two  terms,  the  subject  and  the  predicate;  and  the  three  propositions 
contain  only  three  terms.  One  of  these  terms  is  found  in  both 
premises,  and  is  called  the  middle  term;  the  other  two  terms  are 
called  the  extremes;  both  of  the  extremes  are  found  in  the  con- 
clusion. The  subject  of  the  conclusion  is  called  the  minor  term, 
and  the  predicate  of  the  conclusion  is  called  the  major  term. 
Thus,  in  the  syllogism  given,  Socrates  is  the  minor  term,  mortal  is 
the  major  term,  and  man  is  the  middle  term. 

Th#  Premises. — The  Premises  are  named  from  the  term 
which  they  contain.  The  premise  containing  the  major  term  is 
called  the  major  premise ;  the  premise  containing  the  minor  term 
is  called  the  minor  premise.  The  major  premise  compares  the 
major  term  with  the  middle  term ;  the  minor  premise  compares 


THE   NATUKE   OF   KEASONING.  243 

the  minor  term  with  the  middle  term.  In  the  form  of  the  syllo- 
gism given,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  fundamental  or  typical 
form,  the  major  term  is  the  predicate  of  the  major  premise,  the 
minor  term  is  the  subject  of  the  minor  premise,  and  the  middle 
term  is  the  subject  of  the  major  and  the  predicate  of  the  minor 
premise. 

Reason  for  the  Names. — The  middle  term  is  so  called  be- 
cause it  stands  intermediate  between  the  other  two  in  the  com- 
parison. The  minor  term  is  so  called  because  it  is  usually  smaller 
in  extension  than  the  other  extreme ;  the  major  term  is  so  called 
because  it  is  usually  greater  in  extension  than  the  minor  term. 
Thus,  in  the  syllogism  given,  Socrates  includes  but  one  person, 
while  the  class  of  mortals  includes  many  persons.  The  terms  are 
conveniently  represented  by  the  letters  S,  M,  and  P,  S  represent- 
ing the  minor  term,  or  subject  of  the  conclusion,  P  representing 
the  major  term,  or  predicate  of  the  conclusion,  and  M  represent- 
ing the  middle  term.  The  general  form  of  the  syllogism  is  thus 
"M  is  P;  S  is  M;  hence  S  is  P." 

Order  of  Premises. — In  the  typical  form  of  the  syllogism, 
given  above,  the  minor  premise  follows  the  major  premise.  The 
order  of  the  premises  is,  however,  not  fixed  and  invariable. 
Either  the  major  or  the  minor  premise  may  be'stated  first.  From 
Aristotle  to  Boethius,  470  A.  D.,  the  minor  premise  was  placed 
first;  since  that  time  most  writers  on  logic  have  placed  the 
major  premise  first.  The  former  has  been  called  the  synthetic, 
the  latter  the  analytic  form. 

Order  of  Conclusion. — The  order  of  the  premises  and  con- 
clusion may  also  vary.  Thus,  instead  of  stating  the  premises  first 
and  the  conclusion  last,  we  may  invert  this  order  and  place  the 
conclusion  first  and  the  premises  afterward.  Thus  "  Caesar  was  a 
tyrant,  for  he  was  a  conqueror,  and  all  conquerors  are  tyrants." 
This  form  is  not  only  valid,  but  is  regarded  by  some  as  the  more 
natural  of  the  two,  and  the  one  most  frequently  used  in  ordinary 
speech.  Hamilton  distinguishes  the  two  forms  as  analytic  and 
synthetic,  calling  the  form  just  given  the  analytic  form. 


244  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Order  of  Terms. — The  order  of  the  terms  in  the  premises  is 
also  variable.  The  middle  term  may  be  the  subject  or  predicate 
of  either  premise,  and  the  other  terms  will  vary  accordingly. 
This  variation  of  the  position  of  the  terms  in  the  premises  gives 
what  are  called  the  figures  of  the  syllogism.  There  are  four  pos- 
sible arrangements,  and  hence  there  are  four  figures. 

Figures  of  the  Syllogism. — The  first  figure  is  that  in  which 
the  middle  term  is  the  subject  of  the  major  and  predicate  of  the 
minor  premise ;  as,  "  M  is  P ;  S  is  M ;  hence  S  is  P."  The 
second  figure  is  that  in  which  the  middle  term  is  the  predicate 
of  both  premises ;  as,  "  P  is  M ;  S  is  M ;  hence  S  is  P."  The  third 
figure  is  that  in  which  the  middle  term  is  the  subject  of  both 
premises;  as,  "M  is  P;  M  is  S;  hence  S  is  P."  The  fourth 
figure  is  that  in  which  the  middle  term  is  the  predicate  of  the 
major  premise  and  subject  of  the  minor  premise;  as,  "P  is  M; 
M  isS;  hence  Sis  P." 

The  fourth  figure  was  not  recognized  by  Aristotle.  It  is  sup- 
posed to  have  been  introduced  by  Galen  about  the  second  century ; 
it  was  unnoticed,  however,  until  near  the  beginning  of  the  thir- 
teenth century.  Hamilton  discards  it,  calling  it  a  "logical 
caprice."  Still  it  is  a  possible  theoretical  form ;  and  a  syllogism 
may  be  stated  in  that  form  without  any  violation  of  the  laws  of 
thought. 

Unftgured  Syllogisms. — When  the  three  terms  are  equal  in 
quantity,  the  change  of  figure  does  not  affect  the  conclusion. 
Thus,  in  the  syllogism,  "C  equals  B,  A  equals  C,  hence  A  equals 
B,"  the  conclusion  will  not  be  affected  by  any  change  in  the 
figure.  These  terms  may  be  made  equal  by  the  explicit  quanti- 
fication of  the  predicate.  Thus  suppose  we  have  the  following 

syllogism : 

All  men  are  some  mortals ; 
All  poets  are  some  men ; 
.'.All  poets  are  some  mortals. 

Here,  since  the  terms  in  each  premise  are  exactly  equal  in 
quantity,  no  change  will  take  place  in  the  conclusion  by  any 
change  in  the  figure  of  the  syllogism.  Thus  we  may  have, — 


THE   NATURE    OF    REASONING.  245 

Some  mortals  are  all  men  ; 
Some  men  are  all  poets  ; 
.'.Some  mortals  are  all  poets. 

This  form  of  the  syllogism  was  introduced  by  Hamilton,  and 
called  by  him  the  Unfigured  Syllogism. 

Laws  of  the  Syllogism. — The  following  rules  or  canons 
apply  to  the  syllogism,  and  govern  the  mind  in  drawing  its  con- 
clusion. 

1.  Affirmative  Premises. — If  both  premises  are  affirmative,  the 
conclusion  is  affirmative.     In  other  words,  if  the  major  and  minor 
terms  both  agree  with  the  same  middle  term,  they  will  agree  with 
each  other.     This  is  evident  from  the  axiom  that  "  Things  which 
agree  with  the  same  thing  agree  with  each  other."     This  is  the 
law  of  affirmative  conclusions.     We  must  be  sure  that  we  have 
the  same  middle  term,  for  a  conclusion  is  not  always  possible 
from  two  affirmative  premises. 

2.  Negative  Premises. — If  both  premises  are  negative,  there  is  no 
conclusion.     This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  if  both  terms  disa- 
gree with  the  same  middle  term,  they  may  or  may  not  agree  with 
each  other.     There  is  no  ground  for  a  conclusion.     Thus  from 
"  A  bird  is  not  a  horse ;  a  robin  is  not  a  horse,"  nothing  can  be 
inferred. 

3.  -Negative  Conclusion. — If  one  of  the  premises  is  negative,  the 
conclusion  is  negative.     This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  if  one 
term  agrees  and  another  disagrees  with  a  third  term,  they  must 
disagree  with  each  other.     Thus  from  "  A  man  is  not  a  bird ;  a 
poet  is  a  man,"  we  infer  that  "  A  poet  is  not  a  bird.' 

4.  Middle   Term    Unequivocal. — The  middle  term  must  be  une- 
quivocal.    That  is,  it  must  be   used  in  the  same  sense  in  both 
premises,  or  else  we  may  really  compare  the  minor  term  with  one 
thing  and  the  major  with  another  thing,  and  thus  have  no  ground 
for  a  conclusion.     Thus,  "  Feathers  are  light ;  light  is  contrary 
to  darkness ;  therefore,  feathers  are  contrary  to  darkness "  is  an 
invalid  syllogism.     Here  the' term  "light"  is  used  in  two  distinct 
senses.     In  such  cases,  we  really  have  four  terms,  and  the  form 
has  been  called  a  "  logical  quadruped." 


246  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

5.  Middle   Term   Distributed. —  The  middle  term  must  be  dis- 
tributed in  at  least  one  of  the  premises.     Otherwise  the  major  term 
may  be  compared  with  one  part  of  the  middle  term,  and  the 
minor  term  with  another  part ;  and  there  will  thus  be  actually 
no   common  middle  term,  and  consequently  no  ground  for  an 
inference.      Thus,  from  "Men   are  bipeds,"   and  "Robins  are 
bipeds,"  no  inference  can  be  drawn,  since  the  part  of  the  class  of 
bipeds  that  agrees  with  "  men  "  is  not  the  part  which  agrees  with 
"robins."     The  same  is  true  of  "Black  is  a  color;  white  is  a 
color;  hence,  black  is  white."     Let  the  student  remember  that 
the  subject  of  a  particular  and  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative  are 
undistributed,  and  that  the  subject  of  the  universal  and  the  predi- 
cate of  a  negative  are  distributed. 

6.  Distribution  of  Conclusion. — No  term  must  be  distributed  in 
the  conclusion  that  was  not  distributed  in  the  premises.     This  would 
be  speaking  of  more  in  the  conclusion  than  we  have  grounds  for 
in  the  premises.     Thus,  in  "  All  birds  are  bipeds ;  no  man  is  a 
bird ;  hence,  no  man  is  a  biped,"  the  conclusion  is  invalid,  since 
the  term  biped  is  distributed  in  the  conclusion,  being  the  predi- 
cate of  a  negative  proposition,  and  it  is  not  distributed  in  the 
premise.     From  "  All  men  are  bipeds,  some  men  are  poets,"  the 
conclusion  must  be  "  Some  poets  are  bipeds,"  since  "  poets  "  was 
not  distributed  in  the  premise,  being  the  predicate  of  an  affirma- 
tive proposition. 

7.  Particular  Premises. — From  two  particular  premises  no  conclu- 
sion can  be  drawn.     For,  if  both  premises  were  I,  no  term  would 
be  distributed,  and  hence  the  middle  term  would  be  undistributed, 
and  there  would  be  no  conclusion  (Prin.  4).     If  both  premises 
were  O,  there  would  be  two  negative  premises,  and  thus  no  con- 
clusion (Prin.  2).     If  one  premise  were  I  and  the  other  O,  the 
middle  term,  to  be  distributed,  must  be  the  predicate  of  O.     The 
conclusion,  if  there  is  any,  will  be  negative  (Prin.  3),  and  its 
predicate  will  be  distributed ;  hence  there  must  be  two  terms  dis- 
tributed in  the  premises ;  and  this  is  impossible,  when  they  are 
1  and  O.     Hence  from  two  particular  premises  there  is  no  con- 
clusion. 


THE  NATUKE  OF  REASONING.  247 

8.  Particular  Conclusion. — If  one  premise  is  particular,  the  con- 
clusion is  particular.  To  prove  this  we  shall  show  that  a  univer- 
sal conclusion  must  be  drawn  from  universal  premises.  If  the  uni- 
versal conclusion  is  A,  then  first,  both  premises  are  affirmative, 
as  is  evident  from  Principles  2  and  3 ;  second,  the  subject  of  the 
conclusion  must  be  the  subject  of  one  premise  in  order  to  be  dis- 
tributed, since  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative  is  not  distributed, 
and  that  premise  must  be  universal ;  third,  for  the  same  reason  the 
middle  term  must  be  the  subject  of  the  other  premise  in  order  to 
be  distributed,  and  that  premise  must  be  universal.  Hence  both 
of  the  premises  must  be  universal  for  a  universal  affirmative  con- 
clusion. 

If  the  universal  conclusion  be  E,  then  both  of  its  terms  are 
distributed,  and  the  middle  term  must  be  distributed,  and  this 
requires  three  terms  to  be  distributed  in  the  premises.  This  re- 
quires both  premises  to  be  universal  and  one  of  them  negative,  or 
both  negative  and  one  of  them  universal.  But  from  two  nega- 
tives we  can  draw  no  conclusion ;  therefore  the  premises  must 
both  be  universal.  Therefore,  since  a  universal  conclusion  re- 
quires two  universal  premises,  if  one  premise  is  particular,  the 
conclusion,  if  any,  cannot  be  universal,  and  hence  must  be  partic- 
ular. 

NOTE. — These  several  principles  enable  us  to  dispose  of  any  cases 
of  syllogism  that  may  be  presented,  and  to  dispense  with  the  com- 
plicated methods  of  reduction,  as  taught  by  the  old  logicians. 

Incomplete  Syllogism. — In  ordinary  thought  and  expression 
we  seldom  use  the  complete  syllogistic  form.  One  premise  is 
often  omitted,  being  supplied  mentally  by  the  speaker  and 
hearer.  A  syllogism  with  one  premise  unexpressed  is  called  an 
Enthymeme,  from  en  and  thymos,  meaning  in  the  mind.  Thus  in 
the  following : 

"The  Americans  are  a  free  people, 
.  •  .They  are  happy," 

the  major  premise  "All  free  people  are  happy,"  is  unexpressed. 
In  the  following: 


248  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

"Poets  are  imaginative, 
.  •  .Bryant  was  imaginative," 
the  minor  premise,  "  Bryant  was  a  poet,"  is  unexpressed. 

An  enthymeme,  like  a  complete  syllogism,  often  expresses  the 
conclusion  with  because,  or  then,  or  some  similar  term ;  as, 
"Mr.  Smith  is  happy,  because  he  is  virtuous." 
"Aldebaran  is  a  star;  therefore  it  shines  by  its  own  light." 

The  incomplete  syllogism  is  used  in  ordinary  speech  because 
the  full  form  makes  our  argument  or  conversation  seem  stiff  and 
pedantic.  One  of  the  judgments  is  omitted  because  it  is  so 
obvious,  both  to  the  speaker  and  to  the  hearer,  that  it  would  be 
waste  of  time  to  propound  it.  The  full  form  can  be  readily  com- 
pleted when  it  is  needed  to  test  the  correctness  of  the  conclusion. 

Complex  Syllogism. — Sometimes  several  syllogisms  are 
united  in  an  abridged  form,  so  that  a  conclusion  may  be  drawn 
from  their  combination.  Such  a  complex  syllogism  is  called  the 
Sorites  or  chain-syllogism. 

The  Common  Sorites. — The  ordinary  sorites  consists  of  a  number 
of  syllogisms  in  the  first  figure,  so  combined  that  the  predicate  of 
the  first  premise  becomes  the  subject  of  the  next  premise,  and  so 
on  until,  in  the  conclusion,  the  predicate  of  the  last  premise  is 
predicated  of  the  subject  of  the  first.  Thus, 


"The  Hindoos  are  Asiatics; 
The  Asiatics  are  men ; 
Men  are  rational  animals ;  or, 

Rational  animals  have  body  and  spirit ; 
.  •  .The  Hindoos  have  body  and  spirit." 


A  is  B ; 
Bis  C; 
CisD; 
D  isE; 
.  '.AisE. 


Goclenian  Sorites. — This  order  may  be  reversed  so  that  the 
subject  of  one  premise  becomes  the  predicate  of  the  following 
premise,  and  in  the  conclusion  the  predicate  of  the  first  premise 
is  predicated  of  the  subject  of  the  last  premise.  Thus, 

' '  Rational  animals  have  body  and  spirit,  f  D  is  E ; 

Men  are  rational  animals,  C  is  D  ; 

Asiatics  are  men,  or,       •!  B  is  C  ; 

The  Hindoos  are  Asiatics,  A  is  B  ; 

.  •  .The  Hindoos  have  body  and  spirit."  I  . ' . A  is  E. 

This  is  called  the  Goclenian  Sorites. 


THE   NATURE   OF    REASONING.  249 

Two  Forms  Compared. — The  first  form  is  known  as  the  Aris- 
totelian Sorites  ;  the  latter  is  called  the  Goclenian  Sorites,  having 
been  invented  by  Goclenius.  In  the  former  we  go  from  the  terms 
of  least  extension  to  the  terms  of  greatest  extension ;  in  the  latter 
we  begin  with  the  term  of  greatest  extension  and  proceed  to  the 
least.  The  former  has  been  called  the  ascending,  and  the  latter 
the  descending  form.  The  two  forms  may  be  compared  by  plac- 
ing them  side  by  side,  as  below. 

ASCENDING   SORITES.  DESCENDING  SORITES. 

"  Caius  is  a  man ;  All  sentient  beings  seek  happi- 
All  men  are  finite  beings  ;  ness  ; 

All  finite  beings  are  sentient ;  All  finite  beings  are  sentient ; 

All  sentient  beings  seek  happi-  All  men  are  finite  beings ; 

ness  ;  Caius  is  a  man  ; 

.  '  .Caius  seeks  happiness."  .  *  .Caius  seeks  happiness. 

DEDUCTIVE    REASONING. 

DEDUCTIVE  REASONING  is  the  process  of  deriving  a  particular 
truth  from  a  general  truth.  Thus,  from  the  proposition  that  "  All 
metals  are  expanded  by  heat,"  we  may  derive  the  particular  truth 
that  any  one  metal,  as  zinc,  is  expanded  by  heat.  Stated  in  the 
formal  manner  of  the  syllogism,  we  have  the  following:  "All 
metals  are  expanded  by  heat;  iron  is  a  metal;  hence,  iron  is 
expanded  by  heat."  A  deductive  argument  stated  in  the  syllo- 
gistic form  gives  us  the  deductive  syllogism. 

An  Analytic  Process. — Deduction  is  an  analytic  process.  It 
analyzes  a  universal  truth  into  the  particulars  which  are  em- 
braced in  it,  and  affirms  of  the  particular  what  is  true  of  the 
universal.  Thus  the  truth  that  "  All  men  are  mortal "  is  seen  to 
contain  the  particular  truth,  "Socrates  is  mortal,"  and  by  the 
deductive  process,  this  particular  truth  is  taken  out  of  the 
general  truth.  Deduction  is  therefore  an  inference  from  the 
whole  to  its  parts,  that  is,  an  analytic  process. 

A  Descending  Process. — Deduction  is  a  descending  process. 
The  general  is  regarded  as  higher  than  the  particular  ;  hence  to 
11* 


250  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

go  from  the  general  to  the  particular  is  to  descend.  Deduction 
descends  from  higher  truths  to  lower  truths,  from  laws  to  facts, 
from  causes  to  phenomena,  etc.  Given  the  law,  we  can  by  de- 
duction descend  to  the  facts  that  fall  under  the  law,  even  if  we 
have  never  before  seen  the  facts ;  and  so  from  the  cause  we  may 
pass  down  to  observed  and  even  unknown  phenomena. 

Origin  of  General  Truths. — The  general  truths  from  which 
we  reason  to  particulars  are  derived  from  several  distinct  sources. 
Some  of  them  are  intuitive,  as  the  axioms  of  mathematics  and 
logic.  Some  of  them  are  derived  from  induction,  as  in  the 
example  "  Heat  expands  all  metals."  Some  of  them  are  merely 
hypothetical,  as  in  the  investigation  of  the  physical  sciences. 
Many  of  the  hypotheses  and  theories  of  the  physical  sciences  are 
used  as  general  truths  for  deductive  reasoning ;  as  the  theory  of 
gravitation,  the  theory  of  light,  etc.  Reasoning  from  the  theory 
of  universal  gravitation,  Leverrier  discovered  the  position  of  a 
new  planet  in  the  heavens,  before  it  had  been  observed  by  human 
eye. 

Basis  of  Deduction. — The  basis  of  deductive  reasoning  is 
the  axiomatic  truth  that  "Whatever  is  true  of  the  whole  is  true 
of  the  parts,"  or  "  Whatever  is  true  of  the  general  is  true  of  the 
particular."  This  principle  gives  validity  to  the  deductive 
inference.  It  is  our  authority  for  this  inference.  If  the  question 
arises," How  do  we  know  that  the  conclusion  is  true?"  we  answer 
we  know  that  it  is  so  from  the  self-evident  proposition  that 
"  Whatever  is  true  of  the  whole  is  true  of  the  parts."  The  prin- 
ciple may  be  illustrated  by  the  syllogism  "  All  men  are  mortal, 
Socrates  is  a  man,  etc. " 

Another  Statement. — The  principle  may  also  be  stated  that 
"Whatever  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  the  whole,  may  be 
affirmed  or  denied  of  the  parts."  Hamilton  expresses  it  thus : 
"  What  belongs,  or  does  not  belong,  to  the  containing  whole,  be- 
longs, or  does  not  belong,  to  each  of  the  contained  parts."  Aris- 
totle's statement  of  the  law  is  equivalent  to  the  following :  "  What- 
ever can  be  predicated  affirmatively  or  negatively  of  any  class  or 


THE  NATURE  OF  EEASONING.  251 

term  distributed,  can  be  predicated  in  like  manner  of  all  and 
singular  the  classes  or  individuals  contained  under  it."  This  is 
the  celebrated  Dictum  of  Aristotle. 

Origin  of  the  Basis. — This  principle  is  a  self-evident  and 
necessary  truth.  It  is  not  derived  from  reasoning,  but  lies  back 
of  and  conditions  all  reasoning.  The  proposition  is  the  product 
of  the  intuitive  power. 

I.  ANOTHER  FORM  OF  DEDUCTION. — There  is  another  form 
of  deductive  reasoning  in  which  the  major  premise  does  not  con- 
tain the  conclusion.  Thus,  "  B  equals  C,  and  A  equals  C,  hence 
A  equals  B."  Here  it  will  be  seen  that  the  major  premise,  "  B 
equals  C,"  does  not  contain  the  conclusion,  "A  equals  B,"  and 
thus  we  do  not  go  from  generals  to  particulars.  It  is  also  seen 
that  the  law  of  inference  in  this  syllogism  is  not  that  already 
given,  "  Whatever  is  true  of  the  whole  is  true  of  the  parts."  The 
law  of  inference  is  the  axiomatic  truth,  that  "  Things  which  are 
equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another." 

TJie  Concepts  Equal. — The  peculiarity  of  this  reasoning  is 
that  the  concepts  expressed  by  the  terms  compared  are  not  of 
different  extent.  The  three  terms  are  precisely  equal,  and  thus 
there  is  no  subordination  of  the  propositions.  This  reasoning  is 
that  which  prevails  in  mathematics.  Thus,  x  =  y,  and  y  =  4, 
hence  x  =  4.  Or  in  geometry,  the  triangle  AB  C=  the  square 
ABCD,  and  the  triangle  LMN '  =  the  square  ABCD;  hence  the 
triangle  ABC '=  the  triangle  LMN. 

Reduced  to  Previous  Form. — Some  writers  endeavor  to  re- 
solve this  into  the  form  in  which  the  law  of  inference  is  used  as 
the  major  premise.  Thus,  "Things  that  are  equal  to  the  same 
thing  are  equal  to  each  other ;  A  and  B  are  equal  to  the  same 
thing,  C ;  hence  A  and  B  are  equal  to  each  other." 

Objection  to  This. — If  this  be  insisted  upon,  we  should  insist 
with  equal  propriety  upon  placing  the  ordinary  deductive  syllo- 
gism in  a  similar  form.  Thus,  we  should  reason, — 

'* Whatever  is  true  of  the  general  is  true  of  the  particular; 
It  is  true  of  the  general  that  all  men  are  mortal  ; 
Hence  it  is  true  of  the  particular  that  Socrates  is  mortal." 


252  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

This  would  be  very  awkward  and  is  unnecessary ;  and  so  we 
maintain  that  the  syllogism,  "  A  =  B ;  B  =  C ;  hence  A  =  C," 
is  in  its  proper  and  normal  form.  And  thus  the  axiom,  "  Things 
that  are  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another,"  may 
be  regarded  as  a  law  of  inference  in  the  one  case,  just  as  the  law 
from  the  general  to  the  particular  applies  in  the  other  case. 

NOTE. — To  avoid  this  difficulty,  I  have  sometimes  thought  it  might 
be  well  to  distinguish  three  kinds  of  reasoning  :  Deduction,  which 
passes  from  generals  to  particulars ;  Induction,  which  passes  from 
particulars  to  generals ;  and  Conduction,  which  passes  from  thing  to 
thing  of  the  same  rank.  Each  of  these  forms,  when  presented  in  a 
syllogism,  would  have  its  special  law  of  inference  and  they  would 
rank  as  coordinates.  Each  can  be  reduced  to  the  deductive  form, 
and  if  either  one  is  so  reduced,  all  of  them  should  be.  It  would  thus 
seem  that  there  are  three  kinds  of  reasoning,  or  only  one  kind.  This, 
however,  would  be  a  radical  departure  from  the  accepted  theory  of 
logic.  It  is  probably  better  to  include  this  latter  form  under  De- 
duction, and  retain  the  syllogism  in  the  usual  form  in  accordance 
with  the  explanation  I  have  given. 

II.  MATHEMATICAL  SEASONING. — The  form  of  deduction 
which  we  have  just  considered  is  that  found  in  mathematics,  and 
is  thus  called  mathematical  reasoning.  This  is  of  so  much  impor- 
tance, being  the  principal  and  most  extensive  application  of  de- 
ductive reasoning,  that  it  demands  a  few  words  of  explanation. 

Mediate  Comparison. — Mathematical  reasoning  is  a  process 
of  mediate  comparison.  It  is  one  of  the  finest  illustrations  of  the 
reasoning  process  in  which  two  things  are  compared  through  their 
relation  to  a  third.  The  simplest  form  of  it  is  "  A  equals  B,  but 
B  equals  C ;  hence  A  equals  C."  Here  it  is  assumed  that  we  see 
no  direct  relation  between  A  and  C,  but  infer  their  equality  by 
comparing  each  with  B.  A  good  example  of  this  is  seen  in  the 
demonstration  of  the  square  on  the  hypothenuse,  where  a  square 
and  a  rectangle  are  proved  equal  to  each  other  because  they  are 
equal  to  the  double  of  equal  triangles. 

Kinds  of  Mathematical  Reasoning. — There  are  two  dis- 
tinct methods  of  reasoning  in  mathematics,  the  Direct  and  the 
Indirect.  By  the  Direct  Method,  one  quantity  is  compared  with 


THE   NATURE    OF    REASONING.  253 

another  through  their  common  relation  to  a  third,  or  by  a 
reference  to  the  definitions  and  axioms,  or  to  some  principle 
previously  proved.  In  geometry,  one  quantity  is  sometimes 
proved  equal  to  another  by  superposition. 

By  the  Indirect  Method  we  may  suppose  the  given  proposi- 
tion not  to  be  true,  and  then  show  that  such  a  supposition 
leads  to  an  absurdity;  or  we  make  a  number  of  suppositions,  one 
of  which  must  be  true,  and  then  show  that  all  but  the  one  we 
wish  to  establish  are  false.  This  method  is  called  the  method  of 
the  reduetio  ad  absurdum.  It  is  frequently  used  to  prove  the 
converse  of  a  proposition  when  there  is  no  good  direct  method. 

Errors  in  Mathematical  Reasoning. — There  are  two  errors 
of  reasoning  to  which  young  persons  are  liable.  The  first  is  called 
Reasoning  in  a  Circle;  the  second  is  Begging  the  Question.  "We 
reason  in  a  circle  when,  in  demonstrating  a  truth,  we  employ  a 
second  truth  which  cannot  be  proved  without  the  aid  of  the  first. 
We  are  said  to  beg  the  question  when,  in  order  to  establish  a 
proposition,  we  employ  the  proposition  itself. 

MatJiematical  Reasoning  Identical. — It  has  been  held  by 
Leibnitz  and  others  that  mathematical  reasoning  is  merely  a 
comparison  of  identicals,  that  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  =  a;  in 
other  words,  that  it  is  merely  a  statement  that  a  thing  is  equiva- 
lent to  itself.  This  opinion  is  erroneous,  and  shows  an  incorrect 
conception  of  the  subject  of  reasoning.  Even  in  so  simple  a 
proposition  as  3x2  =  6,  the  two  quantities  are  not  identical, 
though  they  are  equal  in  value :  3  X  2  expresses  one  conception 
of  quantity,  "  2  taken  3  times,"  and  6  expresses  another  con- 
ception, "  six  units."  So  also  in  3x4=  2  X  6,  we  have  two 
entirely  different  conceptions  of  quantity;  and  we  only  know 
they  are  equal  by  their  common  relation  to  12.  Thus  3x4 
=  12,  and  2  X  6  =  12,  hence  3x4=2x6.  In  geometry 
we  can  prove  two  dissimilar  figures,  as  a  triangle  and  a  square, 
equal  to  one  another,  since  both  are  equal  to  some  common 
quantity.  The  same  thing  also  holds  in  algebra. 

Force  of  Mathematical  Reasoning. — The  question  of  the 


254  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

force  and  irresistible  cogency  of  mathematical  reasoning  has 
often  been  discussed.  Some  philosophers  hold  that  it  is  merely 
on  account  of  the  pains  taken  to  define  the  terms  employed,  and 
the  strict  adherence  to  these  definitions.  Stewart  ascribes  the 
force  of  mathematical  reasoning  to  the  fact  that  the  principles 
from  which  it  sets  out — that  is,  its  definitions — are  purely  hypo- 
thetical, involving  no  admixture  of  facts;  and  that  by  simply 
reasoning  upon  these  hypotheses,  the  conclusions  follow  inevit- 
ably. It  is  held  that  the  same  thing  would  be  true  of  any  other 
science,  if  we  could  frame  our  definitions  to  suit  ourselves  instead 
of  being  obliged  to  proceed  upon  facts  as  our  data.  The  truths 
of  mathematics  "  are  necessary  in  no  other  sense  than  that  certain 
definitions  being  assumed,  certain  suppositions  made,  then  certain 
other  things  follow." 

Objection  to  this  View. — This  is  an  incorrect  view  of  the 
subject,  and  illustrates  the  liability  of  the  pure  metaphysician  to 
error,  when  he  deals  with  mathematical  subjects.  The  definitions 
of  mathematics  are  not  in  any  sense  hypothetical,  but  describe 
definite  ideas,  and  express  certain  truths  as  propositions.  An 
hypothesis  can  be  supposed  to  be  other  than  it  is ;  but  a  mathe- 
matical definition,  as  of  a  circle,  is  seen  to  state  a  truth  that 
cannot  be  supposed  to  be  other  than  it  is.  If  the  points  of  the 
circumference,  for  instance,  were  unequally  distant  from  the 
centre,  it  would  not  be  a  circle. 

The  Correct  View. — The  real  reason  for  the  certainty  of 
mathematical  reasoning  may  be  stated  as  follows :  First,  its  ideas 
are  definite,  necessary,  and  exact  conceptions  of  quantity. 
Second,  its  definitions,  as  the  description  of  these  ideas,  are  nec- 
essary, exact,  and  indisputable  truths.  Third,  the  axioms  from 
which  we  derive  conclusions  by  comparison,  are  all  self-evident 
and  necessary  truths.  Comparing  these  exact  ideas  by  the  nec- 
essary laws  of  inference,  the  result  must  be  absolutely  true.  Or, 
stated  in  another  way,  using  these  definitions  and  axioms  as  the 
premises  of  a  syllogism,  the  conclusion  follows  inevitably.  There 
is  no  place  or  opportunity  for  error  to  creep  in  to  mar  or  vitiate 
our  derived  truths.  • 


THE  NATURE  OF  REASONING.  255 

Applied  to  Inductive  Sciences. — Mathematical  reasoning 
may  be  employed  in  the  inductive  sciences ;  indeed,  some  of  their 
greatest  achievements  have  been  obtained  through  mathematics. 
By  it  Newton  demonstrated  the  truth  of  the  theory  of  gravitation ; 
by  it  Leverrier  discovered  a  new  planet  in  the  heavens ;  by  it  the 
exact  time  of  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  or  moon  is  predicted  centuries 
before  it  comes  to  pass.  Mathematics  is  the  instrument  by  which 
the  engineer  tunnels  our  mountains,  bridges  our  rivers,  constructs 
our  aqueducts,  erects  our  factories  and  makes  them  musical  with 
the  busy  hum  of  spindles.  Take  away  the  results  of  the  reason- 
ing of  mathematics,  and  there  would  go  with  it  nearly  all  the 
material  achievements  which  give  convenience  and  glory  to 
modern  civilization. 

INDUCTIVE  REASONING. 

INDUCTIVE  REASONING  is  the  process  of  deriving  a  general 
truth  from  particular  truths.  It  is  the  process  of  inferring  a 
general  law  from  particular  facts.  Thus,  suppose  that  I  ob- 
serve that  heat  expands  iron,  and  zinc,  and  copper,  etc.;  from 
these  facts  I  can  infer  that  "Heat  will  expand  all  metals."  Such 
an  inference  is  an  argument  by  induction.  In  the  same  manner, 
by  observing  that  many  men  die,  I  can  infer  that  "  All  men  are 
mortal."  This  process  of  inferring  a  general  truth  from  partic- 
ular facts  is  called  Induction. 

Unknown  from  the  Known. — Induction  is  thus  the  process 
of  inferring  the  unknown  from  the  known.  Thus,  in  the  example 
given,  from  what  I  know  of  iron,  copper,  zinc,  etc.,  I  infer  that 
which  I  have  not  observed  in  other  metals.  It  is  a  conclusion 
from  something  observed  to  something  not  observed ;  from  some- 
thing within  to  something  beyond  my  sphere  of  actual  experience. 
In  other  words,  it  is  a  process  of  thought  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown. 

A  Synthetic  Process. — Induction  is  also  a  synthetic  process. 
It  combines  special  facts  and  finds  the  general  law  which  com- 
prehends them  all.  Thus  the  law  that  heat  expands  all  metala 


256  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

comprehends  all  the  particular  facts  of  heat  expanding  each  par- 
ticular metal.  The  particular  facts  are  united  by  the  mind  into 
the  general  law;  the  general  law  embraces  the  particular  facts 
and  binds  them  together  into  a  unity  of  principle  and  thought. 
Induction  is  thus  a  process  of  thought  from  the  parts  to  the 
whole — a  synthetic  process. 

An  Ascending  Process. — Induction  may  also  be  regarded 
as  an  ascending  process :  it  rises  from  particular  facts  to  general 
truths.  The  general  truth  is  conceived  as  standing  above  the 
particular  truths  out  of  which  it  is  formed.  We  go  up  the  ladder 
of  thought  in  ascending  from  the  particular  to  the  general ;  and 
the  facts  may  be  regarded  as  the  rounds  of  the  ladder. 

Relation  to  Deduction. — The  relation  of  induction  to  de- 
duction will  be  clearly  seen.  Induction  and  Deduction  are  the 
converse,  the  opposites  of  each  other.  Deduction  derives  a  par- 
ticular truth  from  a  general  truth ;  Induction  derives  a  general 
truth  from  particular  truths.  This  antithesis  appears  in  every 
particular.  Deduction  goes  from  generals  to  particulars;  In- 
duction goes  from  particulars  to  generals.  Deduction  is  an 
analytic  process ;  Induction  is  a  synthetic  process.  Deduction  is 
a  descending  process — it  goes  from  the  higher  truth  to  the  lower 
truth ;  Induction  is  an  ascending  process — it  goes  from  the  lower 
truth  to  the  higher.  They  differ  also  in  that  Deduction  may  be 
applied  to  necessary  truths,  while  Induction  is  mainly  restricted 
to  contingent  truths. 

Kinds  of  Induction. — There  are  two  kinds  of  inductive 
reasoning,  which  may  be  distinguished  as  Logical  Induction  and 
Practical  Induction.  Logical  Induction  assumes  that  we  know 
all  the  particulars  in  inferring  a  general  truth.  This,  however, 
in  practice,  is  usually  impossible.  We  cannot  know  all  the  facts, 
so  we  assume  that  the  facts  known  represent  those  which  are  not 
known,  and  employ  the  principle  that  "What  is  true  of  the  many 
is  true  of  the  whole."  This  is  the  inductive  inference  that  is  of 
real,  practical  use  to  us.  The  former  is  called  logical,  because 
the  inference  carries  with  it  a  logical  necessity,  .without  the  pos- 


THE  ^  NATURE  OF  REASONING.  257 

sibility  of  exception.  The  latter  gives  us  a  conclusion  not  nec- 
essarily true,  but  which  we  usually  accept  as  true.  Logical  in- 
duction is  called  by  some  writers  induction  by  simple  enumeration. 

Basis  of  Induction. — The  basis  of  induction  is  the  propo- 
sition that  what  is  true  of  the  many  is  true  of  the  whole.  Esser,  an 
eminent  logician,  states  it  thus,  "  That  which  belongs  or  does  not 
belong  to  many  things  of  the  same  kind,  belongs  or  does  not  belong 
to  all  things  of  the  same  kind."  This  proposition  is  founded  on 
our  faith  in  the  uniformity  of  nature :  take  away  this  belief,  and 
all  reasoning  by  induction  falls.  The  basis  of  induction  is  thus 
often  stated  to  be  man's  faith  in  the  uniformity  of  nature.  In- 
duction has  been  compared  to  a  ladder  upon  which  we  ascend 
from  facts  to  laws.  This  ladder  cannot  stand  unless  it  has  some- 
thing to  rest  upon ;  and  this  something  is  our  faith  in  the  con- 
stancy of  nature's  laws. 

Origin  of  Basis. — The  basis  of  induction — our  faith  in  the 
uniformity  of  nature's  laws — is  said  to  be  intuitive.  It  seems  to 
be  a  law  of  our  intelligence,  something  growing  out  of  the  consti- 
tution of  the  mind.  Whenever  we  have  uniformly  observed  that 
a  number  of  different  objects  of  the  same  class  possess  a  common 
attribute,  we  are,  by  a  law  of  our  nature,  disposed  to  conclude 
that  this  attribute  is  possessed  by  all  the  objects  of  this  class. 
This  principle  of  extending  our  inferences  beyond  the  limits  of 
experience  is  universal,  and  manifests  itself  at  the  earliest  age  of 
intellectual  development.  It  may  not  always  be  expressed  in  a 
definite  proposition,  but  it  is  tacitly  assumed  and  acted  upon  by 
all  men.  It  has,  therefore,  been  regarded  as  a  natural  principle 
of  our  intelligence. 

The  intuitive  origin  of  this  principle  is  held  by  many  of  the 
German  and  Scotch  metaphysicians,  and  also  by  Cousin  and 
others  of  the  French  thinkers.  Many  modern  thinkers,  however, 
maintain  that  it  is  itself  an  inductive  truth,  a  truth  learned  from 
experience  and  observation ;  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  among 
the  first,  but  among  the  latest  of  our  inductions.  In  reply  to  this 
view,  we  remark  that  the  mind  manifests  a  belief  in  this  principle 


258  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

at  a  very  early  age ;  and  that  if  we  assume  this  principle  to  be 
an  induction,  it  takes  away  our  basis  of  inductive  reasoning. 

Limits  of  Belief. — This  principle  must  be  employed  with 
certain  limitations.  To  infer  universally  that  what  is  true  of  the 
many  is  true  of  the  whole,  will  lead  us  into  error.  "  Many  of  the 
books  in  my  library  have  green  covers,  there/ore  all  have," 
would  be  evidently  an  incorrect  inference.  "Many  dogs  bark, 
therefore  all  dogs  bark,"  is  contradicted  by  a  species  of  dog  found 
in  Greenland.  The  people  of  Siam,  who  know  nothing  of  ice, 
might  infer  that  water  can  never  be  in  any  other  than  a  liquid 
state ;  or  the  inhabitants  of  Central  Africa,  who  have  never  seen 
a  white  man,  might  infer  that  all  men  are  black.  The  error  in 
the  first  and  second  cases  consists  in  not  noticing  the  exceptions ; 
in  the  third  and  fourth  it  seems  to  be  in  not  limiting  the  law  to 
"  similar  circumstances." 

I.  CRITERIA  OF  INDUCTION. — Since  mistakes  may  be  fre- 
quently made  in  the  application  of  the  principle  of  inductive 
reasoning,  the  question  arises  how  to  apply  the  principle  cor-- 
rcctly ;  that  is,  when  we  are  warranted  in  taking  some  instances 
as  samples  of  the  whole  class.  This  leads  us  to  the  establishment 
of  certain  laws  or  rules  called  the  Criteria  of  Induction. 

Simple  Enumeration. — The  first  criterion  for  the  application 
of  the  law  is  that  of  complete  enumeration.  If  each  one  of  the 
particulars  has  the  property  under  consideration,  then  it  is  con- 
clusive that  all  have  it.  Thus,  if  it  is  seen  that  May,  June,  July, 
and  August,  which  are  the  months  of  the  greatest  growth,  are  the 
only  months  that  do  not  contain  the  letter  r,  then  the  conclusion 
is  certain  that  "  the  months  without  the  letter  r  are  the  months 
of  greatest  growth."  If  the  astronomer  finds,  by  actual  observa- 
tion, that  each  of  the  planets  moves  in  an  elliptical  orbit,  then  it 
is  absolutely  certain  that  all  the  planets  move  in  elliptical  orbits. 

This  is  what  Bacon  calls  Induction  by  Simple  Enumeration.  It 
has  also  been  called  Empirical  Induction,  because  it  does  not  go 
beyond  actual  experience.  Hamilton  calls  it  Logical  Induction, 
because  it  is  the  only  induction  which  is  necessitated  by  the  laws 


THE   NATURE   OF   REASONING.  259 

of  thought.  It  is,  however,  entirely  unimportant  in  the  discovery 
of  truth,  as  it  does  not  reach  beyond  the  sphere  of  experience. 
For  progress  in  thought,  we  need  an  induction  that  transcends 
experience,  and  enables  us  to  step  beyond  the  known  into  the 
sphere  of  the  unknown,  and  infer  what  we  have  not  yet  seen. 

A  Causal  Agency. — The  second  criterion  is  the  perception 
of  a  causal  agency  or  some  other  uniform  concomitant  which 
tends  to  secure  a  uniform  result  among  all  the  similar  cases. 
Thus,  by  observation  astronomers  found  that  eclipses  followed 
one  another  in  regular  order ;  they  could  then,  by  induction,  infer 
that  they  would  repeat  in  this  order,  and  thus  foretell  an  eclipse ; 
but  when  the  true  theory  of  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies 
was  discovered,  the  cause  of  this  regularity  became  known,  and 
the  predictions  of  eclipses  became  much  more  certain.  So  also 
when  we  observe  that  several  planets  revolve  in  elliptical  orbits, 
we  may  infer  that  all  planets  revolve  in  elliptical  orbits;  but 
when  we  add  to  this  the  principle  that  their  motions  are  produced 
by  the  action  of  centrifugal  and  centripetal  forces,  the  product  of 
whose  joint  action  is  an  elliptical  orbit,  the  conclusion  that  all 
planets  move  in  elliptical  orbits  becomes  almost  indisputable. 
The  cause  gives  a  stamp  of  certainty  that  does  not  accompany 
the  mere  multiplicity  of  cases,  on  account  of  the  principle  that 
like  causes  produce  like  effects. 

Causes  Difficult  to  Discover. — Causes  are  not  always  readily 
ascertained ;  indeed  there  is  often  very  great  difficulty  in  deter- 
mining the  causes  of  facts  and  phenomena.  These  difficulties  arise 
from  several  sources,  a  few  of  which  we  mention.  First,  the 
cause  is  occult,  not  a  thing  of  sense,  and  the  fact  that  acts  as  a 
cause  is  not  perceived  in  that  relation  to  other  facts.  Second, 
causes  seldom  or  never  act  simply ;  in  most  cases  any  given  fact 
is  the  result  of  several  causes  all  working  to  the  same  end. 
Third,  causes  sometimes  interfere  and  counteract  or  modify  one 
another's  influence.  Fourth,  the  same  result  may  sometimes  be 
produced  by  different  causes.  Fifth,  things  apparently  related  as 
cause  and  effect  may  both  be  effects  of  the  same  cause. 


260  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

II.  TESTS  OF  CAUSAL  AGENCY. — This  difficulty  in  determining 
the  cause  of  facts  and  phenomena  leads  to  the  investigation  of 
tests  by  which  we  may  ascertain  the  causal  agency  in  any  par- 
ticular case  and  thus  be  able  to  make  an  inductive  inference. 
These  several  tests  as  given  by  Mill  and  now  accepted  by  nearly 
all  subsequent  writers,  are  as  follows :  the  Method  of  Agreement, 
the  Method  of  Difference,  the  Method  of  Residues,  and  the 
Method  of  Concomitant  Variations. 

Metliod  of  Agreement. — The  Method  of  Agreement,  as  stated 
by  Atwater,  is, — If,  whenever  a  given  object  or  agency  is  present, 
without  counteracting  forces,  a  given  effect  is  produced,  there  is  strong 
evidence  that  the  object  or  agency  is  the  cause  of  the  effect.  Thus,  if 
in  every  application  of  a  given  degree  of  heat  water  boils,  iron  ex- 
pands, and  clay  hardens,  we  may  infer  that  heat  is  the  cause  of 
these  effects;  and  we  are  authorized  to  draw  the  inductive 
inference  that  whenever  the  cause  is  applied  the  effect  will  follow. 
We  must  remember,  however,  that  the  same  effect  may  be  pro- 
duced by  different  causes ;  as  the  sensation  of  heat  may  arise  from 
a  fire,  or  warm  weather,  or  a  fever,  or  excessive  clothing ;  but  it 
is  usually  easy  to  determine  which  one  of  the  several  causes 
actually  produced  the  effect. 

Method  of  Difference. — The  Method  of  Difference  is, — If 
when  the  supposed  cause  is  present  the  effect  is  present,  and  wlien  the 
supposed  cause  is  absent  the  effect  is  wanting,  there  being  in  neither 
case  any  other  agents  present  to  effect  the  result,  ^ve  may  reasonably 
infer  that  the  supposed  cause  is  the  real  one.  Thus,  we  have  a 
double  proof  that  sound  is  the  result  of  vibrations  of  air  produced 
by  a  resonant  body,  if,  on  the  one  hand,  whenever  sound  is  heard 
such  vibrations  are  found  ;  and  whenever  such  vibrations  appear 
sound  is  given  forth ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  a  bell  or  sonorous 
body  yields  no  sound  when  struck  in  an  exhausted  receiver.  So 
also  it  proves  "  that  the  contact  of  moisture  is  the  cause  of  the  de- 
composition of  animal  matter,  if,  whenever  the  latter  occurs 
moisture  is  present ;  if  dryness  checks  or  arrests  it ;  and  if  salt, 
which  prevents  it,  acts  by  detaching  the  water  from  the  meats 
which  it  preserves." 


THE   NATURE   OF   REASONING.  261 

Method  of  Residues. — The  Method  of  Residues,  or  Residual 
Variations,  is, —  When  in  any  phenomena  we  find  a  result  remain' 
ing  after  the  effects  of  all  known  causes  are  estimated,  we  may 
attribute  it  to  a  residual  agent  not  yet  reckoned.  Thus,  it  was  found 
that  the  velocity  of  sound  as  derived  by  experiment  differed  from 
the  velocity  as  determined  by  the  calculation  of  the  motion  of  air 
waves.  This  residual  velocity  was  a  perplexing  fact,  until  the 
happy  thought  came  to  La  Place  that  it  might  arise  from  the 
heat  developed  by  the  motion  of  the  air-waves.  The  result  of 
such  a  residual  cause  was  calculated,  and  found  to  furnish  a  com- 
plete explanation  of  the  variation,  and  thus  established  the  sup- 
position of  La  Place. 

Concomitant  Variations. — The  Method  of  Concomitant 
Variations  is, —  When  a  variation  in  a  given  antecedent  is  ac- 
companied by  a  variation  of  a  given  consequent,  they  are  in  some 
manner  related  as  cause  and  effect.  Thus,  it  was  proved  by  Pascal 
that  the  column  of  mercury  in  the  Torricellian  tube  was  counter- 
poised by  a  column  of  -air,  by  ascertaining  that  when  the  instru- 
ment was  carried  up  a  mountain  the  height  of  the  column  of 
mercury  diminished  in  proportion  as  the  height  of  the  column  of 
air  above  it  was  diminished. 

Now,  as  Atwater  remarks,  whenever  either  of  these  criteria 
is  found,  free  from  conflicting  evidence,  and  especially  when 
several  of  them  concur,  the  evidence  is  clear  that  the  cases  ob- 
served are  fair  representatives  of  the  whole  class,  and  warrant  a 
valid  universal  inductive  conclusion. 

HYPOTHESIS   AND   THEORY. 

In  Inductive  Reasoning,  we  cannot  always  reach  the  general 
truth,  especially  when  it  is  a  cause  or  a  law,  by  a  mere  synthesis 
of  the  facts  and  phenomena.  In  such  cases,  the  mind  frames  a 
supposition  or  conjecture,  which  is  received  as  provisionally  true 
and  tested  by  the  facts.  Sometimes  this  supposition  is  made  from 
a  few  facts,  and  other  facts  are  searched  for  and  collected  to  test 
its  correctness.  Such  a  supposition  or  conjecture  is  called  an 


262  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

Hypothesis  or  a  Theory.  "We  shall  devote  a  few  words  to  the 
explanation  of  each. 

An  Hypothesis. — An  Hypothesis  may  be  defined  as  a  suppo- 
sition or  conjecture  to  account  for  facts  and  phenomena.  It  is  a 
judgment  which  is  held  to  be  possibly,  not  certainly,  true;  and 
whose  truth  is  to  be  tested  by  the  facts.  Such  a  conjecture  may 
apply  either  to  the  cause  of  facts,  as  the  movement  in  elliptical 
orbits,  or  to  the  law  which  governs  facts,  as  the  law  of  "  equal 
areas  in  equal  times." 

A  Theory. — A  Theory  is  an  accepted  explanation  of  facts  and 
phenomena.  It  may  thus  be  defined  as  a  verified  hypothesis. 
When  an  hypothesis  is  shown  to  explain  all  the  facts  that  are 
known,  these  facts  being  varied  and  extensive,  it  is  said  to  be 
verified,  and  becomes  a  theory.  Thus  we  have  the  theory  of  uni- 
versal gravitation,  the  Copernican  theory  of  the  solar  system,  the 
undulatory  theory  of  light,  etc.,  all  of  which  were  originally  mere 
hypotheses. 

Tlie  Term,  Used  Loosely. — This  is  the  manner  in  which  the 
term  is  usually  employed  in  the  inductive  philosophy;  though  it 
must  be  admitted  that  it  is  not  always  used  in  this  strict  sense. 
Discarded  hypotheses  are  often  referred  to  as  theories;  and  that 
which  is  actually  a  theory  is  sometimes  called  an  hypothesis. 
Thus  writers  speak  of  the  phlogistic  and  antiphlogistic  theories, 
the  theory  of  caloric,  etc.,  hypotheses  which  were  never  verified 
and  are  now  discarded.  The  term  theory  is  also  used  in  mathe- 
matics in  a  different  sense,  meaning  the  principles  of  the  subject 
in  distinction  from  the  practice  of  it. 

Probability  of  Hypotheses. — The  probability  of  an  hypoth- 
esis is  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  facts  and  phenomena  it  will 
explain.  The  larger  the  number  of  facts  and  phenomena  that  it 
will  satisfactorily  account  for,  the  greater  our  faith  in  the  correct- 
ness of  our  supposition.  Thus  the  larger  the  number  of  the 
phenomena  of  light  which  the  "undulatory  hypothesis"  will  ex- 
plain, the  greater  the  probability  of  its  being  a  correct  suppo- 
sition. If  there  is  more  than  one  hypothesis  in  respect  to  the 


THE   NATURE    OF   REASONING.  263 

facts  under  consideration,  that  one  which  accounts  for  the 
greatest  number  of  facts  is  the  most  probable.  Thus,  when  it 
was  seen  that  the  supposition  that  light  was  caused  by  undulations 
accounted  for  more  facts  than  the  hypothesis  of  corpuscles,  the 
first  supposition  became  the  more  probable. 

Verification  of  Hypotheses. — In  order  to  verify  an  hypoth- 
esis, it  must  be  shown  that  it  will  account  for  all  the  facts  and 
phenomena.  If  these  facts  are  numerous  and  varied,  and  the  sub- 
ject is  so  thoroughly  investigated  that  it  is  quite  certain  that  no 
important  class  of  facts  has  been  overlooked,  the  supposition  is 
regarded  as  true,  and  the  hypothesis  is  said  to  be  verified.  Thus, 
the  hypothesis  of  the  "  daily  rotation  "  of  the  earth  on  its  axis  to 
account  for  the  succession  of  day  and  night  is  accepted  as  abso- 
lutely true.  This  is  the  view  taken  by  Dr.  Whewell  and  many 
other  thinkers  in  respect  to  the  verification  of  an  hypothesis. 

Another  View. — Some  writers,  however,  as  Mill  and  his 
school,  maintain  that  in  order  to  verify  an  hypothesis,  we  must 
show  not  only  that  it  explains  all  the  facts  and  phenomena,  but 
that  there  is  no  other  possible  hypothesis  which  will  account  for 
them.  According  to  this,  the  "undulatory  hypothesis"  of  light 
has  not  been  verified,  since  it  has  never  been  shown  that  the  phe- 
nomena of  light  could  not  be  accounted  for  by  some  other  suppo- 
sition. The  former  view  of  verification  is  regarded  as  the  correct 
one.  By  the  latter  view,  it  is  evident  that  an  hypothesis  could 
never  be  verified. 

Origin  of  Hypotheses. — The  hypotheses  of  science  originate 
in  what  is  called  anticipation.  They  are  not  the  result  of  a  mere 
synthesis  of  facts,  for  no  combination  of  facts  can  give  the  law  or 
cause.  We  do  not  see  the  law ;  we  see  the  facts,  and  the  mind 
thinks  the  law.  By  the  power  of  anticipation,  the  mind  often 
leaps  from  a  few  facts  to  the  cause  which  produces  them  or  the 
law  which  governs  them.  Many  hypotheses  were  but  a  happy 
intuition  of  the  mind.  They  were  the  result  of  what  La  Place 
calls  "a  great  guess,"  or  of  Avhat  Plato  so  beautifully  designates 
as  "a  sacred  suspicion  of  truth."  The  forming  of  hypotheses  re- 


264:  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

quires  a  suggestive  mind,  a  lively  fancy,  a  philosophic  imagination, 
that  catches  a  glimpse  of  the  idea  through  the  form,  or  sees  the 
law  standing  behind  the  fact. 

Value  of  Hypotheses. — The  value  of  hypotheses  to  science 
can  hardly  be  overstated.  Nearly  all  the  great  truths  of  the 
physical  sciences  were  once  merely  hypotheses.  The  idea  of  the 
identity  of  lightning  and  electricity  lay  in  Franklin's  mind  as  a 
mere  supposition  until  he  proved  it  by  means  of  his  silken  kite. 
The  Copernican  theory  of  the  solar  system  was  a  mere  hypothesis, 
until  it  was  verified  by  the  observations  of  astronomers.  Kepler 
made  and  rejected  twenty  suppositions  in  regard  to  the  shape  of 
the  earth's  orbit  before  he  discovered  the  true  one.  Newton's 
theory  of  universal  gravitation  was  a  mere  hypothesis  when  it 
first  occurred  to  his  mind  as  he  sat  in  the  garden  and  saw  the 
apple  fall,  and  was  accepted  as  true  only  when,  failing  at  first,  he 
at  last  demonstrated  its  correctness. 

Use  of  Wrong  Hypotheses. — Even  incorrect  hypotheses  may 
be  of  use  in  scientific  research,  since  they  may  lead  to  more  correct 
suppositions.  The  supposition  of  the  circular  motions  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  around  the  earth  as  a  centre,  which  led  to  the 
conception  of  epicycles,  etc.,  and  at  last  to  the  true  theory,  is  an 
illustration  of  this.  So  the  "theory  of  phlogiston"  in  chemistry, 
made  many  facts  intelligible,  before  the  true  one  of  "  oxidation  " 
superseded  it.  And  so,  as  Thomson  says,  "with  the  theory  that 
'  Nature  abhors  a  vacuum/  which  served  to  bring  together  many 
cognate  facts  not  previously  considered  as  related."  Even  an 
incorrect  conception  of  this  kind  has  its  place  in  science,  so  long 
as  it  is  applicable  to  the  facts ;  when  facts  occur  which  it  cannot 
explain,  we  either  correct  it  or  replace  it  by  a  new  one.  The 
pathway  of  science,  some  one  remarks,  is  strewn  with  the  remains 
of  discarded  hypotheses.  "To  try  wrong  guesses,"  says  Dr. 
Whewell,  "  is  with  most  persons  the  only  way  to  hit  upon  right 
ones." 

Application  of  Hypotheses. — This  subject  is  of  so  much  im- 
portance as  illustrating  those  mental  operations  that  belong  to 


THE   NATUEE   OF   REASONING.          *  265 

science  and  practical  life  that  I  add  a  few  more  illustrations, 
quoting  from  Thomson's  Laws  of  Thought:  "The  system  of 
anatomy  which  has  immortalized  the  name  of  Oken,  is  the  conse- 
quence of  a  flash  of  anticipation  which  glanced  through  his  mind 
when  he  picked  up  in  a  chance  walk  the  skull  of  a  deer,  bleached 
and  disintegrated  by  the  weather,  and  exclaimed,  after  a  glance, 
'It  is  part  of  a  vertebral  column!'  When  Newton  saw  the 
apple  fall,  the  anticipatory  question  flashed  through  his  mind, 
'Why  do  not  the  heavenly  bodies  fall  like  this  apple?'  In 
neither  case  had  accident  any  important  share;  Newton  and 
Oken  were  prepared  by  the  deepest  previous  study  to  seize  upon 
the  unimportant  fact  offered  to  them,  and  show  how  important  it 
might  become;  and  if  the  apple  and  the  deer-skull  had  been 
wanting,  some  other  falling  body,  or  some  other  skull,  would  have 
touched  the  string  so  ready  to  vibrate.  But  in  each  case  there 
was  a  great  step  of  anticipation  ;  Oken  thought  he  saw  the  type 
of  the  whole  skeleton  in  the  single  vertebra,  whilst  Newton  con- 
ceived at  once  that  the  whole  universe  was  full  of  bodies  tending 
to  fall." 

"  The  discovery  of  Goethe,  which  did  for  the  vegetable  kingdom 
what  Oken  did  for  the  animal,  that  the  parts  of  a  plant  are  to  be 
regarded  as  metamorphosed  leaves,  is  an  apparent  exception  to 
the  necessity  of  discipline  for  invention,  since  it  was  the  discovery 
of  a  poet  in  a  region  to  which  he  seemed  to  have  paid  no  especial 
or  laborious  attention.  But  Goethe  was  himself  most  anxious  to 
rest  the  basis  of  this  discovery  upon  his  observation  rather  than 
his  imagination,  and  doubtless  with  good  reason."  "As  with 
other  great  discoveries,  hints  had  been  given  already,  though  not 
pursued,  both  of  Goethe's  and  Oken's  principles.  Goethe  left  his 
to  be  followed  up  by  others,  and  but  for  his  great  fame,  perhaps 
his  name  would  never  have  been  connected  with  it.  Oken  had 
amassed  all  the  materials  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  his 
theory ;  he  was  able  at  once  to  discover  and  conquer  the  new  ter- 
ritory." 

12  • 


266  *  ,      MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ANALOGY. 

ANALOGY  is  that  process  of  thought  by  which  we  infer  that  if 
two  things  resemble  each  other  in  one  or  more  particulars,  they 
will  resemble  each  other  in  some  other  particular.  The  term 
analogy  is  derived  from  ana  and  logos,  and  means,  literally,  ac- 
cording to  proportion. 

Illustration. — To  illustrate  analogy,  suppose  that  two  objects, 
A  and  B,  are  observed  to  agree  in  one  or  more  qualities,  and  we 
find  a  quality  in  A  that  we  have  not  observed  in  B ;  we  infer,  by 
analogy,  that  B  also  possesses  that  attribute.  Newton  observed 
that  the  diamond  possessed  a  high  degree  of  refractive  power 
compared  with  its  density ; '  he  knew  this  to  be  true  of  some 
bodies  which  were  combustible;  hence  he  inferred  by  analogy, 
that  the  diamond  contained  a  combustible  element.  He  made 
the  same  inference  also  in  respect  to  water,  and  in  both  cases  his 
inference  was  correct. 

Law  of  Analogy. — Analogy  thus  infers  from  the  partial 
similarity  of  two  or  more  things  their  total  similarity.  The  prin- 
ciple of  inference  is, — when  one  thing  resembles  another  in  known 
particulars,  it  will  resemble  it  also  in  the  unknown.  Another  state- 
ment of  the  principle  is,  if  two  things  agree  in  several  particulars, 
they  will  also  agree  in  other  particulars.  Thus,  suppose  the  attri- 
butes a,  b,  c,  d,  and  e  are  found  in  A,  and  part  of  them,  as  a,  b, 
and  c  are  found  in  B  ;  then  by  analogy  we  would  infer  that  the 
other  attributes,  d  and  e,  are  found  in  B. 

Application  of  tfie  Principle. — This  principle  is  in  constant 
application  in  ordinary  life  and  in  science.  A  physician,  in 
visiting  a  patient,  says,  this  disease  corresponds  in  several  par- 
ticulars with  typhoid  fever,  hence  it  will  correspond  in  all  par- 
ticulars, and  is  typhoid  fever.  So,  when  the  geologist  discovers 
a  fossil  animal  with  large,  strong,  blunt  claws,  he  infers  that  it 
procured  its  food  by  scratching  or  burrowing  in  the  earth.  It 
was  by  analogy  that  Dr.  Buckland  constructed  an  animal  from  a 
few  fossil  bones,  and,  when  subsequently  the  bones  of  the  entire 
animal  were  discovered,  his  construction  was  found  to  be  correct. 


THE  NATURE  OF  REASONING.          267 

Relation  to  Induction. — The  reasoning  by  Analogy  is  closely 
related  to  that  of  Induction.  They  agree  in  this,  that  they  both 
proceed  from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  from  something  within 
to  something  beyond  the  sphere  of  observation.  They  differ, 
however,  in  an  important  respect.-  Induction  infers  from  the 
particular  to  the  general,  and  analogy  infers  from  one  particular 
to  another  particular.  Analogy  infers  more  in  respect  to  an 
object  than  we  have  observed ;  Induction  infers  more  in  respect  to 
a  class  than  we  have  observed.  Thua,in  analogy,  having  observed 
that  the  Earth  and  Venus  are  alike  in  many  particulars,  we  infer 
that  Venus  is  inhabited  because  the  Earth  is.  By  induction, 
having  observed  that  the  Earth,  Venus,  Mars,  and  several  of  the 
planets,  revolve  in  elliptical  orbits,  we  infer  that  all  of  the  planets 
revolve  in  such  orbits. 

The  Law  of  Each. — The  law  of  induction  is  that  "what  is 
true  of  many  is  true  of  all ; "  the  law  of  analogy  is  "  things  that 
have  some  things  in  common  have  other  things  in  common."  In 
induction  the  inference  is  that  of  a  unity  in  plurality ;  in  analogy, 
the  inference  is  that  of  a  plurality  in  unity.  In  the  former  it  is 
a  law  of  the  one  in  many;  in  the  latter  it  is  the  law  of  the  many 
in  one.  Induction  proceeds  on  the  principle, — one  in  many,  there- 
fore one  in  all;  analogy  proceeds  on  the  principle,  many  in  one, 
therefore  all  in  one.  Thus,  if  the  attribute  a  is  found  in  A,  B,  C, 
D,  etc.,  and  A,  B,  C,  D,  etc.,  belong  to  the  class  Q,  then  by  in- 
duction we  infer  that  the  attribute  a  belongs  to  the  class  Q. 
While  by  analogy  we  infer  that  if  a,  b,  c,  d,  and  e  are  found  in  A, 
and  a,  b,  and  c  are  in  B,  d  and  e  will  be  found  in  B. 

Probability  of  Analogy. — The  probability  of  analogy  de- 
pends on  the  number  of  observed  resemblances.  Every  similarity 
which  is  noticed  between  two  objects  increases  the  probability 
that  the  two  objects  resemble  each  other  in  some  other  property. 
When  the  two  resemble  each  other  in  all  respects,  there  is  no 
longer  any  doubt  that  a  property  found  in  one  object  is  also 
found  in  the  other.  In  comparing  two  objects,  the  differences  as 
well  as  the  similarities  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  These 


268  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

come  into  competition  in  our  judgment,  and  must  be  weighed 
against  one  another,  and  the  inference  be  given  on  the  side  which 
has  the  most  weight.  To  illustrate,  suppose  the  observed  resem- 
blances between  two  objects  are  to  the  observed  differences  as  four 
to  one;  then  we  conclude  that  the  probability  is  four  to  one  that 
the  objects  will  agree  in  some  property  observed  in  one  object 
and  not  in  the  other.  That  is,  there  are  four  chances  out  of  five 
of  such  agreement. 

Illustration  of  Probability. — The  trite  example  of  the 
proof  of  the  inhabitability  of  the  moon  is  a  good  illustration  of 
this  principle  of  probability  of  analogy.  The  moon  resembles  the 
earth  in  figure,  motion,  opacity,  relation  to  the  sun,  etc.;  but  the 
earth  is  inhabited,  therefore  it  is  probable  that  the  moon  re- 
sembles the  earth  in  this  respect,  and  is  also  inhabited.  But 
there  are  points  of  dissimilarity  which  create  a  counter-probability 
that  the  moon  is  not  inhabited.  The  moon  is  thought  to  have  no 
atmosphere  or  water ;  but  air  and  water  are  necessary  to  life  on  the 
earth ;  hence  life  cannot  exist  in  the  moon  unless  under  different 
circumstances  from  what  it  exists  in  the  earth.  Now  the  greater 
the  number  of  resemblances  between  the  two  planets  in  other  re- 
spects, the  less  is  it  probable  that  they  differ  in  the  mode  of  sus- 
taining life;  so  that  the  resemblances  noted  do  themselves  become 
presumptions  against  the  moon  being  inhabited ;  and  the  greater 
the  number  of  resemblances  the  less  the  probability  of  the  moon 
being  inhabited. 

Use  of  Analogy. — Analogy  is  of  value  in  the  discovery  of 
new  facts,  as  in  discovering  the  combustible  element  of  water  and 
the  diamond.  By  analogy  Franklin  was  led  to  make  the  experi- 
ment with  his  kite  that  proved  the  identity  of  electricity  and 
lightning.  Analogy  also  aids  induction  in  the  discovery  of  laws 
and  causes.  It  often  suggests  the  hypotheses  which  induction 
afterwards  proves  to  be  true.  It  frequently  points  out  the  road 
to  experiment  and  induction,  and  thus  pioneers  the  way  to  the 
discovery  of  truth.  The  fall  of  the  apple,  by  analogy,  suggested 
to  Newton  the  idea  of  the  moon  falling  towards  the  earth,  which 
resulted  in  the  discovery  of  the  great  law  of  gravitation. 


THE  NATURE  OF  REASONING.  269 

Argument  Deceptive. — The  argument  from  analogy  is 
plausible,  but  often  deceptive.  Thus  to  infer  that  since  American 
swans  are  white  the  Australian  swan  is  white,  gives  a  false  con- 
clusion, for  it  is  really  black.  So  to  infer  that  because  John 
Smith  has  a  red  nose  and  is  a  drunkard,  that  Henry  Jones  who 
also  has  a  red  nose  is  also  a  drunkard,  would  be  a  dangerous 
inference.  The  common  argument, — since  animals  and  nations 
both  grow  from  infancy,  and  animals  die,  therefore  nations  will 
also  decay, — is  as  delusive  as  it  is  plausible.  Conclusions  of  this 
kind,  drawn  from  analogy,  are  frequently  fallacious.  Mandeville 
uses  the  following  argument  against  popular  education :  "  If  the 
horse  knew  enough,  he  would  soon  throw  his  rider."  He  intends 
to  imply  two  pairs  of  related  terms  ;  thus,  "  As  the  horse  is  to  the 
rider,  so  are  the  people  to  their  rulers ; "  which  is  of  course  a 
fallacy,  since  the  relations  are  not  similar. 

To  be  Used  WitJi  Caution. — The  inference  from  analogy, 
like  that  from  induction,  should  be  used  with  caution.  Its  con- 
clusion must  not  be  regarded  as  certain,  but  merely  as  reaching 
a  high  degree  of  probability.  The  inference  from  a  part  to  a 
part,  no  more  than  from  a  part  to  the  whole,  is  attended  with  any 
rational  necessity.  To  attain  certainty,  we  must  show  that  the 
principles  which  lie  at  the  root  of  the  process  are  either  necessary 
laws  of  thought  or  necessary  laws  of  nature ;  both  of  which  are 
impossible.  Hence  analogy  can  pretend  to  only  a  high  degree 
of  probability.  It  may  even  reach  a  large  degree  of  certainty, 
but  it  never  reaches  necessity.  We  must,  therefore,  be  careful 
not  to  accept  any  inference  from  analogy  as  true  until  it  is 
proved  to  be  true  by  actual  observation  and  experiment,  or  by 
such  an  application  of  induction  as  to  remove  all  reasonable 
doubt. 

Influence  on  Literature. — Analogy,  in  its  popular  sense  of 
similarity,  exercises  an  influence  on  language  and  literature.  In 
many  cases,  visible  or  tangible  things  lend  their  names  to  invis- 
ible and  spiritual  things,  from  some  analogy  more  or  less  striking. 
Thus  we  speak  of  a  dear  statement,  a  lofty  idea,  a  deep  thought, 


270  MENTAL    SCIENCE. 

in  which  the  adjectives  applied  to  immaterial  things  are  drawn 
from  the  analogies  of  the  material  world.  So  also  the  figures  of 
rhetoric, — the  simile,  the  metaphor,  personification,  etc. — are 
derived  from  the  analogies  perceived  between  different  things. 
Poetry,  wit,  and  even  the  most  dignified  orations,  abound  in 
figures  and  illustrations  drawn  from  the  similitudes  of  nature. 

TESTIMONY. 

The  materials  used  in  inductive  reasoning  are  obtained  in  two 
ways ;  by  Experience  and  by  Testimony.  Experience  has 
reference  to  the  knowledge  we  gain  for  ourselves  by  perception ; 
and  includes  ordinary  observation  and  experiment.  Observation 
is  the  perception  of  nature  in  her  ordinary  or  usual  relations. 
By  experiment  man  puts  nature  into  new  or  different  relations, 
and  observes  the  result.  The  other  source  of  facts  is  Testimony, 
which  we  shall  now  discuss. 

Definition  of  Testitnony. — By  Testimony,  in  philosophy,  is 
meant  the  statement  to  one  of  the  experience  of  another.  It  im- 
plies and  is  usually  restricted  to  the  communication  of  facts  not 
observed  by  the  person  to  whom  they  are  stated.  Such  a  state- 
ment may  be  made  either  orally  or  in  writing ;  we  may  thus  have 
two  kinds  of  testimony ;  oral  and  written.  These  statements  may 
be  true  or  untrue;  they  may  be  worthy  or  unworthy  of  belief; 
and  consequently  the  conclusions  drawn  from  them  may  be  true 
or.  false.  It  is  thus  necessary  to  investigate  the  credibility  of 
testimony,  and  determine  the  warrants  of  our  belief  in  it. 

Testimony  Probable. — Testimony  is  in  itself  probable.  It 
is  natural  for  the  normally  constituted  mind  to  state  what  is  true ; 
a  statement  to  deceive  is  contrary  to  the  natural  working  of  the 
human  intellect  and  the  moral  nature.  It  is  also  natural  for  us 
to  believe  what  is  stated  to  us.  As  children  we  confide  in  the 
statements  of  parents  and  companions ;  and  it  is  only  as  we  grow 
older  and  find  ourselves  deceived,  that  we  begin  to  be  suspicious 
and  grow  wary  and  cautious  in  accepting  a  statement  as  true. 
A  belief  in  testimony  is  also  reasonable,  since  man's  observations 


THE    NATURE   OF    REASONING.  271 

are  usually  reliable  and  his  moral  intentions  trustworthy.  There 
is  usually  some  strong  motive  required  to  induce  a  man  to  testify 
to  a  falsehood. 

Character  of  Witness. — The  credibility  of  testimony  depends 
somewhat  on  the  character  of  the  witness.  It  is  natural  to  place 
more  confidence  in  the  testimony  of  a  man  of  known  veracity 
than  in  the  statements  of  one  of  known  falsity.  The  credibility 
of  testimony,  however,  is  not  determined  entirely  by  the  character 
of  the  witness.  A  bad  man  may  tell  the  truth ;  a  man  of  good 
reputation  may  tell  a  falsehood.  Still  it  is  reasonable  to  place 
more  confidence  in  the  testimony  of  a  man  of  good  reputation 
than  in  that  of  a  person  whose  character  is  questionable. 

Conditions  of  Belief. — There  are  certain  conditions  which 
limit  or  modify  our  belief  in  testimony.  These  conditions  may 
all  be  embraced  under  two  distinct  classes:  first,  those  which 
relate  to  the  testimony  itself;  and  second,  those  which  relate  to 
the  person  giving  the  testimony.  Both  of  these  conditions  are 
necessary  for  the  credibility  of  testimony;  and  if  either  one  is 
wanting,  the  testimony  is  to  that  extent  weakened. 

First  Condition. — In  respect  to  the  character  of  the  testimony, 
the  first  requirement  is,  that  it  must  not  contradict  the  laws  of 
thought,  nor  the  immutable  laws  of  nature.  Thus,  if  one  should 
testify  that  he  had  seen  a  part  greater  than  a  whole,  or  had 
demonstrated  the  inequality  of  two  right  angles,  we  should  not 
accept  his  testimony  as  true.  So  if  any  one  testified  that  he  knew 
a  man  who  thought  with  his  toes  and  walked  with,  his  eyes,  we 
are  authorized  to  refuse  to  believe  his  testimony.  A  second  re- 
quirement is  that  respecting  the  character  of  the  narrative,  the 
condition  being  that  it  should  be  explicit,  comparatively  full,  and 
self-consistent.  The  concurrence  of  the  testimony  of  several  wit- 
nesses is  also  a  condition  of  belief. 

Second  Condition. — The  second  general  condition  of  credibility, 
that  in  respect  to  the  person,  regards  his  competency  and  veracity, 
or  honesty.  The  ability  or  competency  of  a  witness  depends  upon 
his  power  to  correctly  observe  facts,  and  also  to  correctly  report 


272  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

them.  Any  lack  of  ability  in  observing  or  reporting  facts 
weakens  the  credibility  of  his  testimony.  Weakness  of  eyesight 
or  hardness  of  hearing  would  affect  the  credibility  of  a  man's 
testimony  in  respect  to  what  he  had  seen  or  heard.  The  veracity 
of  a  witness  implies  his  desire  and  intention  to  report  correctly. 
It  includes  both  the  character  of  the  person  and  the  motive  which 
governs  him  in  his  testimony.  Any  evidence  of  a  lack  of  veracity 
evidently  impairs  the  credibility  of  the  testimony.  These  two 
conditions,  ability  and  veracity,  do  not  imply  one  another,  for  it 
not  unfrequently  happens  that  where  the  honesty  is  greatest,  the 
competency  is  least,  and  vice  versa. 

Strength  of  Proof. — A  concurrence  of  these  two  classes  of 
conditions  constitutes  the  strength  of  testimony.  In  any  case  of 
testimony,  if  we  know  the  witness  to  be  a  person  of  good  character, 
that  there  is  no  motive  for  deception,  that  the  statement  is  full, 
explicit,  and  consistent,  and  if  it  coincides  with  the  statement  of 
other  witnesses, — then,  by  a  law  of  our  nature,  we  are  compelled 
to  believe  what  is  testified  to.  Such  a  belief  is  entirely  natural, 
and  almost  inevitable.  Indeed,  it  has  been  shown  that  "it  is 
always  possible  to  assign  a  number  of  independent  witnesses  so 
great,  that  the  falsity  of  their  concurrent  testimony  shall  be 
mathematically  more  improbable,  and  so  more  incredible,  than 
the  truth  of  their  statement  be  it  what  it  may." 

Testimony  Weakened. — The  probability  of  testimony  is 
weakened  in  proportion  as  the  above  conditions  do  not  fully 
co-exist.  If  l!nere  is  but  a  single  witness,  or  if  a  number  are  not 
of  good  character,  or  if  there  be  some  motive  for  deception,  or  if 
they  be  not  entirely  agreed  as  to  the  principal  facts  of  the  case,  or 
the  narrative  be  inconsistent  or  contradictory,  or  the  statement 
vague  and  hesitating, — in  so  far  as  several  or  all  of  these  con- 
ditions co-exist,  the  testimony  would  be  weakened.  It  is  held, 
however,  that  we  may  always  suppose  a  case  so  strong  that  the 
falsity  of  the  witnesses  would  be  a  greater  miracle  than  the  truth 
of  their  testimony.  This  is  claimed  to  be  true  with  respect  to  the 
testimony  of  the  witnesses  to  our  Saviour's  miracles. 


THE   NATURE   OF   REASONING.  273 

Witness  May  be  Mistaken. — In  testing  testimony,  the  possi- 
bility of  a  witness  being  mistaken  in  his  observation,  or  in  some 
inference  connected  with  the  observation,  is  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration. That  is,  the  appearance  may  have  been  just  such  as 
is  described,  but  there  may  have  been  some  illusion  of  the  senses. 
Thus  an  oar  in  the  water  looks  as  if  it  were  bent,  but  the  person 
is  mistaken  who  affirms  that  it  is  bent.  So  one  who  should 
testify  that  he  saw  a  ball  of  fire  or  an  angelic  form  hovering  in 
the  air,  might  suppose  he  saw  them,  but  be  mistaken ;  the  appear- 
ance may  have  been  as  described,  while  there  was  neither  a  ball 
of  fire  nor  an  angel.  The  witness  may  report  correctly  the  ap- 
pearance, but  be  mistaken  in  respect  to  what  it  was  that  he  heard 
or  saw.  This  must  be  determined  by  the  rules  of  common  sense 
which  guide  us  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  aided,  in  some  cases, 
by  such  scientific  principles  as  may  be  applicable  to  the  subjects 
of  testimony.  With  these  to  guide  us,  we  can  usually  satisfy  our- 
selves in  respect  to  the  facts  of  testimony  upon  which  we  are  to 
base  our  inferences. 
12* 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   UNDERSTANDING. 

THE  UNDERSTANDING,  like  the  other  faculties,  can  be  culti- 
vated, and  we  now  proceed  to  discuss  the  culture  of  this 
faculty.  In  this  discussion  we  shall  first  speak  in  general  of  the 
importance  of  such  culture,  and  then  explain  the  methods  of  cul- 
ture in  each  one  of  the  specific  forms  of  the  faculty. 

I.  THE  IMPORTANCE  OP  CULTURE. — The  culture  of  the  under- 
standing touches  the  highest  interests  of  mankind.  No  faculty 
contributes  more  to  the  happiness  and  well-being  of  man,  or  does 
more  for  the  progress  of  society  and  civilization.  The  under- 
standing is  the  faculty  of  thought,  and  man  as  a  thinker  occupies 
the  highest  position  of  honor  and  usefulness.  By  the  power  of 
thought  man  becomes  the  master  of  the  world.  It  is  the  attribute 
of  creative  thought  that  crowns  him  with  the  prerogative  of 
authority,  enabling  him  to  enslave  the  forces  of  nature  and  use 
them  for  his  comfort  and  happiness. 

For  Man's  Excellence. — The  understanding  should  be  culti- 
vated for  the  perfection  of  our  intellectual  nature.  The  power 
of  thought  is  the  highest  activity  of  the  intellect.  The  man  of 
thought  is  the  man  of  dignity  and  power;  the  thinkers  of  the 
world  are  the  men  whom  the  world  delights  to  honor.  The  great 
philosopher  is  enthroned  in  the  memory  of  mankind,  and  his 
achievements  live  with  the  ages.  Plato,  Aristotle,  Kant,  and 
Locke,  are  the  names  around  which  the  world  twines  its  brightest 
laurels.  The  discoveries  of  Copernicus,  Newton,  Kepler,  and 
La  Place,  will  stand  as  monuments  to  their  memory  when  marble 
columns  and  tablets  of  brass  have  mouldered  to  dust.  The  power 
of  thought  should  therefore  be  cultivated  for  its  own  intrinsic 

excellence. 

(274) 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   UNDERSTANDING.  275 

For  the  Progress  of  Science. — The  understanding  should  be 
cultivated  for  the  progress  of  science.  Science  is  itself  an  object 
worthy  of  our  attention ;  the  temples  of  science  are  as  beautiful 
as  the  Parthenon  and  more  enduring  than  the  Pyramids.  Science 
is  also  a  means  of  progress  and  development  to  the  race;  the 
progress  of  civilization  is  largely  due  to  the  development  of  the 
truths  of  science.  This  development  is  the  result  of  thought.  It 
was  the  profound  thinkers  of  antiquity  that  laid  the  foundation 
of  philosophy  and  mathematics.  It  was  the  profound  thinkers 
of  the  last  few  centuries  that  gave  such  far-reaching  application 
to  mathematical  and  astronomical  science.  It  is  to  the  great 
thinkers  of  the  world  that  we  owe  the  almost  marvellous  theories 
and  discoveries  of  modern  science.  It  is  thus  evident  that  the 
culture  of  thought-power  will  aid  in  the  progress  of  science. 

For  the  Progress  of  Truth. — We  need  the  culture  of  the 
understanding  for  the  progress  of  truth.  Science  itself  is  a  body 
of  truth ;  but  there  is  truth  also  outside  of  the  sciences,  the  truths 
of  morality  and  politics,  of  social  liih  and  religion.  Much  of  this 
truth,  that  has  not  yet  been  organized  into  science,  possesses  a 
dignity  and  is  of  value  in  itself,  and  thus  merits  our  best  efforts 
for  its  comprehension  and  development.  Truth  is  also  a  blessing 
to  mankind  in  its  influence  upon  his  condition  and  well-being, 
and  thus  has  further  claims  upon  us  for  its  discovery  and  dis- 
semination. Truth  is  the  herald  of  social  and  national  progress : 
it  is  the  pillar  of  cloud  by  day  and  the  pillar  of  fire  by  night,  to 
lead  the  march  of  events  towards  the  promise  of  a  brighter 
future.  These  truths  are  reached  by  the  power  of  thought ;  and 
the  understanding,  which  gives  this  power  of  thought,  should 
therefore  be  carefully  developed.  Man  should  be  a  truth-lover, 
a  truth-seeker,  and  a  truth-finder ;  and  the  object  of  education 
should  be  to  develop  this  taste  and  ability,  and  make  him  both  a 
lover  of  thought  and  a  thinker. 

For  Success  in  lAfe. — The  faculty  of  the  understanding 
should  be  cultivated  also  for  the  advantage  it  brings  to  us  per- 
sonally. No  faculty  contributes  more  to  high  success  in  life  than 


276  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  power  of  thought.  The  man  of  good  judgment,  the  man  that 
can  think  clearly  and  comprehensively,  the  man  that  can  pene- 
trate the  future  and  foresee  the  coming  event, — this  man  will 
usually  be  successful  in  the  business  affairs  of  life.  The  great 
business  men,  the  celebrated  merchants,  speculators,  and  railroad 
presidents,  are  usually  men  of  great  thought-power.  The  great 
general  plans  his  campaign  with  judgment  and  foresight,  and 
wins  his  battles  by  intellectual  combinations,  quite  as  much  as  by 
the  valor  of  his  soldiers.  Other  things  being  equal,  the  man  of 
best  thought-power  will  be  the  most  successful  in  the  business 
of  life. 

II.  NEGLECT  OF  CULTURE. — The  culture  of  the  understanding 
has  been  very  generally  neglected  in  our  methods  of  teaching. 
The  object  of  teachers  seems  to  have  been  to  fill  the  memory  with 
the  facts  and  truths  of  a  subject,  rather  than  to  develop  the  power 
by  which  these  truths  were  obtained.     They  have  failed  to  de- 
velop the  power  of  original  thought  and  investigation.     Even  in 
teaching   thought-studies,   the   memory  has   been   brought   into 
activity  more  than  the  understanding.     The  mind  has  too  often 
been  regarded  as  a  capacity  to  be  filled,  rather  than  an  activity  to 
be  developed.     Teachers  have  aimed  to  put  knowledge  into  the 
mind,  as  we  pour  water  into  a  vessel,  or  shovel  coal  into  e  coal- 
bin  ;  while  the  power  that  originates  knowledge,  that  works  up 
ideas  and  thoughts  into  laws  and  principles,  has  been  neglected. 
One  reason  why  the  so-called  "self-educated  men"  often  show 
more  thought-power  than  those  who  have  been  trained  in  our 
schools,  is  that,  following  the  bent  of  their  own  minds,  they  have 
developed  the  power  of  original  thought. 

III.  TIME  FOR  CULTURE. — The  culture  of  the  understanding 
should  begin  early  in  life.     While  perception  and  memory  seem 
to  be  more  active  in  youth,  the  understanding  is  also  active  at  an 
early  age.     The  inquiry  after  the  causes  of  facts  and  phenomena, 
and  the  drawing  of  conclusions  from  experience,  indicate  an  early 
activity  of  these  powers  of  thought.     The  faculty  of  judgment,  by 
which  comparisons  are  made,  is  active  from  the  earliest  dawn  of 


THE   CULTURE    OF   THE   UNDERSTANDING.  277 

consciousness;  and  the  power  of  reasoning  also  awakens  very 
early.  Young  persons  should  therefore  be  taught  so  as  to  give 
activity  to  the  powers  of  thought. 

Adapted  to  the  Age. — This  culture  should  be  carefully 
adapted  to  the  age  and  development  of  the  pupils.  Children 
should  be  taught  to  compare  objects,  to  inquire  for  causes,  and  to 
see  the  relation  of  things  to  one  another.  Inductive  reasoning 
should  precede  deductive;  causes  should  be  presented  before  laws 
and  principles ;  and  deductive  thought  and  the  generalizations  of 
science  should  be  introduced  as  the  mind  becomes  prepared  for 
them. 

IV.  DIVISIONS  FOR  DISCUSSION. — The  discussion  of  the  culture 
of  the  understanding  is  conveniently  presented  under  the  follow- 
ing general  heads :  the  Culture  of  Generalization  and  Classifica- 
tion, the  Culture  of  the  Judgment,  and  the  Culture  of  Reasoning. 
For  the  Culture  of  Abstraction  but  little  can  be  directly  done  by 
the  teacher;  and  we  shall  therefore  give  no  formal  discussion  of 
it,  but  merely  make  a  few  suggestions  in  the  closing  paragraph 
of  the  present  chapter. 

V.  CULTURE  OF  ABSTRACTION. — The  power   of  Abstraction 
operates  spontaneously  at   a  very  early  age.     The   mind   soon 
learns  to  draw  qualities  away  from  the  objects  in  which  they  are 
perceived,  and  to  regard  them   as  distinct  objects  of  thought. 
There   is   but   little  need   of  special   exercises  to  cultivate  this 
power.     A  few  lessons   to   lead   pupils   to   abstract  the  various 
qualities  from  objects  might  be  given.     A  careful  drill  on  the 
qualities  as  expressed  in  objects  will  be  sufficient  to  give  the 
power  of  conceiving  them  independently  of  objects.     Care  should 
be  taken,  however,  not  to  keep  the  mind  on  the  concrete  too 
long.     To  hold  the  mind  down  to  tangible  objects  when  it  is  pre- 
pared for  abstract  thought,  would  be  to  enfeeble  its  powers  and 
dwarf  its  growth.     Something  can  be  done  also  by  the  teacher 
to  cultivate  a  taste  for  abstract  thought;  and  such   culture   is 
highly  recommended. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   CULTURE   OF    GENERALIZATION. 

ENERALIZATION,  or  Conception,  is  a  spontaneous  activity 
of  the  mind,  and  in  its  simpler  and  ordinary  forms  de- 
velops naturally  with  the  growth  of  the  other  faculties.  Some- 
thing may  be  done  by  the  teacher,  however,  to  lead  the  student 
to  general  ideas  and  the  use  of  general  terms.  Special  lessons 
may  be  given  to  lead  the  minds  of  children  from  the  particular 
to  the  general,  from  percepts  to  concepts.  Individual  objects 
may  be  presented  to  the  senses,  and  the  mind  be  gradually  led  to 
the  formation  of  general  notions  embracing  these  objects. 

In  Different  Studies. — This  culture  may  be  given  in  several 
of  the  school-room  studies.  In  geography,  individual  rivers  may 
be  grouped  together  into  river-systems,  particular  mountains  into 
mountain-chains,  etc.  In  teaching  definitions,  which  are  usually 
the  description  of  general  notions,  the  pupil  may  be  led  from 
particular  examples  to  the  general  idea ;  indeed,  a  clear  and 
definite  idea  of  the  general  notion  is  only  possible  as  we  have 
distinct  and  definite  ideas  of  particulars.  In  teaching  gram- 
mar, lessons  should  be  given  on  particular  words  as  the  names  of 
objects,  from  which  the  pupil  can  be  led  to  the  general  definition 
of  a  noun  as  the  name  of  an  object ;  and  the  same  method  should 
be  pursued  with  the  other  parts  of  speech.  Studies  presented  in 
this  manner  will  aid  the  mind  in  developing  the  power  of  gen 
eralization. 

JHore  Direct  Culture. — Besides  this  general  culture  of  con- 
ception afforded  incidentally  by  experience  and  the  studies  of  the 
school,  there  are  some  special  exercises  that  may  be  employed  for 
this  culture.  These  exercises  may  be  included  under  three  gen- 

(278) 


THE   CULTURE    OF   GENERALIZATION.  279 

eral  heads;  Logical  Analysis,  Logical  Division,  and  Logical  Defi- 
nition. 

I.  BY  LOGICAL  ANALYSIS. — By  Logical  Analysis  is  meant  the 
examination  and  minute  observation  of  the  concept  and  the  attri- 
butes which  it  embraces.  It  aids  us  in  attaining  to  the  several 
qualities  of  conception ;  namely,  clearness,  distinctness,  and 
adequacy.  A  few  remarks  on  the  formation  of  conceptions  and 
the  use  of  logical  analysis  will  be  appropriate. 

Form  Real  Notions. — We  should  be  careful  to  form  actual 
and  definite  general  notions,  and  not  be  satisfied  merely  with 
general  terms.  The  general  notion  must  be  preserved  by  a  word ; 
but  there  is  a  tendency  to  use  words  without  a  definite  conception 
of  their  meaning.  We  often  suppose  we  have  in  our  minds  the 
ideas  of  things,  when  we  really  have  only  a  word  which  we  use 
vaguely  and  blindly.  Many  of  our  general  terms  are  mere 
hollow  forms,  without  any  content  of  meaning.  What  we  need  is 
to  fill  the  mould  with  ideas,  so  that  it  will  be  no  longer  an  empty 
form,  but  a  solid  content.  This  reality  of  conceptions  may  be  ob- 
tained by  a  careful  and  exhaustive  analysis  of  our  general  notions. 

Form,  Clear  Conceptions. — We  should  aim,  first  of  all,  to 
give  the  quality  of  clearness  to  our  conceptions.  The  tendency  is 
to  use  terms  without  their  creating  in  the  mind  the  ideas  for 
which  they  stand.  General  terms  are  often  used  like  the 
algebraic  symbols,  which  stand  for  quantities  without  our  think- 
ing of  any  particular  quantity  until  the  result  is  obtained.  In 
using  such  words  as  virtue,  liberty,  religion,  church,  etc.,  we  often 
do  not  think  of  what  is  contained  in  them ;  but  pass  them  on  as 
a  banker  hands  out  bills,  without  thinking  of  the  gold  and  silver 
they  stand  for,  or  the  articles  they  would  purchase.  We  can 
avoid  the  evil  consequences  of  this  habit  by  frequently  referring 
to  these  words,  and  allowing  them  to  awaken  the  full  conception 
for  which  they  are  the  symbols.  Special  efforts  to  analyze  con- 
cepts into  their  marks  are  also  necessary  for  the  reality  and  clear- 
ness of  our  conceptions.  , 

Form  Distinct  Conceptions. — There  should  be  special  pains 


280  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

taken  to  cultivate  distinctness  of  conception.  By  distinctness  of 
conception,  as  previously  explained,  is  meant  the  cognition  of  the 
marks  or  attributes  of  a  concept.  The  tendency  is  to  rest  satisfied 
•with  merely  clearness  of  conception,  and  we  thus  fail  to  attain 
distinctness  in  our  general  notions.  This  error  is  seen  even  in 
our  perceptions;  how  many  of  us  can  point  out  the  marks  of  the 
handwriting  which  we  could  identify  under  oath,  or  even  de- 
scribe the  face  of  a  friend  with  whom  we  are  familiar  ?  In  the 
cognition  of  our  conceptions  we  are  still  more  liable  to  indistinct- 
ness; indistinct  perceptions  lead  to  the  habit  of  indistinct  con- 
ceptions. We  can  correct  this  error  by  increasing  the  distinct- 
ness of  our  perceptions.  Our  conceptions  will  also  become  dis- 
tinct by  a  careful  analysis  of  their  marks,  and  a  comparison  with 
other  concepts ;  and  special  efforts  should  be  made  for  the  attain- 
ment of  this  quality. 

Form  Adequate  Conceptions. — We  should  also  aim  to  make 
our  conceptions  adequate.  That  is,  we  should  endeavor  not  only 
to  know  the  marks  of  our  conceptions,  but  also  to  know  the 
marks  of  the  marks.  Adequacy  refers  also  to  the  number  and 
relative  importance  of  the  marks.  A  concept  may  be  perfectly 
clear  and  distinct,  and  still  be  a  very  inadequate  representation  of 
the  class  of  things  for  which  it  stands,  as  it  may  connote  but  two 
or  three  of  the  many  attributes,  and  those  of  trifling  importance. 
Thus  we  may  have  a  clear  and  distinct  concept  of  man  as  "  a  two- 
legged  animal  without  feathers,"  but  it  is  inadequate,  as  it  omits 
the  crowning  mark  of  rationality.  Concepts  may  be  made  ade- 
quate by  a  careful  analysis  of  their  marks,  and  a  comparison  of 
them  with  other  marks  or  attributes.  Accurate  perception  will 
also  aid  us  in  this  work,  as  the  concrete  is  the  basis  of  the  abstract 
and  general.  The  examination  of  the  meaning  of  words  in  the 
dictionary,  tracing  the  definition  of  the  terms  employed  in  any 
given  definition,  will  also  be  found  a  useful  exercise  in  attaining 
to  the  attribute  of  adequacy. 

Use  of  Notatiye  Conceptions. — We  may  enlarge  or  deepen 
the  significance  of  concepts  by  reaching  their  marks  through  the 


THE   CULTURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  281 

notative  meaning  of  terms.  To  most  persons,  all  terms  are  merely 
symbolical,  suggesting  none  of  the  attributes  of  the  concept. 
Thus,  such  words  as  education,  faculty,  philosophy,  oligarchy,  etc., 
are  to  most  minds  merely  symbolical ;  while  to  the  scholar  who 
understands  their  origin,  they  suggest  certain  leading  marks  of 
the  concept  for  which  they  stand.  A  careful  attention  to  the 
structure  of  words  will  often  suggest  some  of  the  marks  of  the 
concept.  The  study  of  the  ancient  languages  or  of  etymology  is 
found  valuable  in  this  respect.  Thus,  a  knowledge  of  the  ety- 
mology of  such  words  as  perception,  conception,  abstraction,  re- 
ligion, synthesis,  analysis,  etc.,  will  immediately  suggest  to  the 
mind  the  marks  of  the  concepts  for  which  they  stand.  It  must 
be  remembered,  however,  that  the  etymology  of  the  word  will 
not  always  give  a  correct  notion  of  the  marks  of  the  concept,  on 
account  of  changes  in  the  meaning  of  the  term  since  its  intro- 
duction into  the  language ;  as,  lunacy,  heathen,  subtraction,  etc. 

Increase  the  Meaning  of  Concepts. — We  can  thus  increase 
the  meaning  of  our  concepts  by  study  and  experience.  General 
terms  have  not  the  same  significance  to  different  minds ;  they  are 
much  richer  in  meaning  to  some  minds  than  to  others.  The 
term  home,  for  instance,  has  but  little  significance  to  one  who  has 
never  experienced  its  influence ;  but  to  those  who  have  enjoyed 
its  blessings,  it  is  filled  with  the  rich  experience  of  a  mother's 
love,  or  father's  care,  and  a  thousand  hallowed  memories.  A 
large  experience  thus  deepens  and  broadens  the  significance  of 
our  general  terms.  Some  authors  seem  to  load  their  words  with 
a  marvellous  fullness  and  richness  of  meaning,  resulting  from 
profound  study  and  reflection.  They  have,  as  it  were,  poured 
into  the  verbal  form  a  richness  and  beauty  from  their  souls,  that 
seem  to  irradiate  their  words  with  a  light  almost  divine.  By 
study  and  reflection  we  can  increase  and  enrich  the  meaning  of 
our  own  words,  add  force  and  influence  to  our  expression,  and 
beautify  and  strengthen  our  mother  tongue. 

II.  BY  LOGICAL  DIVISION. — The  careful  logical  division  of 
concepts  aids  in  giving  clearness  and  distinctness  to  our  con- 


.  282  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

ceptions.  A  distinct  view  of  the  subordinate  conceptions  con- 
tained in  any  given  concept  widens  and  deepens  our  idea  of  that 
concept.  As  Atwater  well  remarks,  "The  thorough  logical 
division  of  any  subject,  thus  defining  the  sphere  and  the  objects 
it  includes,  greatly  assists  the  clear,  thorough,  and  facile  dis- 
^cussion  of  it.  It  also  aids  invention.  The  most  sterile  mind  will 
find  something  to  say  on  a  subject  well  mapped  out.  Indeed,  so 
to  map  it  out,  is  to  say  something  important."  The  logical 
division  of  our  concepts  will  thus  aid  us  in  gaining  clear  con- 
ceptions of  them,  and  also  give  breadth  and  depth  to  our  general 
notions. 

Rules  for  Logical  Division. — In  making  these  logical 
divisions,  the  student  must  be  careful,  to  observe  the  following 
rules: 

RULE  I. — In  logical  division  there  should  be  but  one  principle 
of  division.  Thus  it  would  be  incorrect  to  divide  mankind  into 
Europeans,  Americans,  Pagans,  and  Christians,  since  the  first 
division  is  according  to  locality  and  the  second  according  to  re- 
ligion. So  also  it  would  be  wrong  to  divide  the  books  of  a 
library  into  poetry,  history  t  Latin,  French,  morocco,  and  cloth. 
The  violation  of  this  rule  leads  to  what  is  called  "  cross-divisions," 
in  which  the  same  object  would  be  embraced  under  two  or  more 
classes.  Unobserved  cross-divisions  are  a  fruitful  source  of  per- 
plexity and  confusion,  and  care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  them. 

RULE  II. — In  logical  division  the  members  should  exclude  one 
another.  This  rule  flows  from  the  previous  one;  and  a  violation 
of  the  former  leads  to  a  violation  of  the  latter.  Thus  to  divide 
lines  into  straight,  curved,  circular,  and  elliptical,  or  ideas  into 
particular,  general,  abstract,  and  concrete,  would  violate  this 
rule,  as  some  of  the  divisions  are  included  in  others.  The 
preacher  who  proposed  to  prove  a  certain  doctrine  by  reason, 
revelation,  and  St.  Paul,  fell  into  this  error,  forgetting  that  reve- 
lation included  the  testimony  of  Paul.  A  violation  of  this  rule 
offends  the  careful  thinker,  and  confuses  the  minds  of  those  who 
may  not  notice  the  error.  Carelessness  in  this  respect  reminds 


THE   CULTUEE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  283 

one  of  the  Chinese,  who  are  said  to  divide  the  race  into  first 
Chinese,  then  men,  and  then  women. 

RULE  III. — In  logical  division,  the  division  "should  be  complete. 
That  is,  it  should  include  all  the  species;  or,  in  other  words,  the 
sum  of  the  species  should  be  exactly  equal  to  the  genus  divided. 
This  rule  is  violated  by  leaving  out  any  of  the  parts  of  a  genus,  as 
when  we  divide  actions  into  good  and  bad,  and  omit  those  which 
are  indifferent.  So  also  when  a  subdivision  is  coordinated  with  a 
division;  as  to  divide  bipeds  into  men  and  robins,  rather  than 
into  men  and  birds.  The  rule  is  also  violated  by  dividing  a 
member  too  far;  as  to  divide  polygons  into  triangles,  quadrilat- 
erals, parallelograms,  squares,  etc.  The  parts  named  should  be 
of  the  same  rank  with  one  another,  and  the  sum  of  all  should 
exactly  equal  the  concept  divided. 

RULE  IV. — Logical  division  should  proceed  from  proximate 
genera  to  proximate  species.  There  should  be  no  leaping  from 
one  rank  to  a  remote  rank  in  the  series  of  higher  and  lower  con- 
ceptions, but  a  stepping  from  one  to  the  next  lower.  Thus  to 
divide  animals  into  horses,  robins,  salmon,  etc.,  without  previously 
dividing  them  into  mammals,  birds,  and  fishes,  would  be  a  viola- 
tion of  this  rule.  We  should  become  utterly  confused  in  botany 
if  we  were  to  begin  to  arrange  the  vegetable  kingdom  under 
roses,  lilies,  oaks,  and  lichens.  Naturalists  have  a  regular 
system  of  classification  so  that  they  can  pass  step  by  step  from  the 
highest  class  to  the  lowest.  Thus  in  Botany  the  vegetable  king- 
dom is  divided  into  the  Phaenogamia  and  Cryptogamia,  which 
are  divided  and  subdivided  until  we  come  to  the  lowest  species. 
In  Zoology  the  animal  kingdom  is  divided  into  four  great 
branches, — Vertebrates,  Articulates,  Mollusks,  and  Radiates; 
from  which  we  proceed  by  successive  divisions  to  species  and 
individuals.  These  divisions  are  the  type  of  that  logical  ac- 
curacy with  which  we  should  endeavor  to  divide  any  subject 
which  we  may  be  discussing. 

Use  of  These  Rules. — These  rules  are  a  necessity  to  scientific 
thought,  and  are  invaluable  to  all  clear  thinking.  To  those  who 


284  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

desire  to  attain  to  clearness  and  distinctness  of  conceptions,  prac- 
tice in  logical  division  is  indispensable.  The  writing  of  logical 
outlines  in  the  different  studies  is  of  great  value  in  the  cultivation 
of  the  power  to  make  clear  distinctions  and  obtain  a  logical  grasp 
of  any  subject. 

III.  BY  LOGICAL  DEFINITION. — Exercises  in  logical  defi- 
nition are  also  valuable  in  unfolding  our  conceptions.  Logical 
definition,  including  both  the  genus  and  the  specific  difference, 
gives  clearness,  definiteness,  and  adequacy  to  our  conceptions.  It 
separates  a  conception  from  all  other  conceptions  by  fixing  upon 
and  presenting  the  essential  and  distinctive  property  or  properties 
of  the  conception  defined.  The  value  of  exercises  in  logical 
definition  is  thus  readily  apparent.  The  distinct  explication  of 
the  marks  of  concepts  is  of  fundamental  importance  in  accurate 
thought  and  discourse,  and  this  is  given  in  logical  definition. 

Rules  for  Logical  Definition. — In  logical  definition,  the 
following  rules  are  to  be  observed : 

RULE  I. — A  logical  definition  should  unfold  the  essence  of  tlie 
notion  defined.  That  is,  it  should  be  by  genus  and  differentia. 
The  concept  defined  should  first  be  put  into  the  next  higher  class 
and  then  distinguished  from  other  species  of  that  class.  Thus  in 
defining  man,  we  must  first  say  he  is  an  animal,  and  then  dis- 
tinguish him  from  other  animals  by  the  attribute  of  rationality, 
saying,  "  Man  is  a  rational  animal." 

Should  be  Essential  Attributes. — The  definition  must  embrace 
essential  and  not  accidental  attributes ;  and  to  discover  these  re- 
quires rigid  analysis  and  careful  discrimination.  The  statement 
of  differences  that  are  not  essential  will  give  a  definition  that  may 
be  logical  in  form  but  worthless  in  thought.  The  old  Platonic 
definition,  "Man  is  a  two-legged  animal  without  feathers,"  was 
easily  shown  by  Diogenes  to  be  worthless  by  presenting  a  plucked 
chicken  as  Plato's  man.  The  uneducated  man  often  sees  only 
the  accidental  attributes ;  the  disciplined  mind  seeks  for  the  dis- 
tinguishing marks,  and  is  not  satisfied  until  it  has  found  them. 
Such  a  habit  leads  to  definite  and  adequate  notions  of  our  gen- 
eral ideas. 


THE   CULTURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  285 

RULE  II. — A  logical  definition  should  be  adequate.  That  is, 
it  should  have  precisely  the  same  extension  as  the  thing  denned. 
If  the  definition  includes  more  than  the  notion  defined,  it  is  too 
broad ;  if  it  includes  less,  it  is  too  narrow.  Thus,  the  definition, 
"Man  is  an  animal,"  is  too  broad ;  while  the  definition,  "A  poly- 
gon is  a  triangle,"  is  too  narrow.  So  "  Grammar  is  the  science 
of  language,"  is  too  broad ;  and  "  A  triangle  is  a  figure  having 
three  rectilinear  sides,"  is  too  narrow.  The  test  of  an  adequate 
definition  is  that  it  may  be  simply  converted ;  thus,  "  A  man  is  a 
rational  animal,"  becomes,  when  converted,  "A  rational  animal 
is  man."  An  inadequate  definition  will  not  admit  of  simple 
conversion. 

RULE  III. — A  logical  definition  should  be  by  affirmatives  and 
not  by  negatives.  That  is,  it  should  not  state  what  a  concept  is 
not,  but  what  it  is ;  for  it  does  not  give  us  a  notion  of  what  a 
thing  is  by  stating  what  it  is  not.  To  define  man  as  not  an  angel 
or  not  a  brute,  does  not  give  us  either  a  distinct  or  a  clear  idea 
of  man.  The  definition  of  parallel  lines  as  "  lines  which  do  not 
meet,"  or  of  a  straight  line  as  "  one  that  does  not  change  its  direc- 
tion," is  not  satisfactory  to  the  clear  thinker.  Negative  words 
are,  however,  found  in  the  language,  and  are  sometimes  useful  in 
expressing  shades  of  thought,  and  require  a  negative  definition; 
as,  unholy,  insincere,  etc. 

RULE  IV. — A  logical  definition  should  be  perspicuous.  That 
is,  it  should  not  be  expressed  in  vague,  ambiguous,  or  senseless 
language.  Care  should  be  taken  not  to  employ  figurative  ex- 
pressions in  definitions.  "Tropes  and  figures,"  says  Krug,  "are 
logical  hieroglyphics ;  they  do  not  indicate  the  thing  itself,  but 
only  something  similar."  Thus  to  say,  "  Truth  is  the  grand  scope 
of  all  existence,"  or  "  Logic  is  the  light-house  of  the  understand- 
ing," or  "  The  Divine  nature  is  a  circle  whose  centre  is  everywhere 
and  circumference  nowhere,"  may  do  as  rhetorical  expressions, 
but  have  no  value  as  definitions. 

RULE  V. — A  logical  definition  should  not  be  tautological.  That 
is,  it  should  not  contain  the  name  of  the  thing  to  be  defined. 


286  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Neither  must  we  use  a  derivative  or  synonym  or  correlative  of  the 
term,  which  cannot  be  explained  except  through  the  term  to  be 
defined.  Thus,  such  definitions  as  "  Life  is  the  vital  force,"  or 
"  Law  is  a  lawful  command,"  are  of  no  value ;  for  the  definition 
uses  the  very  word  we  wish  to  define.  This  fault  is  called  defin- 
ing in  a  circle,  since  such  a  definition  returns  upon  itself.  Thus, 
when  we  define  light  as  "that  which  illuminates,"  and  "that 
which  illuminates"  as  light,  we  are  defining  in  a  circle.  The 
error  is  one  to  be  carefully  guarded  against,  as  we  are  liable  to 
fall  into  it  unawares.  We  can  hardly  ridicule  the  boy  who  said 
"  ratio  is  proportion,"  and  then  "  proportion  is  ratio,"  when  we 
remember  that  lexicographers  have  defined  a  plank  as  "a  thick 
board  "  and  a  board  as  a  "  thin  plank." 

RULE  VI. — A  logical  definition  should  be  precise.  That  is,  it 
should  be  free  from  surplus  attributes  or  words.  Thus,  to  define 
a  triangle  as  "a  polygon  with  three  sides  and  three  angles"  is 
incorrect,  as  either  the  "  three  angles  "  or  the  "  three  sides "  are 
superfluous  in  the  definition.  "So  also  to  say  that  a  parallelogram 
is  " a  quadrilateral  having  its  opposite  sides  parallel  and  equal" 
though  it  is  true,  is  not  only  superfluous  but  misleading,  since  it 
implies  that  there  could  be  such  a  figure  without  having  its 
opposite  sides  equal. 

Conclusion. — By  careful  attention  to  these  rules  of  logical 
definition  and  logical  division,  and  an  application  of  them  to  the 
subjects  we  are  studying,  combined  with  a  frequent  logical 
analysis  of  our  general  notions,  we  can  attain  to  a  clear  and  dis- 
tinct use  of  general  terms,  and  cultivate  the  power  of  conception 
to  a  full  and  comprehensive  activity. 

THE  CULTURE  OF  CLASSIFICATION. 

Classification  is  the  application  of  the  power  of  generalization. 
A.S  found  in  the  sciences,  classification  may  be  defined  as  scientific 
generalization.  This  power  of  classification  should  receive  careful 
attention  in  the  education  of  the  young.  A  few  remarks  will  be 
made  on  the  subject  under  the  two  heads;  Importance  of  Classi- 
fication and  Methods  of  Cultivating  this  Power. 


THE   CULTUEE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  287 

I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  CLASSIFICATION. — The  power  of  classifica- 
tion is  of  great  value  to  mankind  in  every  department  of  life,  and 
in  every  occupation  and  profession.  To  impress  the  importance 
of  its  culture  we  shall  notice  briefly  its  value  in  common  life,  in 
study,  and  in  science. 

In  Common  Life. — Classification  is  of  value  in  the  common 
affairs  of  life.  It  gives  system  to  man's  actions,  and  is  thus  an 
economy  of  labor  and  time.  The  mechanic  who  has  a  place  for 
everything  and  everything  in  its  place,  will  do  more  work  in  a 
day  than  one  who  is  deficient  in  system.  The  farmer  who  sys- 
tematizes his  work  will  raise  better  crops  and  receive  a  larger 
return  from  them,  than  one  who  takes  things  loose  and  easy. 
The  merchant  who  has  a  methodical  arrangement  of  his  goods,  or 
the  business  man  who  keeps  his  papers  properly  classified,  will 
expedite  business  and  accomplish  more  than  the  man  who  lacks 
system.  Even  the  good  housewife  knows  the  importance  of  hav- 
ing her  duties  properly  systematized,  if  she  would  dispatch  her 
work  and  relieve  herself  somewhat  from  its  annoyances. 

To  tJie  Student. — The  power  of  classification  is  invaluable 
to  the  student.  A  careful  classification  of  any  branch  of  study 
will  give  one  a  clearer  view  of  the  subject,  and  enable  him  more 
easily  to  retain  it.  Historical  events,  to  be  easily  remembered, 
must  be  arranged  in  proper  order,  or  grouped  around  some  lead- 
ing central  events  on  which  they  depend.  The  study  of  history 
by  historical  epochs,  gives  a  view  of  events  in  their  relations 
which  makes  it  much  easier  to  carry  them  in  the  memory.  The 
same  is  true,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  in  every  branch  of  study. 
A  text-book  properly  classified  will  give  one  a  much  clearer  idea 
of  the  subject  than  one  which  lacks  this  system.  The  easy  dis- 
cussion of  any  question  is  dependent  on  the  same  law  of  classifi- 
cation. The  speaker  must  have  his  subject  arranged  under  ap- 
propriate headings  if  he  wishes  to  recall  the  different  points 
readily,  and  discuss  them  in  their  proper  order. 

Value  in  Science. — The  power  of  classification  is  of  especial 
value  in  science.  Science  has  been  defined  as  systematized  knowl- 


288  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

edge;  there  can  be  no  science  without  classification.  In  h.oth 
the  inductive  and  the  deductive  sciences,  there  must  be  an 
orderly  arrangement  of  the  subject-matter;  while  in  one  branch 
of  the  former,  that  of  Natural  History,  classification  is  the  leading 
feature.  Thus  the  science  of  Botany  consists  of  the  arrangement 
of  plants  into  species,  genera,  orders,  etc.,  and  the  same  is  true 
in  Zoology  and  Mineralogy.  These  sciences  assume  that  the 
objects  of  the  three  kingdoms  were  created  after  great  pattern 
ideas,  differentiated  all  the  way  down  from  the  broadest  classes  to 
the  species  and  individuals ;  and  the  object  of  these  sciences  is  to 
find  these  ideas  and  classify  accordingly.  In  order  to  become  a 
naturalist,  therefore,  we  must  have  the  power  of  classification  well 
developed. 

II.  METHODS  OF  CULTURE. — Admitting  the  importance  of  the 
power  of  classification,  the  question  arises,  how  may  this  power  be 
cultivated?  In  answer  to  this  question,  a  few  suggestions  for  its 
culture  will  now  be  presented. 

Classify  Objects. — To  train  the  powers  of  classification  of 
young  pupils,  they  may  have  lessons  in  the  classification  of 
objects.  The  arrangement  of  color-cards  under  the  heads  of  the 
different  primary  colors,  or  the  arrangement  of  tints  under  the 
common  color  of  which  they  are  varieties,  is  an  excellent  exercise 
for  young  people.  We  may  also  give  them  a  number  of  pebbles, 
and  require  them  to  class  them  in  respect  to  size,  also  in  respect 
to  color,  also  in  respect  to  form,  etc.  We  may  also  give  them  a 
collection  of  flowers,  and  require  them  to  arrange  them  into 
classes  with  respect  to  color,  the  forms  of  the  leaves,  the  forms  of 
the  petals,  the  number  of  stamens,  etc.  A  large  number  of  such 
exercises  may  be  arranged  with  profit  to  young  learners. 

Classify  Studies. — Pupils  may  be  required  to  classify  the 
subject-matter  of  their  'different  studies.  In  geography  a  geo- 
graphical outline  may  be  given,  and  the  pupils  be  required  to 
collate  their  knowledge  from  different  sources,  and  recite  it  under 
the  different  headings.  In  history  the  facts  may  be  grouped  to- 
gether into  periods  and  epochs,  and  learned  and  recited  in  such 


THE   CULTURE   OF   GENERALIZATION.  289 

connection.  A  similar  method  may  be  employed  in  several  of 
the  branches  of  school  study.  A  habit  of  thus  arranging  knowl- 
edge will  be  found  almost  invaluable  in  general  reading;  and 
such  practice  gives  culture  to  the  power  of  classification. 

Write  Outlines. — Pupils  should  be  required  to  write  outlines 
of  the  studies  they  are  pursuing.  Such  outlines  may  be  either 
logical  or  topical ;  some  branches,  as  mathematics  and  grammar, 
will  admit  of  logical  outlines;  others,  such  as  geography  and 
history,  of  only  topical  outlines.  The  lesson  of  each  recitation 
may  be  outlined  on  paper  or  on  the  blackboard  ;  and  occasionally 
several  previous  lessons  may  be  included  in  the  daily  outline.  It 
will  often  be  best  to  let  the  pupil  outline  the  subject  for  himself; 
and  then,  after  he  has  the  benefit  of  this  exercise,  the  teacher  may 
present  a  more  complete  or  logical  outline  for  the  pupils  to  copy 
and  use.  In  some  subjects,  the  recitation  may  be  conducted  in 
accordance  with  a  carefully  prepared  outline  of  the  subject  pre- 
viously presented  to  the  pupils.  In  completing  a  study,  the  pupil 
should  be  able  to  give  a  general  outline  of  the  entire  subject. 
Such  a  drill  will  train  the  pupil  to  systematic  habits  of  thought 
and  study,  and  give  the  power  of  a  comprehensive  grasp  of  sub- 
jects. 

Study  Classiflcatory  Sciences. — The  study  of  the  classifica- 
tory  sciences  is  best  adapted  to  give  culture  to  the  power  of 
classification.  The  classificatory  studies  are  the  several  branches 
of  Natural  History;  Botany,  Zoology,  and  Mineralogy.  The 
main  object  of  these  sciences  is  to  arrange  objects  into  species, 
genera,  orders,  etc.;  and  they  afford  the  best  examples  of  logical 
classification.  Indeed,  they  may  be  said  to  exhibit  the  per- 
fection of  classification;  no  other  science,  except  mathematics, 
can  approach  them  in  the  beauty  and  exactness  of  their  general- 
izations. The  study  of  the  sciences  gives  a  continual  drill  in 
systematic  classification ;  and  trains  the  mind  to  habits  of  vigorous 
and  systematic  thought. 

Study  tlie  Principles  of  Classification. — The  student  should 
be  required  to  notice  and  study  the  principles  of  classification  in 
13 


290  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

these  sciences.  There  should  be  an  intelligent  grasp  of,  the 
relations  expressed  in  these  classifications.  The  student  of  botany 
should  not  only  know  in  what  class  a  flower  is  fouHd,  but  he 
should  also  see  why  it  is  found  there.  He  should  see  the  relation 
of  the  different  classes  to  one  another,  and  to  the  higher  classes 
of  which  they  are  coordinate  parts.  In  other  words,  he  should 
not  only  understand  the  science  itself,  but  also  the  philosophy  of 
the  science.  He  should  grasp  the  law  by  which  it  is  developed, 
and  see  how  he  might  himself  develop  the  science  if  all  knowl- 
edge of  it  were  lost.  Such  a  training,  though  usually  neglected 
'in  teaching  the  sciences,  is  regarded  as  of  vast  importance  in  se- 
curing the  proper  culture  from  their  study. 

The  Beauty  of  Classification. — Efforts  should  be  made  to 
lead  the  pupil  to  appreciate  the  beauty  of  the  scientific  classifica- 
tion of  natural  history.  Some  of  these  divisions  and  relations 
manifest  a  wide  comprehension  of  facts  and  a  grand  generalization 
of  thought.  Cuvier's  division  of  the  animal  kingdom  into  the 
four  great  departments,  Agassiz's  law  of  classifying  the  fishes  in 
respect  to  the  form  of  their  scales,  and  the  similar  grasp  of  essen- 
tial similarities  and  differences  exhibited  in  the  vegetable  king- 
dom, fill  the  mind  with  wonder  and  admiration  of  both  the  laws 
involved  and  the  minds  that  discovered  them.  The  pupil  who  is 
led  to  appreciate  these  things  will  study  them  with  a  new  interest, 
and  obtain  a  discipline  that  can  not  otherwise  be  given. 

Classification  of  the  Sciences. — The  advanced  student  may 
be  led  to  study  the  problem  of  the  classification  of  the  sciences. 
This  is  an  old  problem,  and  has  engaged  the  attention  of  the 
great  thinkers  of  nearly  every  age.  Among  those  who  have  at- 
tempted to  solve  it  we  may  mention  Bacon,  Locke,  D'Alembert, 
and  Comte.  Though  no  one  has  given  a  classification  entirely 
satisfactory  to  the  scientific  world,  many  of  those  presented  are 
ingenious  and  show  a  wide  grasp  of  principles ;  and  their  exami- 
nation will  be  of  real  value  to  the  student.  An  attempt  to  solve 
the  problem  for  himself,  will  also  be  of  interest  and  afford  culture 
tc  the  power  of  classification. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  CULTURE   OF  THE  JUDGMENT. 

JUDGMENT  demands  attention  in  this  work  of  mental 
.-*-  culture.  The  power  of  Judgment  operates  spontaneously  in 
every  mind,  though  in  different  degrees ;  but  much  can  be  done 
to  stimulate  it  to  activity,  and  to  direct  and  increase  its  power. 
We  shall  present  a  few  thoughts  on  the  subject  under  the  two 
heads, — Importance  of  its  Culture,  and  Methods  of  Culture. 

I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  JUDGMENT. — The  power  of  judgment  is 
of  great  value  to  man  in  respect  to  the  activities  of  the  mind  and 
its  products.  It  is  involved  in  or  accompanies  every  act  of  the 
intellect,  and  thus  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  intellectual  ac- 
tivity. It  operates  directly  in  every  act  of  the  understanding; 
and  even  aids  the  other  faculties  of  the  mind  in  completing  their 
activities  and  products.  Its  relation  to  each  one  of  the  faculties 
will  be  briefly  noticed. 

Value  to  Perception, — Judgment  aids  the  faculty  of  per- 
ception. The  first  step  or  act  of  perception  is  the  discrimination 
of  sensations ;  and  discrimination  is  a  work  of  judgment.  The 
cognition  of  the  organism  and  the  external  object  also  involve 
distinctions  requiring  the  action  of  this  faculty.  In  forming  our 
perceptions  of  objects,  we  distinguish  the  different  qualities  given 
by  the  sense  or  by  different  senses,  and  these  qualities  we  unite  to 
form  our  complex  notion  of  the  object.  The  distinction  between 
the  ego  and  the  non-ego  also  involves  an  act  of  judgment,  for  to 
distinguish  is  to  compare  or  judge. 

Value  to  Memory. — Judgment  is  also  of  great  value  to  the 
memory.  The  memory  operates  by  the  laws  of  association.  As- 
sociation implies  comparison ;  we  must  compare  in  order  to  asso- 

(291) 


292  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ciate.  We  could  not  know  things  as  similar  or  in  contrast,  or  as 
contiguous  in  time  and  place,  unless  there  was  an  act  of  judgment 
to  perceive  these  relations.  Judgment  thus  aids  the  mind  in  re- 
membering ;  other  things  being  equal,  the  clearer  our  perceptions 
of  the  relation  of  objects  of  thought,  the  better  will  they  be  re- 
membered. The  culture  of  the  judgment  thus  directly  affects  the 
power  of  the  memory. 

Basis  of  Thought. — Judgment,  as  has  already  been  seen,  lies 
at  the  basis  of  all  thinking.  All  thought-knowledge  involves  an 
act  of  the  judgment.  Even  in  abstraction,  there  is  a  comparison 
of  the  elements  in  order  that  we  may  distinguish  the  quality 
which  we  abstract.  A  concept  is  formed  by  uniting  common  at- 
tributes ;  and  there  must  be  a  comparison  in  order  to  discover 
these  common  attributes.  Each  premise  of  a  syllogism  is  a  judg- 
ment ;  and  the  derived  proposition  is  also  in  the  form  of  a  judg- 
ment. Every  act  of  the  understanding,  therefore,  involves  the 
element  of  comparison,  or  an  act  of  judgment ;  and  we  may  thus 
say  that  the  judgment  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  thought-knowledge. 

Basis  of  Science. — Judgment  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  the 
sciences.  The  materials  of  the  sciences  are  given  by  perception 
and  intuition :  perception  gives  us  ideas  and  facts,  and  intuition 
ideas  and  intuitive  truths.  Both  the  facts  of  perception  and  the 
axioms  of  intuition  are  expressed  as  propositions ;  and  a  propo- 
sition is  a  judgment  expressed.  These  sciences  are  developed  by 
generalization  and  reasoning;  and  judgment  is  involved  in  both 
generalization  and  reasoning.  Every  principle  or  law  of  science 
is  stated  in  the  form  of  a  judgment.  The  activity  of  judgment  is 
thus  concerned  in  the  foundation  of  the  sciences,  and  runs  through 
the  entire  superstructure.  No  scientific  thought  would  be  possible 
without  the  faculty  of  judgment. 

Basis  of  Poetry. — Judgment  is  also  the  basis  of  poetry. 
Every  poetical  figure  involves  an  act  of  comparison.  The  simile, 
"  As  unto  the  bow  the  cord  is,  So  unto  the  man  is  woman,"  in- 
volves a  direct  judgment;  and  the  metaphor,  "Your  voiceless 
lips,  O  flowers,  are  living  preachers,"  is  an  assumed  one.  So  in 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   JUDGMENT.  293 

personification,  there  is  a  perception  of  relations,  or  w.e  could  not 
ascribe  the  attributes  of  one  thing  to  another.  In  a  selection  like 
the  following,  the  element  of  comparison  may  be  seen  running 
like  a  golden  thread  through  every  line : 

"The  bridegroom  sea 

Is  toying  with  the  shore,  his  wedded  bride, 
And,  in  the  fullness  of  his  marriage  joy, 
He  decorates  her  tawny  brow  with  shells, 
Retires  a  space,  to  see  how  fair  she  looks, 
Then  proud  runs  up  to  kiss  her." 

And  so  all  through  imaginative  literature,  the  principle  of 
comparison  gives  it  its  life  and  spirit,  and  imparts  those  attributes 
of  beauty  that  touch  the  imagination  and  thrill  the  heart. 

II.  METHODS  OP  CULTIVATING  THE  JUDGMENT. — The  judg- 
ment, like  every  other  faculty,  acts  spontaneously,  and  is  de- 
veloped naturally  by  its  own  activity.  Still  it  will  admit  of  some 
special  training ;  and  a  few  suggestions  are  presented  in  respect 
to  such  culture.  These  suggestions  apply  especially  to  the  cul- 
ture of  the  judgment  of  young  pupils. 

Exercises  in  Comparison. — Special  lessons  may  be  given  to 
children  in  comparing  objects.  They  may  have  exercises  in 
comparing  objects  in  respect  to  size,  color,  weight,  etc.  They 
may  also  be  required  to  compare  their  ideas  and  form  propo- 
sitions ;  the  construction  of  sentences  about  objects  is  an  exercise 
of  judgment.  Some  of  the  most  practical  exercises,  however,  are 
the  comparison  of  the  forms,  colors,  lengths,  surfaces,  volumes, 
and  weights  of  objects. 

Compare  Forms. — Among  the  earliest  lessons  for  children 
are  those  on  geometrical  forms.  They  should  first  have  distinct 
ideas  of  the  standard  forms ;  and  then  be  required  to  compare  the 
forms  of  objects  with  these  standard  forms.  Thus  after  obtaining 
the  idea  of  a  triangle,  circle,  ellipse,  cylinder,  etc.,  they  may  be 
led  to  see  that  some  objects  are  triangular,  circular,  cylindrical, 
elliptical,  etc.  They  should  be  taught  the  typical  forms  of  leaves, 
and  then  be  required  to  name  the  forms  of  leaves  presented  to 
them. 


294  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Comparq  Colors. — Lessons  should  be  given  to  young  pupils 
in  the  comparison  of  colors.  Ideas  of  the  standard  colors  should 
be  presented,  and  pupils  should  then  be  required  to  judge  of  the 
color  of  objects  presented  to  them.  For  such  an  exercise,  small 
color  cards  may  be  used ;  worsteds,  silks,  etc.,  are  also  prepared 
for  such  lessons.  A  drill  of  this  kind  will  enable  a  pupil  to  dis- 
tinguish a  large  number  of  shades  and  varieties  of  color  with 
great  accuracy, — a  knowledge  which  may  be  of  practical  value  in 
many  of  the  vocations  of  life. 

Compare  Lengths. — The  judgment  may  be  trained  by  the 
comparison  of  the  length  of  objects.  After  giving  an  idea  of  the 
different  units  of  length,  these  may  be  applied  in  judging  of  the 
lengths  of  different  objects.  Thus  pupils  may  be  required  to  tell 
the  length  and  breadth  of  a  room  in  feet,  the  height  of  the  ceiling, 
the  height  of  a  man  or  a  horse  or  a  tree,  the  distance  in  yards  or 
rods  between  two  places,  etc.  They  should  also  be  given  the 
units  of  surface,  the  square  inch,  square  foot,  square  yard,  etc., 
and  be  required  to  judge  of  the  area  of  floors,  the  number  of 
square  yards  in  the  walls  of  a  room,  the  number  of  acres  in  a 
field,  etc.  The  same  may  be  done  in  respect  to  the  measures  of 
volume. 

Compare  Weights. — The  judgment  can  be  cultivated  by  the 
comparison  of  weights.  We  should  first  give  an  idea  of  the 
standard  weights,  ounce,  pound,  etc.  Then  the  student  should  be 
required  to  "heft"  some  object,  as  a  book,  and  give  its  weight  in 
ounces,  or  some  larger  object,  as  a  chair,  and  give  its  weight  in 
pounds.  There  should  also  be  an  exercise  in  learning  to  judge 
of  the  weight  of  objects  by  sight.  With  practice  one  can  learn  to 
judge  within  a  few  pounds  of  the  weight  of  a  person  or  an  animal. 
A  drover  will  approximate  very  closely  to  the  weight  of  a  horse 
or  an  ox  by  looking  at  it. 

Study  of  Mathematics. — One  of  the  best  exercises  for  the 
culture  of  the  judgment  is  the  study  of  mathematics.  In  mathe- 
matical reasoning,  every  step  involves  a  comparison;  and  the 
solution  of  a  problem  or  demonstration  of  a  theorem  is  thus  a 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   JUDGMENT.  295 

constant  exercise  to  the  judgment.  Mental  arithmetic  is  espe- 
cially useful  in  this  respect  to  the  youthful  mind.  Its  relations 
are  precise  and  definite,  and  each  step  in  the  process  follows  so 
naturally  from  the  previous  step  or  some  fixed  relation,  that  it  is 
a  constant  pleasure  to  the  student,  and  gives  delightful  as  well  as 
useful  exercise  to  the  judgment.  Geometry  also,  with  the  classic 
precision  of  its  relations,  gives  a  classic  finish  to  the  acts  of  judg- 
ment. 

Compare  for  Literary  Figures. — Pupils  should  have  exer- 
cises also  in  comparing  for  literary  figures.  They  should  be  re- 
quired to  construct  original  similes,  metaphors,  personifications, 
etc.  In  order  to  do  this,  they  should  notice  the  poetical  figures 
of  literature,  and  try  to  imitate  them.  It  will  be  well  to  have 
them  study  and  imitate  such  figures  as  Horace  Smith's 

"  Your  voiceless  lips,  O  flowers,  are  living  preachers, 

Each  cup  a  pulpit,  and  each  leaf  a  book," 
or  Shakespeare's  oft-quoted  lines, 

"But,  look,  the  Morn,  in  russet  mantle  clad, 
Walks  o'er  the  dew  of  yon  high  eastern  hill," 

or  Longfellow's  expressive  figure, 

"  The  tidal  wave  of  deeper  souls 
Into  our  inmost  being  rolls." 

The  pupil  who  sees  the  analpgies  in  these  similes,  metaphors, 
and  personifications,  can  begin  to  create  original  figures  for  him- 
self, and  thus  cultivate  both  his  judgment  and  his  taste  for  literary 
composition. 

Games  of  SJeill. — There  are  certain  games  of  skill  that  are 
useful  in  cultivating  the  power  of  judgment.  One  of  the  best  of 
these,  for  young  persons,  is  that  of  draughts,  or  checkers.  I  have 
noticed  a  real  growth  in  mental  power  by  children  who  became 
interested  in  this  game.  For  older  minds,  chess  affords  a  de- 
lightful and  most  valuable  exercise  for  the  judgment.  The 
solving  of  riddles,  the  guessing  of  conundrums,  etc.,  also  give 
pleasant  and  profitable  exercise  to  the  judgment  of  young  people. 
Indeed,  such  exercises  will  do  much  more  for  the  development 


296  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

of  thought-power  than  much  of  the  dull,  dry,  rote-teaching  of  our 
schools  has  done. 

TJie  Habit  of  Judgment. — It  should  be  one  of  the  leading 
objects  of  the  culture  of  young  people  to  lead  them  to  acquire  a 
habit  of  forming  judgments.  They  should  not  only  be  led  to  see 
things,  but  to  have  opinions  about  things.  They  should  be  trained 
to  see  things  in  their  relations,  and  to  put  these  relations  into 
definite  propositions.  Their  ideas  of  objects  should  be  worked 
up  into  thoughts  concerning  the  objects.  Those  methods  of 
teaching  are  best  which  tend  to  excite  a  thoughtful  habit  of  mind 
that  notices  the  similitudes  and  diversities  of  objects,  and  en- 
deavors to  read  the  thoughts  which  they  embody  and  of  which 
they  are  the  symbols. 

An  Exercise  in  Opposition. — The  application  of  the  rules 
of  Opposition  of  Judgments  in  deriving  judgments  from  given 
judgments,  is  a  valuable  exercise  to  this  faculty.  Thus : 

1.  Illustrate  the  law  of  unwersals  and  particulars  with  the  judg- 
ments, "All  men  are  mortal,"  "Some  men  are  angels." 

2.  Illustrate  contraries  with  "All  robins  are  birds,"  etc. 

3.  Illustrate  subcontraries  with  "Some  men  are  poets,"  etc. 

4.  Illustrate  contradictories  with  "All  men  are  bipeds,"  etc. 
Anotlier  Exercise  in  Opposition. — The  following  is  an  in- 
teresting and  practical  exercise  in  the  opposition  of  judgments : 

1.  If  "All  A  is  B"  is  true  ;  show  what  follows  for  E,  I,  and  O. 

2.  If  "  All  A  is  B  "  is  false  ;  show  what  follows  for  E,  I,  and  O. 

3.  If  "  No  A  is  B  "  is  true ;  show  what  follows  for  A,  I,  and  O. 

4.  If  "  No  A  is  B  "  is  false  ;  show  what  follows  for  A,  I,  and  O. 

5.  If  "Some  A  is  B  "  is  true ;  show  what  follows  for  A,  E,  and  O. 

6.  If  "  Some  A  is  B"  is  false  ;  show  what  follows  for  A,  E,  and  O. 

7.  If  "  Some  A  is  not  B  "  is  true  ;  show  what  follows  for  A,  E,  and  I. 

8.  If  "  Some  A  is  not  B  "  is  false  ;  show  what  follows  for  A,  E,  and  I. 
^An  Exercise  in  Conversion. — The  following  is  an  interest- 
ing and  practical  exercise  in  the  Conversion  of  Judgments : 

1.  All  men  are  rational.  5.  Some  men  are  virtuous. 

2.  Some  men  are  poets.  6.  No  brute  is  responsible. 

3.  No  men  are  quadrupeds.  7.  Some  men  are  not  responsible. 

4.  Some  minerals  are  stones.  8.  All  triangles  are  polygons. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   CULTURE   OP   REASONING. 

TZ)EASONING  is  the  last  and  the  highest  operation  of  the 
•A.*  Understanding.  There  are  two  distinct  forms  of  reasoning; 
Deductive  Reasoning  and  Inductive  Reasoning.  Each  of  these 
two  forms  of  reasoning  may  be  cultivated  by  appropriate  exercise. 
We  shall  therefore  discuss  the  culture  of  reasoning  under  the  two 
distinct  heads ;  the  Culture  of  Deductive  Reasoning,  and  the  Cul- 
ture of  Inductive  Reasoning. 

I.  THE  CULTURE  OF  DEDUCTIVE  REASONING. 

Deductive  Reasoning,  as  already  defined,  is  the  process  of  de- 
riving a  particular  truth  from  a  general  truth.  It  is  a  form  of 
mental  activity  which  operates  early  in  the  mind  of  the  child ; 
and  is  to  be  trained  by  appropriate  exercises.  Many  of  the 
branches  of  the  school  course  are  especially  adapted  to  give  exer- 
cise and  culture  to  this  power.  The  teacher  should  understand 
the  relation  of  these  studies  to  the  mind,  that  he  may  give  this 
culture  consciously  and  intelligently.  Some  of  the  exercises  and 
studies  particularly  suited  to  the  culture  of  deductive  reasoning, 
will  therefore  be  mentioned. 

I.  STUDY  or  MATHEMATICS. — The  study,  par  excellence,  for  the 
culture  of  deductive  reasoning,  is  mathematics.  The  several 
branches  of  mathematics  present  the  purest  examples  of  deductive 
reasoning ;  they  are  therefore  pre-eminently  fitted  to  give  training 
to  the  power  of  deductive  thought.  They  are  also  adapted  to 
every  stage  of  intellectual  development,  since  they  range  from  the 
simplest  processes  of  mental  arithmetic  to  the  profoundest  gen- 
eralizations of  calculus.  The  pupil  should,  at  an  early  age,  begin 


13* 


(297) 


298  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  simple  analyses  of  arithmetic ;  from  this  he  should  pass  to  the 
more  concise  and  abstract  reasoning  of  algebra,  which,  in  its  first 
steps,  is  similar  to  the  reasoning  of  arithmetic.  Following  the 
elements  of  algebra,  or  in  connection  with  it,  he  should  take  up 
the  science  of  geometry,  in  which  he  will  become  acquainted  with 
the  more  formal  methods  of  syllogistic  reasoning. 

Mental  Arithmetic. — Mental  arithmetic  is  especially  adapted 
to  give  culture  to  the  reasoning  power  of  the  young  mind.  By 
mental  arithmetic,  we  mean  not  the  mere  working  of  problems 
without  slate  or  pencil,  but  that  system  of  arithmetical  analysis 
which  is  found  developed  in  a  good  work  on  the  subject.  Mental 
arithmetic  is  a  system  of  practical  logic  in  its  simplest  form; 
every  step  is  a  judgment  direct  or  indirect,  and  the  entire  subject 
is  permeated  with  the  spirit  of  logic.  Its  processes  are  purely 
analytic,  and  it  thus  trains  the  mind  to  the  most  rigid  analysis. 
Every  truth  is  bound  to  some  other  truth  by  the  thread  of  related 
thought;  and  the  mind  of  the  pupil  acquires  the  habit  of  follow- 
ing a  chain  of  logically-connected  judgments  until  it  reaches  a 
satisfactory  conclusion.  To  give  exercise  to  the  reasoning  powers 
of  the  child,  mental  arithmetic  may  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
list  of  studies  of  the  primary  school. 

Sharpens  the  Mind. — Mental  arithmetic  sharpens  and  strength- 
ens the  powers  of  thought.  The  system  of  rigid  analysis  gives 
point  and  penetrating  power  to  the  mind,  and  enables  it  to  pierce 
a  subject  to  its  core  and  discover  its  elements.  In  this  respect, 
mental  arithmetic  is  a  sort  of  mental  whetstone,  which  gives  edge 
and  keenness  to  the  mind.  Old  Robert  Eecorde  called  his  work 
on  arithmetic  the  "  Whetstone  of  Witte ;"  had  he  lived  until  the 
era  of  mental  arithmetic,  he  would  have  seen  the  full  meaning  of 
his  words,  for  the  method  of  analysis  found  in  mental  arithmetic 
is  indeed  a  whetstone  of  wit,  a  sharpener  of  the  mental  faculties. 
Mental  arithmetic  is  a  system  of  mental  gymnastics ;  through  it 
the  mind  grows  strong  and  tough,  taking  hold  of  difficulties  with 
a  will,  laughing  at  obstacles,  and  rejoicing  in  the  investigation  of 
the  intricate  and  profound. 


THE   CULTURE   OF    REASONING-.  299 

Study  of  Written  Arithmetic. — The  study  of  written  arith- 
metic leads  the  mind  to  a  higher  plane  of  deductive  thought. 
While  the  reasoning  in  mental  arithmetic  is  purely  analytic,  the 
reasoning  of  written  arithmetic  is  more  synthetic  and  demon- 
strative in  its  nature.  Thus  many  subjects  which  in  mental 
arithmetic  are  treated  by  pure  analysis,  in  written  arithmetic  are 
treated  by  demonstration.  In  mental  arithmetic  we  treat  all  the 
various  cases  of  Fractions  by  analysis ;  while  in  written  arithmetic 
we  may  first  establish  a  few  general  principles,  and  then  derive 
all  the  rules  for  the  several  cases  by  deduction  from  these  prin- 
ciples. Many  subjects  in  written  arithmetic  are  purely  deductive 
and  demonstrative  in  their  nature,  as  Proportion,  Progression, 
Evolution,  etc.  The  study  of  written  arithmetic  thus  lifts  the 
mind  up  into  a  higher  plane  of  deductive  thought,  and  gives  a 
culture  adapted  to  the  advancing  maturity  of  the  mind.  When 
properly  taught,  not  as  a  collection  of  rules  for  arbitrary  results, 
but  as  a  system  of  logical  processes,  it  affords  the  mind  a  delight- 
ful and  valuable  exercise  in  deductive  thought. 

Study  of  Algebra. — Algebra  is  also  a  valuable  study  in  train- 
ing the  power  of  deductive  reasoning.  In  its  elementary  ideas 
and  processes,  it  has  its  origin  in  arithmetic,  and  flows  out  of  it; 
and  its  spirit  and  methods  are  essentially  deductive.  Its  methods 
of  calculation  are  analytic  and  demonstrative ;  and  it  rises  into 
the  sphere  of  generalization,  which  gives  a  breadth  and  reach  of 
mind  that  we  cannot  acquire  in  arithmetic.  This  spirit  of  gen- 
eralization lies  at  the  basis  of  the  science,  and  has  given  us  the 
profound  thinkers  in  astronomy  and  physics,  such  as  Newton  and 
La  Place.  The  interpretation  of  these  general  formulas,  as  ap- 
plied to  particular  cases,  so  valuable  in  the  investigations  of  the 
physical  sciences,  is  also  an  excellent  exercise  for  the  development 
of  the  thought-powers  of  the  student. 

Study  of  Geometry. — In  giving  discipline  to  the  power  of 
reasoning,  geometry  has  been  placed  high  in  the  list  of  thought 
studies.  Geometry  is  purely  a  deductive  science.  It  begins 
with  definite  ideas  expressed  in  strictly  logical  definitions,  has  its 


300  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

fundamental  truths  or  axioms  given  by  intuition,  and  with  these 
as  a  basis,  proceeds  by  th,e  logic  of  deduction  to  derive  all  the 
other  truths  of  the  science.  It  is  regarded  as  the  most  perfect 
model  of  a  deductive  science,  and  is  the  type  and  model  of  all 
science. 

Invaluable  Discipline. — As  a  study  for  the  discipline  of  the 
power  of  thought,  geometry  is  invaluable.  It  is  the  perfection 
of  logic,  and  excels  in  training  the  mind  to  logical  habits  of 
thinking.  In  this  respect  it  is  superior  to  the  study  of  logic 
itself,  for  it  is  logic  embodied  in  the  science  of  tangible  form. 
While  logic  makes  us  familiar  with  the  principles  of  reasoning, 
geometry  trains  the  mind  to  the  habit  of  reasoning.  No  study  is 
better  adapted  to  make  close  and  accurate  thinkers.  Euclid  has 
done  more  to  develop  the  logical  faculty  of  the  world  than  any 
book  ever  written.  It  has  been  the  inspiring  influence  of  scien- 
tific thought  for  ages,  and  is  one  of  the  corner-stones  of  modern 
civilization. 

A  Test  of  Power. — Geometry  not  only  gives  mental  power,  but 
is'  a  test  of  mental  power.  The  boy  who  cannot  readily  master 
his  geometry  will  never  attain  to  much  in  the  domain  of  thought. 
He  may  have  a  fine  poetic  sense  that  will  make  a  writer  or  an 
orator ;  but  he  can  never  reach  any  eminence  in  scientific  thought 
or  philosophic  opinion.  All  the  great  geniuses  in  the  realm  of 
science,  as  far  as  known,  had  fine  mathematical  abilities.  So 
valuable  is  geometry  as  a  discipline  that  many  lawyers  and 
preachers  review  their  geometry  every  year  in  order  to  keep  the 
mind  drilled  to  logical  habits  of  thinking. 

Subjects  for  Original  Thought. — In  these  branches  of 
mathematics,  the  student  should  have  problems  and  theorems  for 
original  thought.  Problems  for  solution  are  usually  given  in 
arithmetic  and  algebra;  in  geometry,  however,  the  practice  has 
been  to  present  only  theorems  demonstrated  in  the  text-book,  but 
no  undemonstrated  theorems  to  train  the  student  to  reason  inde- 
pendently of  the  text-book.  This  is  regarded  as  a  serious  defect 
in  the  methods  of  teaching  geometry.  There  should  be  a  large 


THE   CULTUKE   OF   REASONING.  301 

number  of  theorems  for  original  thought;  and  the  student  should 
be  required  to  discover  the  demonstrations  for  himself.  In  this 
way  he  may  be  able  not  nnlv,  as  Cyril  said  of  the  girl-students,  to 
" hunt  old  trails,"  but  also  "to  invent"  processes  of  reasoning  for 
himself.  He  will  become  an  original  thinker  in  the  domain  of 
quantity,  and  acquire  that  acuteness  of  insight  and  independence 
of  thought  that  characterize  the  profound  thinker. 

II.  STUDY  OF  LANGUAGE. — The  study  of  language  is  adapted 
to  give  culture  to  the  power  of  thought.  This  is  apparent  from 
the  fact  that  language  is  the  expression  of  thought.  Language 
is  the  mirror  of  the  mind;  in  it  are  revealed  the  processes  of 
thought;  and  looking  in  this  mirror,  the  mind  may  become 
familiar  with  its  own  workings  and  imitate  the  methods  which  it 
perceives.  Besides  this,  the  ordinary  methods  of  teaching  lan- 
guage are  largely  deductive  in  their  character,  and  the  mind  is 
thus  trained  to  deductive  processes  in  its  study.  The  value  of  a 
few  of  the  branches  in  this  respect  will  be  briefly  noticed. 

Study  of  Grammar. — The  study  of  grammar,  if  properly 
presented  as  a  thought-study,  and  not  as  a  thing  to  cram  into  the 
memory,  affords  a  valuable  exercise  in  deductive  thinking. 
With  the  young  pupil,  the  principles  should  be  reached  induc- 
tively ;  but  having  attained  these  principles,  the  study  is  mainly 
deductive  in  its  character.  The  application  of  the  rules  and 
principles  to  actual  expression  is  a  process  of  deduction.  The 
correction  of  false  syntax  is  purely  deductive  in  its  character ;  we 
reason  from  the  principle  to  the  special  case  that  we  are  correct- 
ing. So  with  parsing  and  analysis;  they  are  purely  deductive 
processes,  and  are  valuable  in  training  the  mind  to  reason  from 
general  principles  to  particulars.  They  are  valuable  as  means 
of  culture  also  from  the  fact  that  they  can  be  so  constantly  used, 
affording  a  daily  drill  in  practical  forms  of  logical  thought  and 
expression.  Many  of  the  distinctions  of  grammar,  also,  are  re- 
tined  and  subtle,  requiring  a  searching  analysis  and  a  philosophic 
insight  into  the  subject,  which  cannot  fail  to  afford  a  most  admir- 
able discipline.  For  the  culture  of  the  power  of  deductive 


302  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

reasoning,  we  should  therefore  give  high  rank  to  the  study  of 
grammar,  a  rank  next  to  arithmetic  on  the  list  of  the  common 
school  branches. 

Study  of  Rhetoric. — The  study  of  rhetoric  is  also  adapted  to 
give  culture  to  the  faculty  of  deductive  thought.  Many  of  the 
principles  of  rhetoric,  including  the  laws  of  taste,  are  the  result 
of  intuition  ;  and  their  application  to  the  criticism  and  con- 
struction of  discourse,  is  a  deductive  exercise.  In  the  application 
of  the  principles  that  may  have  been  reached  by  induction,  the 
mind  of  the  student  passes  from  the  general  principle  to  partic- 
ulars, and  is  thus  proceeding  deductively.  The  process  of  in- 
vention, which  most  writers  include  in  the  subject  of  rhetoric, 
gives  direct  exercise  to  this  power ;  for  the  evolution  of  thought 
on  any  subject,  usually  proceeds  from  generals  to  particulars, 
rather  than  in  the  opposite  direction.  In  the  unfolding  of  any 
subject,  we  usually  think  in  the  light  of  general  principles  and 
intuitions  of  the  higher  reason.  Though  we  may  discover  induc- 
tively, we  present  our  discoveries  in  the  reverse  order  of  their 
origin;  and  the  invention  of  discourse  is  usually  a  movement 
of  thought  from  generals  to  particulars. 

Study  of  Latin  and  Greek. — Even  the  study  of  Latin  and 
Greek,  though  it  may  not  be  generally  acknowledged,  is  valuable 
for  the  training  of  the  mind  in  deductive  processes.  The  rules 
of  construction  are  fixed  in  the  memory  as  general  principles,  and 
the  language  is  interpreted  in  the  light  of  these  principles.  The 
general  forms  for  number,  case,  and  tense  are  learned,  and  then 
applied  to  the  particular  words  of  the  text  in  determining  their 
relation  and  dependence.  Besides,  the  nice  sense  of  discrimination 
cultivated  by  the  comparison  and  selection  of  words  in  making 
the  translation,  not  only  exercises  the  judgment,  but  exercises  it 
under  the  control  of  general  principles  of  taste;  and  the  process 
is  thus  closely  related  to  deductive  reasoning.  The  study,  too, 
cultivates  those  habits  of  accuracy  and  definiteness  that  are  so 
valuable  in  mental  discipline,  and  which  the  deductive  sciences 
are  especially  adapted  to  afford. 


THE   CULTURE   OF   REASONING.  303 

III.  STUDY  OF  THE  METAPHYSICAL,  SCIENCES. — The  power  of 
deductive  thought  receives  some  of  its  highest  culture  from  the 
study  of  those  branches  which  may  be  called  the  metaphysical 
sciences.  These  branches  are  Psychology,  Logic,  Ethics,  2Es- 
thetics,  Political  Economy,  International  Law,  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed Theology,  etc.  These  sciences  deal  with  principles  and 
their  application,  and  are  thus  deductive  in  their  character. 
They  discuss  the  profoundest  questions  of  human  thought  and 
human  life,  and  lift  the  mind  into  that  plane  of  truth  by  which 
its  survey  is  broad  and  comprehensive,  and  from  which  it  can 
look  down  with  intelligence  upon  the  facts  that  have  their  source 
in  and  flow  from  these  principles. 

Study  of  Psychology' — Among  the  first  in  the  list  for  the 
culture  of  this  higher  thought,  we  place  Psychology,  the  science 
of  the  human  mind.  Though  some  of  its  principles  seem  to  be 
derived  by  a  generalization  of  particulars,  yet  in  its  spirit  and 
methods  it  is  deductive.  It  trains  the  mind  to  habits  of  reflective 
thought,  and  enables  it  to  grasp  abstract  and  general  principles. 
It  cultivates  that  nice  sense  of  discrimination  so  necessary  to 
scientific  investigation,  and  gives  the  power  of  penetrative  and 
philosophic  insight.  It  trains  the  mind  to  seize  upon  the  recon- 
dite and  elusive  objects  of  thought  and  feeling,  and  to  trace  its 
way  along  those  spiritual  paths  that  lead  to  the  deeper  mysteries 
of  nature.  By  it  we  not  only  reach  truths,  but  we  go  on  to 
search  for  the  source  and  beginning  of  truth ;  and,  grasping  fun- 
damental principles,  we  are  enabled  to  follow  them  to  their  grand- 
est conclusions. 

In  the  study  of  the  human  mind  we  reach  the  type  of  the 
Divine  mind,  and  thus  rise  from  the  study  of  the  natural  to  that 
of  the  spiritual.  Here  we  attain  the  grand  conceptions  of  Space, 
Time,  Cause,  and  Identity,  and  those  grander  conceptions,  the 
True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good.  Here  we  meet  with  the 
grandest  facts  and  problems  of  the  human  soul, — the  moral 
nature,  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and  human  accountability ;  and 
from  these  we  naturally  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  Immortality, 
God,  and  Heaven. 


304  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Study  of  Logic. — The  study  of  Logic  will  aid  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  power  of  deductive  reasoning.  It  does  this  first  by 
showing  the  method  by  which  we  reason.  To  know  how  we 
reason,  to  see  the  laws  which  govern  the  reasoning  process,  to 
analyze  the  syllogism  and  see  its  conformity  to  the  laws  of 
thought,  is  not  only  an  exercise  of  reasoning,  but  gives  that  knowl- 
edge of  the  process  that  will  be  both  a  stimulus  and  a  guide  to 
thought.  No  one  can  trace  the  principles  and  processes  of 
thought  without  receiving  thereby  an  impetus  to  thought.  In 
the  second  place,  the  study  of  logic  is  probably  even  more  val- 
uable because  it  gives  practice  in  deductive  thinking.  This,  per- 
haps, is  its  principal  value,  since  the  mind  reasons  instinctively 
without  knowing  how  it  reasons.  One  can  think  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  science  of  thinking,  just  as  one  can  use  lan- 
guage correctly  without  a  knowledge  of  grammar;  yet  as  the 
study  of  grammar  improves  one's  speech,  so  the  study  of  logic 
cannot  but  improve  one's  thought. 

Application  of  Logic. — The  application  of  the  principles  of  logic 
to  practical  exercises  affords  an  excellent  means  of  training  the 
power  of  thought.  These  exercises  may  consist  of  pointing  out  the 
principles  in  processes  of  reasoning,  and  also  of  correcting  errors 
in  the  forms  of  reasoning.  The  former  is  like  parsing  and  analysis 
in  grammar ;  the  latter  is  like  the  correction  of  false  syntax :  and 
as  these  exercises  in  grammar  cultivate  the  power  of  using  correct 
language,  so  will  the  corresponding  exercises  in  logic  train  the 
mind  to  accurate  habits  of  thought.  We  recommend,  therefore, 
extensive  practice  in  what  is  called  "logical  praxis,"  or  the  ap- 
plication of  the  laws  and  principles  of  the  science  to  thought  as 
expressed  in  language. 

Correction  of  Fallacies. — This  practice  in  the  correction  of  errors 
of  reasoning  will  be  found  of  especial  value  in  the  culture  of  this 
faculty.  It  should  embrace  the  correction  of  the  forms  of  reason- 
ing, and  the  pointing  out  of  the  fallacies  in  arguments.  It  should 
also  include  the  detection  of  such  errors  as  lie  in  the  matter  of 
reasoning ;  as,  begging  the  question,  reasoning  in  a  circle,  etc.  A 


THE   CULTUEE    OF    REASONING.  305 

drill  in  the  analysis  of  arguments  for  the  detection  and  correction 
of  such  errors  will  make  the  mind  familiar  with  the  correct  pro- 
cesses, and  teach  it  to  be  careful  to  avoid  those  errors  into  which 
even  practiced  thinkers  are  liable  to  fall. 

Heading  Argumentative  Discourses. — The  reading  of  ar- 
gumentative discourses  is  also  recommended  for  this  culture. 
Such  discourses  usually  deal  with  general  principles  and  their 
application,  and  are  thus  deductive  in  their  nature.  They  are, 
too,  the  productions  of  the  great  thinkers;  and  the  mind  will 
learn  to  think  by  following  the  trains  of  thought  of  these  superior 
minds.  The  reading  of  such  productions  as  Calhoun's  discourses 
on  government,  Webster's  defense  of  the  Constitution,  Mill  on 
the  principles  of  civil  government,  Woolsey  on  international  law, 
etc.,  will  give  breadth  and  philosophical  grasp  to  the  mind  and 
lift  it  up  to  the  plane  of  high  and  commanding  mental  activity. 
To  commune  with  the  great  thinkers  is  to  have  our  minds  il- 
lumined by  the  light  of  those  rare  souls  whose  thoughts  mould 
their  own  and  coming  ages. 

Heading  Philosophy. — The  careful  reading  of  philosophy 
will  be  found  valuable  in  this  thought -culture.  However  the 
philosophers  may  have  reached  their  principles,  their  presenta- 
tions of  truth  are  mainly  deductive  in  spirit  and  in  form.  They 
think  and  speak  in  the  light  of  fundamental  principles ;  and  fill- 
ing the  soul  with  grand  conceptions  of  truth,  they  inspire  us  to 
make  our  deductions  from  such  principles.  The  lofty  discussions 
of  Plato,  the  keen  analysis  of  Aristotle,  the  transcendental  phil- 
osophy of  the  German  thinkers,  and  the  practical  speculations  of 
the  thinkers  of  England, — all  lift  the  soul  into  an  atmosphere  of 
pure  thought  from  which  it  may  draw  inspiration  for  its  own 
speculations. 

Heading  Philosophic  Essayists. — The  philosophic  essayists, 
also,  like  Carlyle  and  Emerson,  though  not,  properly  speaking, 
philosophers,  are  full  of  suggestive  thought.  They  are  like  the 
seers  of  old,  rare  prophetic  souls  who  have  an  insight  into  truths. 
They  seem  to  catch  glimpses  of  the  new  stars  of  truth  that  are  to 


306  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

sliine  in  the  heavens  before  they  are  revealed  to  the  common 
mind ;  and  they  give  to  our  minds  some  of  the  afflatus  of  their 
own  spirits.  They  have  a  wonderful  power  to  stimulate  to  think- 
ing. Emerson,  for  instance,  not  only  gives  you  thoughts,  but 
sets  the  mind  to  thinking  for  itself;  he,  as  it  were,  inoculates  the 
mind  with  his  thought  so  that  it  breaks  out  into  thoughts  of  its 
own. 

By  Deductive  Thinking. — Besides  the  culture  afforded  by 
study  and  reading,  the  power  of  deductive  thought  is  cultivated 
by  deductive  thinking.  The  application  of  general  principles  to 
the  facts  and  business  of  life  is  an  exercise  of  deductive  thought ; 
and  such  a  consideration  of  practical  questions  trains  to  habits  of 
deductive  reasoning.  All  men,  in  every  avocation  and  profession, 
are  continually  reasoning  from  general  rules  or  maxims,  and  are 
thus  exercising  and  cultivating  the  power  of  deductive  thinking. 

IV.  AVOID  FALLACIES. — In  order  to  improve  in  deductive 
thinking,  care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  those  errors  in  reasoning 
known  as  fallacies.  The  principal  fallacies  of  deduction  may  be 
embraced  under  two  classes;  first,  those  of  an  unwarranted  as- 
sumption of  premises,  and  second,  those  of  an  irrelevant  conclusion. 
The  principal  fallacy  of  the  first  class  is  that  known  as  Begging 
the  Question ;  the  principal  one  of  the  second  class  is  Arguing  to 
the  Wrong  Point.  The  former  includes  Reasoning  in  a  Circle; 
the  latter  includes  a  variety  of  forms,  such  as  Shifting  Ground, 
Asking  Questions,  Part  Proof,  Argumentum  ad  Populum,  etc. 

Begging  the  Question. — The  fallacy  of  Begging  the  Question, 
called  petitio  principii,  consists  in  the  unwarrantable  assumption 
of  the  thing  to  be  proved,  or  the  assumption  of  that  by  which  it 
is  to  be  proved,  without  proving  it.  Thus  to  assume  without 
proof  that  a  protective  tariff  will  be  of  advantage  to  the  country, 
or  to  argue  that  protection  will  promote  public  wealth  without 
ghowing  it,  is  to  beg  the  question.  So  to  assume  that  the  Bible  is 
divine  without  proving  it,  or  to  argue  that  it  is  worthy  of  belief 
because  it  is  inspired,  without  proving  its  inspiration,  is  a  fallacy 
of  this  kind.  The  usual  form  of  this  fallacy,  and  the  most  de- 
ceptive, is  that  of  reasoning  in  a  circle. 


THE  CULTURE   OF   REASONING.  307 

Reasoning  in  a,  Circle. — The  fallacy  of  Reasoning  in  a  Circle, 
called  argumentum  in  drculo,  is  one  in  which  the  conclusion  is 
virtually  used  in  order  to  prove  the  premise.  Thus,  to  argue 
that  a  party  is  good  because  it  advocates  good  measures,  and 
that  certain  measures  are  good  because  they  are  advocated  by  so 
excellent  a  party,  is  to  reason  in  a  circle.  So  when  persons  argue 
that  their  church  is  the  true  one,  because  it  was  established  by 
God,  and  then  argue  that  since  it  is  the  true  church,  it  must 
have  been  founded  by  God,  they  fall  into  this  fallacy.  To  argue 
that  "  the  will  is  determined  by  the  strongest  motive  "  and  define 
the  strongest  motive  as  that  which  influences  the  will,  is  to  re- 
volve in  a  circle  of  thought  and  prove  nothing.  Plato  commits 
this  error  when  he  argues  the  immortality  of  the  soul  from  its 
simplicity,  and  afterwards  attempts  to  prove  its  simplicity  from 
its  immortality.  It  needs  care  to  avoid  this  error,  for  it  is  sur- 
prising how  easily  one  falls  into  it. 

Fallacy  of  Shifting  Ground. — This  fallacy  consists  in  pre- 
tending to  prove  one  thing,  and  in  really  proving  or  deciding 
upon  another  merely  associated  with  it.  Thus  it  is  a  common  de- 
fence of  criminals  to  allege  that  they  were  insane,  and  to  attempt 
to  prove  this  by  showing  that  they  acted  very  unreasonably.  So 
to  try  to  convince  a  jury  that  a  man  is  guilty  of  a  certain  crime 
by  dwelling  upon  the  enormity  of  the  offence,  is  also  a  fallacy  of 
this  class.  Bacon  is  charged  with  treachery  to  his  friend  the  Earl 
of  Essex;  and  the  writer  dwells  powerfully  upon  the  evil  of  in- 
gratitude in  a  great  man,  instead  of  proving  the  alleged  facts. 

Fallacy  of  Questions. — The  fallacy  of  Questions  consists  in 
asking  two  or  more  closely  related  questions,  applying  the  answer 
of  one  to  the  other.  This  is  a  low  trick  sometimes  employed  by 
lawyers  in  the  examination  of  witnesses,  with  the  view  of  puzzling 
them  or  turning  their  answers  to  a  wrong  account.  Thus,  "You 
were  swayed  by  the  love  of  money  in  the  transaction  ?  "  (meaning 
exclusively),  to  which  the  witness  answers  "Yes"  (meaning  in 
part).  Another  question  follows :  "  In  being  swayed  by  money 
you  acted  selfishly  in  the  transaction  ? "  The  utilitarian  puts  to 


308  MENTAL   SCIENCE 

us  the  questions:  "You  deny  that  virtue  consists  in  utility?" 
"  Yes."  "  Then  you  deny  that  utility  is  a  good  thing."  A  ques- 
tion is  often  double,  so  that  either  a  "  yes  "  or  a  "  no "  will  lead 
to  a  fallacious  inference;  in  which  case  the  fallacy  will  be 
avoided  by  answering  each  part  separately. 

Fallacy  of  Part  Proof. — The  fallacy  of  proving  part  of  the 
question  often  misleads  the  judgment  of  men.  Thus,  if  a  man  is 
charged  with  murder,  it  is  a  fallacy  to  attempt  to  prove  the  charge 
by  merely  showing  that  he  killed  a  man.  So  also  it  is  a  fallacy 
to  conclude  that  a  man  is  a  liar  because  he  is  proved  to  have  made 
a  misstatement,  which  may  have  been  entirely  unintentional. 

Argumentum  ad  Populum. — The  argumentum  ad  populwn 
is  that  in  which  there  is  an  appeal  to  public  opinion,  or  to  passion 
and  prejudice  rather  than  to  reason.  It  does  not  prove  anything, 
but  may  lead  the  judgment  or  actions  of  the  people,  and  is  there- 
fore a  fallacy.  Such  an  argument  is  not  improper  when  the  con- 
clusion arrived  at  is  believed  to  be  a  correct  one ;  but  it  is  illegiti- 
mate when  the  conclusion  is  wrong  in  itself,  or  when  he  who  urges 
it  does  so  hypocritically.  Considered  as  an  argument,  it  is  always 
a  fallacy,  and  should  be  used  with  great  care  and  an  upright  con- 
science. 

Argumentum  ad  Verecundiam. — The  argumentum  ad  vere- 
cundiam  consists  in  an  appeal  to  the  feeling  of  reverence  for  cer- 
tain persons  or  objects,  as  to  antiquity,  the  opinions  of  ancestors, 
etc.,  instead  of  proving  the  point  at  issue.  Thus  the  scholastics 
employed  the  maxim,  "It  is  foolish  to  affirm  that  Aristotle 
erred ;"  and  in  the  same  manner  the  conservative  argues  against 
any  improvement  in  society  or  the  state  by  referring  to  the  opin- 
ions of  the  fathers  of  the  republic.  The  argument  may  be  used 
to  prevent  any  rash  disturbance  of  the  social  order ;  but  it  is  in 
every  case  a  fallacy. 

Argumentum  ad  Ignorantiam. — The  argument  called  ad 
ignorantiam  is  addressed  to  the  ignorance  of  men.  It  consists  in 
assuming  that  a  certain  position  is  correct,  because  an  adversary 
cannot  show  the  contrary.  Thus  some  would  have  us  believe  in 


THE  CULTURE   OF   REASONING.  309 

animal  magnetism  or  spiritualism,  because  we  cannot  explain  their 
phenomena.  To  argue  that  there  is  no  material  world  because 
we  cannot  explain  how  the  mind  knows  it  to  exist,  is  the  cele- 
brated fallacy  of  Hume  in  philosophy.  The  fact  that  we  cannot 
find  a  needle  in  a  haystack  is  no  proof  that  it  is  not  there. 

Argumentum  ad  Hominem, — The  argument  called  ad 
hominem  is  an  appeal  to  the  practice,  principles,  or  professions  of 
an  opponent  to  confirm  our  position  or  to  overthrow  his.  This 
argument  is  good  against  an  opponent,  and  may  silence  him ;  but 
it  may  not  be  good  against  the  views  which  he  advocates.  As  soon 
as  he  renounces  such  opinions  or  practices,  the  argument  ceases 
to  be  of  value  against  him.  Christ  often  used  this  method  to 
silence  the  cavils  of  the  Jews,  as  in  Matt.  xxii.  41-45.  This  fal- 
lacy is  especially  objectionable  when  we  take  advantage  of 
premises  which  those  with  whom  we  argue  allow,  but  which  we 
ourselves  do  not  believe.  It  is  legitimate  only  when  we  wish  to 
make  our  opponents  doubt  their  premises  by  seeing  the  conse- 
quences to  which  they  lead,  or  to  silence  an  unreasonable  and 
cavilling  adversary. 

In  Conclusion. — In  conclusion  we  remark  that  care  to  avoid 
these  fallacies,  combined  with  the  reading  of  works  of  philosophy, 
the  study  of  the  metaphysical  sciences,  the  study  of  logic  and  the 
deductive  sciences,  the  proper  study  of  mathematics  and  language, 
and  the  practice  of  deductive  thought,  will  train  the  mind  to 
clear,  broad,  and  comprehensive  deductive  reasoning. 

II.  CULTURE  OF  INDUCTIVE  REASONING. 
Inductive  Reasoning  is  the  process  of  deriving  a  general  truth 
from  particular  truths.  It  is  one  of  the  earliest  forms  of  thinking 
manifested  by  the  young  mind;  and  is  developed  by  appropriate 
exercise  and  training.  This  exercise  and  training  may  be  given 
in  four  different  ways ;  by  the  inductive  teaching  of  several  of 
the  elementary  branches  of  study;  by  the  formal  study  of  the 
material  sciences;  by  original  investigations  in  these  sciences; 
and  by  being  careful  to  avoid  the  fallacies  of  induction. 


310  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

I.  INDUCTIVE  METHOD  OF  TEACHING. — The  power  of  inductive 
reasoning  may  be  cultivated  by  the  inductive  method  of  teaching 
several  of  the  elementary  branches.  The  inductive  method  of 
teaching  is  that  form  of  teaching  which  passes  from  particulars  to 
generals.  By  it  the  pupil  may  be  led  from  particular  ideas  to 
general  ideas,  or  from  particular  truths  to  general  truths.  The 
former  gives  culture  to  generalization,  which  is  in  the  spirit  of  in- 
ductive thought ;  the  latter  requires  inductive  reasoning  on  the 
part  of  the  pupil,  which  gives  direct  culture  to  inductive  thinking. 
The  principal  of  the  school  branches  for  the  inductive  method, 
are  Object  Lessons,  Geography,  Grammar,  and  Arithmetic. 

In  Object  Lessons, — Object  Lessons  deal  with  objects  and 
their  properties,  and  these  constitute  the  foundation  of  the  induc- 
tive sciences.  A  system  of  object  lessons  is  especially  adapted  to 
train  the  power  of  observation,  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  de- 
velopment of  the  inductive  sciences.  An  object  lesson  requires  a 
pupil  to  analyze  an  object  into  its  parts,  to  look  at  its  details ; 
and  thus  leads  him  to  acquire  the  habit  of  close,  accurate,  and 
analytical  perception.  The  pupil  may  also  be  led  to  classify 
objects,  which  is  a  stage  -of  inductive  science.  He  may  also  be 
1  (1  to  inquire  after  the  causes  of  certain  facts  and  appearances  of 
the  objects,  which  is  induction  proper.  A  system  of  object 
lessons,  in  the  hands  of  an  intelligent  teacher,  may  thus  lead  a 
pupil  in  the  first  steps  of  inductive  thought  and  science. 

In  Teaching  Geography. — Geography  is  a  natural  science 
and  is  developed  inductively;  and  when  properly  taught,  gives 
exercise  in  inductive  thought.  In  this  branch,  a  pupil  should 
first  see  particular  examples  of  the  different  divisions  of  land  and 
water, — continents,  capes,  peninsulas,  islands,  oceans,  gulfs,  bays, 
etc., — and  from  these  be  led  up  to  the  general  notion  of  them 
and  their  definitions.  So  also  the  particular  rivers  and  moun- 
tains should  be  first  presented,  and  the  pupil  be  led  to  unite  them 
into  river-systems  and  mountain-chains,  thus  proceeding  from 
the  particular  to  the  general.  So  far  as  geography  treats  of 
causes  and  laws,  they  should  follow  the  facts  which  depend  upon 


THE   CULTURE   OF   REASONING.  311 

them.  Taught  in  this  way,  geography  cultivates  inductive  think- 
ing; taught,  however,  by  the  ordinary  method  of  definition  and 
description,  very  little  thought  is  awakened,  and  what  there  is,  is 
in  the  spirit  of  deduction  rather  than  induction. 

In  Teaching  Arithmetic. — Even  arithmetic,  which  is  a 
deductive  science,  may  be  so  taught  as  to  train  the  faculty  of 
inductive  thought.  The  earliest  instruction  in  arithmetic  should 
be  presented  concretely  and  inductively.  The  mind  should  pro- 
ceed from  objects  to  numbers,  from  ideas  of  processes  to  their 
formal  statement,  from  the  analysis  of  particular  examples  to  the 
general  rules,  from  the  use  of  a  principle  in  some  special  case 
that  gives  rise  to  it,  to  its  formal  announcement  in  a  general 
proposition.  Thus  the  pupil  may  be  made  familiar  with  the  pro- 
cess of  uniting  and  separating  numbers  before  he  learns  to  call  it 
addition  and  subtraction  ;  he  may  analyze  special  examples  in 
the  different  cases  of  fractions,  and  then  derive  a  rule  from  the 
steps  of  the  analysis;  and  this  is  inductive  in  its  character.  So, 
in  common  divisor,  common  multiple,  evolution,  etc.,  the  prin- 
ciple may  be  first  presented  in  the  special  case  of  a  problem  being 
solved,  from  which  the  mind  may  be  led  to  its  formal  statement. 
Subsequently,  the  principles  may  be  demonstrated  by  deductive 
processes,  and  the  rules  derived  from  general  principles. 

In  Teaching  Algebra. — Some  culture  of  inductive  thought 
may  be  given,  even  in  the  study  of  algebra.  We  may  pass  from 
the  particular  solutions  of  arithmetic  to  the  more  general  so- 
lutions with  algebraic  symbols.  The  transition  from  figures  to 
letters,  from  numerical  exponents  to  literal  exponents,  and  the 
generalization  of  particular  processes,  are  all  in  the  spirit  of  in- 
ductive thought.  Some  of  the  methods  of  operation  and  general 
formulas  may  also  be  obtained  by  inductive  methods  of  reasoning. 
Newton  discovered  his  celebrated  "binomial  formula"  by  in- 
duction ;  he  left  no  deductive  demonstration  of  it  and  probably 
never  discovered  one.  Format's  formula  for  prime  numbers, 
2"1  +  1,  when  m  is  a  term  in  the  series  1,  2,  4,  8,  etc.,  which 
Euler  showed  is  incorrect  when  m  equals  32,  was  derived  by  m- 


812  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

duction.  The  method  of  "mathematical  induction,"  often  used 
in  algebra,  is  more  deductive  in  its  nature  than  inductive,  and 
does  not  afford  culture  to  inductive  reasoning ;  and  most  of  the 
reasoning  of  algebra  trains  to  deductive  rather  than  inductive 
thought. 

In  Teaching  Grrammar. — Grammar  is  largely  a  deductive 
science,  but  its  elements  may  be  taught  inductively ;  and  when 
thus  taught,  will  give  culture  to  inductive  reasoning.  Thus,  we 
may  first  present  individual  examples  of  nouns,  and  then  lead  to 
the  general  idea  of  a  noun  and  to  its  definition ;  and  so  with  all 
the  parts  of  speech.  So  also  we  may  lead  the  pupil  to  discover 
the  properties  of  number,  case,  etc.,  from  language,  and  to  derive 
the  rules  of  inflection  from  individual  cases  of  inflection.  The 
rules  of  syntax  may  also  be  first  presented  in  special  cases,  and 
the  mind  be  led  to  grasp  the  general  from  the  particular.  Such 
teaching  is  in  the  spirit  of  induction,  and  trains  to  inductive 
habits  of  thought.  Other  school  studies  may  be  presented  in  a 
like  manner,  and  when  so  taught  do  something  for  the  culture  of 
inductive  reasoning. 

II.  THE  INDUCTIVE  SCIENCES. — Besides  the  method  of  in- 
ductive teaching,  there  are  several  school  studies  that  give  special 
culture  to  inductive  thought.  These  are  the  branches  which  be- 
long to  the  inductive  sciences ;  and  if  studied  in  accordance  with 
their  spirit,  give  direct  culture  to  the  power  of  inductive  reason- 
ing. Among  these  branches  are  Physiology,  Natural  Philosophy, 
Astronomy,  Chemistry,  and  Natural  History.  A  few  remarks 
on  each  of  these  studies  will  show  their  use  in  affording  the  cul- 
ture we  are  considering. 

Study  of  Physiology. — The  science  of  physiology  treats 
mainly  of  facts.  There  are  few  general  principles  reached,  and 
the  inquiry  for  causes  is  somewhat  limited.  The  study  of  this 
branch  trains  the  pupil  to  close  observation ;  he  is  taught  to  dis- 
sect, to  observe,  and  to  gather  facts.  This  does  not  require  in- 
ductive reasoning,  but  it  is  the  first  stage  of  the  inductive  sciences, 
and  thus  imparts  somewhat  of  the  spirit  of  these  sciences.  The 


THE  CULTUKE  OF  REASONING.          313 

functions  of  the  different  organs  lie  in  the  sphere  of  cause  and 
effect,  and  when  laws  are  reached,  they  are  reached  inductively ; 
and  the  ascertaining  of  these  laws  and  causes  gives  direct  culture 
to  inductive  thought. 

Study  of  Natural  Philosophy. — Natural  philosophy  is  one 
of  the  finest  types  of  a  purely  inductive  science,  as  geometry  is  of 
a  deductive  science.  It  treats  of  facts  and  phenomena,  with  their 
laws  and  causes.  When  studied  according  to  its  own  genius,  as 
it  should  be,  it  is  one  of  the  very  best  studies  for  the  training  of 
inductive  thought.  It  requires  the  observation  of  facts  and 
phenomena,  and  also  experiment  to  ascertain  facts  not  presented 
by  things  in  their  usual  relations.  From  these  the  student 
passes  to  the  inquiry  after  the  causes  of  facts  and  phenomena, 
and  the  laws  which  control  them.  Thus,  from  the  facts  of  falling 
bodies,  it  rises  to  the  cause,  attraction  of  gravitation,  and  from  this 
to  the  law  that  the  distances  are  proportional  to  the  squares  of  the 
times.  Studied  in  this  manner,  it  gives  admirable  culture  to  in- 
ductive thought ;  while  taught,  as  it  so  often  is,  by  the  definitions 
and  discussions  of  the  text-book,  it  not  only  gives  no  culture  to 
induction,  but  is  almost  useless  as  a  matter  of  discipline. 

Study  of  Astronomy. — The  science  of  astronomy  is  also  in- 
ductive in  its  character.  It  begins  with  the  facts  and  phenomena 
of  the  heavenly  bodies,  and  proceeds  to  ascertain  the  causes 
which  produce  the  various  phenomena  and  the  laws  which  govern 
them.  The  study  should  begin  with  the  observation  of  the  sun, 
moon,  and  stars  themselves ;  or  with  the  observation  of  the  facts. 
From  these  the  student  should  be  led  to  the  inquiry  after  the 
causes  which  produce  these  facts  and  phenomena,  and  the  laws  by 
which  these  causes  operate.  These  causes  are  so  recondite  in 
their  nature,  and  require  such  a  breadth  of  thought,  that  the 
student  cannot  be  led  to  them,  but  is  obliged  to  accept  them  as 
already  discovered.  So  also  he  must  learn  the  laws  as  deter- 
mined by  the  great  minds  who  have  discovered  them,  rather  than 
discover  them  himself.  This  is  the  deductive  method  rather  than 
the  inductive,  and  trains  to  deductive  methods  of  thinking.  Be- 
14 


314:  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

sides,  mathematics  enters  very  largely,  almost  entirely,  into  the 
development  of  these  higher  investigations,  which  makes  the 
reasoning  strictly  deductive,  and  cultivates  that  form  of  reasoning. 

Study  of  Cliemistry. — Chemistry  is  mainly  a  science  of  ex- 
periment, as  physiology  is  of  observation.  The  student  is  re- 
quired to  become  familiar  with  the  different  elements,  their 
properties,  their  equivalents  of  combination,  the  results  of  such 
combination,  the  methods  of  analysis  of  compounds,  the  tests  for 
and  detection  of  substances,  etc.  There  is  but  little  theory,  or 
investigation  of  causes  or  laws.  Most  of  the  theories  are  already 
prepared  for  us,  and  the  student  has  only  to  learn  them  and 
attain  skill  in  their  application.  The  prominence  of  experiment 
in  the  study,  and  the  necessity  of  drawing  inferences  from  facts, 
however,  render  it  an  excellent  study  for  the  culture  of  the 
method  of  inductive  investigation. 

Natural  History. — The  three  branches  of  natural  history, 
Botany,  Zoology,  and  Mineralogy,  treat  mainly  of  facts  and  their 
classification.  These  train  the  mind  to  the  close  observation  of 
facts  and  to  generalizations  from  these  facts,  but  not  to  inductive 
reasoning.  Generalization,  however,  the  passing  from  particular 
objects  to  general  ideas,  though  not  inductive  reasoning,  is  in  the 
spirit  of  induction ;  and  the  study  of  these  branches  is  thus  of 
value  in  the  culture  of  inductive  thought.  Besides,  there  are  a 
few  general  principles  reached  in  these  branches,  and  now  and 
then  an  inquiry  after  a  cause;  and  these  afford  a  more  direct 
culture  of  inductive  thought. 

III.  INDUCTIVE  THINKING. — Besides  the  culture  afforded  by 
the  inductive  teaching  of  several  of  the  school  studies  and  the 
formal  study  of  several  of  the  inductive  sciences,  a  course  in  in- 
ductive investigation  is  indispensable  for  the  high  culture  of  the 
power  of  inductive  thought.  In  fact,  more  can  be  done  for  the 
culture  of  inductive  reasoning  outside  of  books  than  in  connection 
with  them,  for  books,  as  a  rule,  announce  the  results  of  induction 
rather  than  take  the  mind  through  the  process  of  induction. 
This  method  can  be  applied  to  every  department  of  nature  and 


THE  CULTURE  OF  REASONING.          315 

society.  The  business  man,  as  well  as  the  professional  man,  the 
merchant,  the  doctor,  the  statesman,  every  one  who  wishes  to 
reach  the  laws  and  causes  which  are  operating  in  his  own  depart- 
ment of  labor,  may  use  this  faculty  in  passing  from  facts  to  their 
causes  and  laws. 

Order  of  Investigation. — For  this  investigation  the  several 
steps  or  stages  are  as  follows :  First,  they  must  seek  for  facts  and 
phenomena.  These  are  to  be  gained  by  observation,  experiment, 
and  testimony.  Second,  they  are  to  ascertain  the  causes  of  these 
facts  and  the  laws  which  govern  them.  They  will  be  aided  in 
this  by  hypothesis  and  theory.  These  hypotheses  are  often  reached 
by  anticipation,  and  are  carefully  verified.  A  few  remarks  on 
each  one  of  these  subjects  will  make  a  little  clearer  what  is  here 
meant. 

Inquiry  for  Facts. — Every  man  should  be  a  good  observer ; 
he  should  see  what  is  going  on  around  him ;  he  should  be  a  fact- 
gatherer.  He  should  observe  the  facts  both  of  nature  and  human 
nature.  He  should  notice  what  is  going  on  in  society,  the 
changes  in  thought  and  institutions,  the  progress  in  art  and  in- 
vention, and  the  fluctuations  in  public  sentiment  and  political 
parties.  As  a  business  man,  he  should  observe  the  facts  of  trade, 
the  growing  demand  for  new  articles  of  commerce,  the  relation 
of  supply  to  demand  of  any  one  article,  etc.  As  such  he  becomes 
a  man  of  intelligence,  and  has  the  material  with  which  to  form 
his  inductive  inferences;  and  this  will  enable  him  to  make  his 
life  a  practical  success  in  the  business  and  professional  world. 

Experiment  for  Facts. — Another  method  of  gaining  facts  is 
that  of  experiment,  which  is  practicable  in  many  departments 
of  life.  If  a  man  is  engaged  in  farming  or  some  similar  avoca- 
tion, he  can  supplement  his  observation  by  experiments.  He  can 
cross  his  strawberries  or  grapes,  try  the  effects  of  different  soils 
on  his  apples  or  pears,  experiment  with  different  methods  of  feed- 
ing his  cattle,  test  the  efficiency  of  new  fertilizers,  etc.  As  a 
merchant,  he  can  try  the  popularity  of  a  new  line  of  goods ;  as  a 
manufacturer,  test  some  new  article  for  the  household,  etc.  In 


316  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

this  way,  he  will  not  only  gain  valuable  information,  but  give 
culture  to  the  power  which  obtains  material  for  inductive  reason- 
ing. 

Inquire  for  Causes. — The  mind  should  accustom  itself  to 
the  inquiry  after  the  causes  of  things.  Every  fact  and  phe- 
nomenon is  the  result  of  some  agency ;  and  the  mind  should  acquire 
the  habit  of  trying  to  see  the  cause  which  stands  behind  the  fact 
and  gives  rise  to  it.  We  thus  rise  from  facts  into  the  domain  of 
philosophy ;  and  learn  to  previse  and  predict  the  future.  The 
facts  as  caused  become  themselves  the  cause  of  other  facts,  and 
the  man  who  can  foresee  and  foretell  their  result,  becomes  a  prac- 
tical prophet  among  his  fellow-men.  By  this  grasp  of  the  future, 
fortunes  are  made,  political  success  is  assured,  the  tide  of  public 
thought  is  anticipated,  and  the  possessor  of  this  power  raised  to 
positions  of  honor  and  influence.  The  successful  men  of  the  day 
in  business,  are  those  who,  with  a  broad  grasp  of  cause  and  effect, 
could  anticipate  the  coming  events  and  be  prepared  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  them. 

Use  of  Hypotheses. — In  thus  ascertaining  the  causes,  it  will 
often  be  necessary  to  use  hypotheses.  These  hypotheses  are  not 
a  combination  of  all  the  facts,  but  the  mind  leaps,  by  a  kind  of 
inspiration,  from  a  few  facts  to  the  cause  which  explains  or  pro- 
duces them.  To  do  this  we  need  to  cultivate  a  lively  fancy,  a 
quickness  of  suggestion,  a  philosophic  foresight  that  catches  a 
glimpse  of  the  idea  through  the  form,  or  sees  the  law  or  cause 
standing  back  of  the  fact.  Care  must  be  used  to  verify  these 
flashes  of  fancy  or  bright  suggestions.  No  hypothesis  should  be 
accepted  as  true  until  the  facts  are  so  numerous  that  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  its  being  proved.  If  facts  are  found  that  it  will 
not  account  for,  another  supposition  must  be  made,  and  so  on, 
until  one  is  obtained  that  will  account  for  the  facts.  Remember 
Whewell's  maxim  that  "  to  try  wrong  guesses  is  with  most  persons 
the  only  way  to  hit  upon  right  ones." 

IV.  CARE  TO  AVOID  FALLACIES. — In  these  investigations, 
great  care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  those  illusive  inferences 


THE   CULTUEE    OF   REASONING.  317 

called  fallacies,  into  which  men  are  liable  to  fall.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  are  those  relating  to  the  ascertaining  of  the 
causes  of  facts.  Mistakes  are  also  made  in  obtaining  the  facts, 
which  have  been  called  fallacies  of  observation.  A  few  remarks 
will  be  made  on  each  of  these  two  classes  of  fallacies, — -fallacies  of 
observation  and  fallacies  of  inference. 

Fallacies  of  Observation. — We  should  be  cautious,  in  obtain- 
ing our  facts,  to  avoid  the  fallacies  of  observation.  These  are  of 
several  classes,  the  most  important  of  which  are  the  following: 
first,  inexact  observation,  or  the  careless  observation  of  facts; 
second,  partial  observation,  or  gaining  an  incomplete  knowledge 
of  facts ;  third,  the  neglect  of  exceptions  and  contradictory  facts ; 
fourth,  the  assumption  of  facts  which  are  not  facts ;  fifth,  the  mix- 
ing of  illegitimate  inferences  with  the  facts.  Special  care  should 
be  taken  to  avoid  all  -of  these  fallacies,  as  any  mistake  in  observa- 
tion will  vitiate  the  general  conclusions  which  we  derive  from 
them. 

Mistaking  the  Cause. — The  fallacy  of  mistaking  the  cause, 
called  non  causa  pro  causa,  is  that  in  which  something  not  a 
cause  is  assumed  to  be  a  cause.  Thus  Newton  fell  into  this  error 
when  he  explained  the  phenomena  of  light  by  the  supposition  of 
corpuscles.  So  the  supposition  that  heat  is  a  fluid,  so  long  taught 
in  natural  philosophy,  was  a  fallacy  of  this  kind.  There  are 
several  forms  of  this  fallacy,  the  principal  of  which  we  shall 
mention. 

Antecedent  for  the  Cause. — This  fallacy,  called  post  hoc,  ergo 
propter  hoc,  consists  in  mistaking  a  mere  antecedent  for  a  cause. 
Thus,  if  we  infer  that  because  an  eclipse  of  the  moon  is  followed 
by  a  heavy  rain,  that  the  former  is  the  cause  of  the  latter,  it  will 
be  a  fallacy  of  mistaking  the  antecedent  for  the  cause.  In 
ancient  times,  people  who  noticed  that  a  remarkable  meteor  in 
the  sky  was  followed  by  some  national  calamity,  or  a  conjunction 
of  planets  was  followed  by  a  royal  marriage  with  far-reaching 
political  consequences,  superstitiously  concluded  that  the  events 
were  related  as  cause  and  effect.  So  to  infer,  because  a  country 


318  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

flourished  under  one  administration  and  suffered  from  a  financial 
panic  under  another  administration,  that  the  administration  was 
the  cause  of  the  result,  is  to  be  guilty  of  this  fallacy. 

Taking  the  Sign  for  the  Cause. — The  fallacy  of  mistaking  the 
sign  for  the  cause  is  a  common  one  with  untrained  thinkers. 
Thus  a  physician  who,  on  seeing  pimples  on  the  face,  attempts  to 
remove  them  by  an  application,  instead  of  endeavoring  to  remove 
the  cause,  falls  into  this  error.  A  statesman,  who  contents  him- 
self with  punishing  the  crimes  which  proceed  from  ignorance, 
without  trying  to  remove  the  moral  causes  from  which  crime 
springs,  is  guilty  of  this  fallacy.  Buckle  falls  into  this  error  by 
tracing  all  progress  in  civilization  to  intellectual  activity,  for- 
getting that  the  intellectual  activity  of  Europe  was  due  to  moral 
causes,  and  was  thus  only  a  sign  or  effect  of  the  real  cause. 

Fallacy  of  Analogy. — The  fallacy  of  analogy,  called  non  tale 
pro  tali,  consists  in  assuming  a  resemblance  where  there  is  no  re- 
semblance. Thus  to  assume  that  because  the  wheat  crop  is 
unusually  large,  we  shall  have  a  fine  corn  crop ;  or  because  the 
season  is  favorable  to  peaches,  apples  will  be  abundant, — is  to 
fall  into  this  error.  The  trite  argument  against  Christianity, 
that  because  all  other  religions  are  a  delusion,  Christianity  must 
be  a  delusion,  is  a  fallacy  of  this  kind,  which  should  not  delude 
any  one  with  ordinary  reasoning  powers.  It  is  a  fallacy  also  to 
carry  an  analogy  too  far;  as  to  infer  from  the  parable  of  the 
praying  of  the  importunate  woman  that  God  resembles  the  unjust 
judge. 


INTUITION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   NATURE   OP   INTUITION. 

TNTUITION",  or  the  REASON,  is  that  power  of  the  mind  which 
-  gives  us  ideas  and  truths  not  furnish'ed  by  the  senses,  nor 
elaborated  by  the  understanding.  Its  products  are  called  primary 
ideas  and  primary  truths.  The  Primary  Ideas  are  those  of  Space, 
Time,  Cause,  Identity,  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  the  Good,  etc. 
The  Primary  Truths  are  all  self-evident  and  necessary  truths,  as 
the  axioms  of  mathematics  and  logic. 

Names  of  the  Fower. — This  power  is  called  Intuitive,  be- 
cause the  products  spring  up  immediately  in  the  mind  upon  the 
presentation  of  the  proper  occasion.  The  ideas  are  not  the  pro- 
ducts of  sensation  and  perception,  but  arise  in  the  mind  on  the 
occasion  of  sensible  experience.  Its  truths  are  not  derived  by  a 
process  of  reasoning,  but  arise  spontaneously  in  the  mind  when 
the  subjects  to  which  they  relate  are  contemplated.  Hamilton 
calls  it  the  Regulative  Power,  because  it  regulates  and  controls 
the  activity  of  the  other  faculties.  Dr.  Hickok  and  some  others, 
following  the  example  of  Kant,  call  it  the  Reason,  a  term  not 
inappropriate,  since  it  is  the  power  or  element  of  the  mind  which 
seems  to  stamp  it  with  rationality. 

In  Wliat  Sense  a  Faculty. — The  power  of  intuition  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  a  faculty,  in  the  same  sense  as  the  other  activities 
of  the  mind.  It  is  not  so  much  an  activity  as  a  spontaneity,  for 
its  products  arise  spontaneously  in  the  mind  on  the  proper  occa- 
sion without  any  special  effort  or  action.  From  this  fact  Ham- 

(319) 


320  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ilton  speaks  of  it  as  the  complement  of  certain  fundamental  laws, 
though  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  characterizes  it  properly.  It 
seems  to  correspond  to  what  was  known  to  the  Greek  philosophy 
as  the  nous  (vour),  the  intelligence.  The  Scotch  philosophers  have 
used  the  term  common  sense  to  name  this  power ;  but  this  term  is 
also  objectionable.  Kant  called  it  the  Reason,  and  this  term  has 
been  quite  largely  adopted,  though  it  is  liable  to  become  con- 
founded with  reasoning.  Several  other  terms  have  been  sug- 
gested, but  none  seems  more  suitable  than  Intuition. 

Nature  of  the  Faculty. — Intuition  or  the  Reason  is  an  intu- 
itive source  of  knowledge.  It  has  an  eye  for  truth  which  tran- 
scends the  truths  of  sense  and  reasoning.  Perception  derives  its 
ideas  through  the  senses ;  Intuition  is  the  source  of  its  own  ideas. 
Reasoning  obtains  its  conclusions  from  premises;  Intuition  ob- 
tains its  truths  from  itself.  It  is  thus  a  centre  and  source  of 
knowing;  a  source  and  originator  of  knowledge.  It  also  fur- 
nishes the  laws  by  which  each  of  the  other  faculties  mature  and 
complete  their  products;  perception,  memory,  and  reasoning  de- 
pend for  their  results  on  the  Reason.  Besides  this,  it  looks 
around  and  through  the  operations  of  the  other  faculties  of  know- 
ing, and  comprehends  their  activities  and  products.  Moreover, 
it  not  only  comprehends  the  activities  of  the  other  faculties,  but 
comprehends  its  own  activities  and  products.  The  faith  in 
Reason  is  itself  an  intuition  of  the  Reason.  This  statement  of  a 
true  conception  of  the  Reason  will  be  more  clearly  seen  as  the 
subject  is  further  discussed. 

I.  EXISTENCE  OF  THIS  FACULTY. — The  existence  of  such  a 
faculty,  though  it  has  been  questioned,  is  apparent  from  an  ex- 
amination of  the  source  of  its  products.  All  of  our  ideas  whose 
origin  we  have  explained,  are  of  three  classes;  percepts,  abstracts, 
and  concepts.  These  ideas  have  their  primary  source  in  per- 
ception,— abstraction  and  generalization  depending  on  perception 
for  the  materials  out  of  which  they  form  ideas.  If  now  we  find 
that  we  have  ideas  not  given  by  either  of  these  three  faculties,  it 
is  reasonable  to  infer  that  there  must  be  some  other  faculty  as  the 


THE   NATURE   OF   INTUITION.  321 

source  of  these  ideas.  Let  us  notice  the  origin  of  our  so-called 
Primary  Ideas. 

Ideas  not  from  Perception. — We  remark  first  that  these 
primary  ideas  are  not  given  by  perception.  A  percept  has  color 
or  form,  hardness  or  softness,  or  some  one  of  the  qualities  of  ma- 
terial things.  A  Primary  Idea,  as  the  idea  of  Space,  has  neither 
color,  nor  form,  nor  hardness,  nor  softness,  nor  any  one  of  the 
qualities  of  matter ;  hence  it  is  not  a  percept,  or  the  product  of 
perception.  The  same  may  be  shown  of  Time,  Cause,  Identity, 
etc.  Since  they  are  not  given  by  perception,  they  cannot  be 
given  by  abstraction,  since  abstraction  is  the  power  of  drawing  a 
quality  away  from  an  object  and  making  of  it  a  distinct  object 
of  thought.  If  we  do  not  perceive  space,  time,  cause,  etc.,  as 
qualities  of  bodies,  we  shall  have  no  such  ideas  to  draw  away 
from  objects. 

Not  by  Generalization. — These  ideas  are  not  concepts,  the 
products  of  generalization.  In  forming  a  general  idea,  we  first 
perceive  the  qualities  of  objects,  then  abstract  the  qualities  which 
are  common,  and  then  unite  these  common  attributes  into  a 
general  notion.  Now,  if  we  have  no  perception  of  these  intuitive 
ideas  as  qualities  of  objects,  we  cannot  abstract  and  unite  such 
qualities  into  general  notions.  Besides  this,  the  general  notion  ia 
always  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  common  qualities  united;  the 
general  idea  equals  the  sum  of  the  particulars  and  can  never 
transcend  this  sum.  Now,  if  our  idea  of  space  were  made  up  of 
all  the  particular  spaces  which  we  may  have  experienced,  it  could 
be  no  larger  than  the  sum  of  these  particulars.  But  in  reality 
our  idea  of  space  infinitely  transcends  the  sum  of  all  possibly  ex- 
perienced spaces.  If  we  should  put  together  all  the  spaces  which 
we  have  seen  occupied  by  matter,  the  result  would  fall  far  short 
of  our  idea  of  space. 

Not  by  Judgment  or  Reasoning. — These   intuitive   ideas 

cannot  be  given  by  judgment  and  reasoning,  since  their  office  is 

to  give  us  truths  and  not  ideas.     In  a  similar  manner,  we  could 

show  that  none  of  these  ideas — Time,  Cause,  Identity,  the  Beau- 

14* 


322  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

tiful,  etc. — can  be  given  by  any  of  the  faculties  we  have  previously 
described.  Hence  there  must  be  some  other  faculty  which  gives 
these  ideas,  and  that  faculty  we  call  Intuition  or  the  Reason.  A 
similar  argument  can  be  given  in  respect  to  the  origin  of  the 
intuitive  truths. 

Existence  Generally  Admitted. — The  existence  of  such  a 
faculty  is  now  generally  admitted  by  philosophers.  Nearly  all 
the  great  thinkers  acknowledge  that  it  is  impossible  to  resolve  all 
our  knowledge  into  the  product  of  experience.  It  is  largely  ad- 
mitted that  a  certain  complement  of  cognitions  must  be  allowed 
as  having  their  origin  in  the  nature  of  the  thinking  principle  it- 
self. In  the  analysis  of  knowledge,  it  is  seen  that  the  mind  itself 
supplies  some  of  the  elements ;  and  there  must  be  an  attribute  or 
faculty  of  the  mind  to  supply  them.  There  is  a  general  agree- 
ment, also,  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  ideas  and  truths  of  the 
faculty  are  formed. 

Existence  Questioned. — There  is  a  certain  class  of  thinkers, 
however,  of  whom  Hobbes  is  a  representative,  who  deny  the  ex- 
istence of  such  a  faculty.  These  thinkers  endeavor  to  trace  all 
of  our  ideas  to  sense  as  their  ultimate  source.  Nearly  all  the 
thinkers  known  as  scientists,  belong  to  this  school.  Locke  is 
claimed  on  both  sides  of  the  question.  He  states  that  all  of  our 
ideas  arise  from  two  sources,  sensation  and  reflection;  but  he  is 
not  entirely  clear  in  his  explanation  of  the  origin  of  those  ideas 
which  we  call  intuitive.  It  is  thought  by  many,  however,  that 
he  meant  to  teach  that  they  are  not  derived  from  sense,  but  that 
they  originate  in  the  mind. 

II.  RELATION  TO  OTHER  FACULTIES. — Intuition  is  intimately 
related  to  all  the  faculties  of  the  mind.  It  seems  to  overlie  and 
condition  the  activities  of  all  the  other  faculties.  It  furnishes 
the  laws  by  which  they  operate,  and  often  adds  elements  to  their 
products  necessary  for  their  completeness.  This  relation  to  the 
other  faculties  will  be  briefly  pointed  out. 

To  Perception. — Through  the  senses  the  perceptive  power  at- 
tains the  idea  of  qualities.  These  qualities  are  necessarily  con- 


THE   NATURE    OF   INTUITION.  323 

ceived  as  belonging  to  something  which  we  call  substance,  and 
this  conception  is  furnished,  not  by  perception,  but  by  intuition. 
The  perception  of  bodies  as  extended  involves  the  idea  of  space ; 
and  this  idea  is  furnished  by  the  intuitive  power.  So  in  the  per- 
ception of  events ;  they  are  conceived  to  be  united  by  the  thread 
of  time,  which  is  also  an  intuitive  idea.  The  cognition  of  an  ex- 
ternal world,  as  was  explained  under  perception,  involves  an  in- 
tuitive belief  that  resistance  implies  something  which  resists, — a 
truth  furnished  by  intuition. 

To  the  Memory. — Memory  is  also  aided  by  intuition  in  com- 
pleting its  action.  The  memory,  as  previously  explained,  retains, 
recalls,  represents,  and  recognizes.  The  element  of  recognition 
is  an  intuitive  act,  and  is  supposed  to  be  due  to  intuition.  It  is 
not  a  result  of  comparison,  for  there  is  nothing  with  which  to 
compare  the  representative  object ;  and  even  if  there  were,  some 
power  would  be  needed  to  pronounce  upon  the  result  of  the  com- 
parison and  recognize  the  similarity  or  identity.  The  act  of 
recognition  is  immediate  and  intuitive,  and  is  an  act  of  the 
Reason. 

To  the  Imagination. — The  imagination  is  also  regulated  in 
its  action  by  the  Reason.  The  products  of  this  faculty  are  limited 
by  the  conditions  of  Space  and  Time,  which  are  intuitive  ideas. 
The  principles  of  Beauty,  after  which  the  imagination  forms  its 
ideals,  are  also  provided  by  the  power  of  intuition.  The  ideals 
of  beauty,  those  patterns  of  grace  and  excellence,  that  give  shape 
to  our  imaginings,  are  largely  due  to  this  element  of  the  mind. 
The  highest  flights  of  imagination  are,  as  it  were,  inspired  by 
and  informed  with  a  rational  idea,  which  comes  from  this  higher 
element  of  our  rational  nature. 

To  the  Judgment. — The  operation  of  intuition  may  also  be 
noticed  in  an  act  of  judgment.  Judgment  compares  two  objects 
of  thought,  and,  perceiving  their  agreement  or  disagreement, 
unites  them  in  a  proposition.  The  truth  of  a  proposition,  how- 
ever, is  not  seen  by  the  judgment,  but  by  a  power  higher  than 
the  judgment.  The  validity  of  a  predication  of  one  thing  of 


324  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

another  is  perceived  and  tested  by  some  power  which  gives  the 
law  of  judgments.  Even  the  ideas  of  similarity  and  difference 
are  the  products  of  intuition.  The  laws  of  derived  judgments,  as 
in  the  inferences  of  Opposition,  are  furnished  by  the  reason.  It 
is  thus  seen  that  intuition  or  reason  regulates  the  acts  of  compar- 
ison in  the  exercise  of  the  judgment. 

To  Reasoning. — Intuition  also  regulates  the  activity  of  the 
reasoning  power.  It  furnishes  all  the  laws  of  inference,  those 
fundamental  principles  which  control  the  reasoning  process. 
Thus  the  simplest  form  of  reasoning,  as  "A  =  B,  but  B  =  C, 
hence  A  =  C,"  depends  on  the  axiomatic  truth  that  "Things 
which  are  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each  other;"  and 
this  axiom  is  an  intuitive  truth.  So  the  principle  of  deduction 
that  "  What  is  true  of  the  whole  is  true  of  the  parts,"  is  furnished 
the  reasoning  faculty  by  a  faculty  which  does  not  reason,  namely, 
intuition.  The  cognition  of  the  conclusiveness  of  the  result  is 
also  an  act  of  that  power  of  reason  that  stands  above  the  faculty 
of  reasoning. 

The  Highest  Faculty. — Intuition  is  thus  the  highest  power 
of  the  mind ;  it  stands  at  the  head  of  and  gives  dignity  and  excel- 
lence to  all  the  faculties.  It  is  the  crowning  attribute  of  the 
intellect,  the  keystone  of  the  spiritual  arch,  the  overarching 
dome  of  the  temple  of  the  mind.  It  is  in  intuition  that  man  be- 
comes a  rational  and  immortal  being.  Here  arise  the  idea  of 
duty,  the  cognition  of  obligation,  and  the  belief  in  the  infinite 
and  absolute.  Here  faith  has  its  origin ;  here  hope  appears  to 
illumine  the  mind  ;  and  here  glow  those  "primal  duties"  which 
"shine  aloft  like  stars."  As  the  blue  sky  arches  over  the  earth 
dotted  with  golden  stars,  so  arching  over  all  the  other  faculties  of 
the  soul  is  the  power  of  intuition,  bright  with  the  stars  of  faith  in 
immortality  j  God,  and  heaven.  Here  appear  those  revelations 
of  heavenly  truth  that  have  come  to  the  world,  trembling  on  the 
poet's  lips  or  glowing  in  the  seraphic  fire  of  prophetic  utterance. 
The  revelation  of  divine  truth  in  the  Bible  and  by  the  Eternal 
Word,  enter  human  consciousness  through  this  overarching  power 
of  the  Keason. 


THE   NATUKE   OF  INTUITION.  325 

III.  THE  PRODUCTS  or  INTUITION. — The  Products  of  the 
Intuitive  power  are  Primary  Ideas  and  Primary  Truths.  An 
Idea,  as  has  already  been  stated,  is  a  mental  product,  which  when 
expressed  in  words,  does  not  give  a  proposition.  A  Primary 
Idea  is  one  that  is  not  given  by  the  senses  nor  derived  from  other 
ideas.  Primary  ideas  are  notions  which  lie  back  of  and  condition 
all  other  ideas.  Such  ideas  are  Space,  Time,  Cause,  Identity,  the 
True,  the  Beautiful,  the  Good,  etc. 

PEIMAEY  TRUTHS. 

I.  NATURE  OP  PRIMARY  TRUTHS. — A  truth  is  a  true  thought ; 
that  is,  it  is  a  mental  predication  which  is  true.     A  Primary 
Truth  is   a   truth  which   lies  back  of  and  conditions  all  other 
truths.     It  is  the  source  of  other  truths ;  from  it  other  truths  are 
derived ;  while  it  is  derived  from  and  depends  on  no  other  truth. 
As  examples  of  primary  truths,  we  mention  the  axioms  of  mathe- 
matics and  logic.     Thus,  "  The  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its 
parts,"  and  "  Things  that  are  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to 
each  other,"  are  examples  of  primary  truths. 

Relation  to  Primary  Ideas. — Every  primary  truth  involves 
at  least  one  primary  idea;  as  "All  bodies  must  occupy  space," 
and  "  Every  event  must  have  a  cause."  Here  Space  and  Cause, 
in  these  two  truths,  are  primary  ideas.  As  to  which  precedes  in 
its  appearance  in  the  mind,  the  idea  or  the  truth,  there  seems  to 
be  some  difference  of  opinion  among  philosophers.  Some  main- 
tain that  the  truth,  as  a  law  of  thought,  appears  in  consciousness, 
and  that  the  idea  is  derived  from  the  truth.  This,  however,  is 
contrary  to  the  usual  order  of  the  origin  of  ideas  and  thoughts; 
and  it  seems  more  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  thought  follows 
the  idea.  Thus  it  would  seem  that  we  must  first  have  the  idea 
of  a  cause,  before  we  can  think  the  thought  that  "  every  event 
has  a  cause." 

II.  EXISTENCE   OF   PRIMARY   TRUTHS. — There  is   a   certain 
class  of  thinkers  who  deny  the  existence  of  primary  truths;  we 
shall,  therefore,  endeavor  to  show  that  the  mind  does  actually 


326  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

possess  these  truths.  Under  the  Understanding  it  was  seen  that 
truths  are  given  by  two  faculties, — judgment  and  reasoning. 
These  are  the  only  faculties  considered  previously  to  intuition, 
that  give  us  truths.  A  judgment  in  the  domain  of  sense  is  called 
a  particular  truth,  as  "  Heat  expands  iron."  From  a  synthesis  of 
particular  truths  we  reach,  by  induction,  a  general  truth;  as 
'*  Heat  expands  all  metals."  By  deductive  reasoning  we  reach  a 
derived,  or  deductive  truth ;  as  "  The  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  tri- 
angle equals  two  right  angles."  By  a  comparison  of  ideas  formed 
by  abstraction  and  generalization  we  may  also  obtain  truths,  as 
"  Man  is  an  animal." 

Truths  Not  Derived. — Now  if  we  examine  our  knowledge 
further,  we  shall  find  some  truths  in  the  mind  that  are  not  judg- 
ments from  sense,  nor  the  comparison  of  abstracts  or  concepts,  nor 
the  result  of  either  inductive  or  deductive  reasoning.  These 
truths  lie  back  of  and  condition  both  judgment  and  reasoning, 
and  thus  control  and  regulate  all  thought.  Take  them  away, 
and  neither  reasoning  nor  science  is  longer  possible  for  want  of  a 
beginning  or  foundation.  If  we  begin  at  some  truth  derived  by 
reasoning  and  trace  it  backward  towards  its  source,  we  shall  at 
last  arrive  at  a  truth  which  depends  on  no  other  truth  for  its 
proof,  but  carries  its  evidence  in  itself.  Such  truths  have  some 
origin ;  they  are  not  given  by  reasoning,  for  they  are  the  basis  of 
reasoning ;  they  are  not  given  by  judgment  in  percepts,  abstracts, 
or  concepts,  for  they  are  independent  of  any  of  these  notions. 
Such  truths  arise  spontaneously  in  the  mind ;  they  are  the  pro- 
ducts of  the  power  of  intuition. 

Existence  Admitted. — The  existence  of  these  first  truths  is 
admitted  by  a  large  class  of  philosophers.  They  have  been  desig- 
nated, however,  by  quite  a  number  of  different  appellations. 
Many  writers,  from  Cicero  downward,  including  Bacon,  Des- 
cartes, Leibnitz,  etc.,  called  them  instinctive  beliefs.  Kant  and 
his  disciples  termed  them  a  priori  or  transcendental  principles,  as 
they  are  prior  to  experience  and  transcend  the  knowledge  fur- 
nished by  the  senses.  Several  of  the  Scotch  writers  have  called 


THE   NATUEE   OF  INTUITION.  327 

them  principles  of  common  sense,  though  Stewart  uses  the  expres- 
sion fundamental  laws  of  human  belief. 

III.  TESTS  OF  PRIMARY  TRUTHS. — Attempts  have  been  made 
by  different  philosophers  to  determine  certain  criteria  by  which 
we  may  recognize  primary  truths  and  distinguish  them  from  all 
other  truths.  The  tests  which  are  regarded  as  the  most  satis- 
factory are, — Self-evidence,  Universality,  Necessity,  and  Sim- 
plicity. 

Self-evidence. — The  first  test  of  a  primary  truth  is  that  it  is 
self-evident.  A  primary  truth  does  not  admit  of  any  proof;  it 
carries  its  own  evidence  in  itself.  Thus  the  truth,  "  Things  that 
are  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each  other,"  is  seen  to 
be  true,  by  all  who  can  comprehend  it,  as  soon  as  it  is  uttered. 
When  it  is  stated  that  "  the  moon  revolves  around  the  earth,"  we 
say,  Yes,  that  may  be  so,  but  how  do  you  know  it  is  so  ?  If  true, 
it  is  a  truth  which  demands  proof  before  it  can  be  accepted.  But 
no  one  asks  or  needs  to  ask  for  the  proof  of  an  intuitive  truth. 
No  proof  is  possible,  and  a  thousand  demonstrations,  if  they  were 
possible,  would  add  no  force  to  our  conviction  of  its  certainty. 
Primary  truths  carry  within  themselves  their  own  vouchers  for 
our  confidence  and  acceptance. 

Universality. — The  second  test  of  a  primary  truth  is  that  it 
is  universal.  By  this  is  meant  that  it  is  active  in  the  minds  of 
all  mankind.  It  may  not  always  be  so  clearly  developed  as  to 
be  presented  in  a  formal  proposition,  but  it  is  instinctively  present 
and  controls  their  action.  In  reflective  minds  these  truths  are 
distinctly  formulated ;  and  other  minds  immediately  yield  assent 
to  them  when  they  are  enunciated  and  clearly  grasped.  There 
is  a  spontaneous  conviction  in  the  minds  of  all  men  of  these 
truths.  They  operate  practically  in  the  minds  of  all,  whether 
they  are  acknowledged  formally  or  not.  Nay  more,  even  the 
skeptic,  who  may  deny  these  principles  in  his  philosophy,  acts 
upon  them  in  individual  cases  just  as  implicitly  as  the  philosopher 
who  admits  them  and  defends  them. 

Necessity. — A  third  test  of  primary  truths  is  that  they  are 


328  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

necessary  truths.  They  are  not  only  true,  but  they  must  be  true; 
it  is  impossible  for  them  to  be  untrue.  We  cannot  conceive 
them  to  be  untrue  without  an  absurdity.  The  opposite  of  them 
is  false  and  cannot  be  true.  Thus  the  truth,  "  Space  is  necessary 
for  the  existence  of  material  things,"  is  not  only  true,  but  it  is 
necessarily  true ;  and  the  opposite,  "  Space  is  not  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  matter,"  is  false  and  nothing  can  make  it  true.  We 
cannot  conceive  that  Deity  himself  could  make  a  primary  truth 
untrue;  that  is,  that  he  could  make  the  sum  of  three  and  two 
equal  to  seven,  or  the  "  whole  less  than  a  part." 

Simplicity. — Another  test  of  a  primary  truth  is  its  simplicity. 
If  a  truth  can  be  resolved  into  some  more  fundamental  truth 
which  contains  it  or  from  which  it  may  be  derived,  it  is  not  a 
primitive  truth.  Thus  the  truth  that  "  The  sum  of  the  angles 
of  a  triangle  equals  two  right  angles,"  though  it  is  a  necessary 
truth,  is  not  a  primary  truth,  as  it  will  admit  of  derivation.  A 
truth  to  be  primary  must  not  only  be  necessary  and  universal, 
but  it  must  also  be  a  fundamental  truth.  This  test  is  expressed 
by  the  term  simplicity.  To  these  several  tests  Hamilton  adds 
that  of  Incomprehensibility,  by  which  he  means  that  we  compre- 
hend that  the  thing  is,  but  not  how  or  why  it  is. 

IV.  REMARKS  ON  PRIMARY  TRUTHS. — No  author  has  at- 
tempted to  give  a  full  list  of  primary  truths;  indeed  such  an 
enumeration  would  be  very  difficult  if  not  impossible.  They  in- 
clude all  the  axioms  of  mathematics,  of  both  number  and  form. 
They  include  also  all  the  self-evident  truths  of  logic,  as  "  The  ex- 
tension and  intension  of  concepts  are  inversely  proportional ;" 
and  the  laws  of  inference,  as  "  What  belongs  to  the  class  belongs 
to  each  individual  of  the  class."  Other  sciences  also  furnish  ex- 
amples of  self-evident  truths. 

Trutfis  Arise  from  Ideas. — Each  intuitive  idea  gives  rise 
to  a  number  of  intuitive  truths.  For  instance,  from  the  idea  of 
Space  we  may  derive  a  number  of  intuitive  truths  or  principles ; 
as,  "All  bodies  occupy  space,"  "All  bodies  are  contained  in 
space,"  "  No  body  can  exist  without  space,"  "  Space  is  necessary 


THE   NATUKE   OF   INTUITION.  329 

to  the  existence  of  material  things,"  "  All  motion  is  in  space," 
"  All  motion  is  from  one  part  of  space  to  another,"  "  A  body  in 
passing  from  one  part  of  space  to  another,  must  pass  through  the 
whole  intermediate  space,"  etc.  So  also  from  the  notion  of  Time 
arise  several  truths ;  as,  "  Every  event  must  be  in  time,"  "  Time 
is  necessary  to  events,"  "  The  mind  requires  time  for  its  exist- 
ence," etc.  The  idea  of  Identity  gives  us  such  propositions  as 
"  A  =  A, "  "  A  is  not  not- A, "  "  A  thing  cannot  be  and  not  be 
at  the  same  time,"  "  I  am  the  same  person  I  was  yesterday,"  etc. 
So  also  we  have  the  moral  axioms,  arising  from  the  idea  of  the 
Eight ;  as,  "  To  tell  the  truth  is  right, "  "  To  utter  falsehood  is 
wrong,"  etc. 

These  Truths  not  Contingent. — There  are  those  who  en- 
deavor to  resolve  these  truths  iato  contingent  truths,  the  result  of 
experience  and  generalization.  To  this  attempt  we  reply  that  no 
observation  of  particular  cases  and  generalization  thereon,  could 
have  produced  the  irresistible  belief  we  have  in  first  truths. 
Each  observation  is  contingent,  and  any  number  of  observed  con- 
tingencies will  never  impose  upon  us  the  feeling  of  necessity, — of 
an  inability  to  think  the  opposite.  We  have  always  seen  a  stone 
fall  to  the  ground  when  thrown  in  the  air,  but  we  find  no  diffi- 
culty in  conceiving  of  the  possibility  of  one  or  all  stones  gravitat- 
ing from  the  earth ;  we  cannot  however  conceive  the  possibility 
of  this  or  any  other  event  happening  without  a  cause.  Nor,  as 
Hamilton  remarks,  can  the  necessity  of  so  thinking  be  derived 
from  a  custom  of  so  thinking;  for  a  custom,  however  general, 
cannot  give  the  stamp  of  necessity. 

Intuitive  Truths  Certain. — The  doctrine  here  taught  main- 
tains the  absolute  certainty  of  primary  truths.  It  maintains  that 
they  are  absolutely  different  from  contingent  truths,  that  they  con- 
tain no  element  of  uncertainty  or  contingency.  An  inductive 
truth  may  be  true  without  a  single  exception ;  but  we  can  always 
imagine  the  possibility  of  an  exception,  and  are  always  prepared 
to  admit  an  exception  if  it  be  pointed  out.  With  respect  to  a 
primary  truth,  not  only  do  we  expect  no  exception,  but  we  hold 


330  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

that  there  can  be  no  exception.  From  their  very  nature  we  know 
that  no  exceptions  are  possible ;  and  if  it  were  announced  that 
an  exception  had  been  discovered,  we  would  riot  believe  it,  for  we 
know  that  such  a  thing  is  impossible.  Nay,  to  show  the  absolute 
character  of  the  ground  upon  which  we  stand,  it  is  held  that 
Deity  himself  cannot  make  an  exception  to  these  truths,  for  they 
are  as  eternal  as  God  himself.  This  is  the  broad  and  funda- 
mental distinction  between  the  philosophy  here  taught  and  the 
materialistic,  contingent,  doubting  philosophy,  so  called,  of  the 
modern  school  of  scientists. 

V.  PRIMARY  IDEAS. — The  Primary  Ideas,  as  already  stated, 
are  Space,  Time,  Cause,  Identity,  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and 
the  Good,  or  the  Right.  These  ideas  may  be  embraced  under 
three  general  classes;  the  intuitive  ideas  of  Science,  the  in- 
tuitive ideas  of  ^Esthetics,  and  the  intuitive  ideas  of  Ethics.  The 
intuitive  ideas  of  science  are  those  of  Space,  Time,  Cause,  Identity, 
etc. ;  the  intuitive  ideas  of  aesthetics  are  those  of  Beauty,  Sublimity, 
and  the  Ludicrous;  the  intuitive  ideas  of  ethics  are  those  of  the 
Right,  the  Ought,  and  Merit  or  Demerit.  Each  of  these  three 
classes  of  ideas  will  be  treated  under  separate  chapters.  Using 
the  word  true  in  a  particular  sense,  the  ideas  of  science  may  be 
called  the  intuitive  ideas,  of  the  True.  Using  the  term  beautiful 
in  its  generic  sense  as  including  all  aesthetic  ideas,  and  we  have 
the  three  classes  of  intuitive  ideas, — the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and 
the  Good. 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE  INTUITIONS   OF  THE  TRUE. 

THE  IDEAS  of  Intuition,  as  previously  stated,  may  be  divided 
into  three  distinct  classes ;  the  intuitions  of  the  True,  the  in- 
tuitions of  the  Beautiful,  and  the  intuitions  of  the  Right.  These 
three  classes  of  ideas  will  be  treated  under  three  distinct  chapters. 
The  intuitions  of  the  True  embrace  four  great  ideas ;  Space,  Time, 
Identity,  and  Cause.  These  may  also  be  called  the  intuitive  ideas 
of  science.  There  are  other  ideas  belonging  to  this  general 
division ;  but  these  are  all  that  we  shall  discuss  here. 

I.    SPACE. 

SPACE  may  be  defined  as  the  condition  of  material  existence. 
Every  material  body  possesses  the  elements  of  extension,  and  ex- 
tension is  possible  only  in  space.  No  material  things  could  exist 
without  space ;  and  we  can  thus  define  space  as  the  condition  or 
postulate  of  material  existence. 

Space  an  Idea. — Space,  subjectively  considered,  is  an  idea  of 
the  mind.  It  has  no  form,  nor  color,  nor  any  of  the  attributes 
of  a  percept;  and  yet  it  is  a  clearly  defined  notion,  as  distinct 
and  definite  as  that  of  an  object.  We  know  what  we  mean  by 
the  word  space,  though  we  may  not  be  able  to  define  it  satis- 
factorily. We  have  also  a  definite  notion  of  the  meaning  of  the 
proposition,  "Space  is  necessary  for  the  existence  of  objects." 
There  is  therefore  a  definite  notion  corresponding  to  the  word 
Space. 

Origin  of  the  Idea. — The  idea  of  space  is  not  a  percept;  it 
has  neither  color,  form,  hardness,  nor  any  of  the  other  attributes 
of  a  percept,  and  hence  is  not  a  product  of  perception.  It  is  not 
an  abstract,  for  it  is  not  a  notion  of  a  quality  drawn  from  an 

(331) 


332  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

object;  hence  it  is  not  given  by  abstraction.  It  is  not  a  concept, 
the  combination  of  special  spaces,  for  the  idea  of  space  infinitely 
transcends  the  sum  of  all  experienced  spaces.  Space  is  therefore 
an  intuition.  It  is  an  idea  that  springs  up  in  the  mind  on  the 
occasion  of  sensible  experience.  Though  it  is  not  an  idea  given 
by  sense,  sense  furnishes  the  occasion  for  its  development  in  the 
mind.  From  the  fact  that  it  springs  up  in  the  mind  in  con- 
nection with  sensible  experience,  and  yet  is  seen  to  be  necessary 
to  the  objects  of  sensible  experience,  it  has  been  said  to  be  logi- 
cally prior  to  experience  and  chronologically  subsequent  to  expe- 
rience. 

Not  a  Mere  Idea. — Space  is  not  a  mere  idea  of  the  mind ;  it 
exists  independently  of  the  mind.  If  there  were  no  minds  to 
conceive  of  space,  space  would  still  have  existence.  Were  this 
not  so,  then  if  all  minds  should  be  blotted  out  of  existence,  there 
would  be  no  space.  Matter  would  still  exist,  worlds  would  still 
continue  to  move  on  as  now, — but  exist  and  move  in  what?  Not 
in  space,  we  reply,  for  that  ceased  to  exist  with  the  last  mind,  if 
space  be  an  idea.  The  absurdity  of  the  conclusion  shows  the  in- 
correctness of  the  premise  that  space  is  a  mere  idea.  Indeed,  if 
we  make  space  a  mere  idea,  we  shall  make  matter  a  mere  idea 
also,  a  conclusion  to  which  Hume  and  some  other  thinkers  have 
come. 

Space  a  Reality. — Space,  we  therefore  say,  is  more  than  a 
mere  idea ;  it  is  a  reality.  Matter  exists,  can  exist  only  in  some- 
thing, and  that  something — the  condition  of  its  existence — is 
space.  Space,  therefore,  is  a  real  existence.  We  may  not  be 
able  to  define  it  any  better  than  the  school-boy  who  said,  "  Space 
is  a  great,  big,  infinite  nothing;"  but  we  are  sure  of  its  reality. 
Even  if  there  were  no  matter,  there  would  be  space.  In  that 
case,  the  idea  might  not  occur  to  the  mind;  but  space  would 
exist  just  the  same  as  it  does  at  present.  Even  if  all  matter  and 
mind  should  "be  blotted  out  of  being,  space  would  still  be  what 
it  is  now."  Nay  more,  so  real  is  the  existence  of  space  that  we 
cannot  conceive  of  any  power  by  which  it  could  be  destroyed. 


THE   INTUITIONS  OF   THE   TRUE.  333 

Other  Views. — Several  distinct  views  have  obtained  in  respect 
to  the  subject  of  space.  Kant  and  his  school  make  it  a  mere 
conception,  a  form  which  the  mind  imposes  upon  matter;  having 
no  external  reality,  but  merely  a  subjective  existence.  Some 
writers  "  have  resolved  space  and  time  into  the  qualities  of  the 
one  infinite  and  absolute  Being,  the  divine  mind."  Dr.  Samuel 
Clarke  regards  space  and  time  as  attributes,  properties,  or  modes 
of  an  eternal  substance.  Sir  Isaac  Newton  seems  to  have  held 
that  the  existence  of  God  always  and  everywhere  constitutes 
space  and  time.  ' 

Elements  of  Space. — As  an  objective  reality,  space  has  several 
distinct  elements.  First,  space  is  continuous ;  it  cannot  be  broken 
into  parts  which  can  be  separated  from  one  another ;  it  extends 
from  one  point  to  another,  and  is  continuous  in  all  directions. 
Second,  space  has  three  dimensions,  length,  breadth,  and  depth; 
in  other  words,  it  is  susceptible  of  these  three  measurements. 
Third,  space  is  quantitative;  it  admits  of  definite  measurement, 
and  is  estimated  as  the  how  much.  Fourth,  it  gives  rise  to  figures, 
and  thus  to  the  science  of  form,  or  geometry.  Fifth,  it  is  without 
limit  in  every  direction, — in  other  words,  it  is  infinite. 

II.    TIME. 

TIME  may  be  defined  as  the  condition  of  being  regarded  as  in 
action  or  motion.  It  is  the  condition  of  the  succession  of  events, 
as  Space  is  the  condition  of  the  extension  of  matter.  Time  is  that 
which  is  required  in  order  that  something  should  take  place,  as 
Space  is  that  which  is  necessary  in  order  that  something  material 
should  exist.  In  other  words,  Time  is  the  condition  of  events  as 
Space  is  the  condition  of  forms. 

Relation  to  Space. — The  relations  of  Time  and  Space  are 
thus  clearly  seen.  Extension  occurs  in  space;  succession  occurs 
in  time.  As  extension  is  possible  only  in  space,  so  succession  is 
possible  only  in  time.  Time  is  necessary  to  succession,  as  space 
is  necessary  to  extension.  Space  is  the  place  of  material  forms ; 
time  is  the  place  of  successive  events.  Space  gives  us  the  question 


334  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

where;  and  time  gives  us  the  question  when.  As  space  is  in- 
volved in  and  given  along  with  extension,  so  time  is  involved  in 
and  given  along  with  succession. 

Time  an  Idea. — Time,  subjectively  considered,  is  an  idea. 
This  idea  is  clear  and  definite;  we  know  what  we  mean  by  the 
word  time,  and  by  any  proposition  involving  the  word.  Yet  this 
idea  has  no  form,  nor  color,  nor  any  of  the  elements  of  a  percept. 
Neither  is  it  like  an  abstract,  a  quality  drawn  from  an  object ; 
nor  like  a  concept,  the  aggregate  of  the  common  qualities  of  a 
class  of  objects.  The  mind  forms  no  mental  image  of  time,  yet  it 
has  a  distinct  cognition  of  it  which  it  discriminates  from  all  other 
cognitions. 

Origin  of  Idea. — The  idea  of  time,  as  of  space,  is  an  intuition. 
It  is  an  idea  that  springs  up  in  the  mind  on  the  occasion  of  sen- 
sible experience.  We  see  objects  in  motion;  motion  involves  a 
change  of  place ;  change  of  place  requires  a  succession  of  different 
places ;  succession  is  involved  in  time,  and  is  the  occasion  of  the 
idea  arising  in  the  mind.  The  mind  gives  birth  to  the  idea  upon 
the  presentation  of  succession  as  the  occasion.  So  the  succession 
of  cognitions — the  succession  of  different  ideas,  thoughts,  and  feel- 
ings, as  different  states  of  consciousness — also  furnishes  the  occa- 
sion for  the  development  of  the  idea  of  time.  Were  there  no 
experience  of  events  as  successive,  there  would  be  no  idea  of 
time;  though  the  fact  of  time  is  necessary  to  this  succession,  since 
there  could  be  no  succession  without  time.  In  view  of  this  re- 
lation, as  Cousin  remarks,  time  is  said  to  be  logically  antecedent 
to  experience,  and  chronologically  subsequent  to  experience. 

Time  a  Reality. — Time  is  not  a  mere  idea  of  the  mind ;  it 
has  an  existence  independently  of  the  mind's  cognition  of  it.  It 
is  the  ground  01  movement,  change,  indeed  of  all  continuous  ex- 
istence, and  must  therefore  itself  have  an  existence.  If  there  were 
no  such  thing  as  time,  there  could  be  no  succession,  nor  change,  nor 
any  continued  existence.  Indeed,  there  could  be  no  existence  of 
either  mind  or  matter ;  for  existence  implies  a  continuity  of  time : 
tfi  exist  is  to  be  from  one  moment  to  another.  Time  is  thus  even 


THE  INTUITION'S  OF  THE   TRUE.  335 

less  purely  subjective  than  space ;  for  if  we  should  assume  that 
both  space  and  matter  are  mere  conceptions  of  the  mind,  yet 
even  to  these  very  conceptions  time  is  necessary. 

Time  Not  a  Mere  Relation. — Some  writers,  as  Dr.  Brown, 
define  time  to  be  merely  the  relation  of  one  event  to  another  as 
prior  and  subsequent.  If  this  view  were  correct,  then  it  would 
follow  that  if  there  were  no  events  there  would  be  no  time,  since 
there  would  be  no  relation  of  events.  Such  a  supposition,  with  its 
inference,  shows  the  incorrectness  of  the  theory.  Time  does  not 
depend  on  the  occurrence  of  events,  but  the  occurrence  of  events 
depends  on  time.  Time  would  still  exist  if  all  events  should 
cease ;  but  were  time  to  be  destroyed  no  succession  of  events  would 
be  possible.  We  can  in  thought  destroy  all  events  except  that 
of  thought,  and  thus  all  relation  of  events ;  but  we  cannot,  by 
any  possibility  of  thought,  destroy  the  existence  of  time.  Time 
is,  therefore,  not  the  relation  of  events  as  prior  and  subsequent, 
but  the  necessary  condition  for  such  a  relation. 

Time  a  Relative  Idea. — Time,  in  its  popular  sense,  as  a 
measured  portion  of  duration,  involves  the  idea  of  relation.  Our 
idea  of  any  portion  of  time  is  modified  by  the  conception  of  the 
relation  of  past  events  to  one  another.  In  other  words,  we  seem 
to  measure  it  by  the  cognition  of  our  present  state  of  conscious- 
ness in  its  relation  to  some  former  state ;  by  the  relation  of  the 
present  me  to  some  former  me.  Hence,  if  the  mind  withdraws 
itself  for  awhile  from  passing  events,  it  loses  the  idea  of  time. 
This  is  noticed  in  sleep,  when  the  time  of  falling  asleep  and 
awaking  seems  to  be  almost  the  same  moment.  The  same  thing 
occurs  when  the  mind  is  absorbed  in  some  object  of  study,  and 
is  thus  abstracted  from  passing  events. 

Elements  of  Time. — As  an  objective  reality,  time  possesses 
several  attributes  of  interest  to  this  discussion.  First,  time  is 
continuous;  it  does  not  consist  of  parts  separate  from  one  another 
like  the  different  objects  of  matter.  Second,  time  has  one  dimen- 
sion, and  only  one;  it  is  regarded  as  having  length  and  may  be 
represented  by  a  line,  one  of  the  elements  of  space.  Third, 


336  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

time  is  also  quantitative;  it  admits  of  definite  measurement  and 
computation.  Fourth,  time  gives  rise  to,  or  is  closely  associated 
with  number,  the  basis  of  the  science  of  arithmetic.  Fifth,  time 
is  without  limit  in  either  direction,  as  past  or  future,  and  is  thus 
infinite. 

III.    IDENTITY. 

IDENTITY  is  another  of  our  intuitive  ideas.  To  define  this  idea, 
or  state  explicitly  hi  what  identity  consists,  is  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible. Approximately  we  may  say,  Identity  is  sameness,  one- 
ness, etc.  Whatever  marks  off  or  distinguishes  an  object  from  all 
other  similar  or  dissimilar  objects,  whatever  constitutes  its  indi- 
viduality, in  that  consists  its  identity.  Or,  negatively,  we  may 
say,  Identity  is  non-diversity,  non-otherness,  etc.  It  will  aid  us  in 
getting  a  clear  idea  of  what  identity  is,  by  noticing  what  it  is  not. 

Not  Similarity. — And  first  we  remark  that  identity  is  not 
similarity;  similar  things  are  not  identical.  Thus  two  drops  of 
water  out  of  the  same  spring,  of  the  same  size,  color,  quality,  etc., 
so  closely  resembling  each  other  that  no  acuteness  of  sense  or 
delicacy  of  instruments  could  detect  any  difference  between  them, 
are  not  identical.  By  the  very  supposition,  they  are  not  the 
same  thing,  but  different  things.  To  say  that  two  things  exactly 
similar  are  identical,  would  be  to  say  that  two  things  are  only 
one. 

Similarity  Not  Implied. — Similarity  is  not  only  not  identity, 
but  it  is  not  even  implied  in  identity.  An  object  may  preserve 
its  identity  and  lose  its  resemblance  to  its  former  self.  The 
spherical  india-rubber  ball  that  rests  on  my  hand,  is  identical 
with  the  same  ball  flattened  by  the  pressure  of  my  other  hand, 
though  there  is  no  resemblance  in  shape  between  them.  The 
knife  opened  and  shut  is  the  same  knife,  though  quite  different  in 
appearance. 

Not  Sameness  of  Composition. — Second,  identity  is  not 
sameness  of  composition.  If  we  take  a  bar  of  wood  or  iron  and 
divide  it  into  several  equal  parts  of  the  same  size  and  shape,  so 
that  we  could  not  distinguish  between  them,  these  parts  would 


THE  INTUITIONS  OF   THE   TRUE.  337 

not  be  identical.  Even  though  they  are  composed  of  precisely 
the  same  chemical  elements  in  the  same  proportion,  we  could  not 
predicate  identity  of  them.  Nay  more,  if  we  take  equal  and  pre- 
cisely similar  parts  of  any  one  element,  as  oxygen,  these  parts  are 
different  parts  and  not  the  same  parts.  Any  consideration  that 
would  make  two  parts  identical,  would  make  any  number  of  parts 
identical,  so  that  we  should  have  the  paradox  of  each  part  being 
itself  and  each  of  the  others.  We  remark  also,  that  sameness  of 
composition  is  not  necessary  to  identity,  as  in  the  human  body, 
which  is  constantly  changing. 

Oi-if/in  of  the  Idea. — The  idea  of  identity  is  an  intuitive  cog- 
nition of  the  reason.  Given  the  fitting  occasion,  and  the  idea 
rises  spontaneously  in  the  mind.  The  occasion  for  the  idea  is 
comparison ; — the  comparing  of  one  thing  with  another,  and  of  a 
thing  with  itself,  or  of  different  cognitions  of  the  same  object. 
The  idea  of  identity  is  thus  probably  preceded  by  that  of  simi- 
larity and  diversity.  We  see  objects  that  are  similar  and  dis- 
similar, and  then  begin  to  compare  an  object  with  itself,  or  dif- 
ferent cognitions  of  the  object  at  different  times,  and  there  arises 
in  the  mind  the  idea  of  identity. 

An  Idea  of  Relation. — The  idea  of  identity,  like  many  others 
of  our  ideas,  is  related  to  its  opposite,  diversity.  Thus  the  idea 
of  long  implies  its  opposite  short,  the  idea  of  large  implies  its 
'opposite  small,  straight  that  of  crooked,  etc.;  so  the  idea  of  identity 
stands  related  to  the  idea  of  diversity.  To  affirm  identity  is  to 
deny  diversity ;  and  to  deny  diversity  is  to  affirm  identity.  It 
does  not  follow  from  this  that  there  cannot  be  identity  without 
diversity ;  but  that  there  can  be  no  idea  of  the  one  without  the 
logical  necessity  of  the  other.  If  there  were  but  one  thing  in  ex- 
istence, there  would  then  be  identity  but  no  diversity ;  but  no 
condition  can  be  imagined  in  which  there  could  be  diversity  with- 
out identity. 

A  Possible  Plurality. — In  the  idea  of  identity,  there  is  im- 
plied a  possible  plurality  of  objects.  In  order  to  predicate  iden- 
tity, there  must  be  a  plurality  of  cognitions  of  the  object.  I  look 
15 


338  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

at  the  tree  to-day  and  I  declare  that  it  is  the  same  tree  that  I  saw 
yesterday.  Here  are  two  cognitions,  the  cognition  of  to-day  and 
the  cognition  of  yesterday ;  and  the  question  arises,  are  there  two 
objects  corresponding  to  these  two  cognitions,  or  is  there  but  one 
object?  The  answer  that  there  is  only  one  object,  gives  us  the 
condition  of  identity.  In  the  conception  of  identity,  we  have  an 
immediate  and  irresistible  conclusion,  that  the  object  of  these 
several  cognitions  is  one  and  the  same  object. 

Elements  Involved. — In  affirming  identity,  it  is  thus  seen 
that  there  are  several  things  implied,  logically  if  not  consciously, 
to  the  mind  in  forming  the  idea.  First,  there  is  implied  a  real 
plurality  of  cognitions ;  second,  a  possible  plurality  of  objects ; 
third,  a  question  whether  there  is  a  real  plurality  of  objects  cor- 
responding to  the  plurality  of  cognitions;  fourth,  a  conviction 
and  decision  that  there  is  but  one  object  corresponding  to  the 
several  cognitions ;  from  which  conviction  emerges  the  clear  and 
definite  notion  of  identity. 

Application  of  Identity. — The  idea  of  identity  may  be  ap- 
plied to  three  distinct  classes  of  objects ;  namely,  Spiritual  Ex- 
istences, Organic  Material  Existences,  and  Inorganic  Matter. 
The  completeness  of  identity  varies  somewhat  in  these  three 
classes  of  existences.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  identity  of 
spiritual  existences  is  much  more  complete  than  of  the  other  ex- 
istences. 

Spiritual  Identity. — The  identity  of  spiritual  existences  con- 
sists in  their  continuity  of  existence.  So  long  as  the  spirit  con- 
tinues to  exist,  it  is  the  same  spirit  and  not  another.  Should  the 
spirit  cease  to  exist,  its  identity  would  cease  also,  since  there 
would  be  nothing  of  which  to  predicate  identity.  If  another 
spirit  were  created  in  its  place,  put  in  the  same  body  and  en- 
dowed with  the  same  conscious  experience  of  the  past,  and  with 
all  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  first,  it  would  not  be  identical 
with  the  former;  for,  by  the  supposition,  it  is  not  the  same 
spirit  but  another  spirit. 

Personal  Identity. — By  personal  identity  we  mean  that  of 


THE  INTUITIONS  OF  THE   TRUE.  339 

the  spiritual  nature  rather  than  that  of  the  body.  The  basis  or 
evidence  of  personal  identity  is  consciousness.  We  are  conscious 
to-day  of  the  same  series  of  past  experiences  as  we  were  yester- 
day ;  the  same  past  stretches  out  before  our  minds ;  and  we  thus 
know  intuitively  that  the  conscious  self  of  to-day  is  identical 
with  the  conscious  self  of  yesterday.  Haven  holds  that  conscious- 
ness is  the  evidence  of  identity ;  but  perhaps  it  would  be  more 
correct  to  say  it  is  the  source  of  the  belief  of  personal  identity. 
Consciousness  is  not  exactly  the  evidence,  but  it  furnishes  the  oc- 
casion upon  which  the  reason  knows  our  personal  identity. 

Locke's  View. — Locke  held  that  identity  consists  in  conscious- 
ness. His  error  is  seen  in  the  inference  that  if  consciousness  were 
in  any  way  interrupted,  as  in  sleep  or  fainting,  personal  identity 
would  cease.  Moreover,  if  we  should  become  unconscious  of 
some  event  of  our  lives,  we  would  not  be  identical  now  with  our- 
selves at  that  period.  Dr.  Reed  illustrates  this  point  by  the  sup- 
position of  a  person  who  when  a  boy  was  whipped  for  robbing 
an  orchard ;  when  a  soldier,  took  a  standard  from  the  enemy  and 
at  that  time  remembers  the  whipping ;  and  who  afterward  became 
a  military  commander,  and  remembers  taking  the  standard  but 
not  the  whipping.  Now  it  follows,  from  Locke's  view,  that  the 
soldier  is  identical  with  the  boy  and  the  general  with  the  soldier, 
but  the  general  is  not  identical  with  the  boy,  because  not  con- 
scious of  the  same  things ;  that  is,  a  is  b  and  b  is  c,  but  a  is  not  c! 

Organic  World. — Identity,  in  the  organic  world,  consists  in 
the  continuity  of  the  life  principle  under  the  same  general 
structure  and  organization.  It  is  not  in  the  body  alone,  nor  in 
the  particles  of  matter  of  which  the  body  is  composed ;  but  in 
those  particles  of  matter  permeated  with  and  united  into  the  same 
general  structure  by  the  mysterious  principle  of  life.  In  this 
case,  the  identity  is  no  longer  complete,  since  the  form  and  size 
of  the  animal  or  plant  changes  year  by  year,  and  even  the  parti- 
cles of  which  they  are  composed  are  continually  changing.  It  is 
only  in  a  modified  and  partial  sense  that  we  can  predicate  iden- 
tity of  an  object  of  the  animal  or  vegetable  world.  Yet  the  term 


340  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

is  so  used ;  as  we  say,  this  is  the  same  tree  under  which  I  played 
when  a  boy ;  and  this  old  man,  now  tottering  and  feeble,  is  the 
same  person  that  was  so  full  of  strength  and  agility  a  few  years 
before. 

Inorganic  World. — Identity,  in  the  inorganic  world,  consists 
of  sameness  of  structure  and  material.  For  perfect  identity, 
there  must  be  no  loss  of  material  nor  any  change  in  structure  or 
constitution.  Strictly  speaking,  there  can  be  no  such  identity, 
as  matter  is  continually  changing ;  so  that,  in  respect  to  the  or- 
ganic world,  the  term  identity  is  used  in  a  secondary  and  popular 
sense.  When  we  speak  of  the  same  mountain  or  river,  we  do  not 
mean  that  they  are  absolutely  the  same,  but  that  they  are  the 
same  numerical  unity,  and  not  some  other  one  of  a  series.  How 
many  changes  are  needed  to  destroy  the  identity  of  an  object, 
and  just  where  the  application  of  the  term  ceases,  it  may  be  diffi- 
cult to  determine ;  as  in  the  oft-quoted  puzzle  of  the  knife  with 
successive  blades  and  handles,  or  the  ship  whose  original  planks, 
ropes,  sails,  etc.,  had  been  replaced  by  successive  repairs. 

IV.    CAUSE. 

A  CAUSE  may  be  defined  as  that  which  produces  an  event. 
An  event  is  that  which  now  is,  but  was  not ;  or  it  is  that  which 
begins  to  be  or  occur.  The  coming  into  being  of  a  new  object 
or  fact,  and  also  any  change  in  an  existing  object,  as  the  ripen- 
ing of  an  apple  or  the  fading  of  a  flower,  are  regarded  as  events. 
All  these  things  are  immediately  referred,  for  their  existence,  to 
some  influence  which  we  call  their  cause.  The  idea  of  a  cause, 
therefore,  is  that  upon  which  some  consequence  depends,  or  with- 
out which  some  event  would  not  occur. 

Nature  of  Events. — The  term  event,  from  e,  out,  and  venio,  I 
come,  signifies  literally  that  which  comes  out  or  appears.  It  is 
that  which  comes  out  or  appears  as  the  result  of  the  operation  of 
some  agency.  It  embraces  the  phenomena  of  the  material  world, 
as  the  twinkling  of  a  star,  the  changing  of  the  moon,  etc.  Under 
the  same  head  are  included  also  states  and  conditions  more  or 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   TRUE.  o-il 

less  permanent ;  as  the  attractive  influence  of  matter,  the  equi- 
librium of  forces,  weight  of  bodies,  conditions  of  fluidity  and  so- 
lidity, etc.  Our  ideas,  feelings,  purposes,  volitions,  etc.,  are  also 
regarded  as  events  in  the  spiritual  world.  Events  are  often  com- 
plex, consisting  of  a  combination  of  several  simpler  events,  each 
of  which  has  a  distinct  cause. 

Cause  and  Effect. — A  cause  has  sometimes  been  defined  as 
that  which  produces  an  effect.  The  term  effect,  however,  seems 
rto  contain  in  itself  the  idea  of  cause,  at  least  by  implication,  and 
may  be  defined  as  a  "caused  event."  The  definition  would  thus 
seem  somewhat  tautological,  being  equivalent  to  saying,  "a  cause 
is  that  which  produces  a  caused  event."  It  is  thus  better  to  de- 
fine a  cause  as  that  which  produces  an  event.  The  terms  cause 
and  effect  are  the  antitheses  of  each  other,  and  are  so  used  in 
philosophy. 

Other  Views  of  Cause. — There  are  some  philosophers,  of 
whom  Hume  and  Mill  are  the  representatives,  who  deny  that  we 
have  any  real  idea  of  cause.  Hume  defines  cause  as  merely  the 
relation  of  things  as  "  constantly  precedent "  and  "  constantly 
subsequent."  He  would  say  "  a  cause  is  a  constantly  precedent 
and  an  effect  is  a  constantly  subsequent  event."  Mill  teaches 
the  same  doctrine,  holding  that  the  "invariable  antecedent  is 
termed  the  cause,  and  the  invariable  consequent  the  effect." 

Objections  to  This  View. — In  objection  to  this  view  it  may 
be  said  that  there  is  more  than  the  mere  relation  of  antecedent 
and  consequent,  however  invariable,  in  the  idea  of  cause.  There 
is  the  notion  that  one  thing  depends  on  another  for  its  existence, 
or  for  its  existence  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  presented  to  us. 
Thus  a  storm  is  invariably  preceded  by  a  change  in  the  barom- 
eter, yet  no  one  thinks  of  this  change  as  being  the  cause  of  the 
storm.  The  sun  and  the  day  invariably  accompany  each  other 
around  the  globe,  but  no  one  ever  thinks  of  the  day  being  the 
cause  of  the  sun  or  its  light.  The  stars  are  constantly  associated, 
one  moving  before  another,  but  we  never  hear  any  one  say  that 
one  star  is  the  cause  of  another  star.  Invariability  of  association, 
and  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  are  two  very  different  things. 


842  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Origin  of  the  Idea. — The  idea  of  cause  is  the  product  of  in- 
tuition. Given  an  example  of  things  related  as  cause  and  effect, 
and  there  immediately  arises  in  the  mind  the  idea  of  cause. 
Thus,  suppose  I  see  a  fire  and  wax  near  it,  and  notice  the  melting 
of  the  wax ;  there  immediately  arises  in  my  mind  the  notion  that 
the  fire  is  the  cause  of  the  melting.  Or  even  given  an  event  un- 
associated  with  its  cause,  and  the  mind  naturally  and  intuitively 
inquires  for  its  origin  or  cause,  showing  that  the  idea  is  native  to 
the  mind.  If  I  saw  the  wax  melting,  even  without  seeing  the 
fire,  I  should  think  there  was  some  cause  for  the  change. 

Other  Vie^vs  of  the  Origin. — It  is  supposed  by  some  that 
the  idea  is  given  by  sensation  and  perception.  This,  however,  is 
impossible.  The  idea  of  cause  is  not  a  percept,  for  it  has  no 
color,  form,  etc.  We  cannot  see,  or  feel,  or  hear  cause ;  all  that 
we  see  is  the  two  objects,  one  in  the  vicinity  of  the  other,  and  the 
changing  form  of  the  latter.  The  idea  of  cause  springs  up  spon- 
taneously in  the  mind,  and  is  the  product  of  the  intuitive  power. 

Result  of  Association. — Neither  is  the  idea  the  result  of  as- 
sociation, however  invariable,  as  Hume  and  Mill  teach.  The 
diameter  and  circumference  of  a  circle  have  been  invariably  con- 
nected with  each  other  in  our  experience,  but  neither  is  thought 
of  as  the  cause  of  the  other.  Neither  is  it  the  result  of  anteced- 
ence and  consequence,  however  often  repeated ;  for  though  sum- 
mer invariably  precedes  autumn,  we  never  think  of  one  as  the 
cause  of  the  other.  The  idea  of  cause  is  not  identical  with  in- 
variability of  antecedence  and  consequence,  and  could  not  have 
originated  in  that  way. 

Laiv  of  Causation. — The  idea  of  cause  leads  to  the  law  of 
causation.  This  law  is  that  every  event  must  have  a  cause.  This 
is  a  universal  proposition,  and  is  regarded  as  a  first  truth.  It  is 
a  self-evident  proposition,  carrying  with  it  its  own  evidence.  It 
is  a  necessary  truth ;  we  see  that  it  not  only  is  true,  but  that  it 
cannot  be  untrue;  no  one  ever  expects  to  find  an  example  in 
which  it  is  not  true.  It  is  a  universal  truth;  all  men  accept  it 
ae  true,  and  act  upon  it  even  before  they  have  formally  stated  it 


THE   INTUITIONS  OF   THE   TRUE.  343 

to  their  minds.  The  little  child,  as  well  as  the  philosopher, 
makes  inquiries  in  respect  to  the  causes  of  things.  By  it  we  in- 
terpret the  facts  around  us,  run  back  into  the  past  for  a  solution 
of  enigmas,  and  predict  the  future  from  the  influences  we  see 
around  us.  It  is  found  in  the  thought  of  every  people,  in  the 
structure  of  every  language,  and  controls  the  actions  of  the 
world. 

Origin  of  the  Laiv. — The  law  of  causation  is  not  the  result 
of  observation,  for  no  one  ever  saw  every  event  and  every  cause. 
It  is  not  an  induction  from  particular  cases  of  cause  and  effect 
presented  by  experience  or  consciousness,  for  no  combination  of 
particular  cases  can  give  the  irresistible  belief  that  every  event 
must  have  a  cause.  Induction  can  give  only  contingent  truths, 
and  the  law  is  not  a  contingent  truth  which  may  be  true  and 
which  we  are  willing  to  believe  until  we  can  find  an  exception  to 
it.  The  law  is  not  only  known  to  be  true,  but  it  is  known  to  be 
true  without  the  possibility  of  an  exception  to  it.  Neither  can  it 
be,  as  has  been  claimed,  the  result  of  our  expectation  founded 
upon  a  customary  experience,  for  the  customary  can  never  reach 
the  certainty  of  the  necessary.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  a  general- 
ization from  facts  in  any  way,  for  no  multiplication  of  cases  will 
stamp  that  which  is  contingent  with  the  seal  of  necessity  and  uni- 
versality. No  combination  of  observed  contingencies  wrill  trans- 
form themselves  into  a  necessity. 

Given  by  Intuition. — The  law  of  causation  is  the  product  of 
intuition.  It  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  primary  truth  given  by  the 
reason.  Given  sensible  experience  as  an  occasion,  and  this  truth 
springs  up  in  the  mind,  and  is  known  as  self-evident  and  immu- 
table. It  is  not  merely  a  law  of  thought  which  we  impose  upon 
our  observation  of  phenomena,  but  is  seen  to  be  a  correct  cog- 
nition of  the  actual  relation  of  the  facts  and  phenomena  of  the 
universe.  It  is  one  of  the  grand  conceptions  of  that  rational 
nature  which  stands  above  and  regulates  the  activities  of  all  the 
other  faculties  of  the  mind. 

Nature  of  Cause. — The  idea  of  cause  is  more  complicated 


344  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

than  at  first  sight  appears.  First,  we  notice  a  distinction  between 
the  cause  of  an  event  and  the  condition  of  the  cause  producing 
the  event.  A  hammer  strikes  a  stone  and  fractures  it ;  if  it  were 
not  for  the  brittleness  of  the  stone,  the  effect  would  not  be  pro- 
duced; hence  the  brittleness  of  the  stone  is  a  condition  of  the 
event.  These  conditions  are  often  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  com- 
plex cause.  Thus  Mill  says,  "  The  real  cause  is  the  whole  of  the 
antecedents  (or  conditions),  and  we  have,  philosophically  speak- 
ing, no  right  to  give  the  name  of  cause  to  one  of  them  exclusively 
of  the  others."  And  Hamilton  says,  "Every  effect  is  only  pro- 
duced by  the  concurrence  of  at  least  two  causes  (and  by  cause, 
be  it  observed,  I  mean  everything  without  which  the  effect  could 
not  be  realized)."  While  there  is  much  truth  in  these  remarks, 
it  seems  to  us  that  we  can  distinguish  between  a  cause  and  a  con- 
dition. 

Cause  Often  Complex. — The  cause  of  an  effect  is,  however, 
often  complex,  involving  several  distinct  elements,  each  of  which 
may  be  regarded  as  a  cause.  Aristotle  and  the  schoolmen 
divided  causes  into  four  classes;  efficient,  material,  formal,  and 
final  causes.  To  illustrate,  a  completed  work  implies  four  things ; 
an  agent  by  whom  it  is  done,  the  material  of  which  it  is  formed, 
the  plan  or  idea  after  which  it  is  fashioned,  and  the  end  for  which 
it  was  formed.  Thus,  in  the  production  of  a  statue,  there  must- 
be  an  artist,  a  block  of  marble,  an  ideal  or  plan  in  the  mind  of 
the  artist,  and  a  motive  for  the  execution  of  the  work.  These 
four  elements  correspond  to  the  four  causes;  efficient,  material, 
formal,  and  final.  Among  these  four  causes,  Aristotle  seems  to 
have  regarded  the  final  cause  as  the  highest.  The  discussion  of 
this  subject  is  of  the  deepest  interest;  it  is  a  discussion,  however, 
which  the  limits  of  this  work  preclude. 

Other  Ideas. — There  are  several  other  ideas  of  the  Reason 
that  are  regarded  as  intuitions  of  the  True,  as  Number,  Equality, 
Being,  Substance,  Infinity,  etc.,  but  the  four  previously  named 
are  all  that  our  limits  will  allow  us  to  discuss. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   INTUITIONS   OF    THE   BEAUTIFUL. 

THE  BEAUTIFUL  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  ideas  of  the 
Reason.  It  is  also  not  only  an  idea,  but  is  regarded  as 
having  an  objective  existence,  and  as  thus  being  an  element  of 
the  objective  world.  It  is  this  element  that  gives  rise  to  the  arts 
of  music,  poetry,  painting,  sculpture,  etc.,  which  we  distinguish 
as  the  Fine  Arts.  Its  laws  have  been  investigated,  and  efforts 
have  been  made  to  develop  a  science  of  the  Beautiful.  The 
science  of  the  Beautiful  is  known  as  ^Esthetics. 

Definition. — No  definition  of  Beauty  has  yet  been  given 
which  has  been  universally  accepted  as  satisfactory.  The  ele- 
ment of  Beauty  is  so  delicate,  its  manifestations  are  so  various, 
and  its  spirit  is  so  coy  and  elusive,  that  it  is  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  discover  in  what  the  Beautiful  consists.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  name  a  property  of  a  single  object  which  makes  it 
beautiful ;  but  to  point  out  what  one  quality  there  is  common  to 
a  beautiful  flower,  statue,  strain  of  music,  and  line  of  poetry, 
has  been  found  to  task  the  powers  of  the  wisest  philosophers.  It 
is  the  aim  of  philosophy,  however,  to  find  the  one  element  in  dif- 
ferent objects  that  renders  them  beautiful,  such  a  discovery  being 
necessary  for  the  solution  of  the  aesthetic  problem. 

Theories  of  Beauty. — The  various  theories  of  the  beautiful 
may  be  reduced  to  two  general  classes :  first,  those  which  regard 
beauty  as  subjective,  having  its  source  and  existence  in  the  mind ; 
and  second,  those  which  regard  it  as  objective,  having  a  real  ex- 
istence in  or  in  connection  with  objects.  The  principal  subjective 
theories  are  those  of  Sensation,  Association,  and  Symbolism. 
The  principal  objective  theories  are  those  of  Utility,  Order  and 
15*  (345) 


346  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Proportion,  Unity  and  Variety,  and  Expression,  or  the  Spiritual 
Theory.  Some  philosophers  hold  that  "  the  source  of  beauty  is 
not  to  be  sought  in  any  single  quality,  but  in  a  circle  of  effects ;" 
and  they  attempt  to  point  out  the  different  circumstances  and 
peculiarities  which  give  rise  to  the  emotion  of  beauty. 

I.  THE  SUBJECTIVE  THEORIES. — The  subjective  theories  make 
beauty  consist,  not  in  the  object,  but  in  ourselves  as  perceiving 
the  object.  Its  seat  and  source  is  within  us,  and  not  without  us. 
Beauty  is  not  any  quality  of  the  object,  but  only  a  feeling  which 
springs  up  in  our  minds,  and  which  we  learn  to  associate  with 
the  object.  Each  of  the  three  principal  subjective  theories  will 
be  briefly  noticed. 

Theory  of  Sensation. — Many  writers  on  philosophy  make 
beauty  a  mere  sensation.  Objects  awaken  certain  feelings;  these 
feelings  are  peculiarly  agreeable,  and  we  come  to  distinguish 
them  from  other  feelings  by  the  term  beautiful.  Mackenzie  de- 
fines beauty  as  "  a  certain  degree  of  a  certain  species  of  pleasur- 
able effect  impressed  upon  the  mind."  Alexander  Bain  remarks 
that  "  the  aesthetic  emotions  are  a  class  of  pleasant  feelings  sought 
to  be  gratified  by  the  compositions  of  fine  art."  Many  other 
writers  speak  of  beauty  as  a  feeling,  and  seem  to  teach  that  beauty 
has  no  existence  except  as  a  sensation  or  an  emotion.  They 
point  out  the  characteristics  of  objects  which  give  rise  to  the  feel- 
ing, but  regard  them,  not  as  elements  of  beauty,  but  merely  as 
the  circumstances  which  produce  the  feeling  of  beauty. 

Theory  of  Association. — Several  writers  make  beauty  con- 
sist in  the  association  of  idea  and  feeling  with  the  external  object. 
Matter  and  mind  are  so  related  that  certain  peculiarities  of  the 
former  awaken  certain  feelings  in  the  latter.  These  feelings, 
which  we  distinguish  by  the  term  beautiful,  we  begin  to  transfer 
to  and  associate  with  the  objects,  and  thus  acquire  the  habit  of 
speaking  of  the  objects  as  beautiful.  Thus  Lord  Jeffrey  says 
that  "  beauty  is  the  reflection  of  our  own  inward  sensations," 
and  that  objects  are  called  beautiful  "merely  because  they  all 
possess  the  power  of  recalling  or  reflecting  these  emotions." 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE    BEAUTIFUL.  347 

TJieory  of  Symbolism. — Another  theory  is  that  the  beauty 
of  objects  consists  in  their  being  the  sign  or  symbol  of  pleasing 
ideas  or  emotions.  It  is  held  that  beauty  is  not  in  the  object,  but 
that  the  sensible  appearance  may,  from  association  with  or  some 
occult  relation  to  sensations  or  affections,  become  the  sign  of 
them,  suggesting  them  to  the  mind.  Thus  the  violet  is  the 
symbol  of  modesty,  the  lily  of  purity,  the  wild  rose  of  simplicity, 
the  oak  of  strength,  the  willow  of  sorrow  and  affliction, — and  this 
power  of  symbolizing  these  ideas  and  feelings  constitutes  their 
beauty.  This  theory  was  held  and  very  fully  developed  by 
Alison,  and  it  was  also  the  view  of  Reid,  and  several  of  the  Ger- 
man philosophers.  It  makes  beauty  subjective,  having  its  origin 
in  mind  rather  than  existing  in  matter. 

Objection  to  Tliese  Theories. — All  these  theories,  in  making 
beauty  subjective,  make  it  purely  relative.  They  assume  that 
beauty  has  no  existence  in  itself,  either  in  mind  or  in  matter,  but 
grows  out  of  their  relation  to  each  other.  Beauty  is  a  mere 
phenomenon  resulting  from  the  contact  of  mind  and  matter,  just 
as  the  spark  which  flies  from  the  smitten  steel  arises  from  the 
contact  of  the  two,  and  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  the  property  of 
.either.  Beauty  has  no  existence  except  as  a  resultant,  as  the 
spark  has  no  existence  when  the  two  elements  are  not  in  that 
contact  which  elicits  it.  These  theories  destroy  the  actual  ex- 
istence of  beauty  in  the  objects  of  nature  and  art.  If  beauty  has 
its  source  in  the  mind,  then  when  the  mind  is  withdrawn  from  an 
object,  it  is  no  longer  beautiful.  A  sunset  is  beautiful  when 
seen,  and  not  beautiful  when  not  seen.  The  same  object  is 
beautiful  to  one  person  who  is  looking  at  it,  and  not  beautiful  to 
another  person  who  does  not  see  it, — that  is,  an  object  is  beautiful 
and  not  beautiful  at  the  same  time !  The  conclusion  to  which  this 
theory  leads  shows  its  incorrectness. 

II.  OBJECTIVE  THEORIES. — There  is  another  class  of  theories 
with  respect  to  the  beautiful  that  regard  it  as  having  an  inde- 
pendent objective  existence  distinct  from  the  mind  perceiving  or 
enjoying  it.  These  are  called  the  objective  theories  of  beauty. 


348  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

The  principal  of  these  objective  theories  are  those  of  Utility, 
Order  and  Proportion,  Unity  and  Variety,  and  the  Spiritual 
Theory. 

Theory  of  Utility. — It  has  been  held  by  some  writers  that 
the  fundamental  principle  of  beauty  is  utility.  We  perceive  in 
the  object  an  adaptation  of  parts  to  accomplish  some  practical 
purpose,  and  are  thus  pleased  with  it.  Thus  a  watch  is  an  object 
of  beauty  because  the  parts  are  so  arranged  as  to  obtain  the  end 
of  keeping  time.  When  this  principle  of  utility  conduces  in 
some  way  to  our  own  personal  welfare,  the  emotion  is  deeper  and 
the  beauty  is  enhanced.  This  theory  was  held  by  Galen,  Mar- 
montel,  and  apparently  by  Hume. 

Reasons  for  the  Theory. — It  may  be  urged  in  favor  of  this 
theory  that  the  perception  of  utility  in  an  object  heightens  our 
appreciation  of  it.  Many  objects  to  which  we  were  indifferent, 
when  their  use  or  adaptation  to  some  beneficial  purpose  becomes 
known  to  us,  are  at  once  clothed  with  an  interest  and  robed  with 
an  attraction  for  us.  A  story  with  a  moral  whose  influence  tends 
to  purify  the  taste  and  improve  the  character,  awakens  a  deeper 
interest  and  commands  more  admiration  than  one  without  such 
an  element.  Besides,  the  contemplation  of  beautiful  objects  re- 
fines the  taste  and  elevates  the  sentiments,  and  is  thus  useful ;  and 
inverting  this  fact,  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  useful  is  the  beau- 
tiful. 

Objections  to  the  Theory. — The  useful  is,  however,  not  the  beau- 
tiful. Were  this  so,  the  most  useful  things  would  be  the  most 
beautiful,  and  this  is  far  from  being  true.  The  water  in  a  canal 
is  more  useful  than  the  same  water  dashing  down  the  mountain 
side  in  a  silvery  cascade,  but  it  is  far  less  beautiful.  Many  things 
very  useful  possess  no  element  of  beauty.  Thus,  to  use  Burke's 
illustration,  the  wedge-like  snout  of  the  swine,  with  its  tough  car- 
tilage for  rooting  and  digging,  is  very  useful,  but  no  one  would 
become  very  enthusiastic  in  praise  of  its  beauty. 

Further,  the  emotion  of  beauty  and  the  feeling  of  pleasure  ex- 
cited by  the  useful,  are  entirely  dissimilar.  One  is  pure  admir- 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  349 

ation,  connected,  it  may  be,  with  our  selfish  nature ;  the  other  is 
a  gentle,  peaceful  feeling,  with  a  character  purely  its  own.  Con- 
sciousness reveals  a  difference,  in  both  the  cognition  and  the  feel- 
ing of  beauty  and  utility ;  and  its  decisions  are  final.  Again,  to 
say  that  beauty  consists  in  utility,  because  the  beautiful  may  be 
of  advantage  to  us,  is  to  invert  the  true  relation,  and  affirm  that 
the  cause  consists  in  the  effect.  £ 

Order  and  Proportion. — Another  theory  places  the  element 
of  beauty  in  order  and  proportion.  By  order  is  meant  the  ar- 
rangement of  the  parts  of  an  object;  by  proportion  is  meant  the 
relation  of  the  several  parts  to  one  another.  The  theory  holds 
that  the  secret  principle  of  beauty  consists  in  the  arrangement  of 
the  parts  of  a  composite  body  in"brder  and  proportion.  A  flower 
is  beautiful  because  its  sepals,  petals,  etc.,  are  all  orderly  and 
symmetrical ;  and  the  same  thing  gives  attraction  to  the  human 
face.  To  put  the  branches  of  a  tree  all  on  one  side,  or  the  eye 
of  a  man  in  the  back  of  his  head,  or  his  ears  at  his  heels,  would 
destroy  the  order  and  proportion,  and  thus  destroy  the  beauty  of 
these  objects.  This  was  the  theory  of  Augustine,  and  seems  to 
be  very  nearly  the  theory  held  by  Aristotle. 

Reasons  for  the  Theory. — In  favor  of  the  theory,  it  may  be  said 
that  all  objects  which  are  beautiful,  seem  to  possess  this  element 
of  order  and  proportion;  and  all  objects  which  lack  it  are  de- 
ficient in  beauty.  A  work  of  art  lacking  order  and  proportion 
in  the  arrangement  of  its  parts,  so  far  lacks  the  element  of  beauty. 
Several  writers,  as  Hogarth  and  Kames,  seem  to  resolve  order 
and  proportion  into  fitness  or  propriety,  the  proportion  of  the 
parts  being  determined  by  the  purpose  of  the  whole.  Thus,  in 
the  contemplation  of  any  object  that  pleases  us,  our  admiration 
is  increased  when  we  discover  a  fitness  in  its  parts  in  relation  to 
themselves  and  the  whole;  and  whenever  there  is  a  perception  of 
unfitness  or  want  of  propriety,  there  is  a  diminution  of  beauty. 

Objections  to  the  Theory. — That  this  principle  enters  into  many 
beautiful  objects  must  be  admitted ;  that  it  is  the  essence  of 
beauty  is  doubted.  If  beauty  consisted  in  order  and  proportion. 


350  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

then  the  more  of  this  element  we  find  in  an  object  the  greater  its 
beauty;  but  this  is  not  always  so.  There  is  as  much  order  and 
proportion  in  a  sunflower  as  in  a  rose  or  lily ;  but  no  one  will 
claim  that  their  beauty  is  the  same.  Two  specimens  of  archi- 
tecture, two  statues  or  paintings,  may  be  equal  in  order  and  pro- 
portion, and  differ  widely  in  the  degree  of  beauty.  There  seems 
to  be  some  subtle,  invisible  element  that  lies  below  and  is  different 
from  order  and  proportion,  that  gives  to  an  object  that  mysterious 
element  which  we  call  beauty. 

Unity  and  Variety. — Another  theory  of  beauty  is  that  of 
unity  and  variety.  It  holds  that  the  beautiful  consists  in  a 
number  of  parts  or  attributes  arranged  in  accordance  with  some 
definite  idea  or  principle.  Unity  alone  is  not  beautiful,  as  a 
single  tone  in  music  or  the  same  color  in  a  painting;  but  unite 
variety  with  it  and  we  have  beauty.  Variety  alone  is  not  beau- 
tiful, as  in  the  disarranged  parts  of  a  picture  or  a  series  of  dis- 
connected notes  in  music ;  but  give  us  unity  with  it  and  the 
beautiful  appears.  The  manifold,  united  by  some  principle  into 
a  unity  of  thought  or  design,  produces  the  beautiful.  In  a 
picture  or  a  poem,  there  is  found  a  variety  of  parts  or  incidents 
arranged  about  some  leading  plan  or  idea,  and  this  is  supposed  to 
give  it  its  beauty.  This  theory  was  distinctly  announced  by 
Hutcheson,  and  has  been  accepted  by  several  subsequent  writers. 
Hegel  teaches  that  the  form  in  which  beauty  manifests  itself  is 
the  "  unity  of  the  manifold."  Another  statement  of  the  theory 
is  that  beauty  consists  in  unity  of  law  and  variety  of  expression. 

Reasons  for  the  Theory. — In  favor  of  this  theory  it  may  be  said 
that  objects  which  we  call  beautiful  possess  this  element.  It  is 
especially  apparent  among  the  geometrical  figures.  Among  the 
plane  figures,  the  regular  polygon  is  more  beautiful  than  the  ir- 
regular polygon,  because  there  is  more  of  unity  in  the  variety ; 
and  the  circle  is  more  beautiful  than  the  regular  polygon,  since 
in  it  there  is  perfect  unity  of  law  and  perfect  variety  of  expression. 
The  same  holds  good  among  the  solid  bodies,  the  sphere,  possess- 
ing perfect  unity  in  variety,  being  the  most  beautiful.  In  a 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  351 

painting,  while  there  must  be  variety  of  object  and  color,  in  order 
to  please,  they  must  all  be  arranged  with  reference  to  some  lead- 
ing thought  or  purpose.  So  in  music,  while  there  must  be  variety 
of  tones,  there  must  also  be  a  unity  of  idea  or  sentiment  running 
all  through  the  piece  in  order  to  gratify  the  taste  and  give  real 
enjoyment.  Hogarth's  line  of  beauty  and  line  of  grace  both 
illustrate  and  serve  to  authenticate  this  theory. 

Objections  to  the  Theory. — It  may  be  objected  to  this  theory, 
first,  that  not  everything  which  possesses  unity  and  variety  is 
beautiful ;  and  also  that  the  beauty  of  objects  is  not  always  pro- 
portional to  the  amount  of  unity  and  variety  in  them.  Second, 
a  few  objects  are  regarded  as  beautiful  which  do  not  possess 
variety,  as  a  single  color,  say  blue  or  orange.  Third,  a  few 
objects  are  regarded  as  beautiful  which  do  not  possess  unity,  as  a 
gorgeous  sunset,  in  which  the  golden  tints  are  not  grouped  ac- 
cording to  any  one  idea  or  plan.  It  must  be  acknowledged,  how- 
ever, that  the  objections  are  not  very  strong,  and  that  there  are 
many  good  reasons  for  regarding  unity  and  variety  as  the  law  of 
the  expression  of  beauty,  if  not  its  fundamental  principle. 

The  Spiritual  Theory. — Another  theory  makes  beauty  to 
consist  in  the  manifestation  or  expression  of  the  invisible  spiritual 
element  under  sensible  forms.  There  are  two  distinct  elements 
in  the  world,  the  visible  and  the  invisible,  the  form  and  the  idea, 
matter  and  spirit.  Beauty  consists  not  in  matter  alone,  nor  in 
spirit  alone,  but  in  the  union  of  these  elements  in  such  a  way  that 
the  latter  expresses  the  former.  When  these  are  united  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  material  manifests  the  spiritual,  the  form  ex- 
presses the  idea,  the  visible  reveals  the  invisible,  our  own  spir- 
itual nature  meeting  itself  in  what  it  sees,  is  touched  and  thrilled, 
and  the  soul  recognizes  itself  as  standing  in  the  presence  of  the 
beautiful.  Dr.  Hickok  says  the  beautiful  consists  of  the  dead 
form  "  quickened  by  the  presence  of  an  inner  spirit,"  of  the 
empty  figure  filled  "  with  a  beating  heart  and  a  glowing  soul." 

Origin  of  the  Theory. — This  theory  was  first  suggested  by  Plato 
and  has  been  adopted  by  many  subsequent  writers.  Hegel  re- 


352  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

gards  beauty  as  the  shining  of  the  idea  through  a  sensuous 
medium.  Ruskin's  typical  beauty  consists  of  qualities  of  objects 
typifying  a  divine  attribute.  There  is  Infinity,  the  type  of  the 
divine  incomprehensibility;  Unity,  the  type  of  the  divine  com- 
prehensibility ;  Repose,  the  type  of  the  divine  permanence; 
Symmetry,  the  type  of  the  divine  justice;  Purity,  the  type  of  the 
divine  energy;  Moderation,  the  type  of  government  by  law. 

In  Inorganic  Forms. — According  to  this  theory,  the  beauty  of 
objects  of  the  inorganic  world  consists  in  their  manifesting  some 
spiritual  principle  or  some  element  relating  to  the  mind.  In  the 
regular  forms  of  the  crystal  we  see  the  idea  of  law  and  order ; 
the  regularity  of  the  angles  suggests  the  mathematical  thought 
of  him  who  formed  it;  and  the  beautiful  gem,  flashing  with 
liquid  light,  seems  to  be  a  shrine  of  grace,  delicacy,  refinement, 
and  purity,  and  is  admirable  to  us  as  it  discloses  these  hidden 
charms  to  our  admiring  souls. 

In  Organic  Forms. — The  beauty  of  the  organic  world,  vege- 
table and  animal,  consists  in  the  revelation  of  some  thought  or 
sentiment  that  pervades  them  and  shines  out  from  them.  Thus 
the  violet  expresses  the  idea  of  modesty,  the  lily  of  purity,  the 
oak  of  majesty ;  and  it  is  such  an  idea  or  sentiment  shining  out 
from  them  that  gives  them  their  beauty.  So  in  the  animal 
kingdom,  the  dove  expresses  affection,  the  horse  strength  and 
agility,  the  eagle  soaring  ambition,  the  tiger  grace  united  with 
power,  the  lion  dignity  and  courage;  and  it  is  the  expression  of 
these  elements  that  gives  beauty.  Man  crowns  the  sphere  of  or- 
ganic beauty  because  he  manifests  most  fully  all  the  various 
forms  of  thought  and  feeling. 

Beauty  in  Man. — Man  is  a  complex  being,  consisting  of  soul 
and  body.  In  man's  body  we  have  the  marvellous  expression  of 
the  Creator's  thought ;  and  he  is  himself,  in  his  spiritual  nature, 
a  centre  and  source  of  thought.  As  an  organic  being,  he  has  or- 
ganic beauty  of  the  highest  order ;  but  no  mere  flush  and  fullness 
of  physical  life  can  account  for  the  beauty  of  the  human  race. 
It  is  the  soul  life  shining  out  through  the  form  and  features  and 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  353 

actions  that  gives  man  his  highest  beauty.  Through  the  complex 
and  varied  organ,  the  human  face,  and  through  thought,  feeling, 
and  action,  which  constitute  human  conduct  and  evince  human 
character,  we  find  the  highest  manifestation  of  a  spiritual  ele- 
ment ;  and  it  is  this  which  places  man  at  the  head  of  all  beautiful 
objects.  Of  all  visible  objects,  the  human  face  stands  first  in  the 
productions  of  art ;  and  the  grandest  products  of  genius  are  those 
that  pertain  to  human  conduct  and  character.  The  highest 
form  of  beauty  in  man  is  where  the  three-fold  powers  of  thought, 
feeling,  and  will  are  blended  into  one  grand  purpose  in  life.  It 
is  not  truth  merely  latent  in  thought,  but  truth  patent  in  char- 
acter ;  it  is  truth  passing  down  from  the  intellect  into  the  heart, 
and  through  the  heart  into  the  will,  and  all  uniting  in  that  grand 
spiritual  product  called  character,  that  crowns  man  with  the 
diadem  of  highest  earthly  beauty. 

MeniarJcs  on  the  Theory. — The  spiritual  theory  is  the  most 
elevated  of  all  the  theories  of  the  beautiful.  It  is  distinctly  held 
by  many  of  the  profoundest  thinkers  in  philosophy ;  and  the 
highest  thought  of  philosophy  and  art  tends  toward  this  doctrine. 
That  it  contains  much  truth  must  be  admitted ;  whether  it  con- 
tains the  whole  truth  is  a  question.  It  cannot  be  forgotten  that 
the  beauty  of  flowers,  as  of  the  violet  or  rose,  is  perceived  long 
before  there  is  any  idea  of  the  conception  which  they  express, 
and  that  the  beauty  of  animals  is  not  in  proportion  to  their  in- 
telligence, or  else  the  monkey  would  be  far  more  beautifu-1  than 
the  gazelle.  As  the  result  of  the  highest  philosophy,  however, 
we  may  say  that  beauty  consists  in  the  expression  of  the  spiritual 
under  the  form  of  the  sensible;  and  that  the  form  in  which  it 
usually  presents  itself  is  that  of  unity  and  variety. 

II.     THE  SUBLIME. 

I.  THE  NATURE  OF  SUBLIMITY. — The  Sublime  is  an  intuitive 
idea  closely  related  to  that  of  beauty,  and  is  usually  treated  under 
the  Beautiful.  In  an  enlarged  sense  of  the  term,  the  Beautiful 
includes  both  beauty  proper  and  sublimity.  In  popular  language. 


MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

however,  we  distinguish  between  the  beautiful  and  the  sublime. 
They  are  both  embraced  under  the  head  of  aesthetic  ideas. 

Idea  and  Emotion. — The  sublime  embraces  both  an  idea 
and  an  emotion ;  and  the  same  term  is  used  to  name  them  both. 
The  emotion  of  sublimity  is  deep  and  serious  in  its  nature ;  in  it 
the  mind  is  agitated,  awed,  subdued,  and  elevated.  The  feeling 
of  sublimity,  like  that  of  beauty,  is  more  prominent  than  the 
idea;  and  some  writers  have  thus  regarded  sublimity  as  an 
emotion  rather  than  an  idea.  This,  however,  is  an  error;  as 
there  must  be  some  cognition  of  sublimity  in  an  object,  or  there 
would  be  no  feeling  awakened  by  it.  It  is  easier  to  describe  the 
feeling  than  to  discover  what  attribute  is  contained  in  the  object 
that  awakens  the  feeling;  and  thus  the  idea  and  attribute  are 
often  overlooked  in  the  discussion. 

Theories  of  Sublimity — The  nature  of  sublimity,  like  that 
of  beauty,  is  difficult  of  explanation.  It  is  easy  to  point  out 
attributes  and  peculiarities  of  different  objects  that  give  rise  to 
the  emotion  of  sublimity ;  but  it  is  not  easy  to  discover  what  one 
element  is  contained  in  objects  that  renders  them  sublime.  One 
class  of  thinkers  hold  that  there  is  no  one  element,  or  at  least 
that  no  one  element  can  be  discovered  in  objects;  the  highest 
philosophy,  however,  has  ever  sought  to  discover  the  one  fun- 
damental principle  of  sublimity  amid  the  variety  of  sublime 
objects.  The  two  explanations  that  are  most  satisfactory  are 
those  founded  on  the  two  principal  theories  of  beauty ;  the  spir- 
itual theory  and  the  theory  of  unity  and  variety. 

The  Spiritual  Theory. — The  spiritual  theory  makes  the 
beautiful  and  sublime  both  consist  in  the  manifestation  of  the 
invisible  or  spiritual  element  in  the  visible  and  material.  It  dis- 
tinguishes them  by  the  relative  proportion  of  these  two  elements 
in  the  object.  In  the  beautiful,  the  visible  and  the  invisible,  the 
finite  and  the  infinite,  are  harmoniously  blended.  In  the  sublime 
the  spiritual  element  predominates,  the  harmony  is  disturbed,  the 
sensible  is  overborne  by  the  supersensible,  and  our  spirits  are 
agitated  by  the  presence,  in  an  unwonted  degree,  of  the  higher 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  355 

element  of  our  being.  The  feeling  raised  by  one  is  calm  and 
peaceful ;  the  other  awes  and  subdues  the  soul.  Dr.  Hickok 
says,  "  When  the  disclosed  sentiment  is  that  of  a  superhuman 
spirit,  and  we  stand  awestruck  in  the  presence  of  an  angel  or  a 
divinity,  the  beauty  rises  proportionally  and  elevates  itself  to  the 
sublime" 

Unity  and  Variety . — The  nature  of  the  sublime  may  also  be 
explained  by  the  theory  of  unity  and  variety.  In  a  sublime 
object,  the  unity  and  variety  are  enlarged  and  intensified.  They 
seem  to  be  transcending  the  limits  of  the  understanding,  so  that 
the  mind  is  unable  to  estimate  or  fully  grasp  the  object.  As 
long  as  the  unity  and  variety  are  measurable,  the  mind  remains 
quiet  and  composed  ;  but  when  it  is  sensible  that  these  are  escap- 
ing it,  are  overwhelming  it,  that  it  is  in  the  midst  of  the  immeas- 
urable and  the  infinite,  the  object  ceases  to  be  beautiful,  and 
becomes  sublime.  Thus  a  lake  or  a  river  is  beautiful,  for  we 
seem  to  be  able  to  grasp  their  magnitude ;  but  the  ocean,  stretch- 
ing far  away  until  the  mind  falters  and  is  bewildered  in  the  pur- 
suit, is  sublime. 

The  Correct  Conception. — This  last  explanation  hints  at  the 
true  nature  of  sublimity.  The  fundamental  element  of  sublimity 
seems  to  be  that  of  infinity,  or  an  approximation  to  infinitude. 
Whatever  passes  beyond  the  bounds  of  the  finite,  or  awakens  the 
cognition  of  the  infinite,  that  is  to  us  sublime.  The  idea  of 
space  unlimited  in  every  direction,  of  time  without  beginning  or 
end,  of  a  first  cause  uncaused,  of  the  immeasurable  extent  of 
creation, — all  these  make  the  soul  swell  with  the  sentiment  of 
sublimity.  So  anything  that  approximates  to  these  ideas,  or  that 
awakens  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  tends  to  awaken  a  similar  feel- 
ing in  the  mind,  and  is  thus  regarded  as  sublime. 

II.  ELEMENTS  OF  SUBLIMITY. — This  element  of  infinity,  or  the  N 
approximation  of  the  infinite,  manifests  itself  in  a  variety  of  ways. 
It  appears  in  Form,  in  the  element  of  Vastness ;  in  Force,  in  the 
element  of  Power ;  in  Sounds,  in  the  element  of  Loudness.     The 
principal  elements  of  the  sublime  are  thus  Vastness,  Power,  and 


356  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Loudness.  All  of  these  may  approximate  to  the  infinite,  or  sug- 
gest the  infinite  to  the  mind,  and  are  thus  elements  of  sublimity. 

Vastness. — Extension  far  beyond  the  ordinary  limits  suggests 
to  the  mind  the  idea  of  infinity,  and  gives  that  expansion  to  the 
soul  which  awakens  the  emotion  of  sublimity.  The  wide-spread- 
ing ocean,  the  liquid  depths  of  the  overarching  sky,  the  abyss  of 
space  filled  with  countless  worlds,  endless  numbers  and  eternal 
duration — all  these  are  sublime  objects.  Extension  in  a  vertical 
direction  is  more  sublime  than  the  same  extension  in  a  horizontal 
direction;  Mont  Blanc,  with  its  snowy  brow  in  the  heavens,  is 
more  sublime  than  if  the  same  extent  of  rock  and  snow  were 
stretched  out  on  the  surface  of  the  earth.  The  reason  for  this  is 
that  extent  upward  exceeds  our  accustomed  measures  of  altitude 
more  than  the  same  extent  would  exceed  our  measure  of  hori- 
zontal distance,  and  thus  approximates  more  nearly  to  infinity. 

Obscurity. — Obscurity  is  also  an  element  of  the  sublime. 
This  is  due  to  the  indistinctness  of  outline,  rendering  it  impossi- 
ble for  us  to  limit  the  size  of  the  object,  and  thus  the  size  is  ex- 
aggerated and  is  suggestive  of  the  idea  of  infinitude.  For  this 
reason,  objects  at  night,  when  their  forms,  clothed  with  shadow, 
merge  in  the  darkness  and  are  not  grasped  by  the  mind,  seem 
larger  than  they  do  by  day,  and  thus  more  sublime.  There  is 
also  sometimes  an  element  of  awe  and  terror  associated  with  them 
that  adds  to  the  element  of  sublimity.  The  description  of  a 
spirit  appearing  in  the  silence  and  darkness  of  night,  as  given  in 
Job,  is  a  fine  example  of  sublimity. 

Great  Power. — Vast  power  is  also  an  element  of  sublimity, 
as  it  is  suggestive  of  infinite  power.  The  ordinary  forces  of 
nature  or  art  do  not  possess  the  element  of  sublimity  ;  but  when 
we  notice  forces  that  largely  transcend  these  ordinary  forces,  the 
idea  and  emotion  of  sublimity  are  awakened.  Thus  a  thunder- 
storm, the  rushing  cataract,  the  heaving  earthquake,  the  belchiug 
volcano,  a  storm  at  sea,  cause  the  soul  to  swell  with  the  feelings 
of  sublimity.  The  presence  of  great  power  accounts  for  the  feel- 
ing of  sublimity  awakened  by  some  of  the  animals,  as  the  lion, 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  357 

the  ponderous  elephant,  the  war-horse  with  his  neck  clothed  with 
thunder.  Among  the  works  of  art,  we  have  the  vast  engine  with 
its  noiseless  motions,  the  rushing,  thundering  locomotive,  and  the 
majestic  steamer  ploughing  the  billows  of  the  deep.  The  de- 
scription of  the  war-horse  in  the  book  of  Job  is  a  fine  example  of 
this  element  in  literature. 

Great  Loudness. — An  unusual  loudness  in  sound  gives  rise 
to  the  idea  and  emotion  of  sublimity,  on  account  of  its  suggesting 
infinite  vastness  or  power.  Thus  the  deep  bass  of  the  organ,  the 
crashing  of  thunder,  the  roar  of  the  cataract,  the  booming  of 
cannon,  the  roar  of  a  multitude  of  voices,  are  examples  of  the 
sublime  in  sound.  John's  description  in  Revelation  of  the  voices 
in  heaven,  "  And  I  heard  as  it  were  the  voice  of  a  great  multi- 
tude, and  as  the  voice  of  many  waters,  and  as  the  voice  of  mighty 
thunderings,  saying,  Alleluia;  for  the  Lord  God  Omnipotent 
reigiieth,"  is  a  fine  example  of  the  sublime  in  sound. 

Grandeur  and  Sublimity. — Some  writers  distinguish  be- 
tween grandeur  and  sublimity;  the  difference,  however,  is  not 
generic,  but  merely  one  of  degree.  Grandeur  is  a  lower  form, 
or  less  degree  of  sublimity.  It  is,  as  it  were,  a  transition  point 
between  the  beautiful  and  the  sublime.  The  peacefully  flowing 
river-  is  beautiful ;  as  it  gathers  impulse  and  purpose  and  rushes 
on  in  rapids,  it  is  grand ;  when  shivered  and  Avild  with  motion  it 
leaps  the  cataract  in  eager  masses,  it  is  sublime.  "A  character 
shaped  upon  truth  is  beautiful;  standing  upon  truth  amid  the 
violence  of  enemies,  is  grand;  adhering  to  truth  amid  the  de- 
rision of  friends  and  in  defiance  of  the  rack  and  fagot,  is  sub- 
lime." 

The  Sublime  and  Beautiful. — The  sublime  and  beautiful, 
when  associated  in  nature  and  art,  make  the  deepest  impressions 
on  the  mind.  A  Swiss  valley  nestling  among  the  hills,  with  a 
silvery  stream  winding  through  it,  is  beautiful;  the  snow-clad 
mountains  that,  serene  and  majestic,  tower  heavenward  and  bathe 
their  brows  in  the  blue  ether  above,  are  sublime ;  and  the  two 
united,  as  at  Chamouni,  form  such  a  combination  of  blended 


358  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

oeauty  and  sublimity  as  moves  the  soul  with  deepest  feelings 
of  pleasure.  Niagara  is  both  beautiful  and  sublime.  The  emer- 
ald hue  of  the  flowing  river,  the  roar  of  the  plunging  water,  the 
mist  rising  in  fleecy  clouds  toward  the  zenith,  the  rainbow  arch 
quivering  in  the  rising  mist  and  crowning  the  scene  with  a 
diadem  of  color,  both  thrill  and  awe  the  human  soul.  In  such  a 
combination,  the  beauty  tempers  and  adorns  the  sublimity ;  and 
the  sublimity  dignifies  and  ennobles  the  beauty.  This  is  illus- 
trated in  the  sunrise  flashing  along  the  summit  of  the  Alps,  in 
the  eloquent  orations  of  Chatham  and  Webster,  in  the  great  epics 
of  Homer  and  Milton,  and  in  the  grand  oratorios  of  Handel  and 
the  sublime  symphonies  of  Beethoven. 

Moral  Sublimity. — There  is  also  an  element  of  sublimity  in 
human  actions  and  character.  Actions  which  in  greatness  and 
nobility  far  transcend  those  to  which  we  are  accustomed,  awaken 
the  idea  and  emotion  of  sublimity.  Newton's  discovery  of  the 
law  of  gravity,  La  Place's  comprehension  of  all  the  laws  of  me- 
chanics in  a  single  equation,  Napoleon's  victories  over  the  Aus- 
trians,  are  examples  of  intellectual  sublimity.  Brutus  trampling 
on  his  natural  affections  and  condemning  his  sons  to  death,  Vir- 
ginius  stabbing  his  own  daughter  to  save  her  honor,  Regulus 
refusing  to  break  his  promise  and  going  back  to  be  put  to  death 
by  the  Carthaginians,  Socrates  calmly  discussing  philosophy  dur- 
ing the  closing  hours  of  his  life, — are  examples  of  the  sublime  in 
character.  The  sublimest  scene  of  all  is  the  death  of  Jesus  on 
Calvary,  with  the  dying  utterances,  "  Father,  forgive  them,"  and 
"  It  is  finished."  Truly  could  Rousseau  say  that  "  Socrates  died 
like  a  hero ;  but  Jesus  Christ  like  a  God." 

III.  THE  LUDICROUS. 

I.  NATURE  OF  THE  IDEA. — The  Ludicrous  is  closely  related  to 
the  Beautiful.  A  general  notion  of  their  relation  is  expressed  when 
we  say  that  they  are  in  a  certain  sense  the  opposite  of  each  other- 
Thus,  the  leading  idea  of  the  beautiful  is  harmony  and  propor- 
tion ;  while  the  leading  element  of  the  ludicrous  is  disproportion 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  859 

and  a  lack  of  harmony.  The  one  pleases  on  account  of  the  har- 
monious relation  of  the  several  parts ;  the  other  pleases  on  ac- 
count of  some  incongruity  in  the  parts  related.  As  ideas  they 
are  both  embraced  under  the  general  head  of  aesthetic  conceptions. 

The  Ludicrous  an  Idea. — It  has  been  customary  to  regard 
the  ludicrous  merely  as  an  emotion,  and  not  as  an  idea.  This, 
however,  we  regard  as  an  error.  Whenever  we  look  at  certain 
objects,  we  are  aware  of  an  agreeable  feeling  which  manifests 
itself  in  smiles  or  laughter.  This  feeling  we  call  the  emotion  of 
the  ludicrous.  As  the  basis  of  this  feeling,  there  must  have  been 
some  conception,  some  cognition  of  an  element  in  the  object, 
which  awakened  the  emotion.  Without  a  cognition  of  the 
ludicrous,  there  could  be  no  feeling  of  the  ludicrous ;  we  there- 
fore maintain  that  the  ludicrous  is  an  idea,  as  well  as  an  emotion, 
and  should  be  treated  under  the  Intellect  rather  than  the  Sensi- 
bilities. 

A  national  Idea. — This  idea  of  the  ludicrous  is  a  rational 
idea ;  it  is,  like  the  beautiful  and  sublime,  a  cognition  of  our 
higher  intuitive  power.  As  in  the  case  of  the  other  rational 
ideas,  the  brute  shows  no  conception  of  it ;  no  animal  except  man 
ever  laughs  at  the  incongruous  or  manifests  any  enjoyment  of  it. 
The  idiot  and  the  uncultivated  savage  have  very  little  apprecia- 
tion of  this  element ;  and  the  uncultured  person  less  than  the  cul- 
tured. The  higher  the  scale  of  civilization  and  culture,  the  more 
sensitive  is  the  mind  to  this  idea  of  the  ludicrous.  It  is  thus  a 
rational  idea,  an  idea  that  belongs  to  our  higher  intellectual 
nature,  and  has  its  place  along  with  the  ideas  of  the  True,  the 
Beautiful,  and  the  Good. 

The  Emotion. — The  idea  of  the  ludicrous  is  always  accom- 
panied with  an  emotion  of  the  ludicrous.  This  emotion  is  a 
species  of  joy  or  gladness,  a  pleasurable  excitement  of  feeling 
that  manifests  itself  in  a  joyousness  of  heart  and  a  smiling  face. 
It  wreathes  the  face  with  smiles,  causes  the**  eyes  to  sparkle  with 
delight,  and  often  breaks  out  into  that  strong  physical  expression 


360  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

which  we  call  laughter.  The  emotion  is  often  so  strong  as  to 
conceal  or  eclipse  the  idea,  so  that  many  writers  overlook  the 
conception  and  treat  the  ludicrous  merely  as  an  emotion. 

Origin  of  the  Idea. — The  idea  of  the  ludicrous,  as  has  al- 
ready been  stated,  is  intuitive, — it  is  a  product  of  the  reason.  It 
arises  in  the  mind  on-  the  occasion  of  sensible  experience.  I  look 
at  an  object  or  listen  to  a  story ;  I  see  the  object  and  hear  the 
words ;  but  by  the  eye  of  intuition  I  perceive  some  peculiarity 
which  awakens  an  emotion  that  expresses  itself  in  a  smile  or  a 
laugh.  The  -physical  eye  does  not  see  it,  the  ear  does  not  hear 
it ;  but,  as  with  the  Bight  and  the  Beautiful,  there  is  an  immediate 
perception  by  the  Reason  of  some  element  which  gives  rise  to  this 
peculiar  feeling  of  gladness  and  buoyancy  of  spirit. 

II.  NATURE  OF  THE  LUDICROUS. — The  nature  of  the  ludicrous, 
like  that  of  the  beautiful  and  right,  is  a  subject  that  has  puzzled 
philosophy.  The  question  is,  what  is  that  one  principle  that  per- 
vades all  objects,  which  awakens  the  idea  and  emotion  of  the 
ludicrous  ?  A  few  of  the  different  theories  will  be  presented. 

Theory  of  Aristotle. — Aristotle  regarded  Comedy,  which  is 
the  expression  of  the  ludicrous,  as  an  illustration  of  worthless 
characters  in  relation  to  what  is  mean,  when  it  is  not  so  to  a 
painful  degree.  Quintilian  thinks  that  "A  saying  that  causes 
laughter  is  generally  based  on  false  reasoning  (some  play  of 
words),  has  always  something  low  in  it ;  .  .  .is  never  honorable 
to  the  subject."  Campbell  mentions  "  that  laughter  is  associated 
with  the  perception  of  oddity,  and  not  necessarily  with  degrada- 
tion or  contempt."  Kant  makes  the  ridiculous  arise  from  the 
suddftn  collapse  of  a  long-raised  and  highly-wrought  expectation. 

Theory  of  Hobbes. — The  celebrated  theory  of  Hobbes  is  that 
"  Laughter  is  a  sudden  glory  arising  from  the  sudden  conception 
of  some  eminency  in  ourselves,  by  comparison  with  the  infirmity 
of  others  or  with  our  own  formerly."  In  other  words,  as  Bain 
remarks,  it  is  an  expression  of  "the  pleasurable  feeling  of 
superior  power."  The  person  who  laughs  is  for  the  time  supposed 
to  be  superior  to  that  at  which  he  laughs.  Thus  we  laugh  at 


THE  INTUITIONS  OF  THE   BEAUTIFUL.  361 

some  defect  of  body,  mind,  or  manner ;  some  blunder,  or  awkward- 
ness, or  lack  of  sharpness  or  courage,  etc.,  feeling  above  and 
looking  down  upon  the  person  who  exhibits  them.  In  reply  to 
this  theory,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  we  do  not  always  laugh  at 
what  is  inferior  to  us,  that  we  often  laugh  at  what  is  not  inferior 
to  us,  and  that  the  proud  and  haughty,  who  most  look  down  on 
inferiors,  do  not  laugh  most. 

The  True  Tlieory. — The  essential  element  of  the  ludicrous 
seems  to  me  to  be  the  incongruous.  Whatever  the  object  may 
be  at  which  we  laugh,  it  will  always  be  found  to  contain  the  ele- 
ment of  incongruity.  For  example,  a  face  awry,  a  fly  on  the 
end  of  one's  nose,  an  awkward  attitude,  a  pompous  manner,  a  big 
hat  on  a  small  person,  big  words  in  describing  little  things,  a  pig 
in  a  church,  an  old  deacon  nodding  during  the  sermon, — all  such 
things  contain  an  element  of  incongruity,  and  are,  for  this  reason, 
laughable.  Should  we  see  a  perfumed  dandy,  tripping  along 
Broadway,  suddenly  slip  and  fall  sprawling  into  the  mud,  we 
should  laugh ;  a  dandy  floundering  in  the  mud  is  certainly  an 
incongruous  spectacle. 

Incongruity  the  Element. — This  element  of  incongruity  is 
often  accompanied  with  some  accessories  that  increase  the  in- 
fluence of  a  humorous  object ;  but  whatever  else  is  wanting,  this 
element  of  the  incongruous  must  always  be  present.  No  object 
is  humorous  without  it ;  and  every  object  that  is  humorous  pos- 
sesses it.  In  nature  or  art,  in  objects  or  ideas,  whatever  causes  us 
to  laugh,  will  be  found  to  lack  some  congruity  or  harmony  or 
relation  among  the  parts.  Not  everything  that  is  incongruous  is 
ludicrous,  however,  for  there  may  be  some  other  element  that 
counteracts  the  natural  effect  of  the  incongruous,  such  as  pity, 
fright,  etc.  In  these  cases  the  greater  emotion  overpowers  the 
lighter  and  destroys  the  effect  of  the  incongruous.  But  all 
things  which  awaken  an  emotion  of  the  ludicrous  will  be  found 
to  contain  this  element  of  disproportion  and  incongruity. 

Incongruity  in  Conditions. — This  element  of  incongruity 
is  seen  in  a  variety  of  objects.     One  form  is  that  of  the  incon- 
16 


362  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

gruity  of  conditions.  Thus  the  incongruity  between  the  inten- 
tional condition  of  the  dandy  and  his  actual  condition  in  the 
mud,  is  a  source  of  the  mirthful  feeling.  A  person  who  prides 
himself  on  his  knowledge  and  is  pompous  in  its  display,  becomes 
an  object  of  laughter  when  he  makes  a  blunder.  A  lady  who 
puts  on  fine  airs  and  pretends  to  polite  accomplishments  makes 
herself  very  ridiculous  when  her  manners  are  coarse  and  her 
language  unrefined  and  ungrammatical.  The  ignorant  servant 
girl  imitating  the  airs  and  manners  of  her  mistress  is  a  subject 
for  laughter. 

Similar  and  Dissimilar. — The  incongruous  manifests  itself 
when  amid  the  diversity  there  is  an  apparent  similarity.  Thus 
the  humor  in  a  pun  is  occasioned  by  the  diversity  of  thought 
combined  with  the  similarity  of  sound.  This  is  seen  also  in  the 
example  of  the  Irish  girl,  who,  when  she  brought  a  glass  of  water 
in  her  hand,  was  told  by  her  master  to  bring  things  on  a  waiter, 
and  next  day  brought  in  his  boots  on  a  waiter.  This  was  John- 
son's idea  of  wit,  when  he  defined  it  as  "a  kind  of  concordia 
diseors,  a  combination  of  dissimilar  images."  Campbell  also  ex- 
pressed this  same  idea  in  his  "strange  assemblage  of  related 
images."  The  humorous  is  thus  a  similarity  in  dissimilarity,  or 
a  dissimilarity  in  similarity ;  it  is  a  kind  of  discordant  harmony, 
a  disagreeing  agreement,  an  appropriate  impropriety,  etc. 

Design  and  Execution. — The  incongruous  frequently  mani- 
fests itself  in  the  incongruity  between  purpose  and  execution. 
The  person  who  aims  at  great  nicety  of  speech  and  misses  the 
mark,  is  naturally  laughed  at.  The  lady  who,  trying  to  make  a 
show  of  her  fine  clothes,  gets  some  of  her  garments  awry,  becomes 
an  example  of  the  ridiculous.  Biddy's  bringing  in  the  boots  on 
the  waiter  is  the  more  laughable,  because  she  thought  she  was 
doing  what  her  master  ordered.  The  little  insect  on  the  lady's  hat 
which  gave  occasion  to  the  poem,  "0  wad  some  power  the 
giftie  gie  us,"  was  much  more  ludicrous  to  the  poet  on  account 
of  the  fine  clothes  and  fashionable  bonnet  of  Miss  Jenny,  than  if 
it  had  been  on  "  some  poor  body." 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  363 

Element  of  Surprise, — The  element  of  surprise  increases  the 
effect  of  the  ludicrous.  The  unexpectedness  of  the  joke  makes  it 
more  effective  than  if  we  knew  what  was  coming.  That  which 
flashes  on  the  mind,  which  comes  with  a  little  shock  to  it,  pro- 
duces the  deeper  effect.  The  quick  repartee,  the  flash  of  a  sudden 
witticism,  the  bubbling  up  of  a  humorous  expression, — these  are 
the  most  pleasing  to  us.  The  tardy  repartee,  the  witticism  that 
is  studied  out,  are  much  less  effective  than  the  quick  and  spon- 
taneous flash  of  wit.  The  knowledge  that  Sheridan  had  studied 
out  and  prepared  his  wit  would  have  largely  detracted  from  its 
effect.  Wit  is  like  champagne, — lively,  fresh,  and  sparkling, 
which  loses  its  flavor  and  life  when  brought  to  the  air. 

Surprise  is  not  an  essential  element  of  the  ludicrous,  however ; 
for  all  things  which  surprise  us  are  not  funny.  We  are  sur- 
prised at  the  loss  of  a  friend,  but  it  is  not  at  all  humorous.  The 
sudden  fall  of  a  window  by  which  we  are  sitting  makes  us  jump, 
but  does  not  make  us  laugh.  My  friend  laughs  at  me  because  I 
jump,  for  he  sees  the  incongruity  between  my  fright  and  the  in- 
significance of  the  cause. 

Element  of  Novelty. — The  element  of  novelty  increases  the 
effect  of  the  ludicrous.  The  unexpectedness  of  a  joke  or  a 
humorous  remark  causes  it  to  produce  a  deeper  impression  on 
the  mind.  Familiarity  with  a  witticism  makes  it  lose  its  flavor; 
a  humorous  story  repeated  several  times  loses  its  freshness  and 
zest,  and  at  last  becomes  stale  and  intolerable.  Wit  and  humor 
do  not  depend  on  novelty,  however.  The  new  is  not  necessarily 
funny.  A  new  object,  a  new  book,  a  new  picture,  etc.,  do  not 
awaken  feelings  of  mirthfulness.  Novelty  is  merely  an  added 
element  to  the  humorous,  as  it  is  to  beauty,  though  it  is  more 
essential  to  humor  than  it  is  to  beauty. 

III.  FORMS  OP  THE  LUDICROUS. — The  ludicrous  manifests  itself 
in  various  forms.  It  is  found  in  both  objects  and  ideas;  and  in 
either  case  the  incongruous  relation  may  be  accidental  or  inten- 
tional. Certain  forms  of  the  accidental  grouping  of  objects  or 
ideas  constitute  what  is  called  the  blunder  or  bull.  The  in  con- 


364  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

gruous  relation  of  ideas  gives  us  the  two  distinct  forms,  called 
wit  and  humor. 

Ludicrous  in  Objects. — The  incongruous  relation  of  objects 
is  often  amusing.  A  very  long  nose,  a  grimace,  some  odd  ar- 
rangement of  the  hair,  some  disarrangement  of  the  dress,  etc.,  will 
excite  laughter.  This  may  be  the  result  of  accident,  as  with  the 
dandy  slipping  into  the  mud,  and  the  lady  with  the  insect  on  her 
bonnet.  Objects  may  also  be  brought  into  incongruous  relations 
intentionally,  giving  us  two  forms  of  the  ludicrous.  Thus  a 
person  may  imitate  the  peculiarities  and  oddities  of  some  indi- 
vidual, giving  rise  to  what  is  called  buffoonery;  or  he  may  play 
off  his  joke  at  his  own  expense  for  the  amusement  of  others,  in 
which  case  we  have  the  clown. 

The  Blunder. — The  accidental  grouping  of  incongruous  ideas 
gives  us  what  is  called  the  blunder  or  bull.  This  is  the  special 
form  known  as  Irish  wit.  Its  characteristic  is  that  there  is  some 
inconsistency  between  the  thing  said  and  done  and  the  thing 
meant.  There  is  an  apparent  congruity  in  the  things  related,  but 
a  real  incongruity.  Swift  gives  a  good  illustration  of  this  form 
of  humor  in  the  story  of  the  people  who,  becoming  angry  at  a 
banker,  threatened  to  burn  the  notes  of  his  bank,  not  thinking 
that  it  would  make  them  poorer  and  him  richer.  A  story  is  told 
of  an  Irishman  whose  face  was  blackened  before  being  wakened 
to  start  on  his  early  journey,  and  who  reaching  the  next  hotel 
looked  in  the  glass  and  seeing  his  plight,  exclaimed,  "Shure 
they  've  waked  the  wrong  man  and  left  me  ten  miles  behind." 
Two  Irishmen,  walking  on  the  road  leading  from  Newburgh, 
came  upon  an  old  milestone,  when  one  of  them,  supposing  it  to 
be  a  tombstone,  said,  "  Tread  lightly,  Jamie,  the  dead  rest  here ; 
he  was  twenty-seven  years  old,  and  his  name  was  Miles,  from 
Newburgh."  Wendell  Phillips  gives  a  good  example  of  this  kind 
of  humor  when,  in  showing  that  we  have  borrowed  our  jokes 
from  the  ancients,  he  says  that  "the  Irish  bulls  are  mostly 
Greek." 

Wit  and  Humor. — Two   forms   of  the  humorous  in   ideas, 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  365 

often  contrasted,  are  those  of  wit  and  humor.  It  is  difficult  to 
state  clearly  the  distinction  between  them,  though  the  difference 
is  easily  appreciated.  "Wit  is  bright  and  sparkling;  humor  is 
.soft,  gentle,  and  glowing.  Wit  has  an  air  of  smartness  and 
sharpness;  humor  is  modest  and  kindly  in  its  nature.  The 
former  may  be  compared  to  the  quick  spark  of  the  Leyden  jar ; 
the  latter  to  the  soft,  gentle  current  of  the  galvanic  battery.  Wit 
is  sometimes  bitter  and  malevolent ;  humor  is  always  kindly  and 
good-natured.  Thackeray,  one  of  the  greatest  humorists,  defines 
humor  to  be  "  a  compound  of  wit  and  love."  "  The  best  humor," 
he  says,  "  is  that  which  contains  the  most  humanity,  that  which  is 
flavored  throughout  with  tenderness  and  kindness."  In  a  literary 
production,  wit  should  come  in  only  by  flashes,  while  humor  may 
be  continued  for  a  long  time  with  enjoyment.  As  a  literary 
quality,  humor  is  much  higher  than  wit;  and,  it  may  be  added, 
is  much  more  rare. 

The  Pun. — A  form  of  wit  in  which  dissimilar  ideas  are  re- 
lated by  means  of  similar  words  is  called  the  pun.  The  pun  is 
thus  a  play  upon  words ;  and  is  entitled  the  wit  of  words.  The 
effect  of  a  pun  depends  upon  the  contrast  between  the  two  ideas 
related  under  cover  of  a  common  or  similar  word;  the  greater 
the  incongruity  between  these  ideas,  the  more  ludicrous  the  effect 
and  the  more  perfect  the  pun.  One  of  the  best  puns  in  the 
language,  perhaps,  is  that  of  Hood's  in  "  Faithless  Nelly  Gray," 
in  which  he  says,  when  she  died : 

"They  went  and  told  the  sexton, 
And  the  sexton  tolled  the  bell." 

The  pun  is  regarded  as  an  inferior  kind  of  wit ;  yet  a  good  pun 
is  sometimes  very  effective. 

Satire  and  Sarcasm. — Similar  to  the  incongruity  of  the 
ideas  of  words,  is  the  incongruity  between  the  thought  expressed 
and  intended,  where  one  thing  is  said  and  another  thing  is  meant. 
This  includes  the  bull,  in  which  the  incongruity  is  accidental, 
and  two  other  forms,  satire  and  sarcasm,  in  which  the  incongruity 
is  intentional.  Satire  is  that  form  in  which,  under  the  guise  of 


366  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

apparent  praise,  are  hidden  the  arrows  of  ridicule  and  criticism. 
In  sarcasm  the  censure  is  stronger  and  more  bitter,  and  the  form 
is  more  direct  and  less  hidden.  Satire  pierces  Avith  a  polished 
rapier ;  sarcasm  cuts  with  a  rough-edged  sword. 

Burlesque. — When  the  incongruity  consists  in  the  debasing 
of  what  is  great  and  noble,  by  representing  it  as  mean  and  con- 
temptible, we  have  what  is  called  burlesque.  Butler's  Hudibras 
thus  ridicules  the  Puritans  of  the  days  of  Cromwell ;  and  Don 
Quixote  is  a  burlesque  on  the  days  of  chivalry.  The  term  bur- 
lesque is  also  applied  to  a  ludicrous  imitation  or  caricature  of 
some  elevated  composition.  A  humorous  imitation  or  application 
of  a  poem  is  called  a  parody. 

The  Mock-Heroic. — When  the  incongruity  consists  in  ele- 
vating low  and  trivial  subjects  into  a  dignity  by  high-sounding 
epithets,  we  have  what  is  known  as  the  mock-heroic.  It  is  so 
called  because  it  burlesques  the  heroic  by  imitating  the  manners 
or  actions  of  heroes.  Pope's  "Rape  of  the  Lock"  is  a  good 
specimen  of  the  mock-heroic.  Some  parts  of  Irving's  "  Knicker- 
bocker's History  of  New  York  "  present  an  excellent  example  of 
this  form  of  the  humorous. 

Relation  of  the  ^Esthetic  Elements. — Having  discussed  the 
nature  of  the  three  aesthetic  elements — the  beautiful,  the  sublime, 
and  the  ludicrous — we  are  prepared  to  notice  a  little  more  defi- 
nitely their  relation  to  one  another.  In  beauty  there  is  a  har- 
mony of  relations;  in  sublimity  there  is  a  suggestion  of  the 
infinite ;  in  the  ludicrous  the  harmony  becomes  distorted  and  the 
relation  is  that  of  the  incongruous.  In  the  beautiful,  the  spiritual 
and  material  are  harmoniously  blended;  in  the  sublime,  this 
harmony  is  broken  by  the  predominance  of  the  spiritual ;  in  the 
humorous,  the  harmony  is  also  destroyed  by  the  loss  of  the 
spiritual  element  and  the  predominance  of  the  material.  In 
beauty,  there  is  unity  and  variety  of  expression  ;  in  sublimity,  the 
variety  is  lost  in  the  suggestion  of  infinity ;  in  humor,  the  unity 
us  lost,  and  the  variety  exists  in  disproportion  and  incongruity. 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  367 

IY.  THE  POWER  OF  TASTE. 

The  power  of  the  mind  which  has  to  do  with  the  element  of 
beauty  has  received  the  special  name  of  Taste.  This  term  is  so 
widely  used  by  writers  that  it  will  be  appropriate  to  inquire  just 
what  we  mean  by  it.  Taste  has  been  variously  defined  by  dif- 
ferent authors ;  some  making  it  a  mere  sensation,  some  an  intel- 
lectual perception,  and  others  uniting  both  of  these  elements  in 
their  definition.  Thus  Blair  defines  it  as  "  a  power  of  receiving 
pleasure  from  the  beauties  of  nature  and  art."  McDermot  re- 
gards it  as  "the  power  of  discriminating  those  qualities"  in 
objects  which  excite  in  us  pleasant  emotions.  Alison  defines  it  as 
"that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  we  perceive  and  enjoy  what- 
ever is  beautiful  or  sublime  in  the  works  of  nature  or  art." 

Difficulty  of  Defining. — This  variety  in  the  definitions  given 
by  different  writers  on  the  subject,  indicates  that  it  is  difficult  to 
determine  what  is  meant  by  Taste.  As  we  find  the  term  used  in 
literature  and  philosophy,  it  is  not  easy  to  ascertain  just  what 
elements  of  the  mind  it  is  designed  to  embrace.  The  difficulty  is 
not  in  understanding  the  action  of  the  mind  in  respect  to  aesthetic 
ideas ;  but  in  deciding  how  many  of  these  actions  or  states  shall 
be  included  in  the  term  taste.  The  question  is  thus  not  a  purely 
psychological  one,  but  partly  a  philological  question.  The  object 
of  this  discussion  is  to  ascertain  what  mental  elements  are  prop- 
erly included  in  this  word. 

The  Mental  Elements. — The  elements  of  the  mind  exercised 
in  the  aesthetic  attributes  of  objects  are  two-fold;  an  intellectual 
and  an  emotional  element.  First,  there  is  a  perception  of  the 
sesthetic  element ;  this  is  an  act  of  the  reason.  Second,  there  is  a 
feeling  awakened  by  this  perception ;  this  is  an  act  of  the  sensi- 
bilities. The  emotional  element  is  often  so  strong  as  to  lead  us 
to  overlook  the  intellectual  element.  Some  hold  that  the  emo- 
tional element  precedes  and  is  the  basis  of  the  idea ;  they  say  we 
first  experience  the  emotion  of  the  beautiful,  and  this  emotion 
leads  us  to  think  there  is  an  idea  of  beauty  and  a  quality  in 
objects  called  beauty  which  produces  the  emotion.  This,  how- 


368  MENTAL   SCIEXCE. 

ever,  we  regard  as  incorrect ;  the  idea  is  the  basis  of  the  feeling, 
and  not  the  feeling  of  the  idea.  The  action  of  the  mind,  which 
we  have  explained  above,  applies  to  the  element  of  the  sublime 
and  the  ludicrous,  as  well  as  the  beautiful,  all  of  which  are 
aesthetic  ideas. 

What  is  Taste  ? — Which  of  these  elements  should  be  included 
in  the  term  taste  f  Is  taste  entirely  intellectual,  or  entirely  emo- 
tional, or  is  it  a  combination  of  these  two  elements?  The  correct 
view,  we  think,  is  that  taste  includes  both  of  these  elements;  it  is 
both  intellectual  and  emotional  in  its  nature.  When  we  speak 
of  a  person's  taste,  we  mean  both  the  power  to  perceive  the 
beautiful  and  the  power  to  enjoy  the  beautiful.  A  person  of 
good  taste  is  one  who  can  both  see  and  appreciate  the  aesthetic 
elements  in  nature  and  art.  We  may  thus  define  taste  to  be  that 
power  by  which  we  perceive  and  enjoy  the  (esthetic  elements  in  the 
objects  of  nature  and  art.  Under  the  aesthetic  elements,  as  already 
explained,  we  include  the  beautiful,  the  sublime,  and  the  ludi- 
crous. iTsing  the  word  beautiful  in  its  generic  sense,  as  including 
these  three  elements,  we  have  the  following  definition :  Taste  is 
that  power  of  the  mind  by  which  we  perceive  and  enjoy  whatever  is 
beautiful  in  nature  and  art. 

Taste  Not  a  Faculty. — It  is  thus  seen  that  taste  is  not  a 
faculty,  but  rather  a  combination  of  the  action  of  two  faculties,  or 
two  distinct  forms  of  mental  activity.  It  is  thus  properly  called 
a  power,  a  term  which  we  use  in  a  more  popular  sense  than  the 
term  faculty.  A  faculty  implies  a  distinct  form  of  mental 
activity,  and  is  thus  simple  in  its  operation.  A  power  may  be 
the  combination  of  distinct  operations  of  two  or  more  faculties. 

Element  of  Judgment. — It  will  be  noticed  that  we  have  not 
included  the  element  of  judgment  under  the  term  taste.  There 
seems  to  be  sufficient  reason  for  this.  A  person  manifests  his 
taste  by  the  judgments  he  expresses  on  the  works  of  art;  but  the 
judgment  is  not  his  taste.  Taste  lies  back  of  and  conditions  his 
judgment.  Correct  judgments  show  good  taste;  incorrect  judg- 
ments manifest  bad  taste.  The  taste  seems  to  be  the  subjective 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  369 

condition  of  mind  which  perceives  and  enjoys,  rather  than  the 
affirmation  or  expression  of  these  conditions.  Our  judgments  re- 
flect our  opinions,  but  are  not  a  part  of  that  condition  of  the 
mind  which  gives  rise  to  and  shapes  our  opinions.  Taste  is  the 
mental  condition  or  action  which  directs  and  moulds  our  judg- 
ments of  objects  of  beauty,  and  does  not  include  the  faculty  of 
judgment. 

Relation  of  the  Elements. — The  two  elements,  perception 
and  appreciation,  do  not  always  exist  in  equal  proportions. 
There  may  be  acute  sensibilities  without  a  very  clear  perception 
of  the  beautiful,  and  there  will  then  be  intense  delight  over  the 
beauties  that  are  perceived,  but  a  lack  of  delicate  perception  of 
beauty.  Without  this  perception,  many  of  the  objects  of  art  are 
not  regarded  as  beautiful.  The  soul  may  stand  in  the  presence 
of  a  statue  of  Canova  or  Thorwaldsen,  and  be  unable  to  see  the 
beauties  which  it  expresses.  The  cataract  of  Niagara,  which 
awakens  feelings  of  sublimity  in  most  minds,  may  seem  to  some 
dull  soul  merely  a  good  place  to  wash  sheep.  The  simple  melody 
may  awaken  feelings  of  beauty  in  the  heart  of  the  peasant  who 
can  see  no  beauty  in  the  sublime  choruses  of  Handel,  or  the 
heavenly  sonatas  of  Beethoven. 

Application  of  Taste. — The  power  of  taste,  it  is  evident,  ap- 
plies to  all  the  aesthetic  ideas.  The  principal  sesthetic  ideas  are 
the  Beautiful,  the  Sublime,  and  the  Ludicrous ;  and  all  of  these 
are  matters  of  taste.  It  has  been  customary  to  define  taste  as  ap- 
plied to  the  beautiful  and  sublime,  omitting  the  humorous  and 
the  witty.  This  is  evidently  an  error;  and  one  that  should  be 
corrected.  It  needs  as  much  taste  to  perceive  and  enjoy  the 
humorous  as  the  beautiful ;  and  a  little  better  taste  would  keep 
some  things  that  are  flat  and  vulgar  out  of  literature.  Taste  is 
the  sesthetic  power,  and  embraces  all  of  the  sesthetic  ideas  and 
emotions.  Special  attention  is  called  to  this  point  as  it  is  new, 
and  one  that  should  be  emphasized. 

Standard  of  Taste. — Man  is  gifted  with  a  native  taste  for 
the  beautiful ;  he  can  see  and  appreciate  the  divine  element  of 


370  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

beauty,  which  the  Creator  has  embodied  in  the  world  around 
him.  The  divine  element  in  man  meets  and  recognizes  a  divine 
element  in  nature,  and  comprehends  and  enjoys  it.  This  natural 
endowment  of  taste  is  cultivated  by  the  contemplation  of  the 
works  of  nature  and  art,  and  by  a  study  of  the  principles  or  laws 
of  beauty.  When  thus  cultivated,  each  man  becomes  a  critic  of 
art,  and  can  sit  in  criticism  on  the  works  of  the  artist.  Personal 
peculiarities  of  taste  allow  of  slight  differences  or  preferences  in 
art;  but  there  will  be  a  large  general  agreement  among  all 
persons  of  cultivated  minds.  If  at  any  time,  through  personal 
idiosyncrasies,  there  seems  to  be  opposition  of  taste,  we  appeal  to 
the  standard  of  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  cultivated  persons. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   INTUITIONS   OF    THE  GOOD,   OK  RIGHT. 

THE  GOOD,  or  the  Right,  is  the  crowning  idea  of  the  human 
soul.  The  three  great  rational  ideas  of  the  mind  are  the 
True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good.  These  three  ideas  rank  in 
an  ascending  series,  the  Good  or  the  Right  standing  at  the  sum- 
mit. We  shall  now  enter  upon  the  explanation  of  this  highest 
and  grandest  idea.  The  discussion  will  include  three  things; 
The  Nature  of  the  Idea,  the  Nature  of  the  Right,  and  the  Origin 
of  the  Idea. 

I.  NATURE  OF  THE  IDEA. — The  idea  of  the  Right  is  a  cog- 
nition in  relation  to  the  actions  of  rational  beings.  As  soon  as 
we  contemplate  certain  actions  of  a  person,  we  immediately  per- 
ceive that  they  contain  an  ethical  element ;  and  we  pronounce 
the  act  right  or  wrong  accordingly.  The  action  may  be  actual 
or  contemplated ;  it  may  pertain  to  the  present,  past,  or  future ; 
it  may  be  the  act  of  a  peasant,  a  warrior,  or  an  emperor.  In 
every  case  it  must  be  the  act  of  a  rational  being,  for  we  never 
apply  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong  to  the  action  of  a  brute  animal, 
or  an  inanimate  object  of  nature. 

The  Idea  Universal. — This  idea  of  the  Right  is  universal. 
That  it  is  so,  is  attested  by  the  experience  and  productions  of  the 
race.  All  men  make  moral  distinctions,  calling  one  thing  right 
and  another  wrong.  No  people  have  been  found,  however  sunk 
in  ignorance  and  moral  degradation,  that  do  not  make  moral  dis- 
tinctions. The  languages  of  all  civilized  and  even  of  uncivilized 
peoples,  abound  in  words  expressing  these  distinctions.  The  lit- 
erature of  the  world  is  filled  with  incidents  and  expressions  based 
on  this  conception ;  indeed,  the  idea  of  the  Right  is  the  inspiring 
principle  of  poetry,  fiction,  and  oratory. 

(871)   - 


372  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Importance  of  the  Idea. — The  idea  of  the  Right  is  the  most 
important  conception  of  the  human  mind.  By  means  of  it, 
society  is  organized  and  held  together.  It  is  the  basis  of  national 
life,  and  the  foundation  of  law  and  government.  Take  this  idea 
out  of  society,  and  man  would  sink  below  the  condition  of  bar- 
barism j  take  th,is  idea  out  of  national  life,  and  the  state  would 
become  but  a  herd  of  wild  animals.  It  builds  our  alms-houses, 
erects  our  public  schools,  rears  our  churches,  gives  inspiration 
and  beauty  to  our  literature,  and  in  fact  is  the  foundation  of 
everything  that  gives  excellence  and  dignity  to  the  human  race. 

The  Idea  of  Obligation. — There  are  two  ideas  that  accom- 
pany or  grow  out  of  the  idea  of  the  Right ;  these  are  the  ideas  of 
obligation  and  of  merit  and  demerit.  The  idea  of  obligation 
grows  immediately  out  of  the  idea  of  the  Right.  As  soon  as  we 
have  cognized  an  action  as  right,  we  immediately  have  the  cog- 
nition that  it  ought  to  be  done ;  as  soon  as  we  have  cognized  an 
action  as  wrong,  there  arises  the  idea  that  it  ought  not  to  be  done. 
These  two  ideas  are  what  we  call  the  ideas  of  obligation;  they 
are  the  ideas  of  the  ought  and  the  ought  not.  They  pertain  to  our 
own  actions  and  also  to  the  actions  of  others.  We  know  we 
ought  to  do  what  we  think  is  right,  and  ought  not  to  do  what  we 
think  is  wrong.  We  know  also  that  another  ought  to  do  what  he 
thinks  is  right,  and  ought  not  to  do  what  he  thinks  is  wrong. 

Merit  and  Demerit. — Following  the  doing  or  not  doing  of 
an  act,  comes  the  idea  of  merit  or  demerit.  When  we  do  what 
we  think  is  right  or  refrain  from  doing  what  we  think  is  wrong, 
there  arises  in  our  mind  the  idea  of  merit.  When  we  do  what 
we  know  to  be  wrong,  or  refrain  from  doing  what  we  think  to 
be  right,  there  arises  the  idea  of  demerit.  This  idea  also  pertains 
to  both  ourselves  and  others  in  relation  to  moral  actions.  We 
condemn  ourselves  for  the  neglect  or  violation  of  a  moral  duty ; 
we  censure  others  for  doing  wrong  or  for  failing  to  do  right. 
The  entire  code  of  social  order  and  government  is  based  upon 
this  idea. 

The  Ethical  Idea  Complex. — It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   GOOD.  373 

ethical  idea  is  a  complex  one.  It  embraces  three  conceptions ; 
the  right  and  wrong,  the  obligation  to  do  the  right  and  not  do  the 
wrong,  and  the  merit  or  demerit  of  the  doer  of  the  actions.  The 
ethical  idea  is  thus  a  triune  conception,  a  "  three  in  one."  In 
this  respect,  the  idea  of  the  Right  differs  from  that  of  Beauty, 
Space,  Time,  or  any  other  of  the  rational  ideas. 

The  Right  a  Reality. — The  Right  is  not  merely  an  idea ;  it 
is  also  a  reality.  There  is  a  real  right  in  actions,  corresponding 
to  our  idea  of  the  right.  An  action  is  not  right  or  wrong  merely 
because  we  think  it  to  be  so ;  we  think  it  to  be  right  or  wrong 
because  it  is  so.  The  right  and  wrong  are  realities ;  they  are 
essential  attributes  of  voluntary  actions.  They  are  verities  too 
that  are  eternal  and  fixed  in  their  nature;  they  cannot  be 
changed  or  annihilated.  No  one  can  make  the  right  wrong,  or 
the  wrong  right.  To  cheat  and  lie  are  ever  wrong,  have  always 
been  wrong,  and  will  always  be  wrong.  The  time  has  never 
been,  the  time  will  never  be,  when  it  will  be  noble  to  lie  and 
cheat ;  and  when  to  tell  the  truth  and  be  honest  will  be  wrong. 
Right  and  wrong  are  eternal  and  immutable  verities. 

Origin  of  the  Idea. — The  idea  of  the  right  is  the  product  of 
the  intuition.  It  is  not  a  conception  put  into  the  mind  from 
without ;  it  is  not  a  development  from  sensations  of  the  agreeable 
and  disagreeable,  nor  a  product  of  our  selfish  instincts.  It  comes 
welling  up  from  the  depths  of  the  soul  when  the  proper  occasion 
is  presented.  Given  an  example  of  the  action  of  one  rational 
being  towards  another,  and  there  arises  immediately  in  the  mind 
the  idea  of  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  this  action.  The 
physical  eye  sees  the  action ;  but  by  the  eye  of  intuition  we  per- 
ceive r.n  ethical  element  in  the  action  by  which  we  pronounce  it 
a  right  or  a  wrong  action. 

II.  NATURE  OF  THE  RIGHT. — The  question  in  what  the  right 
consists,  what  it  is  that  makes  a  thing  right,  has  often  been  dis- 
cussed. This  is  a  difficult  question,  and  one  upon  which  writers 
widely  differ.  The  principal  theories  in  respect  to  the  question 
are, — Highest  Happiness,  Utility,  Legal  Enactment,  Divine  Law, 
the  Divine  Nature,  and  the  Eternal  Nature  of  Things. 


374  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Highest  Happiness. — It  has  been  held  by  some  writers  that 
the  ground  of  the  right  is  in  its  securing  the  highest  happiness  of 
the  individual.  Any  action  which  contributes  to  the  highest 
happiness  of  a  person  is  right,  and  it  is  so  merely  because  it  does 
thus  contribute  to  his  happiness.  Anything  which  detracts  from 
man's  happiness  is  wrong,  and  it  is  so  merely  because  it  dimin- 
ishes his  enjoyment.  Happiness,  or  the  welfare  of  the  individual, 
is  the  test  of  moral  actions,  and  determines  all  the  moral  quality 
that  they  possess.  This  theory  in  different  forms  was  held  by 
Paley  and  others. 

Objection. — The  objection  to  this  view  is  that  it  makes  virtue 
and  happiness  identical,  and  thus  contradicts  the  consciousness 
of  mankind.  Every  one  distinguishes  between  that  which  gives 
pleasure,  and  that  which  is  right.  Men  often  do  the  right  be- 
cause it  is  right,  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  happiness.  Further,  the 
theory  takes  away  all  absolute  quality  of  the  right.  If  that 
which  gives  happiness  is  right,  the  right  becomes  as  variable  as 
our  tastes  for  enjoyment.  If  lying  and  cheating  would  contribute 
to  the  pleasure  or  welfare  of  a  person,  according  to  this  theory 
lying  and  cheating  would  be  right,  and  truth  and  honesty  would 
be  wrong. 

Theory  of  Utility. — Several  thinkers  incline  to  the  theory 
that  the  essence  of  the  right  is  found  in  the  principle  of  utility. 
That  which  is  best  adapted  to  the  welfare  of  man  is  right,  and  is 
so  because  it  is  best  adapted  to  his  welfare.  It  is  not  mere  hap- 
piness, for  that  which  leads  to  enjoyment  may  be  of  real  disad- 
vantage ;  but  that  which,  all  things  considered,  will  secure  the 
best  interests  of  the  individual  and  the  race.  Taking  a  broad 
view  of  the  world,  it  has  been  seen  that  some  things  will  aid  the 
progress  of  the  race,  and  lift  it  up  into  a  higher  civilization ; 
such  things  are  pronounced  to  be  right,  and  are  so  because  they 
accomplish  this  result.  The  opposite  things  are  wrong,  and  are 
so  because  they  retard  the  progress  of  the  race.  Thus  utility  or 
expediency  is  the  ground  and  essence  of  the  right.  This  seems 
to  be  the  view  of  Mill  and  some  other  writers. 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   GOOD.  375 

Objection. — It  is  admitted  that  the  right  secures  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  individual  and  the  race.  But  to  give  this  as  the 
source  of  the  right  is  to  invert  the  true  relation  of  cause  and 
effect,  calling  the  effect  the  cause.  The  true  relation  is  that  cer- 
tain actions  secure  the  best  interests  of  the  race  because  they  are 
right,  and  not  that  they  are  right  because  they  accomplish  this 
object.  Again,  as  applied  to  the  individual,  this  theory  makes 
duty  and  self-interest  identical,  and  this  contradicts  human  con- 
sciousness. It  would  also  make  the  right  variable,  for  the  best 
interests  of  two  individuals  under  different  circumstances  might 
seem  to  be  secured  by  different  or  even  opposite  actions.  So  in 
respect  to  the  community,  we  cannot  always  know  what  will  se- 
cure the  best  interests  of  society  and  the  state,  and  thus  we  could 
not  determine  what  is  right  or  wrong.  Besides,  it  contradicts 
consciousness,  for  we  do  not  thus  stop  to  reason  about  the  matter, 
but  decide  instantly  whether  a  thing  is  right  or  wrong. 

Legal  Enactment. — The  ground  of  right  has  also  been 
placed  in  legal  enactments.  The  law  requires  certain  actions; 
these  we  regard  as  right :  the  law  prohibits  certain  actions ;  these 
we  regard  as  wrong.  The  civil  authority  is  ultimate  ;  man  can- 
not go  back  of  the  law ;  his  only  duty  is  to  obey.  The  law 
makes  the  right  and  wrong  of  things,  and  is  the  ultimate  ethical 
principle.  This  view  was  held  by  Hobbes  and  by  some  of  the 
ancient  sophists. 

Objection. — This  theory  destroys  all  fixedness  in  the  standard 
of  right.  By  it  the  right  varies  as  the  law  varies.  The  law 
commands  one  thing  to-day,  and  another  thing  to-morrow ;  so  one 
thing  is  right  to-day,  and  another  thing  to-morrow.  Laws  have 
changed  from  age  to  age,  so  the  right  must  have  also  changed. 
By  this  theory,  also,  all  laws  are  right,  and  no  law  can  be  wrong, 
so  that  we  could  never  sit  in  judgment  upon  a  law.  While  a 
statute  is  before  a  legislature  for  its  action,  it  may  be  pronounced 
wrong ;  but  as  soon  as  it  is  voted  upon  and  becomes  a  law,  it 
immediately  becomes  right !  By  this  theory  it  also  follows  that 
all  laws  are  equally  right.  The  laws  of  Draco  are  as  good  as 


376  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

those  of  Solon  or  Lycurgus ;  the  edicts  of  Nero  are  as  excellent 
as  those  of  Constantine !  The  boundary  line  of  a  country  is  the 
boundary  of  right  and  wrong;  step  over  the  line  that  divides 
two  countries,  and  you  change  right  to  wrong  and  wrong  to 
right ! 

The  Will  of  God. — Some  excellent  thinkers  place  the  right 
in  the  revealed  will  of  God.  What  God  wills  is  the  ultimate 
right,  and  is  so  because  he  wills  it.  What  is  contrary  to  his  will 
is  wrong,  and  is  wrong  because  it  is  contrary  to  his  will.  This 
view  was  held  by  Descartes  and  others.  Paley  regarded  it  as 
the  rule  of  right,  though  not  the  ground  of  right. 

Objections. — There  are  apparent  objections  to  this  theory.  If 
the  right  originates  in  the  will  of  God,  and  was  not  right  before 
he  willed  it,  then  if  we  suppose  his  will  to  change,  we  must  sup- 
pose the  right  to  change.  Further,  had  there  been  no  revelation 
of  his  will,  then  there  would  have  been  no  right  and  wrong. 
And  if  there  was  any  mistake  or  misunderstanding  as  to  the  rev- 
elation of  his  will,  right  and  wrong  would  not  be  the  same. 
Again,  we  could  not  say  of  the  law  of  God  that  it  is  good,  for  to 
say  that  his  statutes  are  just  and  true,  would  be  merely  to  say 
that  his  statutes  are  his  statutes.  Again,  it  would  prevent  us 
from  attributing  to  Deity  any  moral  character.  "  Holy,  holy, 
holy,  Lord  God,"  "just  and  true  are  thy  ways,"  would  have  no 
meaning  to  us  except  that  his  actions  are  true  to  his  will. 

The  Nature  of  God. — It  is  held  by  some  writers  that  the 
right  lies  in  the  nature  and  character  of  God.  God  is,  and  the 
right  is  because  God  is  as  he  is.  The  wrong  is  that  which  is  con- 
trary to  the  nature  of  God.  This  view  was  held  by  Dr.  Chal- 
mers and  by  some  other  writers. 

Objections. — To  this  view  several  objections  have  been  pre- 
sented. First,  it  is  said,  if  God  had  been  other  than  he  is,  the 
right  would  be  other  than  it  is.  Second,  if  right  and  wrong  de- 
pend on  the  nature  of  God,  then  if  we  could  suppose  God  to 
change,  the  right  and  wrong  would  also  change ;  and  thus  virtue 
would  become  vice  and  vice  would  become  virtue.  Third,  by 


THE   INTUITIONS  OF   THE   GOOD.  377 

this  theory  it  is  a  mere  meaningless  tautology  to  apply  the  terms 
holy,  righteous,  etc.,  to  God,  as  they  are  a  part  of  his  nature,  and 
have  their  existence  only  in  his  nature.  Of  course,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  it  is  as  easy  to  conceive  of  right  and  wrong  chang- 
ing, as  to  conceive  of  God  changing,  or  being  other  than  he  is. 

Nature  of  Things. — This  theory  holds  that  right  and  wrong 
exist  in  the  very  nature  of  things.  They  are  self-existent,  inde- 
pendent, and  immutable.  They  have  no  origin ;  they  are  as 
eternal  as  God  himself.  Were  it  possible  for  God  to  cease  to 
exist,  right  and  wrong  would  still  exist;  were  it  possible  for  God 
to  change,  right  and  wrong  would  still  be  unchanged.  Deity  does 
not  make  them,  and  he  has  no  power  to  change  them.  Law  does 
not  produce  the  right,  but  all  good  laws  are  in  accordance  with 
the  right.  The  act  is  not  right  because  it  secures  happiness,  but 
it  secures  happiness  because  it  is  right.  The  right  is  right  be- 
cause it  is  right ;  we  cannot  get  back  of  the  right  and  find  any- 
thing that  makes  it  right. 

Objections. — To  this  theory  objections  have  also  been  made. 
Dr.  Gregory  says  that  "  This  view  is  at  once  contrary  to  the  true 
conception  of  God  and  the  constitution  of  things.  It  originates 
in  the  attempt  to  understand  the  '  Almighty  unto  perfection,'  and 
to  measure  completely  this  universal  system  with  the  yardstick 
of  man's  reason.  According  to  this  hypothesis,  there  is  some- 
thing back  of  God  which  shapes  all  his .  course  in  spite  of  him- 
self— a  modern  fate.  The  Deity  becomes  a  mere  figure-head  in 
the  universe.  .  .  .  God  is  at  least  as  eternal  and  immutable  as 
morality.  There  is  no  notion  of  things  except  that  which  God  has 
constituted." 

Tlie  Correct  Theory. — It  is  probably  correct  to  say  that 
right  and  wrong  are  ultimate  principles.  It  is  impossible  to 
separate  them  from  the  nature  of  God,  since  he  is  also  eternal 
and  immutable.  They  have  their  source  in  the  nature  of  God 
and  the  nature  of  things;  or  they  are  co-existent  with  God  and 
the  universe.  We  cannot  conceive  either  God  or  the  right  to 
change ;  they  are  both  eternal  and  immutable ;  neither  was  be- 


378  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

fore  the  other ;  neither  was  created,  and  neither  can  be  destroyed. 
The  right  is  thus  wrapped  up,  as  it  were,  in  the  nature  of  God 
and  the  universe.  Logically  it  is  distinct  from  the  character  and 
actions  of  God,  so  that  we  may  sit  in  judgment  upon  his  laws 
and  predicate  holiness  of  his  nature  and  actions.  We  can  thus 
see  a  meaning  in  the  expressions  "  Shall  not  the  Judge  of  all  the 
earth  do  right?"  and  "The  law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect." 

III.  ORIGIN  or  THE  IDEA. — Another  question  extensively  dis- 
cussed by  philosophers  is  that  of  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  the 
right.  Whence  comes  this  idea?  how  does  it  originate  in  the 
mind?  To  this  question  many  different  answers  have  been  given. 
The  question  is  closely  related  to  that  of  the  nature  of  the  right, 
and  by  some  writers  has  been  confounded  with  it,  though  there  is 
an  essential  difference  between  them.  The  one  is  what  makes  a 
thing  right;  the  other  is  how  do  we  come  by  the  idea  of  the  right. 
Some  of  the  principal  theories  of  the  origin  of  the  idea  will  be 
stated. 

Education. — It  is  held  by  some  writers  that  the  idea  of  the 
right  is  the  product  of  education.  The  theory  holds  that  origi- 
nally man  had  no  idea  of  the  right,  that  he  is  not  competent  to 
develop  such  an  idea,  but  that  it  is  put  into  his  mind  by  the  pro- 
cess of  education.  He  is  taught  to  call .  some  things  right  and 
other  things  wrong,  and  thus  learns  to  make  moral  distinctions. 
This  view  seems  to  be.  held  by  Paley,  Locke,  and  some  other 
thinkers. 

Objections. — To  this  view  it  may  be  objected,  first,  that  educa- 
tion will  not  account  for  the  origin  of  the  idea.  Education 
merely  gives  shape  and  development  to  the  idea  already  in  the 
mind.  Secondly,  education  in  respect  to  the  right  presupposes 
the  idea  already  existing,  for  where  did  the  educators  receive  the 
idea  which  they  impart  ?  Besides,  if  these  ideas  are  the  result 
of  education,  it  follows  that  our  moral  distinctions  have  no  fixed 
character,  but  vary  with  our  education,  and  that  we  could  be 
educated  to  believe  the  right  to  be  wrong  and  the  wrong  to  be 
right,  which  we  maintain  is  not  possible. 


THE   INTUITIONS  OF   THE   GOOD.  379 

Legal  Enactment. — It  is  held  by  some  thinkers  that  the 
ideas  of  the  right  are  the  result  of  legal  enactment.  This  theory 
assumes  that  man  naturally  has  no  ideas  of  right  or  wrong,  and 
that  he  is  incapable  of  making  these  moral  distinctions.  He 
comes  in  contact  with  law,  either  human  or  divine,  becomes 
familiar  with  its  commands  and  restrictions,  and  learns  to  think 
some  things  right  and  other  things  wrong.  In  this  way  the  idea 
of  the  right  is  developed  in  his  mind,  and  he  learns  to  make 
moral  distinctions.  This  is  the  theory  of  Hobbes. 

Objections. — The  objections  to  this  theory  are  about  the  same 
as  those  which  apply  to  the  theory  of  education.  First,  law  pre- 
supposes the  idea  of  the  right  in  the  lawgiver,  and  hence  does  not 
account  for  its  origin.  Besides,  this  theory  would  make  our  ideas 
of  the  right  vary  as  the  laws  of  a  country  vary.  If  the  law  re- 
quired the  opposite  of  what  it  now  requires,  that  opposite  we 
wouM  regard  as  right  and  the  present  right  as  wrong !  We  have 
only  to  step  across  the  boundaries  of  a  country  to  change  our 
ideas  of  right  and  wrong !  The  absurdity  of  the  conclusion 
seems  to  be  a  sufficient  refutation  of  the  doctrine.  If  we  refer 
the  idea  to  divine  law,  we  remove  the  question  from  philosophy 
and  hand  it  over  to  theology,  which  is  not  in  the  correct  spirit  of 
philosophy.  Still,  we  believe  that  man  can  judge  of  the  right- 
ness  of  divine  law ;  and  the  Bible  represents  God  as  treating 
man  as  if  he  had  this  power. 

Theory  of  Association. — The  theory  of  association  assumes 
also  that  man's  mind  is  morally  a  blank,  and  that  the  moral 
nature  is  developed  from  sensations  or  feelings.  Some  of  our 
feelings  are  pleasant  and  become  associated  with  the  acts  which 
produced  them ;  and  such  acts  we  call  good.  Some  of  our  feel- 
ings are  unpleasant,  and  these  become  associated  with  actions 
that  produce  them;  and  we  learn  to  call  such  actions  bad  or 
wrong.  Thus,  suppose  a  man  does  something  to  me  to  make  me 
feel  happy,  and  I  say  "  good  feeling."  Associating  this  with  the 
person,  I  say  "  good  person  that  caused  good  feeling ; "  and  pass- 
ing from  the  person  to  the  action,  I  say  "good  action  of  good 


380  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

person  that  caused  good  feeling."  In  the  same  way  we  may  ac- 
count for  the  idea  of  the  bad  or  wrong,  associating  the  bad  feel- 
ing first  with  the  actor  and  then  with  his  act.  In  both  cases,  the 
feeling  is  transferred  to  and  associated  with  the  actor  and  his 
action ;  and  we  thus  learn  to  make  moral  distinctions  independ- 
ently of  our  feelings.  This  is  in  principle  the  view  of  Hume, 
Mill,  and  others  of  the  sensational  school. 

Objections. — There  are  several  objections  to  this  ingenious 
theory.  First,  the  theory  of  association  overthrows  the  inherent 
distinctions  of  right  and  wrong,  and  makes  virtue  and  vice  the 
creations  of  the  sensibilities,  the  products  of  the  feelings.  Second, 
it  contradicts  the  order  of  psychological  operations,  in  which  we 
have  first  the  cognition  and  then  the  feeling.  Third,  it  makes 
morality  merely  relative,  having  no  absolute  existence,  but  a 
variable  affair  as  our  feelings  may  vary.  Fourth,  it  also  contra- 
dicts the  facts  of  consciousness  and  experience,  as  we  often  find 
ourselves  and  others  making  moral  distinctions  before  there  is 
time  for  the  complicated  process  of  transferring  our  feelings. 
Besides,  our  ideas  of  the  right  and  our  feelings  of  pleasure  are 
often  the  reverse  of  one  another ;  and  this  could  not  be  if  the  idea 
of  the  right  were  a  transfer  of  feeling. 

Theory  of  Sympathy. — Another  theory  is  that  the.  idea  of 
right  and  wrong  originates  from  the  principle  of  sympathy. 
Sympathy  is  a  spontaneous  activity  of  the  sensibilities.  Sym- 
pathy with  the  feelings  of  an  actor,  and  also  with  the  feelings  of 
one  towards  whom  the  act  is  performed,  leads  us  to  approve  or 
disapprove  the  act.  Sympathy  with  the  gratitude  of  one  who  has 
received  a  favor  leads  us  to  regard  the  benefaction  as  right; 
sympathy  with  the  resentment  of  one  who  has  been  wronged 
leads  us  to  regard  the  act  as  wrong  and  the  actor  as  worthy  of 
punishment.  Sympathy  with  the  feelings  of  others  in  respect  to 
our  own  actions,  or  of  an  imagined  spectator  of  them,  gives  rise 
to  self-approval  or  condemnation,*and  the  sense  of  duty.  The 
summary  of  these  sentiments  and  the  judgments  derived  from 
them  gives  the  rules  of  morality.  This  is  the  celebrated  theory 
of  Adam  Smith. 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE    GOOD.  381 

Objections. — The  objections  to  this  theory  are  the  same  as  to 
that  of  association.  First,  it  makes  right  and  wrong  merely 
relative,  depending  on  the  feelings  of  others  and  on  our  feelings 
of  sympathy,  both  of  which  are  changeable,  and  thus  may  change 
our  ideas  of  right  and  wrong.  Second,  it  gives  no  imperative 
character  to  the  moral  cognition ;  it  carries  with  it  no  idea  of 
moral  obligation.  Third,  the  view  is  not  sustained  by  conscious- 
ness; we  are  not  conscious  of  deriving  our  moral  ideas  in  this 
manner;  we  are  conscious  of  making  moral  distinctions  inde- 
pendent of  and  even  contrary  to  our  sympathies.  We  sympathize 
with  a  criminal,  but  know  that  it  is  right  to  punish  him. 

Theory  of  Bain. — Alexander  Bain,  one  of  the  most  distin- 
guished philosophers  of  the  sensational  school,  derives  the  idea  of 
the  Right  from  the  two  principles, — Sympathy  and  Prudence,  or 
Self-love.  The  objection  to  the  element  of  sympathy  has  already 
been  stated  in  the  reply  to  the  views  of  Adam  Smith.  To  the 
element  of  self-love,  or  highest  happiness,  it  may  be  objected  that 
it  would  make  the  right  and  wrong  variable, — as  what  affords 
happiness  to  one  person  does  not  always  give  happiness  to 
another.  Besides,  we  are  conscious  that  what  brings  most  happi- 
ness is  not  always  right.  A  thief  knows  that  it  is  wrong  to  steal, 
and  yet  his  booty  gives  him  pleasure  so  long  as  the  law  does  not 
arrest  and  punish  him.  Again,  a  good  man  frequently  sacrifices 
his  desire  of  happiness  to  his  sense  of  duty.  Men  suffer  and  die 
for  the  right ;  not  because  suffering  and  death  give  them  pleasure, 
but  because  they  are  true  to  their  principles  or  their  faith.  If  it 
be  said  that  a  Christian  is  willing  to  suffer  here  in  order  to  secure 
future  happiness,  we  reply  that  an  infidel,  who  has  no  belief  in 
the  future,  may  stand  true  to  his  sense  of  duty  against  all  the 
promptings  of  self-interest.  It  seems  a  shallow  philosophy  to  re- 
solve our  convictions  of  duty  into  our  desires  for  happiness. 

A  Moral  Sense. — Some  writers  hold  that  man  has  a  moral 
sense  by  which  he  perceives  the  right  and  wrong.  As  we  have 
the  sense  of  sight  by  which  we  perceive  color,  and  the  sense  of 
hearing  by  which  we  perceive  sound,  so  we  have  a  sense  whose 


382  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

office  it  is  to  perceive  moral  distinctions  or  ethical  qualities  in 
actions.  This  theory  was  suggested  by  Shaftesbury,  and  de- 
veloped by  Hutcheson. 

Objections. — There  are  serious  objections  to  this  theory.  First, 
the  term  "  moral  sense "  is  ambiguous.  If  it  means  a  sense  like 
sight  and  hearing,  then  it  is  positively  absurd,  for  there  is  no 
such  organ  of  sense  in  the  body,  like  the  eye  or  ear,  for  moral 
perceptions.  Second,  if  it  means  some  function  of  the  sensibilities, 
a  susceptibility  of  the  emotional  nature  by  which  we  feel  the  right 
and  wrong,  it  is  also  incorrect;  for  this  would  make  morality  a 
mere  sentiment,  a  mere  subjective  affection,  similar  to  sound  and 
color,  which  are  mere  sensations.  Third,  it  would  make  morality 
merely  relative,  and  not  a  real  quality  of  actions.  Right  and 
wrong,  virtue  and  vice,  justice  and  injustice,  would  lie  merely  in 
our  feelings,  and  have  no  objective  and  independent  existence. 
If  by  moral  sense,  we  mean  a  power  by  which  the  mind  cognizes 
right  and  wrong,  then  the  view  is  not  incorrect,  though  the  term 
"  moral  sense  "  is  inappropriate. 

TJie  Correct  View. — The  correct  view  of  the  origin  of  the 
idea  is  that  which  we  have  already  presented.  The  idea  of  the 
right  is  an  intuition ;  it  is  the  product  of  the  reason.  It  springs 
up  spontaneously  in  the  mind  on  the  contemplation  of  moral 
actions.  We  find  ourselves,  from  earliest  childhood,  making 
moral  judgments;  and  a  moral  judgment  involves  an  ethical 
idea.  This  idea  must  precede  and  be  the  basis  of  a  moral  judg- 
ment. This  is  the  opinion  of  Kant,  Coleridge,  and  the  most  of 
our  modern  thinkers,  except  those  of  materialistic  views. 

Idea  Modified. — The  idea  of  the  right  is  modified  by  all  the 
influences  which  are  referred  to  in  the  other  theories.  Thus 
education,  law,  association,  sympathy,  etc.,  all  modify  these  ideas 
and  the  application  of  them.  Perhaps,  too,  the  principle  of 
heredity,  recently  introduced  into  the  question  by  the  theory  of 
evolution,  should  also  be  taken  into  account  as  a  modifying 
influence.  But  this  modification  is  quite  a  different  matter  from 
the  origination  of  the  idea,  and  cannot  account  for  the  existence 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE    GOOD.  383 

of  the  original  cognition  of  the  right.  To  modify  and  shape  an 
idea  already  existing  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  the  origina- 
tion of  this  idea. 


The 


THE  NATURE  OF  CONSCIENCE. 


ie  moral  nature  of  man  is  usually  treated  under  the  term 
Conscience,  and  we  now  proceed  to  inquire  what  is  meant  by 
Conscience.  The  term  conscience  has  been  used  in  various 
senses  by  different  writers.  Some  make  conscience  entirely  intel- 
lectual, others  purely  emotional,  and  others  again  partly  intel- 
lectual and  partly  emotional.  In  order  to  determine  precisely 
what  is  meant  by  conscience,  we  shall  call  attention  to  the  ele- 
ments involved  in  the  moral  sense.  A  careful  analysis  will  show 
that  there  are  two  elements,  an  intellectual  and  an  emotional 
element. 

Intellectual  Element. — In  contemplating  the  actions  of 
rational  beings,  several  cognitions  arise  in  the  mind.  First,  there 
is  the  cognition  of  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  the  act.  This 
cognition  of  the  right  is  immediately  followed  by  another  cog- 
nition, that  of  obligation ;  we  realize  that  we  ought  to  do  the  act 
which  we  cognize  as  right,  and  ought  not  to  do  the  act  which  we 
cognize  as  wrong.  This  is  the  idea  of  obligation,  the  idea  of  the 
ought  and  the  ought  not.  This  idea  of  obligation  is  immediately 
followed  by  a  third  cognition,  that  of  merit  or  demerit,  merit  in 
doing  the  right  and  demerit  in  doing  the  wrong.  The  doer  of 
the  right  is  regarded  as  virtuous,  and  is  approved ;  the  doer  of 
the  wrong  is  regarded  as  sinful,  and  is  condemned.  Here  are 
three  distinct  and  allied  cognitions  with  respect  to  a  moral  action, 
each  attended  by  a  corresponding  judgment. 

Emotional  Element. — Each  one  of  these  three  cognitions  is 
attended  with  an  act  of  the  sensibilities.  The  pure  cognitions 
of  the  right  and  wrong  are  accompanied  by  a  slight  feeling  of 
pleasure  or  its  opposite.  The  cognition  of  obligation  to  do  or 
not  to  do  is  immediately  followed  by  a  strong  feeling  of  obligation 
to  do  or  not  tx,  do.  The  idea  of  merit  or  demerit  attaching  to 


384  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  actor  awakens  two  deep  and  kindred  feelings.  First,  we  have 
a  feeling  of  complacency  when  we  have  done  right,  and  a  feeling 
of  remorse  when  we  have  done  wrong.  Second,  we  have  a  feeling 
of  approval  of  the  right  actions  of  another,  and  a  feeling  of  dis- 
approval of  his  wrong  actions. 

Relation  of  these  Elements. — Both  of  these  elements,  the 
intellectual  and  emotional,  are  involved  in  what  we  call  our 
moral  sense.  There  are  three  distinct  cognitions;  and  each  of 
these  is  attended  with  the  corresponding  emotion.  The  feeling 
growing  out  of  the  cognition  of  right  and  wrong  is  not  very 
prominent  as  compared  with  the  other  feelings,  and  need  not  be 
particularly  noticed.  The  feelings  growing  out  of  the  second 
and  third  cognitions  are  deep  and  moving,  and  so  strong  some- 
times as  to  conceal  or  eclipse  the  cognitions,  so  that  these  elements 
are  often  spoken  of  as  mere  feelings.  The  second  and  third  cog- 
nitions apply  both  to  ourselves  and  to  others,  are  both  subjective 
and  objective,  and  the  corresponding  emotions  refer  also  to  our- 
selves and  to  others. 

IVliat  is  Conscience? — Now,  what  is  Conscience?  Having 
seen  the  elements  embraced  in  the  moral  sense,  we  inquire  how 
many  of  these  are  included  in  what  we  call  conscience.  Is  con- 
science purely  intellectual,  is  it  purely  emotional,  or  is  it  partly 
intellectual  and  partly  emotional  ?  If  intellectual  and  emotional, 
does  conscience  perceive  the  right  ?  or  does  it  begin  its  operations 
after  the  cognition  of  the  right  and  wrong,  and  include  only  the 
two  cognitions  of  obligation  and  merit  or  demerit,  with  the  cor- 
responding emotions  ?  In  other  words,  is  the  office  of  cognizing 
the  right  included  in  conscience,  or  does  its  office  begin  after  this 
cognition? 

Answer  of  the  Question. — Upon  these  questions  philosophy 
seems  not  to  be  quite  settled.  Locke  says,  "  Conscience  is  merely 
our  judgment  of  the  moral  rectitude  or  turpitude  of  our  actions." 
St.  Augustine  says,  "  It  is  a  particular  manner  of  feeling  which 
corresponds  to  the  goodness  of  moral  actions."  Dr.  Crombie  saya 
that  the  office  of  conscience  is  "  to  approve  of  our  own  conduct 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE   GOOD.  385, 

.when  we  do  what  we  believe  to  be  right,  and  to  censure  us  when 
we  commit  whatever  we  judge  to  be  wrong."  Rev.  Joseph  Cook 
seems  to  restrict  the  action  of  conscience  to  the  motive,  defining 
it  as  "the  power  which  determines  the  moral  qualities  of  a 
motive."  He  says,  "Conscience  is  the  perception  of  right  or 
wrong  in  motives,  and  a  feeling  that  the  right  ought  and  the 
wrong  ought  not  to  be  chosen  by  the  will." 

The  Correct  View. — Among  so  many  different  and  conflict- 
ing views,  it  is  a  difficult  and  delicate  matter  to  decide.  One 
thing,  I  think,  is  clear ;  the  power  of  conscience  is  partly  intel- 
lectual and  partly  emotional.  Another  point  seems  evident,  that 
one  of  the  most  prominent  elements  is  that  of  the  ought  and  the 
ought  not,  and  the  corresponding  ideas  of  merit  and  demerit. 
These  ideas  are  accompanied  by  their  corresponding  feelings, 
which  seem  also  to  be  elements  of  conscience.  If  this  is  so,  would 
it  not  be  best  to  leave  the  cognition  of  the  right  by  the  reason 
outside  of  the  sphere  embraced  by  the  term  conscience  ?  Espe- 
cially so,  also,  since  we  so  often  see  men  equally  conscientious  in 
the  discharge  of  their  duty,  who  take  such  different  vie^YS  of  what 
is  right.  This  is  the  decision  to  which  a  very  careful  considera- 
tion of  the  subject  has  led  me. 

Definition  of  Conscience. — Conscience  is  the  power  by  which 
we  know  and  feel  that  we  ought  to  do  what  we  think  to  be  right, 
and  ought  not  to  do  what  we  think  to  be  wrong.  It  also  cognizes 
merit  and  demerit,  feels  satisfaction  for  virtuous  conduct  and  re- 
morse for  guilt  in  respect  to  our  own  actions,  and  approves  or 
disapproves  the  actions  of  others.  By  this  view  conscience  cog- 
nizes the  ought  and  the  ought  not  and  the  merit  and  demerit  of 
actions.  It  also  feels  the  ought  and  ought  not,  and  experiences  the 
emotions  corresponding  with  the  ideas  of  merit  and  demerit,  with 
respect  both  to  ourselves  and  to  others. 

Nature  of  this  View. — In  this  view  of  conscience  the  element 

omitted  is  that  of  the  cognition  or  apprehension  of  the  rightnesa 

of  any  given  action.     This  cognition  is  left  to  the  reason,  where 

it  actually  belongs ;    as  it  is  a  rational  cognition,  whether  we 

17 


386  MENTAL   SCIE]STCE. 

bring  it  under  the  conscience  or  not.  This  view  of  conscience 
removes  several  difficulties  that  have  been  inseparably  connected 
with  its  use  and  philosophical  discussion.  If  any  one  teaching  or 
studying  this  work,  thinks  it  would  be  better  to  include  the  ele- 
ment of  the  cognition  of  the  right  in  the  conscience,  the  definition 
can  easily  be  modified  so  as  to  embrace  it. 

Nature  of  Ethics. — This  view  of  conscience  gives  it  a  distinct 
and  definite  place  in  the  science  of  Ethics.  The  science  of  ethics 
is  in  some  respects  similar  to  that  of  geometry.  In  geometry  we 
have  first  an  intuitive  idea  of  extension ;  then  the  intuitions  of 
special  forms  of  extention,  as  a  line,  a  circle,  etc. ;  then  we  have 
intuitive  truths  called  axioms;  and  then,  by  reasoning  from  these 
intuitive  truths,  we  reach  the  conclusions  or  theorems  of  the  sci- 
ence. So  in  ethics  we  have  a  similar  combination  of  ideas  and 
truths.  First,  we  have  the  general  idea  of  the  right.  Second, 
we  have  an  idea  of  particular  forms  of  the  right;  as,  veracity, 
honesty,  etc.  Third,  we  have  certain  axiomatic  principles, 
as  "  to  tell  the  truth  is  right,"  "  to  cheat  is  wrong,"  etc.,  which 
may  be  called  moral  axioms.  From  these  as  a  basis  we  can  derive 
other  truths,  and  thus  build  up  the  science  of  ethics.  Of  course 
the  demonstrations  and  applications  of  the  principles  of  right  are 
much  more  difficult  than  the  reasoning  of  geometry,  because  the 
right  is  often  so  complex  as  involved  in  the  circumstances. 

Relation  of  Conscience. — This  perception  of  the  right  and 
the  unfolding  of  the  science  by  judgment  and  reasoning  do  not 
belong  to  conscience;  they  are  acts  of  the  reason  and  understand- 
ing. Following  these  conceptions  and  axioms  and  demonstra- 
tions comes  the  action  of  conscience.  Knowing  what  is  right, 
conscience  urges  us  to  do  the  right  and  to  avoid  the  wrong.  The 
conscientious  man  is  not  one  who  has  the  clearest  apprehension 
of  the  right  or  who  can  reason  best  in  respect  to  it ;  but  one  who 
is  most  anxious  to  follow  the  dictates  of  his  judgment  and  to  do 
what  he  believes  to  be  right.  The  ignorant  man  who  has  very 
narrow  ideas  of  duty,  the  bigot  who  can  see  only  one  path  of  rec- 
titude— these  may  be  as  truly  conscientious  as  the  most  enlight- 
ened and  broadest-minded  Christian. 


THE   INTUITIONS  OF   THE   GOOD.  387 

diversity  of  Moral  Judgments. — This  view  of  conscience 
accounts  satisfactorily  for  the  diversity  of  moral  judgments. 
This  diversity  may  result  from  any  one  of  several  causes.  Men 
may  not  see  the  action  under  the  same  circumstances  or  relations, 
and  thus  not  be  in  the  condition  to  make  the  same  cognition  in 
respect  to  its  ethical  quality.  Or,  they  may  not  reason  in  the 
same  way,  and  thus  make  a  different  application  of  the  funda 
mental  principles  of  right  and  wrong,  and  hence  reach  different 
conclusions.  In  both  cases  they  may  be  equally  conscientious  in 
respect  to  doing  what  they  think  to  be  right,  or  in  avoiding  what 
they  think  to  be  wrong.  The  difference  is  not  in  their  consciences, 
but  in  their  perception  of  the  right. 

Extent  of  this  Difference. — These  differences  in  the  percep- 
tion or  cognition  of  what  is  right  are  often  very  marked.  Thus 
what  one  approves  another  often  condemns.  The  Spartans  taught 
their  boys  that  it  was  right  to  steal,  provided  they  were  not  de- 
tected in  it.  The  savage  seems  to  think  it  is  right  to  scalp  his 
enemy,  and  even  roast  and  eat  him.  The  very  crimes  of  one 
people  may  be  the  religious  rites  of  another  people.  These  dif- 
ferences, however,  are  easily  accounted  for.  In  many  cases,  cer- 
tain acts  are  mere  habits,  done  without  any  thought  of  right  or 
wrong.  In  other  cases,  a  misconception  of  one  duty  overshadows 
another  duty,  as  in  the  case  of  sacrificing  human  lives  to  the 
gods.  Believing  such  sacrifices  commanded,  the  heathen  surren- 
der a  lower  duty  to  a  higher  one.  The  idea  of  the  right  is  often 
so  involved  in  circumstances  that  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  clear 
notion  of  it,  and  to  see  the  act  in  its  own  light  and  judge  it  ac- 
cordingly. 

A.  General  Uniformity. — The  difference  in  the  perception 
of  the  right,  however,  is  not  so  great  as  may  appear  at  first 
thought.  There  is  really  a  general  uniformity  in  the  moral  per- 
ceptions of  mankind.  In  the  cognition  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  right  and  wrong,  and  the  application  of  those  principles 
to  the  ordinary  actions  of  mankind,  there  is  very  little  disagree- 
ment. All  people  agree  that  to  tell  the  truth  is  right,  and  to  lie 


388  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

is  wrong ;  that  honesty  is  right,  and  fraud  is  wrong ;  that  d^eds 
of  kindness  are  right,  and  murder  is  wrong.  They  may  differ  in 
the  application  of  these  principles,  as  they  do  in  the  application 
of  other  principles ;  and  the  occasion  for  difference  is  greater  here 
than  in  most  other  subjects,  as  the  right  is  involved  in  more 
complicated  circumstances  than  any  other  idea  or  attribute. 

The  Relation  of  Motive. — For  the  actions  of  each  individual, 
the  motive  determines  the  right.  If  we  do  what  we  conscien- 
tiously think  to  be  right,  that  to  us  is  right — or,  at  least,  we  are 
innocent  of  doing  wrong.  This  makes  a  distinction  known  as 
the  absolute  and  the  relative  right.  According  to  this  distinction, 
a  person  may  do  an  act  which  is  contrary  to  the  absolute  prin- 
ciples of  right,  and  yet  not  be  guilty  of  doing  wrong.  The  act 
may  be  relatively  right  to  him,  though  absolutely  wrong.  Thus 
a  man  may  tell  that  which  is  absolutely  false,  and  yet,  supposing 
it  to  be  true  and  designing  to  tell  the  truth,  it  is  not  a  falsehood 
to  him.  He  is  not  guilty  of  deception,  but  is  only  mistaken.  So 
a  man  may  take  the  life  of  another  by  accident,  and  though  he 
has  actually  broken  the  law  which  says  "  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  he 
is  not  guilty  of  murder.  This  distinction,  that  the  motive  decides 
the  moral  quality  of  an  action,  is  acknowledged  by  nearly  every 
class  of  thinkers ;  though  it  is  a  principle  that  must  be  applied 
with  caution,  as  it  may  lead  to  dangerous  conclusions  in  ethics. 

Is  Conscience  a  Safe  Guide  ? — The  question,  Is  conscience 
a  safe  guide?  should  be  answered  according  to  our  conception  of 
conscience,  and  our  idea  of  a  safe  guide.  If  we  take  the  view  of 
conscience,  that  it  begins  with  the  cognition  of  obligation,  and 
does  not  include  the  cognition  of  the  right  itself,  then  it  is  always 
a  safe  and  a  correct  guide.  If  conscience  is  regarded  as  a  power 
that  perceives  the  right,  then  it  is  not  always  a  correct  guide,  for 
men  often  err  in  their  moral  perceptions  and  judgments.  If  in 
the  expression  a  "safe  guide"  we  do  not  mean  a  correct  guide, 
then  we  may  say  that  even  according  to  this  latter  view  of  con- 
science, it  is  a  safe  guides.  The  man  who  follows  his  conscience 
is  usually  in  the  path  of  duty.  Indeed,  it  would  be  a  strange 


THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE    GOOD.  389 

rule  of  morals  to  advise  that  a  man  should  not  follow  his  con- 
science. 

A  Correct  Conscience. — The  conscientious  man  should  be 
careful  to  see  that  his  idea  of  right  is  correct.  A  man  is  often 
responsible  for  his  mistakes  in  moral  judgment.  Paul,  who 
thought  he  ought  to  do  many  things  contrary  to  Jesus  of  Naz- 
areth, is  a  notable  example  of  a  conscientious  man  who  did  what 
he  afterward  believed  to  be  wrong.  His  error  lay,  not  in  follow- 
ing his  conscience,  but  in  not  examining  the  teachings  of  Christ 
more  carefully,  and  forming  a  correct  judgment  in  respect  to 
His  doctrine.  A  conscientious  man  is  thus  often  responsible  for 
his  erroneous  opinions  of  duty.  He  has  neglected  to  investigate 
the  matter  as  he  should  have  done ;  and  should  be  held  respon- 
sible for  this  neglect,  and  for  the  error  in  his  moral  perceptions 
flowing  from  it.  So  also  is  the  man  responsible  who  confounds 
his  conscience  with  his  feelings,  and  does  what  he  thinks  is  right, 
which  is  really  what  he  feels  is  agreeable.  The  conscientious 
man  should  be  as  careful  in  determining  what  is  right  as  he  is  in 
following  the  right  after  he  decides  what  it  is.  Conscience  thus 
applies  to  the  forming  of  moral  judgments,  as  well  as  to  doing 
moral  actions. 


CHAPTER  V. 

CULTURE  OF  THE  INTUITIONS  OF  THE  TRUE. 

REASON,  or  Intuitive  Power,  is  the  crowning  element  of 
J-  the  human  mind.  ^Here  we  rise  into  the  sphere  of  ration- 
ality, and  conceive  of  man  as  a  centre  and  source  of  eternal  and 
necessary  truth.^  From  the  depths  of  the  spiritual  nature  come 
welling  up  ideas  and  thoughts  which  glow,  like  the  pearls  of  the 
ocean,  with  an  immortal  radiance.  The  reason  arches  over  the 
other  faculties  of  the  mind,  as  the  blue  sky  arches  over  the  earth; 
and  in  it  shine  the  golden  stars  of  eternal  and  heaven-born 
truth,) 

Difficult  of  Culture. — This  faculty  is  not  only  higher  than  all 
the  other  faculties  of  the  mind,  but  its  training  and  culture  are 
more  difficult.  The  other  faculties  are  developed  by  exercise ;  this 
faculty  is  not  under  the  control  of  the  will,  like  judgment  or 
memory,  and  is  therefore  not  so  readily  brought  into  exercise. 
The  intuitive  faculty  is  not  so  much  an  activity  as  a  spontaneity ; 
and  it  is  thus  developed  naturally  by  its  own  spontaneous  evo- 
lution of  ideas  and  truths.  The  most  we  can  do  for  its  culture  is 
to  furnish  the  occasion  for  the  cognition  of  truth,  and  by  such 
cognitions  its  eye  becomes  brighter  and  its  vision  clearer  and 
stronger. 

It  Can  be  Cultured. — The  faculty  of  Reason,  though  spon- 
taneous in  its  actions,  will  however  admit  of  culture.  It  begins 
its  operations  early  in  life;  though  there  is  a  vast  difference  be- 
tween the  intuitions  of  childhood  and  of  manhood.  The  cognition 
of  truth  07  the  adult  mind  is  much  clearer  and  higher  than  that 
of  the  child  mind.  There  is  also  a  large  difference  between  the 
intuitive  cognitions  of  the  ignorant,  uncultured  savage,  and  of  the 

(  390) 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  TRUE.          T91 

refined  and  culture,!  philosopher.  The  study  and  attainment  of 
truth,  the  grasp  of  philosophical  principles,  and  the  refinements 
of  thought  and  feeling  of  a  civilized  life,  have  given  the  occasions 
by  which  the  insight  of  the  reason  into  truth  is  much  deeper, 
and  its  grasp  of  intuitive  ideas  much  broader. 

Methods  of  Culture. — The  manner  of  giving  culture  to  this 
faculty  is  intimated  in  this  statement,  f  The  eye  of  intuition  grows 
clear  with  the  development  of  the  human  mind;  hence  all 
mental  development  tends  to  develop  the  reason^  It  evolves  its 
ideas  and  truths  on  the  presentation  of  suitable  occasions ;  hence 
the  occasions  for  its  activity  should  be  frequently  presented. 
The  familiarity  with  truth  of  all  kinds,  by  its  refining  and  elevat- 
ing influence  on  the  soul,  gives  deeper  insight  into  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  truth ;  therefore  all  philosophic  and  thought 
culture  will  tend  to  give  culture  to  the  reason. 

Divisions  for  Culture. — All  the  products  of  the  reason  may 
be  embraced  under  three  general  heads,  the  True,  the  Beautiful, 
and  the  Good.  The  products  under  each  one  of  these  heads  are 
of  two  classes,  ideas  and  thoughts.  Each  intuitive  truth  involves 
one  or  more  intuitive  ideas,  and  grows  out  of  these  ideas:  the 
idea  is  the  basis  of  the  truth,  and  gives  rise  to  it.  We  shall 
therefore  restrict  the  discussion  mainly  to  the  development  of 
these  ideas,  as  the  truths  will  naturally  follow  the  ideas.  The 
culture  of  the  intuitive  power  thus  naturally  divides  itself  into 
three  general  divisions ;  the  culture  of  the  Intuitions  of  the  True, 
the  culture  of  the  Intuitions  of  the  Beautiful,  and  the  culture  of 
the  Intuitions  of  the  Good.  Though  shrinking  from  the  attempt 
to  give  any  discussion  of  the  cultivation  of  this  divine  faculty, 
which  needs  the  pen  of  inspiration  to  treat  it  properly,  I  shall 
present  a  few  suggestions  for  its  culture  under  the  three  heads 
named.  In  this  chapter  I  shall  treat  briefly  of  the  culture  of  the 
Intuitions  of  the  True. 

Intuitions  of  tlie  True. — The  ideas  of  the  True  are  those  of 
Space,  Time,  Number,  Identity,  Cause,  Infinity,  etc.  These  ideas 
spring  up  early  in  the  mind  on  the  presentation  of  suitable  occa- 


392  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

sions,  and  but  little  direct  effort  need  be  made  for  theJr  culture. 
Clearer  and  more  definite  conceptions  of  these  ideas  will  be  ob- 
tained, however,  by  their  frequent  contemplation  and  an  attempt 
to  analyze  or  define  them.  The  general  principle  for  their  de- 
velopment is  that  suitable  occasions  be  presented  for  the  reason 
to  unfold  them.  Questions  by  the  teacher  on  their  nature  will 
aid  the  pupil  in  a  fuller  and  clearer  development  of  these  ideas 
and  a  better  comprehension  of  their  nature. 

Intuition  of  Space. — The  intuition  of  Space  arises  early  in 
the  mind.  The  first  perception  of  it  is  in  the  concrete;  that  is, 
in  connection  with  material  objects  occupying  space.  Through 
touch  we  cognize  an  extended  body  capable  of  resistance,  and 
through  the  eye  we  see  an  extended  and  colored  surface.  The 
idea  of  space,  however,  is  not  given  by  the  sense,  but  by  the  eye 
of  intuition,  that  lies  back  of  and  works  with  the  eye  of  sense. 
The  perception  of  space  in  objects  is  merely  the  occasion  by  which 
the  general  idea  of  space  is  unfolded  from  the  mind.  The  early 
appearance  of  the  idea  in  the  mind  suggests  the  early  study  of 
geometry  by  the  child.  The  study  of  geometrical  figures  will 
accustom  the  mind  to  pass  from  the  conception  of  occupied  to 
unoccupied  or  pure  space,  and  will  enable  it  to  conceive  of  the 
possible  forms,  of  space.  Questions  on  the  nature  of  space,  on 
the  truths  that  arise  out  of  the  conception,  and  on  its  importance, 
will  also  be  appropriate. 

Intuition  of  Time. — The  intuition  of  Time  is  also  early  de- 
veloped in  the  mind.  Its  basis  is  the  successive  experiences  of 
consciousness  in  the  succession  of  events.  We  perceive  events 
as  before  and  after ;  and  though  we  have  no  sense-perception  of 
time,  the  idea  arises  spontaneously  in  the  mind  through  the  ex- 
perience. Time  is  necessary  in  the  conception  of  events  as  suc- 
cessive; hence  the  idea  first  appears  in  the  concrete,  associated 
with  events.  We  can,  however,  think  of  the  time  as  different 
from  the  event  which  occurred  in  time,  and  thus  attain  to  the 
true  or  abstract  notion  of  time.  The  element  of  time  in  the  con- 
crete event  is  given,  not  by  sense,  but  by  intuition;  we  see  the 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  TRUE.  393 

• 

event  as  external,  and  the  mind  supplies  the  element  of  time. 
Subsequently  intuition  lifts  up  the  idea  out  of  all  sense  connec- 
tion, and  thinks  of  it  as  the  grand  condition  of  events,  without 
beginning  or  end.  A  few  examples  and  questions  may  aid  this 
development;  but  nature  takes  care  of  herself  in  this  higher 
activity  of  the  soul.  It  will  be  suitable,  however,  to  lead  the 
pupil  to  a  clearer  appreciation  of  the  infinitude  of  time, — a  cog- 
nition incomprehensible,  but  necessary  and  uneontradictable. 

Intuition  of  Number. — The  intuition  of  Number  is  also  an 
early  conception  of  the  mind.  The  mind  sees  the  objects  through, 
the  sense;  and  in  connection  with  this  sense-experience  thers 
springs  up  in  the  mind  the  idea  of  the  one  and  the  many,  of  unily 
and  plurality.  All  the  different  numbers  are  thus  the  products 
of  intuition.  These  ideas  arise  first  in  the  concrete ;  we  begin  by 
numbering  objects.  The  mind  then  withdraws  this  idea  from  ite 
idea  of  objects,  and  thus  number  in  the  abstract  becomes  a  dis- 
tinct cognition  of  the  soul.  The  only  suggestion  for  the  culture 
of  intuition  in  this  respect  is  to  furnish  the  occasion  for  the 
operation  of  the  intuitive  power.  The  grasp  of  numbers  can,  of 
course,  be  largely  increased  by  practice  and  study ;  and  the  study 
of  the  science  of  numbers  gives  increased  breadth  and  clearness 
to  our  numerical  cognitions. 

Intuition  of  Cause. — The  intuition  of  Cause  also  makes  an 
early  appearance  in  the  mind.  The  little  child's  questions, — 
What  makes  this?  and  What  makes  that? — show  that  it  very 
soon  perceives  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  The  idea  is  not 
the  result  of  philosophy,  for  it  is  as  strong  among  savages  as 
among  civilized  men.  As  previously  shown,  it  is  not  merely  the 
perception  of  antecedence  and  consequence,  for  no  number  of 
such  relations,  however  invariable,  will  give  the  idea  of  cause. 
The  idea  springs  up  native  in  the  mind  on  the  perception  of 
change  or  the  appearance  of  an  event.  As  soon  as  we  see  some 
change  take  place  or  something  come  into  being,  we  immediately 
look  for  the  cause  which  produced  the  change  or  effected  the  re- 
sult. Thus  sensible  experience  is  the  occasion  of  the  origin  of 
17* 


394  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  idea ;  and  therefore,  in  order  to  develop  it,  suitable  occasions 
must  be  presented  to  the  mind.  The  study  of  a  branch  like 
natural  philosophy  will  tend  to  increase  our  grasp  upon  the 
r.otion  of  causation,  and  enable  us  to  distinguish  between  the 
several  kinds  of  cause.  The  mind  may  also  be  led  along  the 
chain  of  causation,  until  it  reaches  the  idea  of  a  First  Cause  and 
the  logical  necessity  of  its  existence. 

Intuition  of  Identity. — The  intuition  of  Identity  is  not  so 
easily  developed  in  the  mind,  at  least  as  a  definite  and  clear  cog- 
nition. It  arises  from  the  perception  and  comparison  of  objects. 
It  is  preceded,  I  think,  by  the  ideas  of  difference  and  similarity ; 
and  from  these  the  mind  gradually  passes  to  the  notion  of  same- 
ness or  identity.  From  the  identity  of  objects  it  passes  to  the 
conception  of  personal  identity,  or  the  sameness  of  the  spirit. 
The  mind  has  before  it  at  every  wakening  moment,  a  cognition 
of  a  present  self,  and  in  the  exercise  of  memory,  a  past  self;  and 
it  knows  that  these  belong  to  the  same  one  self.  Though  the 
idea  is  slowly  developed,  the  mind  unconsciously  acts  in  the  light 
of  it  before  it  is  clearly  cognized  as  an  idea.  We  do  not  mistake 
ourselves  for  some  other  person,  nor  confound  our  parents  with 
the  people  around  them  ;  the  idea  is  thus  potentially  active  in  us, 
regulating  our  conduct,  even  before  it  is  distinctly  apprehended 
as  a  cognition.  All  that  can  be  done  for  its  development  is  to 
supply  the  conditions  for  its  appearance  in  the  mind. 

Other  Intuitive  Ideas. — There  are  other  intuitive  cognitions, 
as  Equality,  Power,  Substance,  Being,  Whole  and  Parts,  which 
we  have  not  space  to  consider.  These  are  developed  in  a  manner 
similar  to  those  already  discussed.  The  presentation  of  suitable 
occasions,  and  the  asking  of  appropriate  questions,  will  enable  the 
reason  to  unfold  these  ideas  which  are  the  condition  and  source 
of  all  thought  and  experience. 

Intuitive  Truths. — The  Intuitive  Truths  are  too  numerous 
to  mention  in  detail.  They  accompany  every  one  of  the  intuitive 
ideas,  some  giving  more  and  others  less  of  these  truths.  The 
most  numerous  are  those  of  number  and  space;  and  the  student 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  TRUE.  395 

gets  culture  in  the  development  of  these  truths  by  the  study  of 
arithmetic  and  geometry.  In  mathematics  we  have  two  classes 
of  intuitive  truths,  called  axioms ;  those  which  pertain  to  quantity 
in  general,  and  those  which  belong  to  specific  forms  of  quantity. 
Of  the  former  class  we  may  Kane  "  Things  which  are  equal  to 
the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each  otiiei.'  Under  the  second  class 
we  name  "Only  similar  numbers  can  be  added;'  Teller,  belongs 
to  arithmetic ;  and  "  All  right  angles  are  equal,"  which  belongs 
to  geometry.  In  the  development  of  these  sciences  each  new  re- 
lation or  conception  of  quantity  is  attended  with  some  new  truth 
of  intuition.  These  truths  are  developed  in  the  mind  by  the 
presentation  of  the  proper  occasion ;  and  when  they  are  somewhat 
recondite,  their  appearance  may  be  aided  by  suitable  illustra- 
tions. 

Stiidy  of  Science. — The  cognition  of  the  True  is  developed  by 
the  study  of  science.  Science  discovers  truth ;  but  intuition  per- 
ceives the  truth  of  its  principles.  Judgment  gives  a  proposition ; 
the  truth  of  the  proposition  is  seen  by  the  reason.  The  under- 
standing draws  a  conclusion  from  premises;  intuition  sees  the 
truth  of  the  derived  proposition.  So  all  science  tends  to  brighten 
and  quicken  the  perception  of  the  true.  Man  grows  in  the  ap- 
preciation of  truth  by  the  study  of  science.  His  soul,  accustomed 
to  the  true,  becomes  wedded  to  truth  ;  his  affections  go  out  towards 
truth ;  he  builds  his  altars  to  the  honor  of  truth,  and  becomes 
himself  a  worshipper  of  the  divine  attribute  of  truth.  Familiar 
with  the  truths  of  science,  his  soul  goes  out  in  yearnings  after  the 
.source  of  truth;  and  he  thus  rises  in  his  conceptions  from  the 
natural  to  the  «uper.uatural,  from  the  truths  of  science  to  Him 
\vho  is  the  essence  and  embodiment  of  infinite  truth,  and  is  thus, 
in  its  highest  serse,  THE 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  INTUITIONS  OF  BEAUTY. 


BEAUTIFUL  is  a  divine  attribute  revealed  to  the  higher 
-•-  reason.  The  intuition  of  the  reason  in  the  sphere  of  the 
Beautiful,  are  of  three  principal  classes  ;  the  Beautiful  proper,  the 
Sublime,  and  the  Ludicrous.  Each  of  these  three  classes  of  ideas 
is  developed  by  the  presentation  of  objects  containing  the  aesthetic 
element.  A  few  remarks  on  the  culture  will  be  made,  showing 
the  value  of  the  beautiful  or  the  value  of  aesthetic  culture,  and 
methods  of  giving  this  culture.  The  subject  may  be  appropriately 
entitled  The  Culture  of  Taste. 

I.  VALUE  OF  BEAUTY.  —  This  idea  of  beauty  is  of  so  much 
value  to  mankind  that  a  brief  consideration  of  the  influence  of 
the  beautiful  will  give  significance  to  the  discussion  of  its  culture, 
and  tend  to  make  teachers  more  careful  to  afford  this  culture  to 
their  pupils.  The  facts  and  truths  of  science  are  not  the  only 
things  valuable  in  education,  though  this  seems  to  be  the  popular 
belief.  The  mind  grows  in  the  appreciation  of  truth  by  feeding 
upon  the  true  ;  but  the  soul  has  other  appetites  than  those  for 
truth.  Beauty  is  food  for  the  spiritual  nature  as  well  as  truth  ; 
and  the  mind  develops  in  its  communion  with  the  spirit  of  beauty. 
Art  is  an  educating  influence  as  well  as  science  ;  and  some  of  the 
richest  products  of  the  soul  spring  from  the  culture  of  the  fine 
arts  and  the  element  of  beauty  which  they  embody. 

Refines  the  Mind.  —  Beauty  refines  and  elevates  the  mind. 
The  element  of  beauty  breathes  of  the  spirit  of  refinement.  As 
the  sunlight  comes  beaming  out  of  the  depths  of  the  pure  blue 
heavens,  and  illuminates  the  world,  so  the  spirit  of  beauty  carries 
with  it  purity  and  refinement.  The  mind  that  is  susceptible  to 

(  C9<!  ) 


THE   CULTUEE   OF   THE    BEAUTIFUL.  897 

the  beauties  of  nature  and  art,  intuitively  turns  away  from  all 
that  is  coarse  or  vulgar,  and  sympathizes  only  with  that  which 
is  refined  and  elevated.  "  There  is  no  more  potent  antidote  to 
low  sensuality,"  says  Schlegel,  "than  the  adoration  of  beauty." 
A  taste  for  pictures,  for  poetry,  for  music,  etc.,  will  unfit  a  person 
for  the  enjoyment  of  the  dirt  of  the  drinking  saloon,  or  the  vulgar 
wit  and  ribald  jest  of  the  uncultured  crowd.  A  beautiful  home, 
with  its  refining  influences,  tends  to  infuse  a  spirit  of  refinement 
in  the  mind  that  lifts  it  above  the  grossness  and  coarseness  of  vice 
and  physical  indulgences.  Beauty  is  the  light  of  the  world  of 
thought  and  feeling;  and  the  soul  grows  and  refines  in  this  light 
as  the  lily  refines  in  the  sunlight  of  day. 

A  Source  of  Enjoyment. — Beauty  is  a  source  of  enjoyment. 
One  of  the  purest  and  most  exquisite  pleasures  comes  from  the 
communion  with  the  works  of  nature  and  art.  The  soul  thrills 
with  an  exquisite  delight  as  we  read  the  tender  sonnet  or  sublime 
epic,  stand  in  the  frescoed  halls  or  galleries  of  paintings,  or  listen 
to  the  combined  voices  of  man  and  instrument  in  the  opera  or 
oratorio.  To  one  who  has  a  mind  to  appreciate  the  productions 
of  art,  they  are  a  source  of  the  purest  and  highest  delight  that 
the  human  heart  can  experience.  So  also  may  we  derive  enjoy- 
ment from  the  beauties  of  nature.  Here  is  a  well-spring  of  joy 
which  is  never  dry.  The  tender  light  of  the  auroral  dawn,  the 
liquid  depths  of  the  blue  sky,  the  fleecy  clouds  floating  above  in 
wondrous  variety  of  form,  the  pure  white  lily  or  blushing  rose  of 
the  garden,  the  modest  forget-me-not  of  the  shady  forest,  the 
songs  of  birds  trilling  on  the  air, — all  these  are,  to  the  soul  that 
can  feel  them,  the  source  of  a  pleasure  beyond  words  to  express. 

Adorns  Lowly  Objects. — Beauty  gives  interest  to  the  lowliest 
objects  of  life.  It  casts  a  charm  around  ordinary  events  and  inci- 
dents, and  plants  flowers  along  the  pathways  of  our  daily  life. 
\Ve  need  not  go  to  halls  of  statues  and  galleries  of  pictures  to 
find  this  element;  it  is  a  spirit  that  fills  the  world  with  its 
presence.  Wordsworth  voiced  a  universal  sentiment  when  he 
wrote  "  To  me  the  meanest  flower  that  blows  can  give  thoughts 


398  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

that  do  often  lie  too  deep  for  tears."  Burns  at  the  plow  could 
find  a  theme  for  the  exquisite  lines  on  the  daisy, — "  Wee,  modest, 
crimson-tipped  flower."  The  cot  may  be  never  so  lowly,  but  a 
few  flowers  in  the  window,  some  wreaths  of  autumn  leaves  with 
their  rich  colorings,  and  a  tasteful  arrangement  of  the  rude  fur- 
niture, will  make  it  seem  as  attractive  as  the  palace  of  a  king. 
It  is  the  mission  of  the  beautiful  to  raise  up  the  lowly  things  of 
life,  and  enrobe  them  with  that  ethereal  spirit  of  beauty  that  shall 
make  them  a  source  of  delight  to  the  heart. 

Leads  to  Morality. — Beauty  leads  to  morality  and  virtue. 
The  love  of  beauty  refines  the  mind  and  attracts  it  into  the  paths 
of  purity  and  virtue.  The  perception  of  beauty  in  the  physical 
world  leads  to  a  love  of  moral  beauty ;  and  a  love  of  moral  beauty 
leads  to  virtuous  actions.  The  mind  that  is  susceptible  to  ex- 
ternal beauty,  that  delights  in  the  beauty  of  color,  form,  and 
tone,  will  naturally  be  open  to  the  influences  of  morality,  for 
virtue  is  moral  beauty.  Conscience  and  taste  are  so  related  that 
they  have  a  reciprocal  influence  upon  each  other.  Many  persons 
do  right  from  the  love  of  the  beautiful  which  they  perceive  in 
moral  action,  aside  from  the  incentives  of  moral  obligation. 
"Vice  is  a  monster  of  such  hideous  mien"  that  we  shun  it  on  ac- 
count of  its  deformity;  the  goddess  of  virtue,  radiant  .with  celestial 
beauty,  entices  us  into  the  paths  of  purity  and  holiness.  Beauty 
is  thus  a  minister  of  virtue,  and  tends  to  purify  the  heart,  ennoble 
the  aspirations,  and  dignify  the  life. 

An  Aid  to  Religion. — Beauty  is  an  aid  and  an  incentive  to 
religion.  The  beautiful  in  the  world  is  a  divine  presence,  and 
leads  the  soul  toward  the  ineffable  beauty  of  its  author.  All 
radiant  with  the  glory  of  the  skies,  it  turns  the  mind  upward 
towards  the  source  of  eternal  and  heavenly  beauty.  The  beau- 
tiful is  thus  one  of  the  ladders  on  which  the  soul  rises  towards  the 
pure  and  heavenly.  "  In  days  of  yore,"  says  Schiller,  "  nothing 
was  holy  but  the  beautiful."  The  mother  church  has  understood 
this  ministry  of  the  beautiful,  and  employed  it  for  deepening  re- 
ligious feeling  and  devotion.  Painting,  and  sculpture,  and  archi- 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  399 

tecture,  and  poetry,  a'u!  music,  have  all  been  enlisted  in  the 
interests  of  religion.  It  is  in  the  service  of  religion,  too,  that  art 
has  achieved  its  highest  triumphs.  The  most  beautiful  frescos 
are  those  of  Raphael  and  Michael  Angelo ;  the  noblest  specimens 
of  architecture  are  found  in  the  cathedrals;  and  the  grandest 
musical  compositions  are  the  sacred  fugues  of  Bach  and  the  ora- 
torios of  Haydn  and  Handel. 

Not  Identical  with  Religion. — The  Beautiful  is  not,  how- 
ever, identical  with  Religion.  The  love  of  the  beautiful  will  not, 
of  itself,  make  us  holy.  Had  Raphael  been  morally  what  he  was 
aesthetically,  even  Christ  himself  would  almost  have  had  a  rival 
in  virtue.  The  theology  of  the  Greeks  was  distinguished  alike  for 
its  beauty  and  its  imperfections.  It  presented  the  finest  type  that 
the  world  has  known  of  a  system  of  ethics  founded  on  the  beau- 
tiful, but  failed  because  beauty  and  piety  are  not  identical. 
True  religion  must  be  founded  on  the  religious  nature  rather 
than  on  the  a3sthetic.  Piety  and  beauty  may,  however,  go  hand 
in  hand,  for  the  highest  beauty  on  earth  is  Christian  piety.  The 
noblest  manhood  is  Christian  manhood ;  and  the  most  beautiful 
womanhood  is  Christian  womanhood.  The  spirit  of  the  beautiful 
may  therefore  unite  its  attractions  with  the  spirit  of  the  good  and 
enhance  its  glory,  as  clambering  vine-leaves  adorn  Corinthian 
columns  and  Gothic  arches. 

II.  CULTURE  OF  THE  BEAUTIFUL. — The  value  of  the  beautiful  p 
being  thus  apparent,  we  pass  to  the  consideration  of  the  culture 
of  the  intuitive  power  in  the  sphere  of  the  beautiful.  The  gen- 
eral principle  of  this  culture  is  to  give  the  mind  exercise  in  the 
perception  of  beauty.  As  the  memory  is  cultivated  by  remember' 
ing,  so  the  perception  of  the  beautiful  is  developed  by  the  con- 
templation of  beautiful  objects.  This  exercise  can  be  given  by 
both  the  objects  of  nature  and  the  productions  of  art. 

.1.  Culture  from  Nature. — The  perception  of  the  beautiful 
is  cultivated  by  the  observation  of  natural  scenery.  The  soul 
rises  in  its  perception  and  appreciation  of  the  divine  element  of 
l:cauty  by  becoming  familiar  Avith  the  beauty  and  sublimity  of 


400  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

nature.  Here  we  possess  a  source  of  culture  accessible  to  every 
mind ;  nature's  galleries  of  beauty  are  free  to  all  that  will  take 
the  trouble  to  visit  them.  We  can  see  this  ethereal  spirit  of 
beauty  blooming  in  the  flower,  twinkling  in  the  star,  trilling  in 
bird-songs,  and  shining  in  the  myriad-hued  sunsets.  It  sighs  in 
the  zephyr,  chatters  in  the  streamlet,  laughs  in  the  cascade,  roars 
in  the  cataract,  and  howls  in  the  tornado. 

Nature  Full  of  Beauty. — Nature  is  a  master  artist,  and  has 
embodied  the  spirit  of  beauty  in  all  her  works.  We  can  see  it  in 
the  morning  sunlight  kissing  the  cheeks  of  dew-gemmed  flowers; 
in  the  evening  twilight  that,  like  a  silver  clasp,  links  the  day  and 
darkness ;  in  the  morning  star  that  heralds  the  rising  sun,  or  in 
the  star  of  eve  that  glitters  like  a  diamond  upon  the  brow  of 
night;  in  the  azure  sky  above,  fretted  with  fleecy  clouds  or 
spanned  by  the  rainbow's  graceful  arch ;  in  the  smiling  valley  at 
our  feet,  dotted  with  cozy  hamlets  or  ribboned  with  crystal 
streamlets ;  and  in  the  broad  expanse  of  old  ocean,  as  it  blends 
with  the  sky  and  vanishes  in  the  hazy  distance.  We  can  hear  it 
in  the  vocal  woods  of  spring-time,  in  the  whispering  of  evening 
zephyrs,  and  in  the  green  valley  where  the  silver  stream 

"Babbling  low  amid  the  tangled  wood, 
Slips  down  through  moss-grown  stones  with  endless  laugh  trr." 

2.  Culture  from  Art. — The  works  of  art  also  afford  a  means 
for  the  development  of  the  aesthetic  nature.  The  fine  arts  are 
the  embodiments  of  the  beautiful,  and  thus  furnish  occasions  for 
the  perceptions  of  beauty  and  models  for  the  culture  of  correct 
ideals.  The  principal  of  these  arts  are  Poetry,  Painting, 
Sculpture,  Music,  and  Architecture.  A  few  words  in  respect  to 
the  culture  afforded  by  each  of  these  will  be  appropriate. 

Culture  from  Poetry. — The  perception  of  the  beautiful 
may  be  cultivated  by  reading  poetry.  The  element  of  beauty  is 
largely  embodied  in  poetic  composition.  Poetry  has  been  ex- 
pressively defined  as  "  a  rhythmical  creation  of  beauty."  The 
bright  visions  of  loveliness  that  rise  in  poetic  minds  have  been 


THE   CULTURE    OF   THE    BEAUTIFUL.  401 

embalmed  in  immortal  verse,  and  give  inspiration  and  shape  to 
the  visions  of  the  thousands  who  read  them.  The  mind  awakens 
to  beautiful  conceptions  by  communing  with  the  souls  who  seemed 
to  have  caught  visions  of  the  ineffable  beauties  of  the  heavenly 
land.  The  flame  of  beauty  glowing  in  the  poet's  line  kindles  the 
flame  of  appreciation  in  the  minds  of  his  admirers,  and  fills  them 
with  the  sweet  emotions  that  awaken  dreams  of  unearthly  loveli- 
ness. 

Select  Authors. — Care  should  be  taken  to  select  those  authors 
who  present  the  best  models  of  taste.  The  works  selected  should 
be  adapted  to  the  age  and  development  of  the  student.  The 
child  can  not  appreciate  the  higher  imaginings  of  Milton  and 
Shakespeare,  but  will  follow  with  delight  the  simple  lines  of  Scott 
and  Longfellow.  The  coarse  and  impure  productions  of  genius 
should  be  carefully  withheld  from  the  young;  and  after  their 
tastes  have  been  moulded  by  the  refinements  of  literature,  they 
will  turn  with  disgust  from  the  corrupting  pages  of  such  writers 
as  Byron  and  Swinburne.  The  beautiful  passages  of  imaginative 
prose  may  also  be  used  for  aesthetic  culture.  The  mind  of  the 
child,  filled  with  jewels  of  thought  set  in  golden  expressions,  will 
grow  in  refinement  and  in  appreciation  of  the  all-prevading 
presence  of  the  beautiful. 

Culture  from  Music. — This  aesthetic  culture  is  also  given 
by  the  study  of  music.  Music  is  beauty  expressed  in  the  melody 
and  harmony  of  tone,  and  is  thus  adapted  to  train  the  mind  to 
the  perception  and  appreciation  of  the  beautiful.  We  should 
begin  the  culture  with  the  use  of  the  simpler  melodies  of  a  Bellini 
or  a  Donizetti,  pass  to  the  simpler  harmonies  of  the  old  chorals 
and  sacred  hymns,  and  at  last  rise  to  the  comprehension  and  en- 
joyment of  the  sonata  and  oratorio,  or  the  grand  harmonies  of 
the  full  orchestra.  This  culture  can  be  obtained  in  the  home 
circle,  the  singing  school,  the  musical  society,  the  concert,  and 
the  opera.  Every  home  should  be  provided  with  an  organ  or 
piano ;  and  the  voice  of  singing  should  rise,  like  a  sweet  incense, 
from  every  family  altar.  Home  can  be  thus  made  attractive,  the 


402  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

taste  of  its  inmates  refined,  and  the  soul  enticed  into  the  paths  of 
purity  and  virtue. 

fainting  and  Sculpture. — The  productions  of  painting  and 
sculpture  should  also  be  used  for  giving  culture  to  the  aesthetic 
nature.  Here  we  find  the  embodiment  of  the  most  beautiful 
ideals  of  form  in  the  purity  of  marble  or  the  richness  of  color; 
and  these  high  ideals  of  transcendent  genius  train  us  to  a  famil- 
iarity with  the  highest  types  of  beauty.  It  will  not  be  convenient 
for  every  one  to  visit  galleries  of  art,  but  by  photograph  and  en- 
graving we  can  become  familiar  with  the  masterpieces  of  paint- 
ing and  sculpture  in  the  world.  Subsequently,  if  an  opportunity 
conies  to  see  the  originals,  there  will  be  an  added  interest  and  a 
higher  appreciation,  as  we  stand  thrilled  with  the  spell  of  fasci- 
nation before  the  immortal  paintings,  frescos,  and  statues  of  the 
masters  of  art. 

From  Other  Arts. — The  arts  of  architecture,  landscape  gar- 
dening, etc.,  may  also  aid  in  the  development  of  the  aesthetic 
nature.  Models  of  the  various  styles  of  architecture  in  the  mind 
give  an  appreciation  of  symmetry  and  proportion  in  buildings. 
Familiarity  with  artistically  laid  out  grounds,  such  as  we  find  in 
some  of  our  public  parks,  and  around  a  few  private  homes,  culti- 
vate the  taste  and  suggest  how  we  can  make  our  homes  attractive. 
It  is  the  mission  of  art  of  every  kind,  not  only  to  give  pleasure 
to  the  mind,  but  to  cultivate  in  it  purer  ideals  and  a  higher  ap- 
preciation of  the  beautiful,  and  thus  contribute  to  this  higher 
culture  of  the  soul. 

3.  In  Several  Studies. — There  are  several  branches  of  knowl- 
edge which  aid  in  the  culture  of  the  intuitions  of  the  beautiful. 
The  most  important  of  these  are  ./Esthetic,  Rhetoric,  and  Literary 
Criticism,  and  the  principles  of  Painting,  Sculpture,  and  Archi- 
tecture. These  studies  deal  with  the  principles  of  beauty,  enable 
us  to  see  where  they  are  violated  or  conformed  to  in  works  of  art, 
and  thus  quicken  and  improve  our  ideas  of  the  beautiful. 

Study  of  Esthetics. — The  perception  of  beauty  can  be 
heightened  by  the  study  of  the  principles  of  beauty  as  presented 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   BEAUTIFUL.  403 

in  ^Esthetics.  Intuition  is  not  a  blind  goddess ;  it  is  a  spontan- 
eous activity ;  but  it  can  grasp  broad  principles  and  operate  in 
the  light  of  them.  The  intuitive  power  comprehends  the  great 
laws  of  beauty,  and  when  familiar  with  these  its  cognitions  are 
true  to  the  perfect  ideals.  Fashion  and  habit,  though  they  can- 
not change,  tend  to  warp  the  action  of  this  faculty  ;  and  it  needs 
the  guiding  influence  of  great  laws  of  beauty  to  keep  it  true  to  its 
own  native  conceptions.  Surrounded  by  the  sanctions  of  law,  it 
is  more  confident  in  its  assertions ;  raised  upon  the  high  plane  of 
aesthetic  principles,  it  has  a  broader  sweep  and  a  clearer  insight, 
and  can  catch  defects  and  perceive  beauties  that  elude  the  un- 
trained faculty.  We  recommend,  therefore,  for  the  training  of 
this  power,  the  study  of  the  great  laws  of  beauty  as  presented  in 
our  treatises  on  aesthetics. 

Study  of  Rhetoric. — In  the  study  of  Rhetoric  we  become 
familiar  with  the  principles  of  literary  composition,  and  are  thus 
enabled  to  perceive  the  graces  of  literature  that  might  otherwise 
escape  our  notice.  We  can  learn  to  look  below  the  surface,  and 
not  be  deceived  by  the  false  glare  and  tinsel  of  poetic  compo- 
sition. It  enables  us  to  separate  the  dross  from  the  gold,  to  dis- 
tinguish between  what  is  merely  meretricious  in  ornament,  and 
what  is  in  accordance  with  good  taste,  and  to  be  able  to  sit  in 
criticism  on  the  products  of  literary  genius.  It  will  also  enable 
us  to  avoid  violations  of  the  canons  of  taste  in  our  own  literary 
composition.  A  better  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  rhetoric 
would  have  saved  the  pages  of  some  of  our  greatest  poets  from 
an  occasional  blemish ;  Shakespeare,  with  all  his  native  genius, 
slips,  now  and  then,  into  errors  of  no  trivial  character. 

Principles  of  Other  Arts. — The  principles  of  all  the  arts 
may  be  studied  to  advantage  for  the  culture  of  the  intuitions  of 
the  Beautiful.  A  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  painting,  or  sculpture, 
or  architecture,  will  enable  us  to  see  higher  excellencies  in  those 
arts,  and  to  appreciate  them  more  fully.  The  reading  of  works 
of  aesthetic  criticism,  such  as  Ruskin's,  will  afford  the  same  kind 
of  culture,  and  open  the  eye  to  the  perception  of  graces  and  de- 


404:  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

fects  to  which  it  would  otherwise  be  closed.  It  will  give  one  the 
power  to  see  a  meaning  in  a  tint,  a  shade,  or  an  ornament,  where 
before  it  saw  only  color  or  stone.  Such  works  seem  to  infuse  the 
spirit  of  beauty  throughout  the  soul ;  and  intuition  is  affected  in 
its  action  by  such  infusion  and  the  inspiration  which  attends  it. 
In  Human  Life. — In  conclusion,  we  remark  that  we  should 
endeavor  to  derive  this  culture  from  and  embody  it  in  human 
life.  The  highest  beauty  is  that  which  belongs  to  conduct  and 
character,  and  here  we  find  one  of  the  most  important  means  of 
.esthetic  culture.  Man  should  endeavor  to  embody  beauty  in  all 
that  he  does,  and  thus  make  life  itself  artistic.  Our  daily  tasks 
should  not  be  regarded  as  drudgery;  they  should  be  moulded  by 
some  ideal  of  excellence,  and  then  the  humblest  occupation  will 
become  a  pleasure  to  us.  Moral  action,  patterned  after  a  high 
ideal,  becomes  artistic;  and  we  have  the  beauty  of  conduct. 
Character  should  be  the  development  of  ideals  of  excellence,  and 
life  itself  become  a  fine  •  art.  Contemplating  these  models  of 
excellence,  we  rise  to  a  higher  appreciation  of  that  divine  beauty 
which  is  above  all,  through  all,  and  in  all.  We  may  thus  come 
to  feel  with  the  ancients  that  the  soul  alone  is  beautiful ;  and  in 
loving  the  beautiful,  the  soul  loves  its  own  image  as  there  ex- 
pressed. And  as  the  soul  is  a  reflection  of  the  infinite  mind,  our 
highest  admiration  will  be  for  the  divine  Artist  in  whom  is  the 
fullness  and  perfection  of  beauty,  and  who  is  thus  THE  BEAUTIFUL. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   INTUITIONS   OP   THE    RIGHT. 


Intuitions  of  the  Good,  or  the  Right,  are  the  highest 
-*-  finite  cognitions  of  the  soul.  All  the  intuitions  of  the 
Reason  —  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good  —  stand  on  the 
high  plane  of  rational  and  transcendental  knowledge.  The  con- 
ception of  pure  truth  lifts  the  soul  far  above  the  cognitions  of 
sense.  The  perception  of  the  Beautiful  is  a  more  refined,  if  not  a 
nobler  conception  than  that  of  the  True,  and  touches  a  larger  part 
of  our  nature,  as  it  involves  an  act  of  the  sensibilities.  The  idea 
of  the  Good,  however,  is  a  grander  and  nobler  conception  than 
either  that  of  the  True  or  the  Beautiful  ;  and  it  brings  into  action 
the  entire  spiritual  nature  —  the  Intellect,  the  Sensibilities,  and 
the  Will.  In  its  highest  manifestation  it  rises  into  the  sphere  of 
the  infinite  in  the  cognition  of  The  Good  or  GOD. 

Division  for  Discussion.  —  The  intrinsic  excellence  of  this 
idea  and  its  far-reaching  influence  on  the  character  and  achieve- 
ments of  mankind,  lead  me  to  hesitate  to  enter  upon  the  discus- 
sion of  its  culture.  What  is  here  presented  has  been  written  with 
a  deep  sense  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  treatment,  and  with  the 
hope  of  giving  a  fuller  and  worthier  development  of  it  in  some 
other  work,  at  some  future  time.  The  subject  is  here  treated 
under  four  heads  ;  the  Nature  of  the  Culture,  the  Importance  of 
the  Culture,  the  Principles  of  the  Culture,  and  the  Culture  of  the 
Different  Ideas  and  Duties. 

I.  NATURE  OF  CULTURE  OF  MORAL  IDEAS.  —  The  moral  ideas, 
though  given  by  the  reason,  will  admit  of  assistance  in  their  de- 
velopment. This  is  especially  true  in  respect  to  the  different 
specific  forms  of  the  general  notion  of  the  Right.  All  persons  have 

(405) 


406  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

a  general  notion  of  moral  distinctions ;  but  the  cognition  of  the 
specific  forms  of  the  Eight  is  largely  due  to  culture  ard  education. 
The  moral  ideas,  in  this  respect,  are  similar  to  those  of  space. 
Intuition  gives  us  the  general  notion  of  space;  and  by  intuition 
also  we  can  attain  to  all  the  possible  forms  of  space,  as  lines,  tri- 
angles, circles,  etc.  The  mind,  however,  is  greatly  aided  in  con- 
ceiving these  geometrical  forms  by  models,  pictures,  descriptions, 
etc.  Illustration,  also,  though  it  does  not  originate,  greatly 
facilitates  the  development  of  the  axioms  of  mathematics  in  the 
mind.  The  same  thing  holds  true  in  respect  to  moral  ideas  and 
truths.  Indeed,  the  moral  ideas  being  so  much  more  complex 
than  the  idea  of  space,  the  influence  of  education  in  developing 
the  particular  forms  of  the  right,  is  still  more  important  than  it 
is  in  developing  the  forms  of  space. 

TJie  Ideas  to  be  Developed. — The  general  ideas  to  be  de- 
veloped are, — first,  the  general  notion  of  the  right;  second,  the 
general  notion  of  obligation;  third,  the  idea  of  merit  and  demerit 
in  respect  to  moral  action.  The  idea  of  the  right  will  include 
many  forms  of  the  right;  the  idea  of  obligation  will  apply  to 
each  one  of  these  specific  forms  of  the  right;  and  the  idea  of 
merit  and  demerit  will  apply  to  all  actions  in  respect  to  each  cog- 
nition of  duty. 

Idea  of  the  Right. — The  idea  of  the  right  is  more  difficult  to 
develop  than  any  other  intuitive  idea.  This  results  from  several 
causes.  First,  the  right  is  more  complex  than  any  other  cog- 
nition of  the  mind.  It  is  not  always  revealed  by  the  action,  for 
the  same  act  may  be  right  or  wrong,  according  to  circumstances. 
The  right  lies  largely  in  the  motive;  and  yet  not  entirely  so 
either,  since  we  cannot  always  justify  wrong  actions  by  good 
motives.  Besides,  too,  our  selfish  interests  and  feelings  often 
collide  with  the  right  and  blind  us  to  the  clear  cognition  of  duty ; 
indeed,  they  are  so  strong  that  we  sometimes  think  the  right 
wrong  and  the  wrong  right.  It  often  needs  the  eye  of  reason  to 
be  unclouded  by  the  feelings,  and  to  act  in  the  pure,  clear  atinos- 
pnere  of  truth  in  order  to  discern  the  path  of  duty.  If  our  feel- 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   RIGHT.  407 

ings  are  correct,  they  work  in  unison  with  intuition,  and  thus  aid 
in  the  clear  perception  of  the  right.  It  is  thus  evident  that  it 
needs  the  utmost  care  and  the  most  delicate  culture  to  unfold 
this  idea  of  the  right  in  the  human  soul. 

Idea  of  Obligation. — The  idea  of  obligation  is  not  so  difficult 
to  develop  as  the  idea  of  the  right.  Given  the  cognition  of 
the  right,  and  there  is  little  difficulty  in  awakening  the  cognition 
of  duty  in  respect  to  the  right.  This  idea  is  attended  with  a 
strong  feeling,  and  the  action  of  the  sensibilities  will  assist  in  the 
development  of  the  cognition.  We  must,  therefore,  awaken  the 
feeling  of  obligation  as  well  as  the  idea,  in  order  to  give  a  more 
definite  conception  of  this  idea.  In  this  matter  of  morals,  the 
head  and  the  heart  are  very  intimately  related.  There  is  a  sus- 
ceptibility to  moral  ideas  and  truths  which  seems. to  be  partly 
intellectual  and  partly  emotional;  and  the  two  work  together  in 
moral  conceptions.  The  more 'tender  the  conscience,  the  clearer 
will  the  eye  of  reason  appear,  and  the  stronger  and  deeper  the 
intuitions  of  the  right  and  obligation. 

Idea  of  Merit  and  Demerit. — The  idea  of  merit  and  demerit 
follows  the  two  previous  cognitions,  those  of  the  right  and  the 
ought.  These  latter  ideas  are  prospective  in  their  action, — they 
are  awakened  in  view  of  a  possible  act ;  the  ideas  of  merit  and 
demerit  are  retrospective  in  their  action, — they  follow  the  act  to 
which  they  pertain.  They  grow  out  of  the  idea  of  the  right,  and 
thus  depend  for  their  clearness  and  strength  upon  the  moral 
quality  which  we  perceive  in  the  action.  The  idea  is  also  very 
intimately  associated  with  the  feeling  of  merit  and  demerit, 
giving  a  sort  of  moral  susceptibility  which  is  partly  feeling  and 
partly  cognition.  Indeed,  emotion  and  cognition  are  so  inter- 
woven in  the  ethical  nature  that  they  seem  almost  to  constitute  a 
new  faculty  or  power  of  the  mind  for  the  intuition  of  the  right. 
It  is  intuition,  interpenetrated  with  emotion,  that  gives  us  the 
clearest  convictions  of  moral  duties  and  their  results  to  us.  For 
the  development  of  the  conviction  of  merit  and  demerit,  there- 
fore, we  must  train  the  emotional  element  to  act  in  harmony 
with  the  intellectual  element. 


408  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Special  Ethical  Ideas. — The  general  idea  of  the  right,  as 
stated,  embraces  many  special  forms  of  the  right,  such  as  honesty, 
veracity,  obedience,  etc.  These  particular  forms  of  the  right  bear 
the  same  relation  to  the  general  notion  of  the  right,  as  the  dif- 
ferent forms  in  geometry  do  to  the  general  idea  of  space.  Out 
of  this  general  idea  of  the  right  and  these  specific  forms  of  the 
right  grow  certain  principles  of  moral  action  which  we  may  call 
the  moral  axioms.  Thus  having  the  idea  of  truth  and  falsehood 
and  the  right,  there  immediately  arises  the  intuitive  truth  that  to 
speak  the  truth  is  right  and  to  tell  a  falsehood  is  wrong.  These 
moral  axioms  have  about  the  same  relation  to  the  science  of 
ethics  that  the  axioms  relating  to  space  have  to  the  science  of 
geometry. 

Idea  of  Duty. — The  ideas  of  the  right  and  of  obligation  lead  to 
another  idea,  that  of  duty.  Each  idea  of  the  right,  when  accom- 
panied with  the  idea  of  obligation,  presents  itself  as  a  duty.  The 
idea  of  duty  is  thus  a  complex  cognition  consisting  of  two  cog- 
nitions, the  right  and  the  ought.  It  also  implies  a  belief  in  the 
freedom  of  the  will,  though  it  does  not  embody  an  act  of  the  will. 
This  idea  of  duty  leads  to  an  act  of  the  will ;  and  when  thus  env 
bodied  in  human  action,  we  have  virtue.  Virtue  is  thus  a  trinity 
of  elements ;  the  right,  the  ought,  and  th*  act  which  embodies 
them. 

The  Different  Duties. — The  duties  may  be  classed  under 
three  general  heads;  duties  to  self,  duties  to  others,  and  duties  to 
God.  The  duties  to  self  are  called  Personal  Duties.  They  in- 
clude Control,  Culture,  Purity,  etc.  The  duties  we  owe  to  others 
are  called  Relative  Duties.  They  include  Veracity,  Honesty, 
Kindness,  etc.  The  duties  we  owe  to  God  are  called  Religious 
Duties.  They  include  Faith,  Love,  Reverence,  etc.  The  object 
of  moral  culture  is  first,  to  lead  us  to  a  clear  idea  of  all  these 
duties ;  second,  to  impress  the  obligation  to  do  these  duties ;  third, 
to  lead  to  the  actual  development  of  these  ideas  in  virtuous 
actions,  and  thus  to  develop  manly  and  womanly  character. 

Duty  and  its  Opposite — Each  one  of  these  duties  has  its 

- 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  EIGHT.          409 

opposite ;  the  good  and  the  evil  being  related  in  opposite  pairs. 
Thus  we  have  the  right  and  the  wrong,  duty  and  its  opposite, 
virtue  and  vice.  The  doing  of  a  duty  is  a  virtue;  the  doing  of  its 
opposite  is  a  vice.  The  mere  omission  of  a  duty  is  also  a  wrong; 
as,  a  lack  of  respect,  or  obedience,  or  kindness,  or  gratitude.  A 
vice  is  thus  a  contrary  to  a  virtue,  and  sometimes  a  privative  of 
it, — a  relation  similar  to  that  of  positive  and  negative  conceptions. 
The  object  of  moral  culture  is  to  enforce  the  right,  and  prevent 
the  wrong ;  to  lead  the  child  to  do  the  duty  and  avoid  its  opposite. 

II.  IMPORTANCE  OF  THIS  CULTURE. — The  importance  of  the 
moral  idea  will  indicate  the  importance  of  moral  culture.  As  it 
stands  highest  among  our  cognitions,  so  does  its  culture  transcend 
that  of  every  other  cognition.  As  the  idea  brings  into  activity 
every  part  of  our  spiritual  nature,  so  does  the  culture  of  intuition 
in  the  sphere  of  the  Good  affect  man  more  profoundly  than  the 
training  of  any  other  faculty  of  the  intellect.  A  few  remarks 
will  be  presented  to  indicate  the  value  of  this  idea  and  its  devel- 
opment in  the  human  mind. 

To  the  Individiial. — The  cognition  of  the  good  gives  highest 
dignity  and  glory  to  the  soul.  It  does  this,  first,  because  it  is 
the  nobles  attribute  of  man's  nature.  There  is  a  scale  of  these 
higher  ideas, — the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good, — all  of 
which  give  especial  beauty  and  worthiness  to  man's  nature.  Of 
these  three  ideas,  that  of  the  Good  stands  the  highest ;  it  is  the 
crowning  idea  of  the  soul;  and  its  culture  thus  gives  highest 
excellence  and  dignity  to  the  spiritual  nature.  Second,  it  is  also 
the  basis  of  responsible  action,  and  thus  of  moral  character.  It 
moulds  man's  thoughts  and  feelings,  gives  a  spiritual  worth  and 
dignity  to  his  actions,  and  is  the  basis  of  that  spiritual  entity 
which  we  call  character.  The  highest  product  of  man's  life  is 
character;  and  the  essence  of  character  is  the  moral  element. 
From  this  it  draws  its  inspiration  and  life ;  and  in  it  the  element 
of  the  good  shines  with  an  ineffable  radiance. 

In  Personal  Influence. — The  idea  of  the  right  is  the  source 
of  personal  influence.  The  man  who  enthrones  the  idea  of  the 
18 


410  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

good  at  the  centre  of  his  being,  becomes  the  man  of  moral  power. 
The  words  of  such  a  man  fall  on  the  heart  with  an  influence  that 
no  mere  eloquence  of  language  can  give.  The  ancients  were 
right  in  regarding  moral  character  as  one  of  the  elements  of  an 
orator,  for  the  words  that  come  from  a  heart  consecrated  to  the 
sentiment  of  duty  seem  to  be  charged  with  spiritual  power.  The 
moral  idea  gives  a  man's  actions  an  influence  they  can  derive 
from  no  other  source.  A  man  whose  character  is  moulded 
around  the  idea  of  the  good  moves  through  the  world  like  the 
sun  in  the  heavens,  giving  light  and  influence  wherever  he  goes. 
Washington  was  great,  not  as  a  statesman,  not  as  an  orator  or 
writer  of  state  papers,  not  even  as  a  general ;  his  greatness  lay  in 
his  moral  attributes,  in  his  peerless  character.  Aaron  Burr,  with 
the  rarest  grace  of  personal  accomplishment,  with  the  silvery 
tongue  of  persuasive  eloquence,  and  with  a  mind  that  grasped 
great  questions  and  reduced  them  to  simplicity,  was  shorn  of  his 
influence  when  it  was  known  that  he  lacked  moral  principle. 

Value  to  literature. — The  idea  of  the  right  is  the  source  of 
what  is  best  in  literature.  It  is  the  informing  principle  of  all 
that  is  most  interesting  or  inspiring  in  prose  or  poetry.  Take 
the  idea  of  the  right  out  of  literature, — the  struggle  of  the  two 
moral  forces  in  life,  and  the  triumph  of  the  good  over  the  evil, — 
and  we  remove  nearly  everything  that  gives  it  value  and  interest. 
Omit  this  element  in  poetry,  and  though  beauty  might  remain, 
the  highest  element  of  beauty  is  wanting ;  it  has  lost  the  warmth 
and  glow  of  life,  and  remains  but  a  cold,  icy  statue,  without  a 
beating  heart  or  living  soul.  Oratory  is  grandest  when,  in 
earnest,  burning  words,  the  orator  pleads  for  law,  justice,  and 
honor.  Even  fiction  would  lose  nearly  all  of  its  charms  did  not 
the  hope  of  a  final  adjustment  of  the  moral  forces,  the  punishment 
of  vice  and  the  reward  of  virtue,  keep  alive  the  interest  in  the 
•  development  of  events. 

Value  to  the  Arts. — The  idea  of  the  right  is  the  highest  in- 
spiration to  art.  The  aesthetic  element  is  not  sufficient  for  the 
greatest  triumphs  of  the  artist.  The  most  celebrated  paintings 


THE  CULTURE   OF  THE   RIGHT.  411 

or  worKS  of  statuary  are  not  those  that  embody  pure  beauty 
alone,  but  those  in  which  the  moral  element  blends  with  the 
beautiful.  The  highest  works  of  art  are  those  related  to  religion, 
and  religion  is  the  moral  element  lifted  up  into  the  divine.  The 
Madonnas  and  the  Transfiguration  of  Raphael,  and  the  paintings 
and  statues  of  Michael  Angelo,  all  embody  some  ethical  or  reli- 
gious idea.  The  sublime  statue  of  Moses,  the  fainting  form  of  the 
Dying  Gladiator,  and  the  fearful  group  of  the  Laocoon,  derive 
their  power  from  the  expression  of  a  moral  element.  The  grand 
cathedrals  are  the  embodiment  of  the  sentiments  of  aspirations  and 
devotion,  and  seem  to  be  shrines  for  the  indwelling  of  the  divine 
goodness.  Music  is  never  so  grand  as  when,  in  organ  symphony 
or  majestic  chorus,  it  strives  to  express  the  deep  religious  emotions 
of  the  soul. 

Value  to  Society. — The  idea  of  the  right  is  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  social  organization.  It  is  the  central  force  that 
attracts  men  together  and  holds  them  in  the  bonds  of  social 
amity  and  peace.  Without  this  idea,  men  might  herd  together 
like  the  brute  animals ;  but  the  beautiful  fabric  of  social  life  is 
quite  a  different  thing  from  a  herd  of  cattle  or  a  hive  of  bees. 
The  care  for  one  another's  rights  and  privileges,  the  acts  of  kind- 
ness and  benevolence,  the  establishment  of  schools  for  the  edu- 
cation of  the  young,  the  erection  of  asylums  for  the  afflicted 
and  insane,  all  the  social  institutions  that  give  beauty  and  excel- 
lence and  refinement  to  social  life,  have  their  origin  in  this  idea 
of  the  right. 

Value  to  the  State. — The  state  is  also  a  crystallization  of 
forces  around  the  idea  of  the  right.  The  ethical  sentiment  is  the 
tie  that  binds  together  the  minds  and  hearts  of  men  into  the 
organic  unity  of  government.  Take  the  idea  of  the  right  out  of 
the  state,  and  it  falls  shivered  into  a  thousand  fragments.  Each 
party  rallies  around  some  moral  idea,  and  makes  its  appeal  to 
voters  in  the  name  of  some  great  principle  of  human  justice. 
On  this  principle  revolutions  are  organized,  and  governments 
revolutionized.  Let  any  great  wrong  be  perpetrated  by  the 


412  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

government  or  the  party  in  power,  and  the  people  will  rise  in 
their  might  to  overthrow  it.  The  Revolution  and  the  Civil  War 
were  both  fought  in  the  name  of  justice  and  human  rights.  All 
progress  in  government  has  grown  out  of  a  clearer  apprehension 
of  human  rights  and  civil  duties ;  and  the  ideal  of  the  future  is  a 
government  crystallized  around  the  idea  of  complete  and  impar- 
tial justice. 

III.  PRINCIPLES  OP  ETHICAL  CULTURE. — Having  a  clear 
conception  of  the  nature  of  the  ideas  to  be  developed,  we  next 
inquire  how  these  ideas  are  to  be  cultivated  and  the  different 
duties  inculcated.  The  work  is  delicate  and  difficult,  and  of 
great  practical  interest.  The  general  method  of  development 
may  be  briefly  stated  to  be  by  precept,  by  example,  and  by  habit. 
That  is,  the  moral  nature  may  be  developed  by  instilling  moral 
axioms  into  the  mind,  by  presenting  examples  of  virtuous  action, 
and  by  leading  to  the  acquisition  of  habits  of  right  conduct.  A 
statement  of  these  general  principles  in  detail,  with  one  or  two 
others  closely  related  to  them,  will  be  appropriate  to  the  discus- 
sion. 

Witt  Admit  of  Culture. — The  moral  intuitions  will  admit  of 
culture  and  development.  Though  the  idea  of  the  right  is  an 
intuition,  the  clear  and  definite  perception  of  moral  ideas  is 
largely  aided  by  circumstances  and  education.  Careful  culture, 
though  it  does  not  implant  the  idea,  will  do  much  for  its  develop- 
ment. Careful  training  will  make  the  eye  for  moral  distinctions 
sensitive  and  bright ;  while  neglect  or  evil  influences  will  dull 
the  perception  and  deaden  the  moral  sense.  A  corrupt  and  de- 
graded life,  though  it  may  not  entirely  destroy  the  power  of  per- 
ceiving moral  distinctions,  will  blunt  the  moral  perceptions  and 
destroy  that  fine  sense  of  duty  that  belongs  to  the  virtuously 
educated  mind.  The  demand  for  culture  of  the  moral  sense  is 
greater  than  that  of  any  of  the  intuitions,  since  the  colliding  in- 
fluences of  appetite  and  passion  tend  to  lead  us  away  from  our 
ideas  of  the  right,  and  subvert  our  conceptions  of  duty. 

Should  JZegin  Early. — The  culture  of  the  idea  of  dutv  should 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  RIGHT.          413 

begin  early  in  the  life  of  the  child.  Its  intuitive  sense  of  right 
and  wrong  should  be  properly  directed.  The  delicate  perceptions 
of  the  young  mind  and  the  sensitive  feelings  of  the  young  heart 
should  not  be  blunted  and  warped  by  the  influences  of  wrong 
precepts  or  vicious  companions.  Thought  and  feeling  should  both 
be  attuned  to  the  ideas  of  truth  and  goodness.  The  practice  of 
right  doing  at  this  early  formative  period  of  life  will  become  crys- 
tallized into  habits  and  be  fixed  in  the  character.  Moral  culture 
should  therefore  begin  with  the  intellectual  life  of  the  child,  and 
be  continued  through  its  entire  education.  The  young  soul 
should  be  wedded  to  the  principles  of  morality,  so  that  its  tastes 
and  pleasures  and  longings  are  all  in  the  direction  of  what  is  pure 
and  virtuous. 

Feeling  with  Cognition. — In  the  culture  of  the  moral  ideas, 
feeling  should  be  blended  with  cognition.  Conscience  is  a  com- 
bination of  intellect  and  emotion  ;  and  the  two  seem  to  combine 
in  our  convictions  of  moral  duties.  The  moral  feelings  are  an 
incitement  to  moral  cognitions;  they  constrain  and  incite  the 
intuitive  power  to  action.  Indeed,  in  these  moral  intuitions,  as 
well  as  in  the  beautiful,  intuition  seems  to  become  interpene- 
trated and  suffused  with  emotion,  constituting  a  moral  sense  or 
susceptibility  for  moral  distinctions.  The  eye  of  the  reason 
seems  to  grow  brighter  in  its  perceptions  when  illuminated  by 
the  flame  of  emotion  kindled  on  the  altars  of  the  heart. 

In  the  Concrete. — Moral  culture  should  be  given  in  the  con- 
crete. We  need  examples  of  virtuous  actions,  as  an  occasion  for 
the  development  of  moral  distinctions  in  young  minds.  They 
need  to  see  moral  truth  embodied  in  moral  deeds  in  order  to  ob- 
tain a  clear  cogniton  of  moral  ideas.  Let  virtue  embody  itself 
in  human  form,  and  walk,  talk,  and  act,  and  an  impression  is 
made  that  will  manifest  itself  in  the  thought  and  conduct.  Talk 
to  a  child  of  the  beauty  and  necessity  of  truthfulness,  and  your 
words  may  fall  on  listless  ears ;  but  give  him.  truth  and  honesty 
in  action,  and  his  mind  opens  to  perceive  and  appreciate  the  right. 
The  moral  lessons  for  children  should  therefore  be  in  the  form  of 


414:  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

incidents  of  moral  action.  Christ  set  an  example  of  moral  teach- 
ing by  his  use  of  the  parable  in  presenting  the  truths  of  the  new 
gospel ;  and  the  teacher  of  morals  should  follow  the  example  of 
the  Great  Teacher. 

Example  of  the  Teacher. — One  of  the  strongest  influences 
in  the  culture  of  moral  ideas  and  duties  is  that  which  reveals 
itself  in  the  daily  life  of  the  teacher.  This  moral  influence,  rising 
unconsciously  out  of  the  depths  of  his  being  and  emanating  from 
him  as  a  kind  of  spiritual  radiance,  makes  an  imperishable  im- 
pression. A  lack  of  moral  power  in  the  teacher  will  be  imme- 
diately felt  by  the  pupils;  and  the  profession  or  assumption  of 
virtue  without  a  reality  at  the  heart,  will  but  teach  .  deceit  and 
hypocrisy.  When  there  is  not  a  devotion  to  duty  burning  within 
the  soul,  all  outward  manifestations  of  it  will  be  worse  than 
worthless.  At  every  point  of  contact  with  the  teacher  who  is 
pure  and  noble  at  heart,  the  pupils  will  feel  the  presence  and 
charm  of  a  manly  integrity,  and  be  stimulated  to  virtuous 
thought  and  action. 

Examples  of  Parents. — The  examples  of  parents  are  espe- 
cially powerful  in  moral  culture.  The  strongest  lesson  in  moral- 
ity is  the  daily  walk  and  conversation  of  upright  and  virtuous 
parents.  The  precept  of  father  or  mother  may  do  some  good ; 
but  the  loving  deed  of  the  mother  and  the  inflexible  integrity  of 
the  father  will  do  much  more  than  their  words.  Parents  should 
be  careful  to  embody  their  precepts  in  their  own  lives.  The  real 
in  parents  begets  a  reality  in  their  children;  they  are  influenced 
more  by  what  their  parents  are  than  by  what  they  say.  The 
parent  who  teaches  one  thing  in  precept  and  another  thing  in 
practice,  need  not  be  surprised  if  his  children  should  be  early 
skilled  in  fraud  and  deceit.  For  a  father  to  tell  his  boy  not  to 
smoke,  and  have  to  take  his  cigar  out  of  his  mouth  to  do  so,  will 
not  make  a  very  deep  impression  in  respect  to  the  vice  of  smok- 
ing. The  highest  idea  of  duty  lives  in  the  heart  and  shines 
through  us  in  our  lives ;  and  the  parent  who  is  true  to  a  high 
ideal  of  purity  and  virtue  will  be  a  constant  lesson,  a  living 
epistle  of  duty  to  his  children. 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE    EIGHT.  415 

By  Literature. — Good  literature  is  a  strong  influence  for  the 
culture  of  moral  ideas  and  feelings.  Here  noble  sentiments  are 
expressed  and  deeds  of  honor  and  heroism  are  portrayed.  Our 
sympathies  are  enlisted  in  favor  of  the  right  and  against  the 
wrong,  and  the  heart  throbs  in  unison  with  that  which  is  pure, 
noble,  and  elevated.  Here  we  learn  to  admire  high  ideals  of 
character,  and  to  form  our  own  ideals  of  what  we  would  like  to 
do  and  become.  Vice,  too,  is  portrayed  in  repulsive  colors,  so 
that  we  turn  away  from  it  with  instinctive  hatred.  Where  the 
demands  of  retributive  justice  are  satisfactorily  met,  as  they 
should  be  in  a  work  of  art,  the  consequences  of  evil  actions  tend 
to  deter  one  from  a  life  of  vice.  There  are  works  of  literature, 
however,  which  do  not  possess  these  attributes,  and  become  a 
source  of  degradation  rather  than  elevation;  and  these  should 
carefully  be  withheld  from  the  young. 

By  History. — The  study  of  history  is  valuable  in  developing 
moral  ideas.  History  deals  with  the  actions  of  mankind,  and 
these  actions  contain  a  moral  element.  They  reveal  the  motives 
which  have  inspired  mankind,  wherein  dwells  the  idea  of  duty. 
The  consequences  of  these  actions  also  serve  to  cultivate  our  ap- 
preciation of  the  good  and  our  detestation  of  the  evil.  The  deeds 
of  benevolence  call  forth  our  admiration  and  inspire  us  with  a 
spirit  of  benevolence ;  the  heroic  actions  of  heroes  and  martyrs 
lift  the  soul  up  to  a  plane  of  moral  feeling  in  which  it  also 
aspires  to  deeds  of  heroism.  So  also,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
element  of  meanness  in  human  action,  the  craft  and  falsehood  of 
the  unprincipled,  and  the  corruption  of  the  base  and  degraded, 
repel  the  soul  and  cause  it  to  turn,  with  an  instinctive  dread  or 
hatred  of  what  is  low  and  vicious,  towards  what  is  pure  and 
virtuous. 

By  tlie  Bible. — The  book  of  books  for  the  culture  of  the 
moral  nature  is  the  Bible.  Here  we  have  the  finest  precepts  of 
virtue  ever  penned ;  and  here  we  see  some  of  the  noblest  ideals 
of  human  conduct  and  character.  In  this  book  we  have  the 
most  impressive  statements  of  the  wages  of  sin ;  and  here  are 


416  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

portrayed  the  most  striking  examples  and  results  of  wrong-doing. 
Above  all,  it  is  in  this  book  that  illumined  with  a  divine 
morality  and  radiant  with  a  celestial  virtue,  is  portrayed  the 
ideal  man,  full  of  grace  and  truth.  Filling  the  hearts  of  the 
young  with  the  golden  precepts  that  fell  from  his  lips,  and  im- 
planting his  character  in  their  minds  as  an  ideal  of  virtue,  we 
have  the  strongest  influence  for  the  development  of  moral  ideas 
and  moral  character. 

Avoid  Evil  Influences. — An  important  thing  in  moral  cul- 
ture is  to  avoid  evil  influences.  The  soul  can  be  stained  or 
marred  by  sin ;  the  moral  sense  can  be  weakened  by  contact  with 
vulgarity  and  vice ;  the  taste  can  be  contaminated  so  that  it  will 
enjoy  the  evil  rather  than  the  refined  and  elevated.  Evil  in- 
fluences seem  to  blunt  the  moral  perceptions  and  seal  the  eye  of 
reason.  These  influences,  too,  are  do  insidious  in  their  nature 
that  they  steal  in  upon  the  soul,  and  stain  it  before  we  are  aware 
of  them.  All  such  influences  weaken  our  perception  of  the  right 
and  duty,  and  should  be  carefully  guarded  against  in  the  moral 
education  of  the  young.  It  may  be  well  to  allow  the  young  to 
see  a  little  of  vice  in  its  repulsive  aspects ;  but  this  is  doubtful 
policy.  The  method  of  the  Spartans,  who  taught  their  sons  tem- 
perance by  making  the  Helots  intoxicated,  is  questionable. 

Moral  Influences. — We  should  endeavor  to  surround  the 
young  with  moral  influences.  The  eye  of  reason  for  the  per- 
ception of  moral  ideas,  grows  brighter  with  the  purity  of  the 
soul.  Whatever  tends  to  purify  and  elevate  the  spiritual  nature, 
seems  to  increase  our  spiritual  perceptions.  The  more  elevated 
the  character,  the  broader  and  higher  the  grasp  of  the  moral  in- 
tuitions. As  the  ear,  with  musical  training,  becomes  so  delicate 
that  it  catches  the  slightest  discord,  so  the  conscience  may  be  so 
delicately  attuned  to  virtue  that  the  slightest  variation  from  it 
will  break  upon  the  moral  sense  like  a  discord  upon  the  ear. 
By  the  refining  influence  of  virtue,  the  conscience  becomes  so 
sensitive  that  the  most  delicate  moral  distinctions  will  be  imme- 
diately seen  and  felt.  Spiritual  elevation  carries  with  it  additional 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  RIGHT.          417 

spiritual  insight ;  and  whetever  influences  tend  to  purify  the 
heart  and  ennoble  the  life,  will  aid  in  the  culture  of  the  intuitions 
of  the  right. 

A  Rule  of  Action. — The  intelligent  conception  of  moral 
action  is  aided  by  a  clear  conception  of  some  broad  and  compre- 
hensive rule  of  right.  Such  a  principle  will  answer  the  questions, 
— Why  is  this  action  right  ?  why  is  one  course  of  action  to  be 
taken  instead  of  some  other  course?  There  are  several  such 
rules  which  will  guide  us  practically  in  moral  action.  One  is  the 
simple  principle  of  right ;  a  thing  should  be  done  because  it  is 
right.  Another  principle  is  that  an  action  should  be  performed 
because  it  secures  the  best  interests  of  all  concerned.  Another  rule 
in  respect  to  our  actions  to  others,  is  that  we  should  do  as  we 
would  be  done  by.  Dr.  Hickok's  rule  of  "spiritual  worthiness," 
though  I  do  not  regard  it  as  an  "absolute  rule  of  right,"  is  one 
of  the  most  elevated  and  practical  that  has  ever  been  announced. 
The  principle  is  that  I  should  do  an  act  because  it  secures  my  own 
spiritual  worthiness.  To  know  that  it  is  worthy  of  the  soul  and 
gives  spiritual  dignity,  is  my  sanction  for  the  correctness  of  my 
actions.  It  is  equivalent  to  a  high  self-respect ;  and  the  law  is 
that  a  thing  is  right  which  enables  the  soul  to  respect  itself. 
Such  a  rule  as  this  tends  to  reinforce  our  intuitive  conception  of 
the  right,  and  gives  the  sanction  of  our  own  spiritual  worthiness 
to  such  an  intuition. 

IV.  CULTURE  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  DUTIES. — The  conception 
of  Duty,  as  already  explained,  involves  the  idea  of  the  right  and 
of  obligation.  We  apprehend  it  to  be  our  duty  to  do  what  we 
cognize  as  right ;  and  also  to  leave  undone  what  we  cognize  as 
wrong.  Our  duties  are  many  and  various ;  but  for  this  dis- 
cussion they  may  all  be  embraced  under  three  general  classes ; 
Duties  to  Self,  Duties  to  Others,  and  Duties  to  God.  There  are 
also  duties  to  society  and  the  state ;  but  these  are  omitted  as  less 
appropriate  to  the  consideration  of  the  culture  of  the  sense  of 
duty  in  the  young. 

PERSONAL  DUTIES. — Personal  duties  are  those  which  we  owe 
18* 


418.  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

to  ourselves  as  spiritual  and  immortal  beings.  They  are  duties 
which  we  should  attend  to  if  we  were  the  only  persons  living  in 
the  world,  or  if  we  were  cut  off  from  all  association  with  our 
fellow  men.  They  contribute  to  our  own  personal  welfare,  and 
secure  the  approbation  and  worthiness  of  our  own  spirits.  The 
most  important  of  these  duties  are  Control,  Culture,  Purity,  In- 
dustry, and  Temperance.  Each  of  these  duties  has  its  opposite 
to  be  avoided ;  as,  Intemperance,  Indolence,  Impurity,  etc.  To 
these  we  should  apply  the  general  law  of  moral  culture,  that  we 
should  cultivate  the  virtue  and  avoid  the  vice. 

Self-Control. — One  of  the  first  duties  to  ourselves  is  that  of 
self-control.  Man  finds  in  himself  impulses  and  propensities  that 
tend  to  his  injury  and  degradation.  These  impulses  are  of  two 
kinds,  mental  and  physical.  The  physical  impulses  are  our 
appetites  for  animal  gratification;  as,  eating,  drinking,  indolence, 
licentiousness,  etc.  The  mental  impulses  are  such  as  jealousy, 
vanity,  auger,  peevishness,  intolerance,  etc.  All  of  these  impulses, 
when  uncontrolled  by  reason,  tend  to  injure  our  bodies  or  minds, 
and  weaken  and  degrade  our  spiritual  nature.  The  first  duty 
to  ourselves,  therefore,  is  the  proper  control  of  these  desires 
and  propensities.  Such  a  control  is  required  to  preserve  the 
body  and  mind  from  injury.  It  is  also  demanded  by  the  interests 
of  our  spiritual  nature,  as  all  lawless  passions  bring  degradation 
und  a  loss  of  self-rtspect. 

Purity. — A  second  duty  to  one's  self  is  that  of  purity.  We 
should  not  only  restrain  ourselves  from  evil  by  self-control,  which 
is  a  negative  virtue ;  but  we  should  also,  by  positive  effort,  culti- 
vate spiritual  purity.  All  evil  thoughts  that,  like  serpents,  go 
creeping  through  the  soul,  leaving  their  slimy  trail  behind,  should 
be  carefully  excluded.  Thoughts  of  the  pure  and  refined  should 
be  welcomed  and  cultivated ;  and  aspirations  after  the  high  and 
noble  should  be  encouraged.  The  soul  should  be  a  shrine  of 
pure  thoughts  and  beautiful  imaginings,  a  temple  fit  for  the  in- 
dwelling of  the  gods.  The  light  of  truth  and  beauty  should  be 
shining  there,  and  the  vestal  flame  of  purity  should  be  kept  ever 


THE    CULTURE   OF   THE    RIGHT.  419 

burning  on  the  altars  of  the  heart.  From  every  soul  should  arise 
like  a  sweet  incense  the  prayer  of  Socrates  of  old,  "  Grant  to 
make  me  beautiful  within." 

Culture. — Culture  is  a  duty  that  the  mind  owes  to  itself.  The 
soul  is  not  created  nature ;  it  grows  into  spiritual  excellence  by 
proper  culture.  This  growth  may  be  stimulated  and  directed ; 
and  it  is  duty  of  every  person  to  labor  for  the  proper  develop- 
ment of  all  his  powers.  The  fact  that  the  soul  can  be  cultivated 
indicates  the  duty  of  affording  it  culture.  The  further  fact  that 
the  spiritual  nature  reaches  its  highest  state  of  perfection  by  cul- 
ture, emphasizes  this  duty.  The  glory  of  man  is  in  a  full  and 
harmonious  development  of  all  his  powers.  To  neglect  this  cul- 
ture is  an  indignity  to  our  own  souls ;  to  afford  this  culture  secures 
the  approval  of  our  sense  of  right,  and  meets  the  demands  of 
spiritual  worthiness. 

Indtistry. — The  duty  of  industry  should  be  early  inculcated. 
This  is  an  important  practical  virtue;  man  was  not  born  to  idle 
away  his  time  in  pleasure,  but  to  accomplish  some  useful  purpose. 
He  is  to  be  not  merely  a  consumer,  but  a  producer  of  that  upon 
which  he  lives.  The  law  of  industry  is  written  in  the  very  con- 
stitution of  man.  It  needs  no  divine  command  to  teach  that  "in 
the  sweat  of  thy  face  shalt  thou  eat  bread."  Every  man  is  under 
obligation  to  the  behests  of  his  own  soul  to  do  something,  and  not 
be  a  mere  drone  in  the  busy  hive  of  the  world.  The  virtue  of 
industry  should  thus  be  early  inculcated,  and  the  vice  of  indo- 
lence proscribed.  Teachers  and  parents  should  aim  to  cultivate 
industrious  habits  among  the  young,  and  thus  make  work  a 
pleasure  and  idleness  a  source  of  un  happiness. 

Temperance. — The  virtue  of  temperance  is  closely  related  to 
that  of  self-control.  It  is  the  regulated  activity  of  those  appetites 
which,  immoderately  indulged,  lead  to  degradation  and  ruin. 
Many  things  are  wrong  only  in  their  abuse ;  and  such  abuse  is 
intemperance.  Temperance  is  the  proper  use  of  our  powers, 
either  mental  or  physical,  and  of  those  objects  which  gratify  or 
give  pleasure  to  these  powers.  Thus  we  should  be  temperate  iu 


420  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

eating  and  drinking ;  gluttony  or  drunkenness  is  an  indignity 
and  a  disgrace  to  the  human  spirit.  So  there  are  other  propen- 
sities which,  when  moderately  exercised,  contribute  to  our  welfare, 
but  when  exercised  without  restraint  degrade  us  to  the  level  of 
the  brute.  The  duty  of  temperance  should  be  early  taught  to 
the  young;  and,  if  possible,  confirmed  into  a  habit. 

Ambition. — Ambition  is  a  moral  trait  of  mixed  good  and 
evil.  An  ambition  for  high  attainments  in  science  or  art  or 
moral  achievement,  is  a  noble  motive,  and  should  be  sedulously 
cultivated.  An  ambition  to  equal  in  skill  or  power  or  influence 
any  of  our  fellows  is  also  a  virtue  worthy  of  ourselves  and  is  of 
advantage  to  the  world.  When,  however,  the  ambition  seeks 
power  or  influence  for  unworthy  ends,  it  becomes  a  vice  and 
should  be  avoided.  The  passion  to  excel  others  for  the  mere 
purpose  of  excelling  them,  or  for  the  purpose  of  standing  above 
or  ruling  them,  is  an  ignoble  quality  of  mind  ;  in  this  form, 
ambition  has  been  a  scourge  to  mankind,  and  deserves  the 
obloquy  it  receives.  A  person  dominated  by  such  a  mean  and 
ungenerous  ambition,  can  secure*  neither  the  approval  of  his  own 
spirit  nor  the  respect  of  the  world. 

Vanity. — Vanity  is  a  moral  trait  entirely  unworthy  of  a  self- 
respecting  spirit.  It  indicates  a  littleness  of  character  that 
receives,  as  it  merits,  the  contempt  and  pity  of  others.  Vanity 
manifests  itself  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Some  persons  are  vain  of 
their  wealth,  others  of  their  personal  appearance  or  their  position 
in  life,  others  of  their  family  or  their  birth, — things  that  give  no 
true  nobility  to  character.  Others,  again,  are  vain  of  their 
attainments  in  knowledge  or  their  achievements  in  science,  art,  or 
literature, — things  which  are  excellent  in  themselves,  but  which 
lose  their  attraction  when  associated  with  egotism  and  vanity. 
The  vain  man  thrusts  himself  forward  on  public  occasions,  ob- 
trudes himself  on  public  notice,  turns  the  conversation  upon  him- 
self or  upon  subjects  which  will  give  prominence  to  his  own 
actions  and  attainments.  In  all  such  cases  the  person  makes 
himself  an  object  of  contempt,  and  is  usually  a  "laughing-stock" 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE    RIGHT.  42] 

even  to  those  who  may  respect  his  real  excellencies  of  character. 
Vanity  thus  detracts  from  our  appreciation  of  those  things  which 
are  really  worthy  of  our  esteem  in  a  man,  and  creates  contempt 
where  there  might  have  been  admiration.  A  manly  unconscious- 
ness of  one's  own  merits  is  the  brightest  ornament  of  high  attain- 
ments and  noble  actions. 

Covetousness. — Covetousness  is  an  ignoble  feeling  that  tends 
to  bring  degradation  upon  the  soul  that  cherishes  it.  It  mani- 
fests itself  in  an  inordinate  longing  for  anything  that  is  not  our 
own ;  though  it  is  usually  applied  to  the  desire  for  wealth. 
When  this  develops  into  a  passion  and  takes  possession  of  the 
soul,  as  it  often  does,  we  have  one  of  the  most  pitiable  examples 
of  the  degradation  of  the  human  spirit  of  which  we  can  conceive. 
For  wealth  the  miser  denies  himself  the  comforts  of  life,  forgets 
the  claims  of  kindred  and  friends,  scorns  the  demands  of  charity 
and  benevolence,  and  centres  his  affections  on  sordid  dust.  His 
soul  seems  to  shrivel  and  shrink  until  every  kindly  impulse  or 
generous  feeling  is  destroyed,  and  he  becomes  as  insensible  as  the 
gold  he  worships.  In  opposition  to  so  detestable  a  vice,  we  should 
train  ourselves  and  our  pupils  to  generous  impulses  and  a  kindly 
spirit  of  benevolence  that  will  bless  mankind  as  it  adorns  one's 
own  character. 

DUTIES  TO  OTHERS. — The  second  class  of  duties  are  those 
which  grow  ojut  of  our  relation  to  other  persons  than  ourselves. 
The  principal  of  these  duties  are,  Courtesy,  Obedience,  Veracity, 
Honesty,  Charity,  Gratitude,  etc.  The  obligation  to  discharge 
these  duties  is  two-fold.  First,  they  are  demanded  of  us  by  the 
rights  of  others ;  we  are  under  obligation  to  do  them  because  of 
their  relation  to  and  effects  upon  mankind.  Second,  the  dis- 
charge of  these  duties  secures  our  own  spiritual  worthiness ;  to 
neglect  or  violate  them  brings  spiritual  unworthiness  and  a  sense 
of  personal  dishonor.  Both  of  these  principles  should  be  applied 
as  motives  to  the  discharge  of  our  relative  duties. 

Courtesy. — Courtesy  is  a  common  duty,  not  restricted  to  any 
particular  relation,  but  one  which  we  owe  to  all  mankind.  In 


422  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

its  negative  form,  it  excludes  all  rudeness  and  insolence  towards 
a  person,  forbids  scorn  and  arrogance  and  ridicule,  and  every- 
thing that  carries  with  it  an  appearance  of  disrespect  or  insult. 
In  its  positive  aspect,  it,  requires  civility  in  word  and  action,  and 
a  careful  attention  to  the  feelings  and  opinions  of  others.  Any 
discourtesy  is  an  indignity  to  the  person  towards  whom  it  is  ex- 
tended, and  a  violation  of  his  intrinsic  right  to  be  treated  with 
respect.  An  act  of  discourtesy  towards  us  does  not  release  us 
from  the  duty  of  courtesy;  we  may  properly  feel  indignant  at 
such  treatment,  but  our  resentment  may  be  tempered  with  a 
dignity  and  delicacy  which  manifest  our  appreciation  of  our  own 
worthiness  and  a  sense  of  what  is  due  from  us  to  others,  even 
though  they  are  unworthy  of  it. 

Obedience. — Obedience  is  a  virtue  that  springs  out  of  the  re- 
lation of  a  person  to  one  in  authority  over  him.  It  is  a  rational 
duty,  and  is  readily  recognized  by  a  mind  in  which  the  sense 
of  the  right  is  clear  and  intelligent.  It  is  a  duty  rendered  in 
obedience  to  the  demands  of  our  own  spirit,  as  well  as  to  the  re- 
quirement of  the  person  in  authority.  We  see  that  the  person 
has  a  right  to  demand  obedience;  and  we  obey  because  of  his 
right  to  demand.  We  see,  at  the  same  time,  that  we  are  under 
obligations  to  obey,  even  aside  from  this  demand ;  and  that  not 
to  render  this  obedience  would  be  an  indignity  to  our  own  spir- 
itual natures.  This  principle  should  be  carefully  inculcated  in 
the  minds  of  the  young.  They  should  be  taught  the  duty  of 
obedience,  and  learn  to  render  it  willingly,  and  with  a  sense  of 
personal  dignity  in  so  doing.  They  should  be  obedient  to 
parents,  teachers,  and  all  others  in  authority,  and  thus  cultivate 
the  virtue  of  good  citizenship, — obedience  to  the  state. 

Veracity. — Veracity  is  a  duty  that  grows  out  of  our  relation 
to  others.  To  deceive  a  person  is  an  indignity  to  him  as  a  person, 
and  is  thus  a  violation  of  the  principles  of  morality.  It  is  also 
wrong  in  that  it  may  lead  him  into  an  erroneous  statement  or  an 
improper  action.  It  is  also  seen  to  be  an  indignity  to  one's  own 
spirit ;  the  man  who  willfully  deceives  another  cannot  but  feel 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  RIGHT.          428 

that  he  sacrifices  his  own  self-respect.  Besides,  truth  is  an  excel- 
lence in  itself.  It  is  one  of  the  noblest  virtues,  and  gives  high 
worth  and  dignity  to  the  mind  in  which  it  dwells.  Its  opposite, 
lying,  is  an  ignoble  and  cowardly  vice ;  and  brings  self-degrada- 
tion and  a  loss  of  honor  to  the  soul.  Truth  should  be  cultivated 
in  small  things  as  well  as  in  great.  There  are  no  "  white  lies ;" 
a  lie  is  always  black  with  dishonor.  Care  is  to  be  taken  also  to 
avoid  falsehoods  of  equivocation,  of  gesture,  and  even  of  silence 
with  intention  to  deceive.  Such  lies  are  even  worse  than  a  direct 
untruth,  because  they  seem  to  combine  the  element  of  cowardice 
with  the  intention  to  deceive.  The  young  should  be  trained  to 
value  the  virtue  of  veracity,  and  to  enshrine  this  principle  at  the 
very  centre  of  their  being,  that  it  may  shine  with  radiance  in  all 
their  words  and  actions. 

Honesty. — Honesty  is  a  duty  that  applies  primarily  to  matters 
of  finance  and  trade ;  but  it  also  includes  all  dealings  with  others. 
We  should  be  as  careful  to  act  honestly  with  the  thoughts,  the 
reputation,  and  character  of  another,  as  with  his  property  or  his 
purse.  To  cheat  him  out  of  his  invention,  or  to  endeavor  by 
falsehood  to  rob  him  of  his  reputation  and  esteem  among  man- 
kind, would  be  as  vile  as  to  steal  his  purse  or  burn  his  buildings. 
To  deal  dishonestly  with  a  person  not  only  takes  from  him  that 
which  belongs  to  him,  but  is  also  an  indignity  to  him  as  a  rational 
being.  The  duty  of  honesty  is  also  required  by  our  own  personal 
worthiness ;  it  is  a  degradation  to  our  own  spirit  to  deal  dishon- 
estly with  our  fellow  men.  Even  if  we  could  secure  some  per- 
sonal interest  or  happiness,  it  would  be  bought  at  the  price  of 
self-contempt  and  a  sense  of  spiritual  unworthiness. 

Charity. — Charity,  or  the  spirit  of  kindness,  is  a  duty  due  to 
all  mankind.  We  are  associated  with  our  fellow-beings ;  they 
have  a  right  to  happiness,  and  we  bear  a  relation  to  that  happi- 
ness. The  law  of  kindness  forbids  anything  that  tends  to  wound 
the  feelings  or  produce  suffering  among  our  fellow  men.  It  is 
not  the  reciprocity  of  favors,  a  selfish  return  for  what  has  been 
given,  but  a  spirit  of  love  that  goes  out  to  all,  regardless  of  what 


424  MENTAL   SCIENCE . 

they  have  done  to  us.  Kindness  is  a  right  that  others  may  de- 
mand from  us ;  we  are  therefore  under  obligation,  not  only  not 
to  mar  their  happiness,  but  also  to  contribute  to  it.  This  virtue 
is  also  due  to  the  behests  of  our  own  worthiness ,  an  intentional 
act  of  unkindness  is  followed  by  a  sense  of  personal  degradation. 
The  kindly  word  or  deed  that  makes  others  happy  is  also  re- 
flective; it  leaves  a  happiness  behind  it  in  our  own  spirits.  We 
should  teach  the  young  to  give  kind  words,  friendly  smiles,  and 
helpful  deeds,  for  the  relief  and  happiness  of  those  around  them. 

Gratitude. — Gratitude  is  a  duty  that  grows  out  of  a  special 
relation  to  others,  that  of  receiving  favors  or  kindness  from  them. 
It  is  an  intuitive  cognition  that  such  favors  should  be  appreciated 
by  the  recipient,  and  awaken  in  his  heart  a  feeling  of  gratitude. 
This  feeling  should  be  manifested  by  some  token  of  word  or  deed. 
Not  to  feel  and  express  this  sentiment  of  gratitude  indicates  a 
hard  and  selfish  heart,  and  a  character  unworthy  of  esteem  or 
respect.  Ingratitude  is  one  of  the  meanest  vices ;  it  shows  a  base 
spirit.  The  duty  of  gratitude  is  a  right  of  the  benefactor ;  he 
can  claim  it  as  his  recompense  and  due.  It  is  also  demanded  by 
our  own  spiritual  worthiness ;  the  ungrateful  heart  must  exper- 
ience a  sense  of  unworthiness  as  it  stands  in  its  own  presence  and 
feels  the  gaze  of  its  own  moral  eye. 

DUTIES  TO  GOD. — Consciousness  reveals  in  the  mind  the  idea 
of  a  Supreme  Being.  This  idea,  whatever  may  be  said  of  the 
external  reality,  is  universal ;  it  is  found  in  the  mind  of  every 
nation  and  people.  The  idea  of  God  as  a  first  cause  shines  like 
a  star  in  the  sky  of  every  mind,  and  a  belief  in  him  as  a  ruler 
and  governor  of  nature  and  mankind  illumines  man's  thought 
and  character,  as  the  sun  in  the  heavens  illumines  the  world.  A 
belief  so  important  and  general  demands  recognition  in  philoso- 
phy and  education.  The  conception  of  such  a  Being  and  of  our 
relation  to  him  gives  rise  to  certain  duties  due  to  him.  These 
duties  belong  to  the  sphere  of  moral  action  in  its  broad  sense, 
and  should  be  included  in  a  system  of  moral  culture.  They  may 
be  specifically  distinguished  as  our  Religious  Duties. 


THE    CULTURE   OF   THE   RIGHT.  425 

Classes  of  Religions  Duties. — Our  duties  to  the  Divine  Be- 
ing are  many  and  various.  They  may,  however,  be  all  included 
under  three  general  Classes  ;  Faith,  Love,  and  Obedience.  Faith 
is  an  act  of  the  intellect,  and  will  include  all  of  our  beliefs  with 
respect  to  his  nature  and  the  conception  of  our  duties  toward 
him.  Love  is  an  act  of  the  sensibilities,  and  embraces  the  feel- 
ings that  should  flow  out  toward  him.  Obedience  is  an  act  of 
the  will,  and  includes  the  principle  of  all  our  religious  acts.  The 
conception  of  each  one  of  these  general  duties  is  a  product  of  the 
intuitive  power,  and  is  to  be  developed  by  the  appropriate  culture 
of  that  power.  A  few  remarks  will  be  made  in  respect  to  each 
one  of  these  duties. 

1.  Faith  in  God. — Faith  is  a  belief  in  the  existence  and 
nature  of  the  Divine  Being.  It  is  an  act  of  intuition,  and  one  of 
the  very  highest  acts  of  the  faculty.  God  does  not  reveal  himself 
to  the  senses ;  no  eye  hath  seen  nor  ear  ever  heard  him  ;  he  is  not 
an  object  of  experience,  nor  a  result  of  reflection,  but  is  known 
by  an  act  of  the  mind  that  transcends  all  experience.  He  is  not 
a  part  of  nature,  nor  is  he  revealed  in  nature ;  he  is  altogether 
above  the  natural  world, — entirely  a  supernatural.  He  does  not 
belong  to  any  of  our  finite  conceptions  of  space  and  time;  but  is 
an  infinite  in  time  and  an  infinite  in  space.  He  is  an  all-pervad- 
ing, omnipresent  spirit,  without  beginning  or  end.  He  is  not  an 
effect  of  causes,  or  a  link  in  the  chain  of  causation ;  but  is  him- 
self the  First  Cause  uncaused.  Such  is  our  necessary  conception 
of  a  divine  being ;  and  this  conception  is  one  of  intuition,  and  is 
the  highest  and  grandest  conception  of  the  intuitive  power.  The 
Supreme  Being  himself  is  beyond  all  finite  comprehension  ;  and 
is  grasped  by  that  attribute  or  operation  of  intuition  which  we 
call  Faith. 

Grandeur  of  this  Idea. — The  idea  of  God  is  the  highest  and 
noblest  to  which  the  human  mind  has  ever  attained.  It  concen- 
trates in  itself  all  that  is  grand  and  noble  and  good  and  beautiful 
and  sublime.  It  is  a  combination  of  infinities;  the  infinite  in 
time,  the  omniscient  in  knowledge,  the  omnipresent  in  space. 


426  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

We  have  an  idea  of  the  True ;  God  is  our  idea  of  absolute  TRUTH. 
We  have  an  idea  of  the  Beautiful;  God  is  our  idea  of  the  per- 
fection of  the  BEAUTIFUL.  We  have  an  idea  of  the  Good ;  God 
is  our  conception  of  the  absolute  and  infinite  GOOD.  In  this 
idea  we  combine  and  crystallize  all  the  infinitudes  of  intuition; — 
an  infinite  in  time,  an  omnipresent  in  space,  a.  first  cause  uncaused, 
a  spiritual  identity,  without  variableness  or  shadow  of  turning ; 
the  absolute  truth,  the  perfection  of  beauty,  and  the  ineffable  good, 
All  of  these  infinitudes  are  embraced  in  this  one  grand  conception 
of  GOD. 

Vahie  of  the  Idea. — This  idea  is  not  only  the  grandest  intui- 
tion of  the  soul,  but  is  the  most  important  idea  in  philosophy. 
It  is  the  most  inspiring  and  elevating  cognition  of  the  human 
mind;  it  lifts  the  soul  up  to  its  highest  aspirations  and  activities. 
Inspired  by  this  idea,  the  mind  has  attained  its  noblest  achieve- 
ments in  literature  and  art  and  character.  The  grandest  modern 
epics  are  the  Paradise  Lost  and  the  Divine  Comedy,  the  embodi- 
ment of  Christian  faith ;  and  the  grandest  epic  of  antiquity  is 
inspired  by  a  faith  in  Jupiter  and  his  attendant  deities.  In  the 
art  of  painting,  the  Transfiguration  of  Raphael,  the  Last  Supper 
of  Da  Vinci,  and  the  Last  Judgment  of  Michael  Angelo,  stand 
unapproachable  for  beauty  and  sublimity.  The  Church  of 
St.  Peter,  the  Duomo  of  Florence,  and  the  Cathedral  of  Cologne, 
are  the  embodiments  of  the  religious  faith  and  feelings  of  centu- 
ries. The  Messiah  of  Handel  and  the  Creation  of  Haydn  attain  a 
sublimity  of  conception  unsurpassed  in 'music.  The  Bible,  as  the 
development  of  the  religious  idea  of  the  world,  will  ever  be 
regarded  as  the  book  of  books.  The  highest  example  of  the  heroic 
in  character  is  seen  in  the  men  who  through  faith  in  God  ^tood 
firm  and  triumphant  in  the  martyr's  fire.  The  scene  of  highest 
moral  grandeur  on  earth  is  that  in  which  the  Son  of  Man  hung 
on  the  cross,  dying  for  the  truth,  and  with  a  pitying  heart  for 
others,  praying  "  Father,  forgive  them,"  and  with  the  thought  of 
his  own  sublime  work  completed,  exclaiming  "  It  is  finished." 

Cultivate  Faith. — This  intuition  of  faith  is  to  be  sedulously 


THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  RIGHT.          427 

cultivated.  No  means  are  to  be  neglected  to  give  fullest  de- 
velopment to  this  grand  and  universal  cognition  and  belief.  By 
precept  and  illustration,  by  Sabbath-school  and  Bible  and  church, 
by  all  that  is  best  and  purest  in  human  life  and  human  thought, 
this  idea  of  faith  in  God  is  to  be  developed.  Every  effort  should 
be  made  to  counteract  that  spirit  of  infidelity  that  would  try  to 
strike  out  God  from  the  universe  and  the  faith  in  God  from  the 
human  soul.  Indeed,  so  important  is  this  idea  to  human  life  and 
human  character,  that  it  is  better  for  the  world  that  men  should 
believe  in  a  divine  being,  even  if  such  a  belief  were  but  a  dream 
of  the  imagination.  Woe  to  the  race  and  the  world  if  the  stai 
of  faith  in  God  should  ever  be  blotted  out  of  the  sky  of  human 
faith  and  philosophy ! 

2.  Love  to  God. — Love  is  a  duty  to  God,  flowing  out  of  the 
activities  of  the  sensibilities.  Believing  in  a  God,  we  recognize 
him  as  the  perfection  of  all  that  is  excellent  in  character,  and 
thus  as  worthy  of  our  fullest  admiration  and  veneration.  To  him 
gushes  out  spontaneously  all  that  is  best  and  holiest  in  human 
feeling.  The  natural  feelings  toward  the  divine  being  may  all 
be  expressed  in  the  one  word  Love.  Love  to  God  is  the  homage 
of  the  heart  to  the  perfection  of  the  Divine  Nature.  Love  is 
thus  a  duty  we  owe  him  on  account  of  the  excellence  of  his  being. 
It  is  also  a  duty  of  reciprocation ;  as  the  embodiment  of  all  that 
is  good  he  is  full  of  kindness  and  love  to  us ;  and  we  owe  him  the 
duty  of  love  in  return.  We  love  him  because  he  is  worthy  of 
our  love ;  and  we  love  him  also  "  because  he  first  loved  us."  The 
law  of  duty  requires  that  on  the  altar  of  our  hearts  should  be 
kindled  and  kept  ever  burning  the  fire  of  consecrated  love  to 
God. 

Manifestations  of  Love. — This  principle  of  love  manifests 
itself  in  a  variety  of  ways.  These  different  manifestations  give 
rise  to  special  duties  comprehended  in  the  great  central  duty  of 
love.  Among  the  principal  of  these  duties  growing  out  of  Love 
we  may  mention  Humility,  Reverence,  Prayer,  and  Worship. 

Humility. — Humility  is  a  natural  feeling  of  the  mind,  grow- 


428  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ing  out  of  our  faith  in  a  Supreme  Being.  When  the  soul  stands 
in  the  presence  of  the  Infinite  Being,  it  feels  its  utter  insignificance 
and  unworthiness,  and  veils  its  face  and  bows  to  the  dust,  saying, 
"  Holy,  holy,  holy,  Lord  God  Almighty."  In  so  doing  it  is  true 
to  its  own  natural  instincts,  and  shows  its  recognition  of  and 
respect  for  the  attributes  of  divinity.  It  is  thus  an  act  demanded 
by  its  own  sense  of  spiritual  worthiness ;  to  stand  with  head  erect 
and  covered  in  the  presence  of  Almighty  God,  would  seem  like  an 
indignity  to  him  and  would  merit  its  own  contempt.  Humility  is 
thus  not  servility  of  spirit ;  it  is  the  soul's  conscious  recognition 
of  the  homage  and  attitude  due  to  superior  power,  wisdom,  and 
holiness.  Such  an  attitude  is  also  seen  to  be  consonant  to  the 
divine  nature ;  "  the  spirit  of  God  delights  to  dwell  in  the  hearts 
of  the  humble;"  and  the  promise  is  "Blessed  are  the  meek." 
Humility  is  one  of  the  sweetest  blossoms  of  the  human  heart; 
it  is  "  that  sweet  root  from  which  all  heavenly  virtues  spring." 

Reverence. — Reverence  to  God  is  an  act  of  the  heart  inspired 
by  faith  in  the  existence  of  the  Divine  Being.  It  is  the  natural 
feeling  of  the  human  heart  in  the  presence  of  the  absolute  Spirit. 
The  human  heart  feels  a  respect  for  the  spiritual  in  humanity, 
which  rises  in  proportion  to  the  excellence  of  the  spiritual  element 
disclosed.  In  the  presence  of  some  hoary  sage,  the  soul  bows  with 
uncovered  head  in  humility  and  respect.  When  it  stands  in  the 
presence  of  the  Absolute  in  goodness  and  power,  this  respect  rises 
into  reverence,  and  the  homage  of  the  soul  is  complete.  Such  a 
feeling  of  reverence  gives  highest  dignity  and  worthiness  to  the 
human  spirit.  Though  bowing  in  humility,  the  soul  lifts  itself 
into  highest  dignity  by  the  feeling  of  reverential  affection.  "  No 
man  is  so  exalted  as  when  utterly  losing  himself  in  his  reverence 
for  Deity." 

Prayer. — Prayer  is  a  natural  outgrowth  of  the  human  heart 
from  a  faith  in  and  a  love  for  divine  goodness.  It  is  the  soul's 
sincere  desire  for  the  love  and  care  of  a  Heavenly  Father,  who  is 
conceived  as  being  the  source  of  every  good  and  perfect  gift.  la 
this  act  of  the  heart,  go  out  the  richest  currents  of  our  feeliiigf 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE    RIGHT.  429 

towards  the  All-Father,  with  the  desire  that  he  will  fill  us  with 
the  rich  influences  of  love  and  purity  that  flow  from  his  nature. 
Prayer  is  not  only  an  instinctive,  but  it  is  a  reasonable  duty ;  for 
the  nature  of  our  relation  to  God  makes  it  a  demand  of  our 
sense  of  right.  God  is  our  father ;  he  is  the  author  of  our  being 
and  our  happiness ;  he  has  blessings  to  bestow  upon  us ;  and  it  is 
but  reasonable  that  we  should  ask  for  those  things  which  we  feel 
we  need.  Prayer  also  serves  to  deepen  our  attachment  to  God ; 
it  brings  the  soul  in  nearer  communion  with  the  Infinite  Soul. 
Prayer  is,  in  fact,  the  golden  link  of  love  that  unites  the  heart  of 
man  to  the  heart  of  Deity. 

Worship. — The  act  of  worship  is  a  duty  growing  out  of  our 
faith  in  and  love  for  the  Divine  Being.  By  worship  we  mean 
those  acts  of  honor  and  reverence  which  religion  accords  to  the 
Supreme  Being.  In  it  the  soul  seems  to  gather  its  feelings  and 
pour  them  out  in  specific  forms  of  love  and  veneration.  It  is 
humility  and  reverence  and  prayer,  all  fused  into  one  feeling, 
and  going  out  into  one  act.  It  manifests  itself  in  the  bended 
knee,  the  chant  of  praise,  the  song  of  adoration,  and  in  the  con- 
secration of  the  soul  to  holiness.  Worship  is  a  duty  we  owe  to 
the  Divine  Being  on  account  of  his  glorious  attributes  and  deeds ; 
to  him  who  inhabiteth  eternity  and  whose  glory  filleth  immensity, 
acts  of  worship  are  due.  It  is  a  duty  demanded  by  our  own 
sense  of  worthiness ;  the  soul  could  not  respect  itself  if  it  did  not 
pour  itself  forth  in  the  adoration  of  the  infinite  and  divine. 
Worship  is  thus  the  crowning  act  of  love  to  God ;  and  it  adorns 
the  brow  of  the  spirit  with  its  brightest  chaplet  of  worthiness. 

3.  Obedience  to  God. — Obedience  is  the  act  of  the  will 
towards  the  Supreme  Being.  It  is  the  subordination  of  the  human 
will  to  the  Divine  Will.  Faith  is  the  act  of  the  intellect ;  Love  is 
the  act  of  the  sensibilities ;  Obedience  is  the  act  of  the  will.  Obed- 
ience is  doing  what  God  has  commanded,  and  doing  it  because 
he  has  commanded  it.  Love  prompts  to  many  deeds  that  flow 
out  of  the  pure  spontaneity  of  the  heart.  In  love  we  do  not  stop 
to  inquire  what  God  requires ;  we  do  what  the  feeling  prompts. 


430  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

In  obedience  the  question  is  not  what  I  like,  but  what  God  re- 
quires; and  the  will  moves  in  obedience  to  the  divine  behest. 
There  is  no  question,  necessarily,  of  the  right,  but  merely  the 
question  of  what  is  God's  will  in  respect  to  an  action,  and  our 
will  operates  in  harmony  with  the  Divine  Will. 

Forms  of  Obedience. — The  principle  of  obedience  applies  to 
every  duty  that  may  be  required  by  the  Divine  Being.  Whatever 
we  conceive  to  be  commanded,  that  we  are  under  obligation  to 
perform,  merely  because  it  is  required.  The  object  is  to  determine 
clearly  what  is  the  will  of  God ;  and  this  will  is  our  law  and  our 
guide.  The  divine  will  is  believed  to  be  revealed  to  mankind  in 
the  Bible ;  and  thus  believing,  the  soul  is  under  obligations  to 
render  a  willing,  loyal,  and  implicit  obedience.  To  discover  the 
divine  will  is  not  within  the  sphere  of  mental  philosophy,  but  be- 
longs to  theology ;  and  thus  its  discussion  would  not  be  appro- 
priate to  this  work.  All  that  philosophy  has  the  right  to  do  is 
to  recognize  this  principle  of  obedience,  and  thus  lay  a  foundation 
for  theology  to  build  on.  This  foundation  we  have  now  laid; 
and  those  who  believe  in  the  revelation  of  the  Divine  Will  in  the 
Bible  and  the  Divine  Word,  may  build  up  the  beautiful  temple 
of  religious  philosophy, — a  temple  of  grand  and  symmetrical 
proportions,  and  radiant  with  the  light  that  comes  streaming 
from  the  heavenly  world. 


THE  SENSIBILITIES. 


I.  NATURE  OF  THE  SENSIBILITIES. 
I.  THE  EMOTIONS. 
n.  THE  AFFECTIONS. 
TIT.  THE  DESIRES. 

IL  CULTURE  OF  THE  SENSIBILITIES. 
L  IMPORTANCE  OF  CULTURE. 
n.  METHODS  OF  CULTURE. 


THE    SENSIBILITIES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES. 

SENSIBILITIES  are  the  powers  by  which  we  feel.  They 
-*-  constitute  that  part  of  the  mind  in  which  we  find  the 
emotional  nature  of  man.  They  are  the  source  of  the  joys  and 
sorrows  of  life ;  of  its  pleasures  and  disappointments,  its  happiness 
and  its  misery.  Here  arise  the  emotions  which  thrill  the  heart 
with  pain  or  pleasure;  here  we  find  the  source  of  the  affections 
which  fill  the  world  with  the  brightness  of  love  or  the  dark 
stains  of  hatred;  and  here  originate  the  desires  which  urge  us 
onward  in  the  pathways  of  life,  and  place  the  beacon  of  hope  over 
the  portals  of  the  future  world. 

Relation  to  the  Intellect. — The  relation  of  the  sensibilities  to 
the  intellect  is  easily  understood.  An  act  of  the  sensibilities  is 
usually  preceded  by  an  act  of  the  intellect.  There  must  first  be 
a  cognition,  an  idea  in  the  intellect,  before  there  can  be  an 
emotion  in  the  sensibilities.  Thus  when  we  love  we  must  love 
something,  when  we  hate  we  hate  something,  when  we  desire 
there  must  be  some  object  towards  which  our  desires  go  out ;  and 
these  objects  must  have  been  previously  cognized  by  the  intellect. 
There  may,  however,  be  some  affections  of  the  sensibilities  which 
have  not  risen  into  distinct  consciousness,  that  were  not  preceded 
by  a  distinctly  conceived  idea,  as  was  explained  under  conscious- 
ness. 

Intellect  and  Emotion. — The  strength  of  feeling  is  usually 
proportioned  to  the  strength  of  intellect.     When  the  cognition 
19  (433) 


434  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

cf  the  intellect  is  deep  and  vivid,  the  feelings  arising  will  also  be 
strong  and  vivid.  The  man  of  a  strong  and  vigorous  intellect 
•will  usually  have  strong  and  deep  feelings.  This  is  seen  in  such 
characters  as  Csesar,  Luther,  Milton,  Cromwell,  and  Washington. 
The  great  orators  were  not  only  profound  reasoners,  but  they  put 
an  enthusiasm  and  strength  of  sentiment  into  their  thoughts  that 
moved  the  hearts  of  their  listeners  and  produced  conviction. 
The  great  leaders  of  mankind  have  usually  been  men  of  broad 
minds,  strong  wills,  and  deep  feelings. 

Classification  of  Sensibilities. — The  forms  of  feeling  are 
many  and  various.  These  forms  are  difficult  of  classification; 
indeed,  no  classification  has  yet  been  given  which  has  been 
generally  accepted  by  philosophers.  The  simplest  and  most 
plausible  division  is  that  which  regards  them  as  consisting  of 
three  great  classes ;  the  Simple  Emotions,  the  Affections,  and  the 
Desires.  The  Simple  Emotions  are  the  source  of  the  joys  and 
sorrows  of  life;  the  Affections  are  feelings  which  go  out  to  an 
object  with  the  wish  of  good  or  ill  to  it;  the  Desires  are  feelings 
that  go  out  to  an  object  with  the  wish  of  its  possession  or  the  re- 
verse. The  principle  of  this  classification  is  stated  in  the  ex- 
pressions,— I  enjoy,  I  love,  I  desire;  with  the  opposite  feelings,  I 
suffer,  I  hate,  I  feel  aversion. 

TJie  Simple  Emotions. — The  Simple  Emotions  are  simple 
feelings  which  spring  up  in  the  mind  in  view  of  certain  cog- 
nitions. They  are  purely  subjective  in  their  nature,  not  going 
out  towards  any  object,  but  simply  giving  pleasure  or  pain  to  the 
person  who  experiences  them.  Such  are  sorrow  for  the  loss  of 
friends,  sympathy  for  the  suffering,  the  enjoyment  of  the  beau- 
tiful, etc.  They  may  be  regarded  as  modifications,  more  or  less 
definite,  of  the  general  feelings  of  happiness  or  unhappiness,  and 
which,  in  the  specific  forms,  constitute  the  joys  and  sorrows  of 
life. 

The  Affections. — The  Affections  are  feelings  that  v  go  out 
towards  an  object  with  a  wish  of  good  or  ill  to  the*  object. 
Thus  in  love  or  hatred,  the  feeling  passes  out  to  the  object  of  love 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  435 

or  hatred.  They  differ  from  the  simple  emotions  in  thus  assum- 
ing an  objective  form,  and  flowing  out  towards  the  object  which 
sxcites  the  feeling.  So  strong  sometimes  is  this  objective  element, 
this  wish  of  good  or  ill  to  the  object,  that  it  obscures  the  sub- 
jective element.  The  affections  are  thus  not  simple  but  complex 
feelings,  embracing  both  a  subjective  and  an  objective  element. 

The  Desires. — The  Desires  are  feelings  that  flow  out  towards 
an  object  with  the  wish  of  possession  or  its  opposite.  Thus  the 
desire  for  fame  or  riches  is  a  feeling,  a  feeling  that  passes  out  to 
the  object,  and  a  feeling  accompanied  with  the  wish  of  bringing 
the  object  to  ourselves  for  our  possession  and  enjoyment.  The 
feeling  is  only  satisfied  by  the  possession  or  use  of  the  object 
which  awakens  the  feeling.  The  feeling  is  thus  triply  complex; 
it  is  subjective,  objective,  and  attractive. 

Illustration. — These  three  classes  of  feelings  may  be  illus- 
trated by  the  analogy  of  a  spring  or  fountain.  The  simple 
emotions  are  simply  the  play  of  the  water,  the  gushing  up  from 
unknown  depths  of  the  pure  liquid  of  the  spring.  The  affections 
are  the  waters  flowing  out  from  the  spring  into  the  meadow,  giv- 
ing verdure  to  the  grass  and  beauty  to  the  flowers  that  border 
the  banks  of  the  rivulet.  The  desires  are  the  waters  flowing 
back  again  to  their  source,  bearing  on  their  bosom  such  objects 
as  the  current  may  have  caught  in  its  embrace.  In  the  simple 
emotions,  there  is  simply  a  play  of  feelings;  the  fountain  rises 
and  falls,  sparkling  in  the  sunlight  of  joy  or  darkened  by  the 
shadows  of  sorrow.  In  the  affections,  the  fountain  of  feeling 
flows  out  towards  an  object,  bearing  love  or  hatred  in  its  course, 
and  carrying  it  to  the  object  which  calls  it  forth.  In  the  desires, 
the  feeling  not  only  rises  in  the  bosom  and  flows  out  to  the 
object,  but  it  clasps  that  to  which  it  flows,  and  endeavors  to  draw 
it  to  ourselves  for  our  own  enjoyment. 

Opposite  Feelings. — The  sensibilities  are  dual  in  their  nature 
and  products.  Each  feeling  has  its  opposite  corresponding  feel- 
ing. This  is  true  of  each  of  the  grand  divisions  of  the  sensi- 
bilities. Thus,  joy  has  its  opposite,  sorrow;  love,  its  opposite, 


436  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

hatred;  desire,  its  opposite,  aversion.  Each  specific  form  of 
these  three  divisions  has  also  its  opposite,  more  or  less  definite 
according  to  the  character  of  the  feeling.  These  opposites,  or 
correlatives,  are,  as  it  were,  the  opposite  poles  of  feeling,  the  posi- 
tive and  negative  poles  of  the  sensibilities. 

I.  THE  SIMPLE  EMOTIONS. 

The  Simple  Emotions  are  simple  feelings  which  arise  in  the 
mind.  Their  general  characteristics  are  expressed  by  the  terms 
joy  and  sorrow.  They  include  all  those  general  states  of  feeling 
which  give  a  tinge  of  joyousness  or  sadness  to  the  mental  consti- 
tution. They  embrace  also  the  more  specific  forms  of  feeling, 
such  as  sympathy  for  loss  of  friends,  the  enjoyment  of  society, 
the  enjoyment  of  the  beautiful  or  sublime,  the  satisfaction  or  re- 
morse resulting  from  a  moral  action,  etc.  These  are  all  simple 
emotions,  varying  as  the  objects  or  ideas  vary  which  give  rise  to 
them. 

Classification. — The  simple  emotions  are  divided  into  two 
general  classes;  the  Instinctive  and  the  Rational.  The  In- 
stinctive Emotions  are  those  which  spring  up  out  of  the  general 
condition  of  the  mind,  either  with  or  without  some  exciting  cause. 
They  are  independent  of  any  cognition  of  the  reason,  and  thus 
belong  to  our  lower  nature,  some  of  them  being  shared  by  the 
brute  animals.  Such  are  the  enjoyment  of  society,  sorrow  for  the 
loss  of  friends,  etc.  The  Rational  Emotions  are  those  which  arise 
from  the  cognitions  of  the  reason.  Such  are  the  feelings  awak- 
ened in  view  of  the  beautiful  and  sublime,  the  feelings  of  obliga- 
tion that  follow  the  conception  of  the  right,  etc. 

I.  THE  INSTINCTIVE  EMOTIONS. — The  Instinctive  Emotions 
are  those  which  spring  up  spontaneously  in  our  nature  without 
any  definite  conception  of  the  reason.  They  embrace  all  simple 
emotions  that  do  not  arise  from  a  rational  cognition.  The  prin- 
cipal feelings  of  this  class  are  Cheerfulness  and  its  opposite,  Melan- 
choly, Pleasure  of  Companionship  and  its  opposite,  Sorrow  at  the 
Loss  of  Friends,  and  Sympathy  with  the  Happiness  or  Sorrow  of 
others.  A  brief  discussion  of  each  of  these  will  be  given. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  437 

Cheerfulness. — Cheerfulness  is  a  state  of  mind  growing  out 
of  a  natural  disposition  to  happiness.  It  is  an  innate  gladness  of 
spirit,  a  general  liveliness  or  joyousness  of  disposition,  a  condition 
of  the  mind  in  which  "a  subdued  under-current  of  gladness 
seems  to  fill  the  soul  and  flow  through  all  its  channels."  It  is  a 
disposition  to  be  joyful  rather  than  a  joy  itself,  filling  the  soul 
with  a  sunny  aspect  like  "  a  mild,  equally  diffused  light  filling 
the  sky,  and  bathing  all  objects  in  its  serene  loveliness  and 
beauty."  When  it  breaks  out  into  a  more  sudden  striking  mani- 
festation, it  is  called  gladness.  It  is  the  source  of  the  merry 
laugh  of  childhood,  the  friendly  look  and  kindly  smile  of  maturer 
years,  and  the  happy  and  tranquil  frame  of  mind  of  old  age. 

Melancholy. — Melancholy  is  a  habitual  disposition  to  sadness. 
It  is  the  opposite  of  cheerfulness ;  and,  like  it,  is  a  disposition  of 
the  soul  rather  than  an  active  emotion.  It  frequently  occurs  in 
minds  of  delicate  sensibilities,  and  is  often  associated  with  poetic 
genius,  as  in  Cowper  and  others.  Nearly  all  of  the  rarest  geniuses 
hpve  been  slightly  tinged  with  it,  among  whom  we  may  mention 
Tennyson,  Longfellow,  Hawthorne,  and  Irving.  Such  spirits, 
too,  are  usually  the  most  sensitive  to  the  humorous ;  and  are  often 
the  most  humorous  writers,  as  Lamb,  Hood,  and  Irving.  This 
latter  fact  illustrates  the  old  adage  that  "  the  fountain  of  laughter 
lies  very  near  to  the  fountain  of  tears." 

Pleasure  of  Companionship. — The  feeling  of  pleasure  that 
grows  out  of  companionship  is  also  an  instinctive  emotion.  We 
naturally  delight  in  companionship;  we  enjoy  the  social  circle, 
the  evening  party,  the  summer  excursion  where  soul  mingles  with 
soul  in  the  friendly  word  or  sparkling  jest.  We  love  to  wander 
with  a  few  congenial  friends,  sharing  the  delights  of  the  twilight 
hour,  or  to  sit  at  quiet  eve  when  the  shadows  gather,  and  com- 
mune with  some  kindred  spirit  whose  soul  seems  linked  by  some 
congenial  tie  to  our  own.  It  is  closely  related  to  the  feeling  of 
friendship,  and  may  be  the  basis  of  that  affection. 

Sorrow  for  Loss  of  Friends. — Another  instinctive  emotion 
is  the  sorrow  we  feel  at  the  loss  of  friends.  This  is  a  deep,  sad 


438  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

feeling,  proportioned  to  the  intimacy  and  strength  of  the  attach- 
ment we  cherished  for  the  friend.  The  nearer  and  dearer  the 
friend,  the  stronger  and  more  poignant  the  grief.  Sometimes  the 
soul  seems  to  sink  into  the  depths  of  an  utter  and  hopeless  sorrow, 
and  again  a  gentle  melancholy  pervades  the  action  of  the  mind. 
The  feeling  of  sorrow  is  modified  by  the  lapse  of  time.  At  first 
we  often  feel  that  the  grief  can  never  be  assuaged  and  the  heart 
soothed ;  but  time  is  the  great  consoler,  and  by  and  by  the  pain 
grows  less,  and  the  deep  feeling  passes  into  a  gentle  sadness  of 
memory.  Such  was  the  feeling  under  which  Tennyson  wrote  his 
In  Memoriam,  and  Longfellow  his  Hyperion. 

Sympathy  With  Happiness. — Another  form  of  simple  emo- 
tion is  that  of  sympathy  with  the  happiness  of  others.  This  feel- 
ing is  so  prominent  and  distinct  that  it  has  received  a  distinct 
name,  sympathy.  The  term  applies  to  our  feeling  in  respect  to 
joys  or  sorrows,  the  happiness  or  misery  of  others;  but  it  is  sym- 
pathy with  the  happiness  that  we  first  consider.  This  is  a  glad, 
joyous,  and  generous  feeling  that  arises  spontaneously  in  a  noble 
soul.  When  others  are  happy,  our  hearts  feel  like  rejoicing  with 
them ;  the  smile  of  gladness  on  the  face  of  a  companion  awakens 
a  corresponding  smile  on  our  own  faces.  We  congratulate  our 
friends  on  their  good  fortune,  ami  share  with  them  the  happiness 
it  brings. 

Sympathy  With  Sorrow. — The  opposite  feeling  is  that  of 
sympathy  with  the  sorrows  of  others.  This  is  a  much  deeper 
feeling  than  sympathy  with  their  happiness.  Indeed,  the  term 
sympathy  is  used  almost  exclusively  in  this  latter  sense.  The 
reason  for  this  is  obvious.  The  sorrows  of  life  are  more  marked 
and  exceptional,  and  thus  affect  persons  more  deeply  than  their 
joys,  so  that  our  feelings  of  sympathy  are  naturally  deeper.  Be- 
sides, there  is  a  greater  need  of  sympathy  for  sorrow  than  for 
joy;  for  the  sorrowing  heart  needs  the  touch  of  a  friendly  spirit 
and  the  sustaining  words  of  a  sympathizing  friend. 

II.  THE  RATIONAL  EMOTIONS. — The  Rational  Emotions  are 
those  that  are  awakened  in  response  to  a  rational  cognition. 


THE   NATURE    OF    THE   SENSIBILITIES.  439 

They  are  feelings  that  arise  from  the  ideas  of  intuition,  or  the 
reason.  Thus,  when  I  cognize  beauty,  I  experience  a  feeling  of 
enjoyment;  and  so  when  I  have  an  idea  of  the  right  or  of  obli- 
gation, there  is  a  corresponding  feeling  of  obligation  awakened  in 
the  soul.  Such  feelings  are  called  the  Rational  Emotions.  The 
principal  emotions  of  this  kind  are  the  Egoistic,  the  JEsthetic, 
and  the  Ethical.  The  Egoistic  Emotions  are  those  of  Pride  and 
Humility.  The  ^Esthetic  Emotions  are  those  of  the  New  and 
Wonderful,  the  Beautiful,  the  Sublime,  and  the  Ludicrous.  The 
Ethical  Emotions  are  the  feeling  of  Obligation,  the  feelings  of 
Approval  and  Disapproval,  and  the  feelings  of  Satisfaction  and 
Remorse. 

1.  The  Egoistic  Emotions. — The  Egoistic  Emotions  are 
those  which  centre  in  ourselves.  They  are  based  on  the  con- 
ception of  the  ego,  which  is  primarily  a  rational  conception. 
They  include  the  conception  of  Pride  and  its  opposite,  Humility. 

Pride. — The  feeling  of  Pride  is  a  rational  emotion,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  based  on  the  conception  of  the  ego  or  self,  which  is  a 
rational  conception.  The  immediate  cause  of  the  emotion  is 
some  real  or  imagined  excellence.  This  excellence  may  pertain 
to  our  intellectual  or  moral  attainments,  to  our  condition  in  life, 
or  to  any  circumstances  that  seem  to  lift  us  above  our  associates. 
The  feeling  is  one  of  inflation,  or  of  self-congratulation.  It  does 
not  necessarily  imply  a  comparison  with  others,  as  the  proud  man 
may  evince  pride  even  when  alone  or  when  not  in  company  with 
his  fellows. 

Forms  of  Pride — The  general  feeling  of  pride  may  manifest 
itself  in  several  different  ways.  When  there  is  a  display  of 
superiority,  with  the  purpose  of  courting  applause,  it  is  called 
vanity.  When  there  is  a  disposition  to  magnify  that  which  is  of 
little  worth,  and  to  plume  oneself  on  what  one  does  not  possess, 
it  is  called  conceit.  When  the  person  looks  with  contempt  upon 
others  and  acts  with  arrogance  towards  them,  it  is  called  haughti- 
ness. When  a  man  has  a  high  appreciation  of  his  real  merits 
and  holds  himself  as  if  conscious  of  his  own  superiority,  it  is 


440  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

called  simply  pride;  and  the  man  is  not  called  vain  nor  conceited, 
but  simply  a  proud  man. 

Humility. — The  opposite  emotion  to  pride  is  that  of  Hu- 
mility. This  feeling  implies  the  placing  of  too  low  an  estimate 
upon  our  own  attainments  or  character.  It  is  a  feeling  of  in- 
feriority as  compared  with  others,  or  as  compared  with  our  own 
standards  of  excellence.  It  leads  to  modesty  of  deportment,  a 
standing  back  for  others  to  take  the  lead  in  positions  of  honor 
and  responsibility,  a  shrinking  from  the  gaze  of  the  multitude,  or 
from  assuming  the  responsibilities  of  public  life.  It  is  an  at- 
tractive trait  of  character,  and  is  especially  admirable  when  as- 
sociated with  noble  traits  or  high  achievements.  Excessive  hu- 
mility leads  to  bashfulness  or  embarrassment  in  deportment;  and 
when  united  with  a  desire  to  please,  often  gives  a  person  an  air 
of  servility  or  obsequiousness. 

2.  TJie  ^Esthetic  Emotions. — The  ^Esthetic  Emotions  are 
those  which  arise  from  the  aesthetic  cognitions.  They  embrace 
the  feelings  relating  to  the  New  and  Wonderful,  the  Beautiful, 
the  Sublime,  and  the  Ludicrous.  Each  of  these  will  be  separately 
considered. 

Emotion  of  Novelty. — The  perception  of  novelty,  which  is  a 
rational  conception,  gives  rise  to  an  emotion  called  surprise.  This 
is  an  agreeable  feeling,  and  is  the  source  of  much  of  the  pleasure 
we  derive  from  the  contemplation  of  the  objects  of  life.  We 
delight  in  seeing  or  hearing  something  new.  Even  an  event 
which  is  in  itself  painful,  affords  a  kind  of  pleasure  in  its  novelty. 
We  may  be  pained  by  the  loss  of  a  friend ;  but  the  thing,  and  not 
the  hearing  of  it,  grieves  us.  We  tire  of  the  monotony  of  same- 
ness; we  need  variety  to  spice  the  enjoyments  of  life.  Novelty 
even  heightens  our  enjoyment  of  the  beautiful ;  a  picture  seen 
many  times,  or  a  piece  of  music  heard  too  frequently,  ceases  to 
afford  pleasure.  It  has  been  remarked  that  to  live  always  among 
mountain  scenery  diminishes  our  enjoyment  of  it.  One  of  the 
pleasures  of  travelling  is  the  continued  succession  of  new  objects 
which  are  presented  to  the  mind. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  441 

Emotion  of  Ennui. — There  is  a  feeling  opposite  to  that  of 
novelty,  which  is  very  nearly  expressed  by  the  word  ennui.  This 
feeling  arises  from  the  monotonous  repetition  of  the  same  scenes 
or  incidents.  We  tire  of  a  straight  or  level  road ;  we  grow  weary 
and  at  last  become  disgusted  with  the  same  series  of  musical 
sounds.  Even  the  most  beautiful  song  or  poem  loses  its  effect 
upon  us  if  too  often  repeated,  and  leads  to  a  feeling  of  disgust 
rather  than  pleasure.  The  lack  of  variety  produces  a  feeling  of 
weariness  and  languor  of  spirits,  a  feeling  of  satiety  and  indiffer- 
ence, that  sometimes  makes  one  almost  weary  of  life.  One  can 
hardly  wonder  that  pleasure-loving  kings  had  persons  employed 
to  invent  new  sources  of  enjoyment,  to  afford  them  daily  surprises, 
and  thus  relieve  the  monotony  of  their  lives. 

Emotion  of  Wonder. — The  feeling  of  wonder  is  akin  to  that 
of  surprise,  but  differs  from  it  in  being  deeper  and  more  exciting. 
It  is,  as  it  were,  a  greater  degree  of  the  same  element ;  that  is; 
increase  or  intensify  surprise,  and  we  have  the  feeling  of  wonder. 
The  object  which  awakens  the  feeling  must  not  only  be  new,  but 
it  must  add  the  elements  of  the  strange  and  marvellous  to  novelty. 
We  are  surprised  at  what  is  new  or  different ;  we  wonder  at  what 
is  great,  strange,  extraordinary,  or  not  easily  understood.  A  high 
degree  of  wonder  passes  into  astonishment,  and  a  very  high  degree 
of  astonishment  receives  the  name  of  amazement. 

Emotion  of  Beauty. — From  the  conception  of  the  beautiful 
arises  the  emotion  of  beauty.  This  emotion  is  one  of  the  most 
delightful  of  our  nature.  It  is  a  gentle  and  peaceful  feeling, 
soothing  and.  agreeable  to  the  spirit,  filling  the  soul  with  the  pur- 
est and  most  exquisite  delight.  It  is  a  purely  disinterested  feel- 
ing, containing  no  element  of  selfishness;  the  delight  we  experi- 
ence we  long  to  share  with  others.  It  is  also  an  emotion  that 
refines  and  elevates  our  natures,  leading  us  naturally  toward  the 
pure  and  virtuous.  Some  writers  have  objected  to  the  expression 
"  the  emotion  of  beauty,"  holding  that  the  proper  term  to  apply 
to  the  feeling  is  admiration;  but  we  may  admire  many  things  not 
beautiful ;  and  the  only  expression  that  distinguishes  this  peculiar 
feeling  from  all  others  is  that  of  the  emotion  of  beauty. 
19* 


442  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Emotion  of  Sublimity. — The  emotion  of  sublimity  is  similar 
to  that  of  the  beautiful,  but  differs  from  it  in  several  particulars. 
The  emotion  of  beauty  is  a  calm,  quiet  feeling,  that  brings  peace 
and  tranquillity  to  the  soul :  the  emotion  of  sublimity  is  a  deeper, 
broader,  stronger  feeling,  that  disturbs  and  agitates,  while  it 
pleases  the  mind.  In  the  presence  of  a  sublime  object,  the  mind 
is  aroused  and  excited;  it  seems  to  rise  and  expand  with  the 
element  of  infinity.  The  beautiful  soothes  and  charms  the  spirit ; 
the  sublime  agitates  and  overawes  it.  The  former  touches  the 
springs  of  sympathy  and  love,  the  latter  lifts  the  mind  above 
these  gentle  emotions,  and  endows  it  with  strength  and  power. 
Both  are  pleasing  emotions;  but  the  feeling  of  sublimity  cannot 
be  continued  so  long  as  that  of  beauty  without  exhaustion  and 
consequent  reaction. 

Emotion  of  the  Ludicrous. — The  emotion  of  the  ludicrous 
is  a  peculiar  and  exhilarating  feeling  of  delight,  which  wreathes 
the  face  with  smiles  and  attunes  the  voice  to  laughter.  It  seems 
to  involve  the  principle  of  a  "joyful  elation  of  rebound  or  relief" 
from  a  condition  of  restraint  or  serious  feeling,  as  children  burst 
firom  the  confinement  of  the  school-room  with  a  shout  of  laughter. 
The  feeling  of  the  ludicrous  is  clearly  akin  to  the  emotions  of  the 
beautiful  and  the  sublime,  and  seems  to  lie  between  them.  It  is 
more  active  than  the  feeling  of  beauty,  and  less  deep  than  that 
of  sublimity.  The  feeling  of  beauty  is  placid  and  calm;  the 
feeling  of  the  ludicrous  is  bright,  lively,  and  cheerful.  The  feel- 
ing of  sublimity  is  deep,  strong,  and  oppressive ;  the  feeling  of 
humor  is  light,  sportive,  and  relieving.  The  feelings  of  beauty 
and  sublimity  seem  to  border  on  that  of  the  ludicrous.  The  glow 
of  pleasure  in  the  contemplation  of  a  beautiful  object  can  easily 
be  turned  into  the  smile  and  the  laugh ;  and  the  feeling  of  sub- 
limity can  readily  drop  into  that  of  humor,  illustrating  the  old 
adage  that  there  is  but  a  step  between  the  sublime  and  the  ridi- 
culous. 

<i$.  The  Ethical  Emotions. — The  Ethical  Emotions  are  those 
which  arise  in  the  mind  on  the  apprehension  of  ethical  ideas. 


THE   NATUKE   OF    THE   SENSIBILITIES.  443 

They  embrace  the  feeling  of  obligation,  the  feeling  of  satisfaction 
at  duty  performed,  of  remorse  from  duty  neglected,  and  of  ap- 
proval and  censure  in  respect  to  the  actions  of  others. 

Emotion  of  Obligation. — When  the  reason  cognizes  the 
right  and  the  attending  idea  of  obligation,  the  emotional  nature 
immediately  gives  rise  to  the  feeling  of  obligation.  This  is  a 
strong,  deep  feeling,  that  tends  to  move  the  will  to  action.  It 
embraces  both  a  positive  and  a  negative  element ;  there  is  a  feel- 
ing to  do  or  not  to  do;  an  emotion  of  the  ought  and  the  ought  not. 
It  applies  also  both  to  our  own  actions  and  to  the  actions  of 
others;  we  feel  that  we  ourselves  ought  or  ought  not  to  do  a  cer- 
tain thing;  and  also  that  others  ought  or  ought  not  to  act  in 
some  particular  way. 

Emotion  of  Satisfaction. — Following  certain  acts  of  rational 
beings,  there  is  the  perception  of  merit  or  demerit;  and  out  of 
this  perception  arises  a  corresponding  feeling  of  merit  or  demerit. 
When  we  have  done  what  we  think  to  be  right,  there  is  a  sweet 
feeling  of  satisfaction  arising  in  the  bosom.  It  is  a  joy  unspeak- 
able, a  delight  incomparable  with  any  other  emotion  that  ever 
animates  the  human  soul.  It  cheers  us  in  the  hour  of  misfor- 
tune, sweetens  the  cup  of  poverty,  sustains  us  amid  the  most  try- 
ing circumstances  of  life,  enables  us  to  withstand  the  coldness  of 
friends  and  the  slanders  of  enemies,  and,  above  everything  else, 
smooths  the  pillow  of  death  and  fills  the  soul  with  joy  in  the 
thought  of  the  life  to  come. 

Emotion  of  Remorse. — The  opposite  emotion  to  satisfaction 
is  that  of  remorse.  When  we  have  done  what  we  know  to  be 
wrong,  this  dark  feeling  arises,  filling  the  mind  with  deepest 
gloom  and  sorrow.  It  speaks  to  the  soul  with  an  accusing  voice 
that  cannot  be  hushed.  It  throws  a  shadow  over  the  brightest 
joys  of  life,  gnaws  at  the  very  vitals  of  the  heart,  drives  rest  and 
peace  from  the  softest  pillow,  and  fills  the  thought  of  the  future 
with  dread  and  horror.  So  strong  is  this  feeling  that  it  some- 
times drives  a  man  into  dissipation  to  droAvn  the  upbraiding 
voice,  and  even  aims  the  pistol  at  the  heart  of  the  half-frenzied 
suicide. 


444  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Emotion  Towards  Others. — The  cognition  of  the  merit  or 
demerit  in  the  actions  of  others  awakens  similar  feelings  of  appro- 
val or  disapproval,  towards  one  who  has  done  what  we  think  to 
be  right  we  experience  feelings  of  approval  and  commendation ; 
towards  one  who  has  done  what  we  regard  as  wrong,  we  exper- 
ience feelings  of  condemnation  and  censure.  These  feelings  are 
proportioned  to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  the  action.  They  are  in- 
dependent of  the  relation  of  the  good  or  evil  act  towards  our- 
selves; though  the  intensity  of  feeling  is  increased  when  the 
action  is  done  to  us.  They  are  also  independent  of  sympathy  for 
others ;  though  the  feeling  of  sympathy  may  modify  the  depth  of 
the  emotion. 

II.   THE  AFFECTIONS. 

The  Affections  are  feelings  which  go  out  to  an  object  with  a 
wish  of  good  or  ill  towards  it.  They  are  feelings  which  not  only 
move  the  heart  to  pleasure  or  its  opposite ;  but  they  flow  out  to 
and  centre  upon  something  objective  to  the  mind.  They  thus 
differ  from  the  simple  emotions,  in  that  they  assume  an  active 
and  transitive  form,  going  out  from  their  source,  and  centering 
upon  the  objects  which  awaken  them.  They  are  therefore  com- 
plex in  their  nature,  involving  a  subjective  and  an  objective  ele- 
ment. 

Classification  of  the  Affections. — The  Affections  are  divided 
into  two  general  classes;  the  Benevolent  and  the  Malevolent 
Affections.  The  Benevolent  Affections  (bene,  well,  and  volo,  I 
wish)  are  those  which  go  out  to  an  object  with  a  feeling  of  good 
will  towards  it.  The  Malevolent  Affections  (male,  ill,  and  volo,  I 
wish)  are  those  which  go  out  with  a  feeling  of  ill  will  towards  the 
object  on  which  they  rest.  The  affections  are  thus  seen  to  be 
different  forms  of  the  principles  of  love  and  hate,  as  the  simple 
emotions  are  so  many  modifications  of  joy  and  sorrow.  An  af- 
fection, when  it  exists  in  an  inordinate  degree,  so  as  to  go  beyond 
the  bounds  of  reason,  is  called  a  passion. 

I.  THE  BENEVOLENT  AFFECTIONS. — The  Benevolent  Af- 
fections assume  different  forms  according  to  the  objects  which 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  445 

awaken  them.  The  most  important  are  the  love  of  kindred,  the 
love  of  friends,  called  Friendship,  the  love  of  benefactors,  called 
Gratitude,  the  love  of  country,  called  Patriotism,  the  love  of  the 
race,  called  Philanthropy,  and  the  love  of  God,  called  Piety. 
Each  of  these  will  be  briefly  discussed. 

Love  of  Kindred. — The  love  of  kindred  is  an  instinctive 
principle  of  human  nature.  It  originates  in  the  relation  of  parent 
and  offspring,  and  extends  with  the  widening  circle  growing  out 
of  this  relation.  The  feeling  is  also  beautifully  adapted  to  this 
relation,  and  the  interests  which  it  embraces.  It  links  the  mother 
to  the  child  by  a  tie  necessary  to  its  well-being  in  helpless  infancy, 
and  holds  the  child  true  to  the  interest  of  the  parents  in  their 
days  of  needed  care  and  sympathy.  It  is,  perhaps,  stronger  in 
the  parent  than  in  the  child,  and  stronger  in  the  mother  than  in 
the  father.  The  feeling  is  a  priceless  blessing  to  mankind.  It 
founds  the  home  with  all  its  cherished  influences;  and  thus  lays 
the  foundation  of  the  state.  It  beautifies  and  ennobles  human 
nature,  is  the  source  of  some  of  the  purest  enjoyments  of  life,  and 
gives  the  world  the  type  of  that  home  in  Heaven  where  we  are 
all  to  be  children  of  one  Father. 

Friendship. — Friendship  is  the  love  of  friends  for  one  another. 
It  differs  from  the  love  of  kindred  in  that  it  is  not  based  on  any 
ties  of  relationship.  Its  foundation  is  congeniality  of  spirit; 
there  must  be  some  tastes  or  feelings  in  common.  Similarity, 
however,  is  not  essential;  as  we  often  find  friendship  between 
persons  of  almost  opposite  characters.  Circumstances  may 
strengthen  or  weaken  the  sentiment;  and  any  change  in  the 
actions  or  moral  character  of  one  party  will  tend  to  modify  the 
feeling.  The  sentiment  of  friendship  is  a  beautiful  one,  and  has 
adorned  many  a  character  and  brightened  many  a  page  of 
literature. 

Gratitude. — Gratitude  is  the  love  we  feel  towards  benefactors. 
In  it  the  heart  goes  out  with  a  feeling  of  benevolent  regard 
towards  the  person  who  has  been  kind  to  us.  This  feeling  is 
manifested  by  means  of  thanks,  and  by  a  return  of  kindly  deeds. 


4:46  MENTAL  SCIENCE 

It  is  measured  not  so  much  by  the  extent  of  the  gift  or  favor  as 
by  the  spirit  that  prompted  it.  A  small  favor,  with  a  pure  and 
benevolent  motive,  makes  a  deeper  impression  on  the  heart  than 
a  larger  gift  with  an  appearance  of  any  selfish  motive.  Gratitude 
is  a  royal  virtue  of  the  soul,  and  the  absence  of  it  denotes  a  dis- 
ordered or  degraded  condition  of  the  spiritual  nature. 

Patriotism. — Patriotism  is  the  love  we  feel  for  home  and 
country.  It  is  a  stronger  and  broader  feeling  than  that  of  friend- 
ship, as  our  country  is  broader  than  our  circle  of  friends.  It  is 
based  on  the  separation  of  the  race  into  families  and  nations,  and 
the  division  of  countries.  Similarity  of  language,  manners,  cus- 
toms, literature,  etc.,  tends  to  cultivate  and  strengthen  the  senti- 
ment. Privation  and  suffering  intensify  the  feeling,  as  may  be 
seen  among  the  people  of  Holland  and  Switzerland.  It  is  a  sen- 
timent that  gives  dignity  to  manhood  and  citizenship ;  and  is  of 
value  in  preserving  the  liberties  of  a  country  against  the  op- 
pression of  tyrants,  or  the  machinations  of  corrupt  and  selfish 
political  leaders. 

Philanthropy. — Philanthropy  is  the  love  of  the  human  race. 
It  is  a  feeling  for  man  as  man,  whatever  his  color,  condition,  or 
country,  a  love  and  regard  for  him  as  a  member  of  the  human 
family.  It  is  a  broader  feeling  than  that  of  patriotism,  not  being 
limited  by  the  boundaries  of  state  or  country.  It  is  a  feeling 
closely  allied  to  that  of  sympathy.  Indeed  the  emotion  of  sym- 
pathy may  be  regarded  as  the  basis  of  the  affection ;  philanthropy 
is  the  feeling  of  sympathy  flowing  out  objectively  to  the  persons 
that  awaken  it.  It  is  a  noble  sentiment  and  of  great  value  to 
humanity,  tending  to  alleviate  human  woe  and  increase  human 
happiness.  It  took  Howard  into  the  prison-pens  of  England  and 
the  pest  houses  of  the  Continent,  to  alleviate  the  sufferings  of  con- 
victs and  lazars,  and  caused  Peabody  to  devote  his  millions  to 
the  education  of  the  poor  and  ignorant,  without  distinction  of 
color  or  race. 

Piety. — Piety  is  love  for  the  Supreme  Being.  This  is  the 
highest  form  of  the  affections,  as  the  object  of  the  feeling  is  him- 


THE    NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  447 

self  the  highest.  The  feeling  of  piety  involves  several  other 
forms  of  affection  lifted  up  towards  the  sphere  of  the  infinite. 
Thus,  regarding  the  Supreme  Being  as  the  All-Father,  we  exper- 
ience towards  him  a  feeling  of  filial  affection.  Regarding  him 
also  as  the  author  of  every  good  and  perfect  gift,  our  hearts  go 
out  with  feelings  of  gratitude  to  him  as  a  bountiful  benefactor. 
Associated  with  him  also  is  the  hope  of  a  blissful  hereafter  in  a 
home  of  joy  and  brightness  which  we  call  Heaven.  All  these 
attributes  and  sentiments  being  lifted  up  into  the  sphere  of  the  in- 
finite and  perfect,  give  to  the  feeling  of  love  to  God  a  depth  and 
strength  possessed  by  no  other  affection.  As  the  heart  goes  out  to 
God,  it  swells  with  a  richness  and  depth  of  emotion  that  transcends 
every  other  feeling  to  which  the  soul  is  susceptible. 

Relation  of  Affection. — There  is  an  interesting  relation 
between  the  several  forms  of  affection.  The  sentiment  of  af- 
fection, it  will  be  seen,  exists  in  concentric  circles  of  feeling. 
It  has  its  origin  in  the  small  circle  of  home  life;  flowing  out 
further,  it  widens  into  the  circle  of  friendship ;  passing  out  from 
this,  it  broadens  into  the  circle  of  patriotism,  embracing  our 
country ;  spreading  still  further,  it  covers  the  whole  earth  in  the 
form  of  philanthropy;  leaving  earth  and  mounting  upward 
towards  the  infinite,  we  have  the  highest  form,  that  of  piety  or 
religion.  Here  the  heart  pours  out  its  richest  affections  in  love 
towards  the  All-Father,  and  the  soul  bows  in  adoration  and  wor- 
ship. 

II.  THE  MALEVOLENT  AFFECTIONS. — The  Malevolent  Affec- 
tions are  the  opposite  of  the  Benevolent  Affections.  As  the 
former  are  so  many  forms  of  love,  the  latter  may  be  regarded  as 
so  many  forms  of  hate.  The  malevolent  affections,  like  the  be- 
nevolent, vary  according  to  the  objects  to  which  they  are  ap- 
plied. Each  one  of  the  benevolent  affections  may  have  its  cor- 
responding malevolent  affection.  There  are  other  more  specific 
forms,  however,  which  have  received  special  names  and  which 
call  for  special  attention.  These  forms  are  Resentment,  Envy, 
Jealousy,  and  Revenge. 


448  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Resentment. — Resentment  is  a  feeling  that  arises  in  the  mind 
in  view  of  an  injury  received.  It  is  very  nearly  the  opposite  of 
gratitude, — ingratitude  being  merely  the  want  of  gratitude, — the 
love  for  benefits  received.  It  is  an  instinctive  principle  of  our 
nature,  springing  up  spontaneously  upon  the  contemplation  of  the 
wrong  we  have  suffered.  It  is  also  a  deliberate  feeling  founded 
upon  the  clear  and  dispassionate  conception  of  the  act  and  its  cir- 
cumstances. In  this  case,  it  may  assume  the  form  of  retaliation, 
in  which  we  return  evil  for  evil,  or  invoke  the  arm  of  the  law  to 
redress  the  wrong  suffered.  The  feeling  is  not  entirely  selfish, 
as  it  may  be  awakened  by  some  wrong  done  to  another,  in  which 
case  sympathy  seems  to  be  the  basis  of  the  feeling.  It  is  liable 
to  abuse,  so  far  as  it  is  excessive  or  seeks  retaliation ;  it  is  also  of 
value  in  securing  the  ends  of  justice  or  the  proper  punishment  of 
the  criminal. 

Envy. — Envy  is  a  resentful  feeling  towards  one  who  is  more 
fortunate  or  successful  than  ourselves.  This  superiority  may  be 
in  wealth,  or  influence,  or  beauty,  or  public  position,  or  personal 
regard.  The  feeling  is  stronger  when  the  object  of  our  envy  be- 
longs to  our  own  sphere  in  life  or  our  own  circle  of  society;  it  is 
more  natural  to  envy  the  successful  young  man  of  our  neighbor- 
hood than  some  one  with  whom  we  are  not  acquainted.  Envy  is 
usually  accompanied  with  the  desire  to  deprive  the  fortunate  one 
of  his  possessions ;  but  not  necessarily  so,  since  we  might  envy  a 
person's  beauty  or  wealth  without  wishing  to  deprive  him  of  it. 
It  is  usually  regarded  as  a  mean  and  petty  feeling,  and  indicates 
a  narrow  and  ungenerous  disposition. 

Jealousy. — Jealousy  is  a  resentful  feeling  towards  one  who  is 
or  seems  to  be  dispossessing  us  of  what  we  regard  as  our  own. 
Thus  we  are  jealous  of  one  who  has  won  or  seems  to  be  winning 
the  affections  of  a  friend.  In  a  similar  sense  we  are  jealous  of 
our  rights;  the  king  is  jealous  of  his  authority,  etc.  The  two 
feelings  of  envy  and  jealousy  are  closely  related  and  easily  con- 
founded. Jealousy  is  a  painful  apprehension  of  losing  what  we 
possess ;  envy  is  a  pain  or  dislike  caused  by  seeing  some  good  or 


THE   XATURE    OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  449 

advantage  in  the  possession  of  another.  It  is  thus  readily  under- 
stood how  love  and  jealousy  are  so  frequently  united.  This  view 
will  account  for  the  term  jealousy  being  used  in  a  good  sense,  as 
"  I  am  a  jealous  God,"  as  he  does  not  wish  to  lose  the  love  and 
obedience  of  his  children. 

Revenge. — Revenge  is  a  resentful  feeling  going  out  for  the 
gratification  of  personal  hatred.  Its  source  is  a  personal  wrong 
received,  from  which  arises  a  feeling  to  do  equal  wrong  in  return. 
Its  principle  is  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,  a  blow  for  a  blow,  evil  for 
evil ;  not  because  justice  requires  it,  but  because  the  feelings  in- 
cite it.  It  looks  not  to  a  violated  law,  but  to  a  personal  wrong ; 
and  aims  not  to  uphold  the  principles  of  justice,  but  to  gratify 
the  feeling  of  personal  malice.  In  its  lowest  form,  it  seems  to 
manifest  a  malignant  delight  in  the  sufferings  of  an  enemy.  It 
is  a  dark  and  degrading  passion,  and  indicates  a  cruel  and  fiendish 
spirit. 

III.    THE  DESIRES. 

The  Desires  are  feelings  which  flow  out  to  an  object  with  a 
wish  of  possessing  the  object.  The  feeling  of  desire  is  a  complex 
one,  seeming  to  possess  a  threefold  element.  First,  there  is  a 
simple  feeling,  pleasant  or  unpleasant;  second,  this  feeling  be- 
comes objective,  goes  out  to  an  object ;  and  then  there  is  a  wish 
to  bring  this  object  to  ourselves,  in  a  desire  proper,  or  a  wish  to 
push  it  away  from  ourselves,  as  in  aversion. 

Its  Basis. — The  basis  of  a  desire  is  some  previous  condition 
or  act  of  the  sensibilities.  A  desire  does  not  usually  spring  up 
immediately  out  of  a  perception  or  cognition  of  an  object,  but  out 
of  an  emotion  or  an  affection  which  has  been  awakened  by  such 
a  perception  or  cognition.  Between  the  desire  and  the  cognition 
of  an  object  there  is  generally,  if  not  always,  some  other  feeling, 
either  agreeable  or  disagreeable,  which  forms  the  basis  of  the 
desire.  Thus  we  enjoy  the  beauty  of  a  picture ;  and  then  we  de- 
sire to  possess  it.  We  experience  love  for  a  person  and  then  de- 
sire to  possess  the  person  or  his  love.  This  preceding  emotion  or 


450  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

affection  is  not  to  be  regarded,  however,  as  a  part  of  the  feeling 
of  desire,  but  merely  as  a  condition  of  its  origin. 

Aversion. — As  the  other  two  forms  of  the  sensibilities  have 
their  opposites,  so  the  desires  exist  in  opposite  poles  of  feeling. 
The  opposite  feeling  of  desire  is  called  aversion.  As  desire  en- 
deavors to  draw  an  object  towards  us,  so  aversion  endeavors  to 
push  it  away  from  us.  Aversion,  like  desire,  usually  has  its  basis 
in  some  previous  experience,  in  something,  however,  disagreeable 
rather  than  agreeable.  Both  desire  and  aversion  have  their 
source  in  the  past,  while  their  object  lies  in  the  present  or  future. 

Classification. — The  desires  are  of  two  general  classes,  those 
growing  out  of  the  physical  nature  and  those  founded  on  the 
nature  of  the  mind.  The  former  are  called  the  Animal  Desires, 
the  latter  the  Rational  Desires.  Of  the  former  we  may  mention 
the  desire  of  food,  of  activity,  of  repose,  of  stimulants,  etc.,  usually 
called  the  appetites.  Of  the  latter  are  the  desire  of  happiness,  of 
knowledge,  of  power,  of  society,  etc. 

These  several  desires  have  their  opposites  or  counterparts, 
called  aversions.  Thus  the  desire  of  happiness  has  its  counterpart, 
the  aversion  to  suffering;  the  desire  of  wealth  its  counterpart, 
aversion  to  poverty ;  the  desire  of  knowledge,  aversion  to  igno- 
rance, etc. 

I.  THE  ANIMAL  DESIRES. — The  Animal  Desires  are  those 
which  spring  from  the  physical  constitution  of  man.  They  have 
been  called  appetites,  though  the  term  is  somewhat  ambiguous, 
since  it  is  generally  restricted  to  the  physical  sensation  arising 
from  the  wish  for  food.  The  term,  as  here  used,  however,  relates 
to  the  mental  as  well  as  the  physical  feeling.  The  principal  de- 
sires are  those  of  Food,  of  Stimulant,  of  Activity,  of  Repose,  and 
of  Sex. 

Desire  of  Food. — The  desire  of  food  is  a  natural  feeling 
growing  out  of  our  physical  nature.  It  is  designed  to  secure  the 
health  and  growth  of  the  body.  It  is  proportioned  to  the  con- 
ditions of  the  physical  system,  and  to  the  length  of  abstinence 
from  food.  In  health  it  is  usually  stronger  than  in  disease,  and 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  451 

also  in  youth  than  in  advanced  age,  on  account  of  the  greater  de- 
mands of  the  growing  body  for  nourishment.  It  is  based  on  a 
physical  feeling  which  is  often  so  prominent  as  to  cloud  the  con- 
ception of  the  mental  element  of  the  desire. 

Desire  of  Stimulants. — The  desire  of  stimulants  is  akin  to 
the  desire  of  food.  It  differs  from  it,  however,  in  being  an  ab- 
normal instead  of  a  natural  desire.  It  is  based  on  a  condition  of 
the  physical  system  induced  by  the  use  of  narcotics  or  other 
stimulants.  Thus  the  habitual  use  of  alcohol  creates  a  demand 
for  its  use ;  and  the  use  of  opium  cultivates  the  desire  for  its  con- 
tinuance. These  desires  become  so  powerful  sometimes  as  to 
dominate  and  enslave  the  strongest  will,  as  in  the  cases  of  Cole- 
ridge and  De  Quincey.  Human  nature  presents  no  sadder  pic- 
ture than  when  the  will  becomes  enslaved  by  the  appetite  for 
stimulants,  and  the  man  becomes  a  drunkard  or  an  opium-eater. 

Desire  of  Activity. — The  desire  of  activity  grows  out  of  our 
physical  nature.  It  indicates  a  healthy  condition  of  our  muscular 
and  nervous  system,  and  is  designed  to  promote  the  health  and 
vigor  of  that  system.  It  is  stronger  in  youth  than  in  old  age; 
and  is  also  found  in  the  lower  animals  as  well  as  in  man.  Thus 
the  bird  delights  to  hop  from  branch  to  branch,  or  cleave  the  air 
with  arrowy  flight,  and  the  colt  rears  and  prances  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  its  strength  and  agility.  The  basis  of  the  feeling  lies 
deep  in  the  physical  system,  but  there  is  also  a  mental  element 
in  it  which  constitutes  it  an  act  of  the  sensibilities. 

Desire  of  Repose. — The  desire  of  repose  also  grows  out  of 
our  physical  nature.  It  is  designed  to  rest  and  recuperate  the 
nervous  and  muscular  system,  to  protect  it  from  injury,  and  pro- 
mote its  health.  It  is  also  a  source  of  enjoyment  to  us  after  we 
are  wearied  with  the  labors  of  the  day.  The  feeling  of  languor 
that  creeps  over  us  is  a  delicious  feeling  that  lulls  us  to  quiet  re- 
pose, and  that  seems  to  bring  with  it  a  balm  to  the  soul  as  well 
as  rest  to  the  physical  system. 

II.  THE  RATIONAL  DESIRES. — The  Rational  Desires  are  those 
which  spring  entirely  out  of  our  mental  constitution.  Their 


452  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

basis  is  not  the  body  but  the  mind ;  not  physical  pleasure  but 
mental  enjoyment.  The  principal  of  these  are  the  Desire  of 
Happiness,  Desire  of  Society,  Desire  of  Wealth,  Desire  of  Power, 
Desire  of  Esteem,  Desire  of  Knowledge,  and  a  peculiar  form  of 
desire  and  aversion  called  Hope  and  Fear. 

Desire  of  Happiness. — The  desire  of  happiness  is  instinctive 
and  universal.  It  is  not  entirely  selfish,  since  it  may  be  accom- 
panied with  a  generous  desire  for  the  happiness  of  others.  Its 
primary  operation  is  to  give  enjoyment  to  our  own  personal  ex- 
perience. It  is  also  adapted  to  contribute  to  the  happiness  of 
society,  since  if  each  is  happy  all  will  be  happy,  and  also  since 
when  a  person  is  himself  happy  he  feels  like  making  others  happy. 
It  is  also  the  basis  of  the  hope  of  continued  existence  beyond  the 
grave,  since  if  we  could  not  enjoy  life  we  would  not  care  to  have 
it  prolonged  in  the  future.  Upon  it  also  is  based  one  of  the 
strongest  incentives  of  religion,  the  reward  of  right-doing  being 
blessedness  forever. 

Desire  of  Society. — The  desire  of  society  is  also  instinctive 
and  universal.  It  shows  itself  in  early  childhood  and  continues 
with  us  through  life.  It  is  manifested  even  by  the  lower  animals, 
which  collect  in  flocks  and  herds.  This  desire  is  the  source  of 
some  of  life's  purest  associations  and  enjoyments.  It  is  the  basis 
of  society  and  the  state,  for  the  association  of  men  gives  rise  to 
social  regulations  and  the  laws  of  government.  It  is  also  one  of 
the  strongest  feelings  of  our  nature,  as  is  seen  in  the  sufferings  of 
solitary  confinement.  Deprived  of  the  society  of  his  fellow  men, 
man  will  console  himself  with  the  companionship  of  animals,  as 
Byron  describes  in  the  "  Prisoner  of  Chillon."  The  man  who 
loses  this  feeling,  and  shuns  mankind,  becomes  a  misanthrope, 
and  leads  a  dark  and  gloomy  life. 

Desire  of  Wealth. — The  desire  of  wealth  is  wide-spread, 
though  not  universal.  It  is  not  an  instinctive  and  natural,  but  a 
derivative  feeling.  It  begins  in  the  wish,  not  for  money  itself, 
but  for  the  enjoyments  it  may  purchase  for  us.  The  feeling  is 
then  transferred  to  wealth  itself.  The  desire  for  wealth  is  not 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  453 

necessarily  an  ignoble  one,  if  it  is  valued  for  the  happiness  it  may 
bring  ourselves  and  friends.  When  desired  for  the  purpose  of 
devoting  it  to  deeds  of  benevolence  and  philanthropy,  it  is  a 
noble  and  praiseworthy  feeling.  It  often  degenerates,  however, 
into  a  desire  for  money  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  for  anything  it 
may  procure  for  the  possessor  or  others.  This  is  the  passion  of 
avarice,  one  of  the  most  detestable  manifestations  of  human  nature 
that  the  world  affords. 

Desire  of  Poiver. — The  desire  of  power  is  a  universal  and 
instinctive  feeling.  It  manifests  itself  in  the  games  of  childhood, 
in  the  rivalries  of  school  life,  and  in  the  vocations  and  professions 
of  society.  Even  the  brute  animals  evince  it  in  their  contests  for 
mastership  and  in  their  rule  of  flocks  or  herds.  It  is  not  neces- 
sarily malevolent  in  its  character,  as  there  may  be  generous 
rivalries  even  among  friends.  It  is  apt,  however,  to  breed  feel- 
ings of  ill  will  and  even  to  turn  friends  into  bitter  enemies.  The 
feeling  has  been  of  great  advantage  to  the  world  as  a  stimulus  to 
personal  exertion  and  public  enterprise.  Through  it  lofty 
positions  have  been  attained,  great  battles  have  been  won,  states 
have  been  founded  and  governments  inaugurated,  and  the  arts 
and  sciences  pushed  on  towards  perfection. 

Desire  of  Esteem. — The  desire  of  the  esteem  of  others  is  an 
instinctive  principle.  It  is  seen  in  early  childhood,  and  mani- 
fests itself  throughout  life.  It  is  also  well  nigh  universal,  as 
there  are  few  who  do  not  desire  the  approval  and  esteem  of  theii 
fellow  men.  It  operates  both  in  securing  the  personal  regard  of 
friends  and  associates,  and  the  general  good  opinion  of  society 
called  fame.  It  even  reaches  beyond  time  into  eternity,  in  the 
desire  to  leave  a  good  name  behind  us  and  secure  the  remem- 
brance and  honor  of  posterity.  The  feeling  does  not  spring  from 
a  selfish  principle  of  our  nature,  for  we  prefer  the  good  opinion 
of  those  who  can  be  of  no  possible  service  to  us.  Neither  can  it 
be  traced  to  the  idea,  as  Hume  teaches,  that  the  good  opinion 
of  others  confirms  our  own  opinion  of  ourselves,  since  we  often 
feel  we  are  better  thought  of  than  we  deserve. 


154  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Desire  of  Knowledge. — The  desire  of  knowledge  is  an  in- 
stinctive principle  of  our  nature,  and  also  a  universal  one.  It 
manifests  itself  with  the  opening  mind  of  childhood,  and  when 
properly  encouraged,  increases  with  the  development  of  years 
It  is  an  appetite  that  grows  by  what  it  feeds  upon,  since  the 
more  we  know  the  greater  is  the  desire  to  know.  It  is  not  due 
to  a  selfish  principle  of  our  nature,  for  we  love  knowledge,  not 
for  what  it  brings  us,  but  for  its  own  self;  and  the  more  one  pos- 
sesses, the  stronger  is  the  desire  that  it  shall  become  universal. 
The  desire  of  knowledge  is  one  of  the  purest  and  noblest  feelings 
of  our  nature,  and  is  characteristic  of  a  refined  and  elevated 
spirit. 

Hope  and  Fear. — Hope  and  Fear  are  modifications  of  de- 
sire. Hope  is  the  desire  of  some  expected  good,  and  fear  is  the 
aversion  to  some  anticipated  evil.  The  degree  of  the  emotion 
depends  on  the  nature  of  the  object  and  the  liveliness  of  the  feel- 
ing with  which  it  affects  the  mind.  What  we  very  much  desire, 
that  we  hope  for  very  strongly ;  what  we  are  very  greatly  averse 
to,  that  we  fear  very  greatly.  When  sick,  our  strongest  desire  is 
to  get  well ;  and  the  invalid  usually  has  strong  hopes  of  recovery 
even  when  his  case  is  hopeless  to  all  eyes  but  his  own.  The 
miser  dreads  more  than  everything  else  the  loss  of  his  money ; 
and  this  is  his  greatest  fear.  The  desire  for  future  happiness  is 
strong  in  the  human  heart,  and  the  hope  of  the  Christian  seizes 
upon  the  joys  of  the  heavenly  world  with  a  tenacious  grasp. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   CULTURE   OF    THE   SENSIBILITIES. 

THE  SENSIBILITIES  will  admit  of  culture,  and  should  not  be 
neglected  in  the  work  of  education.  They  do  not  enter  so 
prominently  into  the  work  of  school  training  as  the  intellect,  but 
they  are  no  less  important  in  the  development  of  character.  In- 
deed, the  sensibilities  lie  much  nearer  the  source  and  spring  of 
human  action  than  the  intellectual  faculties;  and  thus,  with  the 
exception  of  intuition,  do  more  to  determine  the  conduct  and 
moral  character  of  man.  The  subject  would  require  a  volume 
to  discuss  it  satisfactorily ;  our  limits  will  permit  but  a  brief  and 
inadequate  discussion  of  the  subject. 

I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SENSIBILITIES. — The  importance  of  the 
Sensibilities  and  their  culture  should  be  more  fully  appreciated. 
Schools  are  established  for  the  education  of  the  intellect;  but 
very  little  provision  is  made  for  the  culture  of  the  sensibilities. 
Pupils  are  classed  and  graded  in  respect  to  their  intellectual  ac- 
quirements ;  to  attempt  to  grade  pupils  on  the  basis  of  their  emo- 
tional nature  would  be  thought  visionary  and  unpractical.  Our 
curricula  of  studies  are  filled  with  branches  to  give  activity  to 
the  intellect;  what  branches  are  given  for  the  education  of  the 
sensibilities?  So  great  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  this  element  of 
our  nature,  demands  the  statement  of  a  few  reasons  for  its  culture. 

Of  Great  Value. — The  sensibilities  are  of  great  value  to  man- 
kind. Man  is  not  intellect  alone;  he  has  a  heart  to  feel,  as  well 
as  a  head  to  think.  His  thought  is  directed  and  incited  by  his 
feelings ;  and  thus  some  of  the  highest  intellectual  products  are 
due  to  the  sensibilities.  The  will,  which  is  the  immediate  source 
of  action,  has  its  roots  in  the  feelings;  and  thus  the  heart  is, 

(455) 


456  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

in  a  sense,  the  source  of  the  action  of  mankind.  Take  the  heart 
element  out  of  human  action  and  human  products,  and  they 
would  be  shorn  of  much  of  their  excellence  and  power.  Take  the 
emotional  element  out  of  character  and  society,  and  they  would 
lose  all  that  is  best  and  most  beautiful  in  them.  The  wise  man 
understood  this  when  he  said,  "  Keep  thy  heart  with  all  diligence, 
for  out  of  it  are  the  issues  of  life." 

Influence  on  the  Intellect. — The  activity  of  the  intellect  is 
largely  dependent  upon  the  sensibilities.  A  quick  and  lively 
sensibility  is  usually  attended  with  a  quickness  and  strength  of 
intellectual  conception.  A  man  with  cold  and  sluggish  feelings 
will  usually  be  found  to  have  a  dull  and  plodding  intellect.  The 
emotional  nature  excites  the  intellectual  nature  to  activity,  and 
stimulates  it  to  efforts  that  it  would  otherwise  be  unable  to  put 
forth.  Thus  under  the  stimulus  of  strong  feeling,  a  man  will  ac- 
complish what  he  would  not  have  believed  himself  capable  of 
performing.  The  love  of  humanity,  the  aspiration  after  excel- 
lence, the  desire  of  esteem  or  power,  etc.,  have  been  the  source 
of  the  great  achievements  of  the  race.  The  grandeur  of  some  of 
the  frescos  of  the  Sistine  Chapel  was  partly  due  to  the  perturbed, 
if  not  indignant,  spirit  of  the  great  artist,  Michael  Angelo. 

Relation  to  Thought. — Feeling  gives  force  to  thought.  An 
idea  without  feeling  in  it  is  like  a  dead  acorn ;  you  must  put  your 
heart  in  your  thoughts,  if  you  would  have  them  take  root  and 
grow  in  other  hearts.  Sentiment  is  not  only  the  life,  it  is  the 
soul  of  an  idea.  An  abstract  thought  not  warmed  by  the  glow 
of  the  heart  is  a  marble  statue  without  life;  put  sentiment  into 
the  idea,  and  we  have  the  statue  with  a  beating  heart,  a  flashing 
eye,  and  a  rational  soul.  Sentiment  is  a  stronger  force  than 
logic;  the  best  reasoners  are  not  always  men  of  most  influence. 
Mankind  are  influenced  more  through  their  emotional  natures 
than  through  their  intellects.  In  influence,  inspiration  is  better 
than  instruction.  A  touch  of  pathos,  a  tender  incident,  an  ap- 
propriate compliment,  are  often  more  effective  than  the  most 
logical  demonstration.  In  education  it  is  better  to  inspire  the 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  457 

heart  with  a  noble  sentiment  than  to  teach  the  mind  a  truth  of 
science. 

Relation  to  the  Will. — The  sensibilities  exert  a  strong  in- 
fluence upon  the  will.  Our  volitions  depend  largely  upon  oui 
feelings ;  and  we  reach  the  will  of  others  through  their  hearts. 
Carlyle  says,  "  The  natural  king  is  one  who  melts  all  wills  into 
his  own ; "  and  the  fire  that  melts  the  will  is  kindled  on  the  altars 
of  the  heart.  "  Hearts  are  stronger  than  swords,"  says  Phillips. 
Love  will  conquer  where  steel  is  powerless.  The  Norman  bow 
and  battle-ax  could  triumph  on  the  field  of  Hastings,  and  the 
Norman  conqueror  endeavor  to  force  a  new  language  on  a  con- 
quered people ;  but  the  love  of  the  simple  dialect  which  soothed 
them  to  slumber  in  the  cradle  of  a  mother's  arms  triumphed  over 
law  and  force,  and  saved  to  us  the  rich  legacy  of  the  Saxon 
speech.  Hearts  are  indeed  stronger  than  swords.  The  gospel 
came,  not  with  waving  banners  and  pomp  of  war,  but  with  the 
golden  precepts  of  love  to  men  and  to  God;  and  it  has  over- 
thrown idolatry  and  superstition,  and  led  mankind  upward  into 
the  highest  civilization  the  world  has  ever  known. 

Relation  to  Oratory. — The  great  orator  relies  on  touching 
the  feelings  as  well  as  upon  convincing  the  judgment.  The 
most  intellectual  speeches  are  not  the  most  effective.  An  aud- 
ience would  hardly  listen  an  hour  to  the  delivery  of  the  Prindpia, 
even  if  repeated  with  the  charm  of  Whitfield's  intonation.  The 
great  orators  have  been  men  of  emotional  power,  men  who  put 
their  hearts  into  their  thoughts.  "The  passions  are  the  only 
orators  that  always  succeed,"  says  Rochefoucauld.  Henry  Clay, 
in  his  tribute  to  oratory,  says — "There  is  no  power  like  oratory. 
Caesar  controlled  men  by  exciting  their  fears ;  Cicero  by  swaying 
their  passions."  It  is  the  tender  sentiment,  the  quivering  lip,  the 
trembling  accent,  the  moistened  eye,  that  are  often  the  most  elo- 
quent pleaders.  In  Webster's  great  Dartmouth  College  speech, 
there  may  have  been  conclusive  argument ;  but  when  with  trem- 
bling voice  and  moistened  eye  he  referred  to  his  own  loved  Alma 
Mater,  even  the  judges  on  the  bench  were  moved  to  tears. 
20 


458  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Relation  to  Happiness. — The  sensibilities  are  the  source  of 
the  joys  and  sorrows  of  life.  Happiness  is  a  matter,  not  of  con- 
ditions and  natural  surroundings,  but  of  the  feelings.  A  happy 
disposition  Avill  be  contented  under  any  circumstances,  and  find 
enjoyment  in  any  conditions  of  life;  a  morose,  dissatisfied  dis- 
position will  be  unhappy  amid  the  splendors  of  wealth  and  the 
gilded  honors  of  royalty.  Happiness  does  not  consist  in  intel- 
lectual attainments  or  scientific  achievements ;  it  is  not  found  in 
the  writing  of  popular  books,  or  the  delivery  of  great  orations ; 
it  is  found  in  the  peaceful  feeling  that  pervades  the  soul.  The 
home  of  happiness  is  in  the  lieart ;  the  source  of  happiness  is  a 
peaceful  conscience  and  a  contented  mind. 

Relation  to  Actions. — The  sensibilities  are  the  source  of  the 
actions  of  mankind.  The  deed  comes  from  the  heart  more  fre- 
quently than  it  does  from  the  head ;  and  even  the  head  is  largely 
obedient  to  the  heart.  Our  thoughts  are  largely  colored  by  our 
feelings.  We  are  apt  to  think  what  we  like  is  right,  and  what 
we  dislike  is  wrong.  We  too  often  yield  our  judgments  to  our 
affections,  instead  of  moulding  our  affections  to  our  judgments. 
The  mass  of  mankind  do  what  they  like,  rather  than  what  they 
think  to  be  right.  Love  is  queen  of  the  mind;  it  shapes  the 
thought  and  leads  the  will,  and  thus  moulds  our  opinions  and 
actions. 

Relation  to  Morality. — The  sensibilities  are  thus  intimately 
related  to  morality.  Through  their  influence  on  the  will,  they 
are  the  source  of  moral  actions.  A  good  feeling  flows  out  into  a 
good  action ;  an  evil  feeling  leads  to  an  evil  deed.  Love  in  the 
heart  prompts  the  will  to  an  action  of  kindness  and  benevolence ; 
hatred  in  the  heart  goes  forth  into  an  act  of  revenge  or  murder. 
A  feeling  of  covetousness  leads  to  fraud  and  theft;  and  hatred 
applies  the  burning  torch  or  lifts  the  knife  of  the  assassin.  Love 
to  man  beautifies  the  earth  with  its  manifestation  of  generous 
action;  love  to  country  goes  forth  in  the  heroic  deeds  of  pat- 
riotism: love  to  God  has  inspired  the  consecrated  life  or  crowned 
the  martyr's  faith  with  a  glorious  death.  The  heart  has  em- 


THE   CULTURE   OF    THE   SENSIBILITIES.  459 

balmed  itself  in  the  actions  of  mankind ;  and  moral  action  is  thus 
largely  dependent  upon  the  feelings. 

Relation  to  Religion. — The  sensibilities  are  intimately  re- 
lated to  religion.  The  essence  of  religion  is  Love ;  love  to  God 
and  love  to  man.  Love  is  the  essence  of  obedience;  we  obey 
God  because  we  love  him.  Love  prompts  us  to  acts  of  religious 
duty, — to  reverence,  prayer,  and  worship.  Love  builds  the 
grand  cathedrals,  raises  the  altars  of  incense,  sounds  in  the  loud 
hallelujahs,  and  is  heard  in  the  still,  small  voice  that  ascends  to 
the  throne  on  high.  Love  is  the  essence  of  salvation,  as  revealed 
in  the  Atonement ;  "  God  so  loved  the  world  that  he  gave  his  only- 
begotten  Son "  to  die  for  us.  The  central  element  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion  is  thus  the  principle  of  love.  Enshrined  at  its 
centre,  it  shines  out  from  all  its  forms  and  institutions  with  a 
radiance  divine.  The  highest  revelation  of  God  is  that  given  in 
the  definition  of  the  Saviour,  God  is  Love. 

Principles  of  Culture. — There  are  several  general  principles 
to  guide  us  in  the  work  of  cultivating  the  sensibilities.  The  first 
principle  is  that  the  sensibilities  are  to  be  cultivated  by  exercise. 
The  second  principle  is  that  we  should  develop  the  higher  feel- 
ings and  repress  the  lower  feelings.  The  feelings,  as  we  have 
learned,  are  dual ;  they  are  positive  and  negative.  The  positive 
feelings  are  usually  of  advantage  to  mankind ;  the  negative  feel- 
ings are  usually  of  disadvantage.  As  a  rule,  therefore,  we  de- 
velop the  positive  feelings,  and  repress  the  negative  feelings.  A 
third  principle  is  that  the  feelings  should  be  under  the  control  of 
the  judgment  and  the  sense  of  duty.  Many  feelings  that  are  fre- 
quently evil  are  allowable  and  even  useful  when  under  proper 
control.  Moderation  is  thus  the  law  of  culture  in  respect  to  some 
of  the  sensibilities.  Having  stated  these  general  principles  of 
culture,  and  indicated  their  application,  we  shall  endeavor  in 
the  following  discussion  to  show  the  value  of  the  various  feelings, 
and  indicate  the  importance  of  their  culture. 


4:60  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

I.  CULTURE  OF  THE  SIMPLE  EMOTIONS. 

The  Simple  Emotions  are  of  two  distinct  classes ;  the  Instinctive 
Emotions  and  the  Rational  Emotions.  Each  of  these  will  admit 
of  culture,  and  should  receive  the  careful  training  of  parent  and 
teacher.  This  culture  should  be  begun  in  childhood  and  con- 
tinued through  life. 

I.  THE  INSTINCTIVE  EMOTIONS. — The  Instinctive  Emotions 
embrace  several  different  classes  of  feelings ;  as,  Cheerfulness, 
Melancholy,  Sorrow  for  Loss  of  Friends,  and  Sympathy  Avith 
others.  These  feelings  need  both  stimulus  and  restraint;  those 
that  benefit  us  should  be  stimulated,  and  those  that  are  an  injury 
to  us  should  be  restrained.  They  should  be  directed  in  a  proper 
channel,  and  be  subjected  to  the  control  of  the  judgment. 

Cheerfulness. — Every  one  should  cultivate  the  emotion  of 
Cheerfulness.  A  cheerful  and  happy  disposition  makes  our  life 
happy,  and  disseminates  the  sunshine  of  joy  around  U3.  Cheer- 
fulness is  conducive  to  health ;  a  sorrowful  heart  wears  out  the 
delicate  fibres  of  the  body.  Worry  kills  more  people  than  work. 
Cheerfulness  brings  spiritual  health  also ;  as  Emerson  says,  "  All 
healthy  things  are  sweet-tempered."  The  joy  of  the  spirit  indi- 
cates its  strength ;  and  "  A  merry  heart  doeth  good  like  a  medi- 
cine." We  should  endeavor,  therefore,  to  cultivate  in  children 
a  merry,  cheerful  disposition.  Sympathize  with  them  in  their 
sports  and  pleasures ;  let  not  sour  looks  or  scolding  words  check 
the  flow  of  happiness  in  their  souls.  Live  to  be  happy  and  to 
make  others  happy. 

Melancholy. — The  tendency  to  Melancholy  in  a  child  re- 
quires the  careful  attention  of  teacher  and  parent.  This  ten- 
dency is  sometimes  due  to  natural  disposition,  and  is  sometimes 
the  result  of  special  causes,  as  the  loss  of  parents  or  friends.  In 
any  case,  care  should  be  taken  to  prevent  its  becoming  a  perma- 
nent disposition.  This  can  be  done  by  cheerful  words,  by  pleasant 
surroundings,  and  by  presenting  pictures  of  the  bright  side  of 
life.  Especial  care  should  be  taken  with  those  who  are  a  little 
advanced  in  years  who  seem  to*  be  falling  into  a  melancholy  dis- 


THE    CULTURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  461 

position,  for  it  is  often  the  precursor  of  insanity.  It  can  usually 
be  cured  by  a  change  of  surroundings,  or  by  inducing  the  person 
to  engage  in  some  pleasant  employment  that  will  occupy  the  mind 
and  keep  it  from  dwelling  upon  its  grief. 

Social  Companionship. — The  enjoyment  of  Companionship 
is  worthy  of  cultivation.  Enjoyment  of  social  life  tends  to  pre- 
vent selfishness,  and  to  develop  sympathy  and  geniality  of  feeling 
and  action.  A  child  who  has  been  brought  up  without  compan- 
ions is  usually  selfish  and  disagreeable.  Companionship  is  a 
source  of  happiness;  some  of  the  purest  pleasures  of  life  flow 
from  the  converse  of  congenial  and  refined  society.  It  is  also  a 
means  of  conferring  happiness  on  others;  the  gentle  deed,  the 
kindly  word  and  sympathizing  smile  which  social  life  cultivates, 
go  very  far  to  make  life  pleasant,  and  give  joy  to  many  a  heart. 
The  hater  of  society,  the  gloomy  misanthrope,  is  an  abnormal 
development ;  and  is  a  burden  to  himself  and  of  little  use  to  the 
world.  It  is  our  duty,  therefore,  to  place  children  in  circum- 
stances where  they  may  develop  the  love  of  companionship.  For 
this  purpose,  our  public  schools  are  a  great  blessing ;  for  in  them 
all  classes  meet  on  the  same  social  level,  and  thus  learn  to  know 
each  other  and  acquire  a  unity  of  feeling  and  interest. 

Sympathy. — The  feeling  of  Sympathy,  though  instinctive  in 
the  human  heart,  is  worthy  of  cultivation.  Sympathy  is  of  great 
value  to  the  world.  It  is  the  source  of  gentle  deeds,  loving 
words,  and  many  of  the  best  influences  that  bless  human  life.  It 
inspires  mankind  to  some  of  its  noblest  deeds;  leads  a  man  to 
risk  his  own  life  to  save  a  drowning  child,  to  rush  into  the  flames 
to  rescue  the  inmates  of  a  burning  building,  or  to  give  of  his 
means  for  the  relief  of  the  destitute  and  suffering  of  a  stricken 
city.  Such  a  spirit  should  be  encouraged  and  also  controlled.  It 
should  not  be  allowed  to  operate  so  as  to  conflict  with  the  senti- 
ment of  duty.  The  surgeon  must  not  listen  to  the  cries  of  his 
patient,  nor  the  judge  be  swayed  by  the  tears  of  the  wife  and 
children  of  the  criminal.  Our  aim  should  be  to  unfold  this  feei- 
ing  in  the  light  of  judgment  and  the  sense  of  duty. 


(\ 


462  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

II.  THE  RATIONAL,  EMOTIONS. — The  Rational  Emotions  are 
of  three  general  classes;  the  Egoistic,  the  ^Esthetic,  and  the 
Ethical.  In  the  discussion  of  the  culture  of  these  emotions,  we 
shall  speak,  under  the  Egoistic,  of  Pride  and  Humility;  under 
the  ^Esthetic,  of  Novelty,  Beauty,  and  the  Ludicrous ;  and  under 
the  Ethical,  of  the  feelings  of  Obligation,  Satisfaction,  and  Re- 
morse. 

Pride. — The  feeling  of  Pride,  when  under  proper  control, 
gives  strength  and  dignity  to  the  character.  When  it  becomes  a 
predominant  feeling,  however,  it  mars  the  spiritual  excellence, 
and  is  a  source  of  littleness  and  weakness.  We  should  therefore 
be  careful  to  regulate  this  feeling  and  its  manifestation.  We 
should  aim  to  cultivate  a  noble  pride  of  character  that  would 
scorn  to  do  a  base  or  ignoble  act.  Care  should  be  taken,  how- 
ever, to  suppress  all  exhibition  of  vanity,  conceit,  or  haughtiness ; 
as  these  degrade  the  character  and  subject  the  individual  to  the 
contempt  of  his  fellows.  Even  the  highest  attainments  or  endow- 
ments lose  their  lustre  when  the  man  is  puffed  up  with  pride  or 
indulges  in  self-laudation  on  account  of  them. 

Humility. — The  feeling  of  Humility,  the  opposite  of  pride, 
also  demands  attention  in  the  work  of  culture.  Humility,  if  not 
carried  to  excess,  is  a  valuable  and  attractive  trait  of  character. 
It  endears  a  man  to  his  friends,  gives  added  merit  to  real  excel- 
lence, and  is  an  especial  adornment  to  high  attainments  or  great 
deeds.  When  carried  to  excess,  however,  it  may  disqualify  a 
man  for  the  real  duties  of  life,  or  prevent  him  from  accomplishing 
that  for  which  his  talents  would  otherwise  qualify  him.  As  a 
rule,  however,  humility  is  a  crown  of  beauty  and  a  robe  of  honor. 
It  is  a  virtue  that  gives  superior  value  to  great  gifts,  and  elevates 
the  person  in  the  estimation  of  mankind.  The  world  delights  to 
honor  the  man  who  is  great  without  being  proud  or  vain  of  his 
greatness.  The  man  of  finest  character  and  greatest  influence  is 
he  who,  under  the  guise  of  a  modest  demeanor,  possesses  a  firm 
self-reliance  and  a  just  confidence  in  his  ability  to  discharge  the 
duties  that  may  devolve  upon  him. 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE    SENSIBILITIES.  463 

Novelty. — The  feeling  of  Novelty  is  not  to  be  overlooked  in 
culture  and  education.  When  properly  developed  and  cultivated, 
it  will  give  pleasure  and  interest  to  life.  It  is  a  principle  which 
the  teacher  can  use  in  making  school  life  pleasant,  and  in  secur- 
ing the  attention  of  his  pupils.  The  lecturer  or  preacher  must 
put  his  discourse  in  some  new  or  striking  form  in  order  to  attract 
and  impress  the  public  mind.  Care  should  be  taken,  also,  that 
the  taste  for  novelty  does  not  lead  to  unhappiness,  and  a  lack  of 
interest  in  the  commonplace  and  useful.  The  boy  that  is  con- 
tinually thirsting  for  something  new,  may  become  dissatisfied 
with  the  sober  and  every-day  face  of  truth.  The  man  or  woman 
who  makes  life  a  search  for  new  things,  leads  a  restless  and  wasted 
existence.  Truth  and  beauty  are  worth  more  than  novelty;  and 
it  will  be  a  great  mistake  in  culture  to  allow  a  taste  for  the  new 
and  wonderful  to  eclipse  or  subordinate  the  taste  for  truth  and 
beauty. 

l$ea^lty. — The  emotion  of  Beauty  is  the  purest  and  highest  of 
the  aesthetic  emotions,  and  it  should  be  sedulously  cultivated.  It 
has  a  purifying  and  elevating  influence  on  the  character,  and  is 
the  source  of  some  of  the  most  exquisite  enjoyments  of  life.  The 
mind  should  be  led  to  linger  lovingly  among  the  beautiful  objects 
of  nature,  to  find  enjoyment  in  the  figures  and  sentiments  of 
poetry,  to  experience  an  exquisite  delight  in  listening  to  the 
melodies  and  harmonies  of  music,  and  to  fill  the  memory  and 
the  imagination  with  the  graceful  forms  of  the  sculptor's  art. 
Such  a  love  for  beauty  will  flow  out  into  all  our  actions,  and 
beautify  our  characters.  It  will  enable  us  to  make  houses  more 
attractive,  and  home  life  a  source  of  highest  enjoyment.  It  will 
elevate  our  tastes  and  aspirations,  and,  by  its  purifying  influences, 
make  our  souls  temples  fit  for  the  indwelling  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

The  Ludicrous. — The  feeling  of  the  Ludicrous  is  worthy  of 
culture.  The  enjoyment  of  humor  is  a  source  of  refined  pleasure, 
giving  a  buoyancy  to  the  spirit  and  a  zest  to  life.  A  person  that 
sees  the  humorous  side  of  things,  finds  much  to  lighten  the  cares 
of  life,  and  is  a  source  of  sunshine  to  other  hearts.  The  play  of 


464  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

humor  in  the  soul  lightens  and  freshens  the  spirit,  as  music  does 
the  soldiers  on  a  weary  march.  A  hearty  laugh,  we  are  told, 
doeth  good  like  a  medicine.  Care  should  be  taken  that  the  taste 
for  humor  be  refined  and  elevated ;  there  is  no  necessary  relation 
between  vulgarity  and  wit.  The  humorous  incidents  and  anec- 
dotes remembered  should  be  free  from  coarseness  of  word  or  sug- 
gestion. The  humorous  authors  should  be  those  of  purity  and 
refinement.  The  droll  pages  of  Dickens,  the  polished  satire  of 
Thackeray,  the  gentle  play  of  fancy  in  the  pages  of  Goldsmith 
and  Irving,  the  delicate  wit  of  Lamb,  and  the  broader  humor  of 
Hood,  are  all  adapted  to  cultivate  a  healthy  taste  for  the  hum- 
orous. 

The  Moral  Feelings. — The  moral  feelings  demand  attention 
in  this  work  of  education.  These  feelings  are  of  immense  impor- 
tance in  moral  culture.  The  feeling  that  we  ought  to  do  the 
right  has  a  strong  influence  in  the  clear  conception  of  obligation 
and  of  the  right.  So  also  the  feeling  of  satisfaction  and  remorse 
in  respect  to  our  actions,  and  the  feelings  of  approval  and  censure 
for  the  actions  of  others,  aid  in  the  clear  development  of  these 
ideas.  Delicacy  of  feeling  gives  added  delicacy  of  perception; 
and  the  heart  aids  the  head  in  moral  culture.  Conscience,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  emotional  as  well  as  intellectual.  We  should,  there- 
fore, cultivate  the  moral  emotions.  The  child's  heart  may  be 
aroused  by  incidents  of  moral  action.  Fable  and  fiction  serve  an 
excellent  purpose  in  this  culture  by  calling  out  the  moral  feelings. 
A  tender  and  delicate  conscience  indicates,  not  weakness  and 
effeminacy  of  character,  but  manly  strength  and  dignity. 

II.     CULTURE  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 

The  Affections  consist  of  two  general  classes ;  the  Benevolent 
Affections  and  the  Malevolent  Affections.  Of  these  the  first  class" 
give  beauty  and  excellence  to  character,  while  the  second  class 
usually  weaken  and  debase  it.  In  the  culture  of  these  forms  of 
feeling,  the  fundamental  principle  is  to  stimulate  the  good  feelings 
and  repress  the  evil  feelings. 


THE   CULTURE    OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  465 

I.  BENEVOLENT  AFFECTIONS. — The  Benevolent  Affections  in- 
clude the  Love  of  Kindred,  Friendship,  Gratitude,  Patriotism, 
Philanthropy,  and  Piety.  Care  should  be  taken  to  give  due 
exercise  and  proper  development  to  each  one  of  these  several 
forms  of  feeling. 

Love  of  Kindred. — The  love  of  kindred  is  one  of  the  most 
important  of  the  ail'ections,  giving  rise  to  the  family  and  the 
home.  It  is  also  a  feeling  which  adorns  the  character  and  gives 
beauty  to  social  life.  The  love  of  the  mother  for  her  child  is  one 
of  the  holiest  feelings  of  the  heart ;  and  the  reciprocal  affection 
of  children  for  their  parents,  especially  when  continued  into 
mature  manhood  and  womanhood,  is  an  admirable  virtue.  The 
love  of  a  boy  for  his  mother  is  a  strong  influence  to  protect  him 
from  the  evils  of  social  life ;  and  the  attachment  of  a  daughter  to 
her  father  is  no  less  admirable  and  useful.  The  young  man  who 
is  ashamed  of  such  a  feeling,  or  who  speaks  of  his  father  as 
the  "  old  man  "  or  of  his  mother  as  the  "  old  woman,"  is  on  the 
high  road  to  ruin.  Special  care  should  be  taken  in  the  nurture 
of  this  feeling.  Parents  should  be  careful  to  do  nothing  to 
weaken  these  attachments;  and  children  should  cherish  their 
parents  in  their  deepest  affections. 

FriendsJiip. — Friendship  is  a  pure  and  noble  feeling  of  the. 
soul;  a  pure  and  disinterested  friendship  indicates  a  large  and 
generous  mind.  The  man  whose  heart  does  not  go  out  in  warm 
attachment  to  some  congenial  spirit,  is  wanting  in  some  of  the 
best  traits  of  humanity :  it  is  a  mean  and  selfish  mind  that  does 
not  make  a  friend  of  somebody.  The  sentiment  of  friendship  re- 
fines and  elevates  the  soul,  in  that  it  is  a  purely  disinterested  feel- 
ing, springing  from  no  selfish  or  prudential  motives.  For  a 
friend,  the  heart  flows  out  in  deeds  of  affection  without  any 
thought  of  remuneration ;  our  pleasure  is  another's  happiness 
rather  than  our  own.  If  adversity  comes  and  "  the  friends  who 
in  our  sunshine  live  "  turn  away  with  coldness  and  neglect,  true 
friendship  shows  its  fidelity  by  clinging  closer  to  the  objects  of  its 
love  as  others  neglect  and  forsake  them.  The  chain  of  friendship 


466  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

is  not  broken  by  death,  but  continues  to  bind  the  heart  to  the 
loved  one,  even  when  no  longer  on  earth.  As  with  Tennyson  in 
relation  to  the  friend  of  his  young  manhood,  the  feelings  of  our 
hearts  will  rise  with  a  sweet  incense  of  affection  toward  the  loved 
one  in  the  skies.  To  evoke  and  nurture  so  admirable  a  senti- 
ment, should  be  one  of  the  aims  of  correct  culture. 

Gratitude. — Gratitude  is  a  virtue  that  indicates  a  just  and 
honorable  spirit.  A  lively  sense  of  favors  received  which  mani- 
fests itself  by  words  or  actions,  is  a  natural  feeling  of  a  heart 
moulded  to  a  nice  sense  of  honor.  The  man  who  can  receive 
benefits  from  another  and  not  experience  a  warm  feeling  of  grati- 
tude, lacks  some  of  the  essentials  of  true  manhood.  Unfortunately, 
however,  the  selfishness  of  the  human  heart  frequently  makes  us 
insensible  of  the  duty  we  owe  to  benefactors.  Sometimes  the 
recollection  of  a  favor  seems  to  be  a  burden  to  the  spirit,  and 
turns  the  heart  against  the  one  who  has  done  us  a  kindness.  In- 
deed, the  lack  of  a  feeling  of  gratitude  is  a  common  fault  of 
humanity,  and  one  that  should  be  guarded  against  with  the 
utmost  care.  The  idea  of  duty  should  come  in  to  stir  up  the 
heart  to  the  proper  feeling;  the  sense  of  justice  and  the  meanness 
of  the  neglect  of  this  virtue  should  arouse  the  mind  to  a  lively 
sense  of  gratitude  to  benefactors. 

Patriotism. — Patriotism  is  a  high  and  noble  feeling  of  our 
nature,  and  should  not  be  neglected  in  the  culture  of  youth.  It 
is  a  source  of  excellence  and  happiness  to  its  possessor,  and  a 
blessing  to  the  country  in  which  one  lives.  It  leads  a  man  to 
guard  the  institutions  of  his  country  from  those  influences  that 
would  subvert  or  impair  its  liberties.  Proud  of  the  inheritance 
of  the  past,  the  patriotic  heart  desires  to  transmit  the  institutions 
unimpaired  and  even  improved,  if  possible,  to  coming  genera- 
tions. Under  the  impulse  of  this  sentiment,  a  man  rushes  to  the 
defence  of  an,  imperiled  nation,  willing  to  die  that  his  country 
may  live.  A  nation's  life  is  rooted  in  the  feeling  of  patriotism 
that  lives  in  the  bosoms  of  its  citizens.  The  constitution  of 
England,  the  struggles  for  a  United  Italy,  the  convulsions  of 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  467 

France  for  freedom,  and  the  glory  of  the  American  republic,  are 
all  the  product  of  the  feelings  of  patriotic  hearts.  A  sentiment 
so  noble  in  character  and  so  rich  in  blessings  to  a  nation,  should 
be  carefully  nurtured  in  the  minds  of  its  youth.  The  teacher 
should  endeavor  to  kindle  and  keep  burning  the  flame  of  pat- 
riotism in  the  hearts  of  his  pupils,  by  the  recital  of  the  glorious 
deeds  of  their  ancestors,  and  by  every  means  that  shall  make 
them  love  their  country  and  watch  over  her  institutions. 

Philanthropy. — The  feeling  of  philanthropy  is  a  source  of 
great  benefit  to  the  human  race.  It  provides  bread  for  the 
hungry,  wipes  the  tear  from  the  eye  of  sorrow,  binds  up  the 
wounds  of  the  broken-hearted,  and  aims  to  relieve  suffering  in 
every  form.  The  asylum  for  the  weak-minded  and  insane,  the 
institutions  for  the  education  of  the  blind  and  deaf,  the  hospital 
for  the  suffering  poor,  the  school  for  the  orphan  and  home  for 
the  indigent,  are  all  the  outgrowth  of  the  feeling  of  philanthropy. 
The  feeling  also  ennobles  the  person,  and  wins  for  him  the  highest 
respect  and  fondest  recollections  of  mankind.  It  is  the  sentiment 
of  mankind  that 

"The  drying  up  a  single  tear  lias  more 
Of  honest  fame,  than  shedding  seas  of  gore." 

The  names  of  Howard,  Wilberforce,  Garrison,  and  Florence 
Nightingale  will  grow  brighter  in  the  memory  of  the  world  with 
the  passing  of  the  centuries.  A  feeling  so  rich  in  honor  to  its 
possessor,  and  so  laden  with  blessings  to  the  race,  should  be  care- 
fully cultivated. 

Piety. — The  feeling  of  love  that  goes  out  towards  the  All- 
Father  should  not  be  overlooked  in  a  scheme  of  education.  As 
this  is  the  highest  form  of  affection,  so  it  lifts  the  soul  into  the 
highest  sphere  of  thought  and  feeling.  Flowing  out  towards  the 
infinite,  it  seems  to  cause  the  heart  to  expand  and  swell  with  a 
feeling  of  infinity.  As  the  soul  tends  to  shape  itself  to  that  which 
it  loves,  so  the  love  of  infinite  purity  and  excellence  tends  to  de- 
velop the  highest  form  of  purity  and  excellence  in  the  human 
soul.  God  in  the  heart  will  tend  to  infuse  godlike  attributes  into 


468  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  character.  A  feeling  so  rich  in.  its  results  to  the  spiritual 
nature  should  receive  careful  culture.  The  heart  should  be  en- 
couraged in  its  aspirations  after  divine  perfection,  and  by  refer- 
ence to  his  watchful  care  and  loving-kindness,  led  upward  to  the 
Heavenly  Father  as  the  highest  object  of  its  affection. 

II.  MALEVOLENT  AFFECTIONS. — In  respect  to  the  several 
forms  of  the  malevolent  affections,  the  one  rule  is  that  of  sup- 
pression and  control.  Envy  and  jealousy  are  usually  contempt- 
ible feelings,  and  degrade  and  contaminate  the  soul.  Such  feel- 
ings should  be  shunned  as  we  would  shun  a  viper  or  a  beast  of 
the  forest.  Resentment  may  be  allowed  under  proper  control, 
when  it  is  in  the  form  of  indignation  at  the  wrongs  of  ourselves 
or  of  others.  Meanness  of  character,  the  violation  of  principle, 
acts  of  injustice  and  oppression,  are  fit  subjects  for  our  indignation. 
Under  such  provocations  the  eye  may  flash,  and  the  lip  quiver, 
and  the  voice  go  forth  in  words  of  burning  indignation.  All  feel- 
ings of  retaliation  or  revenge,  however,  are  unworthy  of  a  moral 
being;  they  are  a  relic  of  barbarism,  and  fit  only  for  the  bosom 
of  a  savage.  By  endeavoring  to  make  these  principles  operative 
in  the  hearts  of  children,  we  shall  do  much  for  that  ideal  state  of 
society  when  strife  and  injustice  shall  cease,  and  the  law  of  love 
shall  rule  in  every  heart. 

III.    THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  DESIRES. 

The  Desires  are  feelings  which  go  out  to  an  object  with  a  wish 
of  possession  or  the  reverse.  They  consist  of  two  classes;  the 
Animal  Desires  and  the  Rational  Desires.  The  law  of  culture  is 
to  control  and  repress  the  lower  desires  and  stimulate  and  direct 
the  higher  ones. 

Desire  of  Food. — The  desire  of  food  is  a  natural  feeling 
designed  for  the  growth  and  repair  of  the  body.  So  long  as  it  is 
under  the  control  of  the  judgment,  it  is  not  an  ignoble  feeling; 
but  when  it  breaks  away  from  such  control,  and  the  man  becomes 
a  glutton,  we  have  one  of  the  most  repulsive  pictures  of  humanity. 
A.S  a  rule,  not  much  attention  should  be  given  to  what  we  are  to 
eat,  except  to  see  that  it  be  nutritious  and  wholesome.  Care 


THE   CULTURE    OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  4C9 

should  be  taken  to  prevent  over-eating,  as  it  is  one  of  the  most 
prevalent  sources  of  disease  and  death.  Alexander  is  not  the 
only  one  who  has  died  from  over-feeding ;  men  are  dying  every 
year  from  improper  indulgence  of  the  appetite.  Less  attention 
to  the  desire  for  food  would  be  better  than  more  attention  to  it. 
Penn's  maxim  is  a  good  one  in  eating;  "Always  rise  from  the 
table  with  an  appetite,  and  you  will  never  sit  down  without  one." 

Desire  of  Stimulants. — The  one  rule  in  respect  to  the  desire 
of  stimulants  is  repression.  Total  abstinence  is  the  only  safe 
rule.  The  injury  arising  from  their  use  is  not  so  much  in  a 
single  violation  of  the  rule,  as  in  the  growth  of  the  desire.  In 
no  other  desire  does  the  appetite  so  grow  by  what  it  feeds  upon 
The  inebriate  often  knows  the  injurious  effects  of  his  habit,  but 
he  has  not  the  power  of  will  to  break  the  chain  with  which  his 
appetite  has  bound  him.  Not  infrequently  the  maddening 
thought  of  his  enslavement  raises  the  pistol  to  his  brow,  and  he 
dies  a  suicide.  The  use  of  opium  and  chloral  is  becoming  a  curse 
to  our  country;  thousands  of  lives  are  being  wrecked  yearly  by 
these  narcotics.  We  should  write  the  maxim  upon  the  hearts  of 
our  youth,  that  the  only  certain  safety  is  total  abstinence. 

Desire  of  Activity. — The  desire  of  activity  is  designed  by 
nature  to  promote  our  physical  well-being.  Physical  activity  is 
the  law  of  physical  health.  The  young  should  thus  be  encouraged 
in  their  sports.  Facilities  for  out-door  games  for  both  sexes 
should  be  provided.  Boys  should  have  a  noble  ambition  to  excel 
in  base-ball,  cricket,  foot-ball,  etc.  The  boating  club  will  prove 
a  valuable  auxiliary  in  the  development  of  physical  health  and 
strength.  For  girls,  the  proper  physical  exercises  are  not  yet 
provided;  and  it  is  one  of  the  problems  of  the  age  what  we.  shall 
do  for  the  physical  education  of  American  women. 

Desire  of  Repose. — The  desire  of  repose  is  also  designed  for 
the  health  and  vigor  of  the  physical  system.  Nature  needs  rest 
as  well  as  activity.  This  demand  is  usually  complied  with  in- 
stinctively ;  and  but  little  need  be  suggested  in  respect  to  it.  In 
adult  life,  however,  in  this  busy,  active  age,  we  need  more  repose. 


470  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

American  manhood  is  suffering  from  overwork ;  and  the  weakness 
of  the  present  will  be  entailed  upon  posterity.  In  the  busy  strife 
of  competition  to  be  rich,  or  to  rise  to  the  highest  positions  in  the 
profession,  we  are  wasting  energy  and  abridging  the  period  of 
human  life.  We  are  living  in  a  fast  age ;  we  live  too  fast  and 
die  too  early ;  we  need  more  frequent  and  longer  intervals  of  rest. 
Let  teachers  and  others  preach  the  gospel  of  repose  to  American 
society. 

Desire  of  Happiness. — Happiness  is  man's  birthright ;  he 
was  not  designed  for  sorrow  and  misery.  The  desire  of  happiness 
is  a  stimulus  in  many  departments  of  labor,  and  an  incentive  to 
high  achievements.  It  is  also  the  source  of  present  enjoyment, 
for  the  thought  of  being  happy  in  the  future  makes  us  happy  in 
thinking  of  it.  The  common  laborer  who  has  a  pleasant  home, 
cheers  his  toil  through  the  weary  day  by  the  thought  of  the 
happiness  that  awaits,  him  when  the  toils  of  the  day  are  ended. 
The  feeling  of  happiness  is  thus  not  only  a  light  that  gives 
radiance  to  the  present,  but  irradiates  the  future  with  brightness ; 
cheering  the  present  and  stimulating  us  to  labors  for  the  attain- 
ment of  nobler  ends.  Fill  the  skies  of  childhood  and  youth  with 
sunshine,  and  plant  roses  along  their  pathway ;  cause  the  hearts 
of  the  young  to  throb  with  joy,  and  they  will  not  only  be  happy 
themselves,  but  contribute  to  the  happiness  of  the  world. 

Desire  of  Society. — The  desire  of  society  is  an  instinctive 
feeling  that  contributes  to  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  mankind. 
It  is  a  feeling,  however,  that  should  be  regulated  with  judgment. 
Care  must  be  exercised  that  one  does  not  acquire  the  habit  of 
entire  dependence  on  society  for  happiness.  The  woman  who 
lives  for  society  alone  is  not  only  miserable  a  part  of  the  time, 
but  becomes  disqualified  for  the  proper  discharge  of  the  duties  of 
life.  Now  and  then  we  meet  with  young  persons  who  shun 
society,  and  seem  happy  only  in  solitude.  This  is  the  other  ex- 
treme, and  is  also  to  be  avoided.  Efforts  should  be  made  to 
interest  such  persons  in  social  pleasures.  It  must  be  remembered, 
however,  that  for  the  attainment  of  much  that  is  valuable  in  life, 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   SENSIBILITIES.  471 

in  art  or  science,  a  person  must  work  alone.  Solitude  is  con- 
genial to  thought  and  philosophy ;  and  the  works  of  art  are 
usually  the  products  of  lonely  hours  of  imaginings. 

Desire  of  Wealth. — The  desire  of  wealth  is  a  feeling  not  es- 
sentially unworthy  of  the  human  soul.  To  wish  for  money  for 
the  refinement  and  culture  it  may  bring  us,  is  commendable. 
Especially  is  it  worthy  of  a  man  to  wish  for  money  wherewith  to 
make  a  beautiful  home  for  his  family,  and  to  educate  his  children 
and  place  them  in  comfortable  positions  in  society.  To  desire 
property  that  we  may  contribute  to  the  happiness  of  others  is 
even  a  nobler  feeling.  The  longing  for  wealth  merely  for  the 
sake  of  wealth,  or  for  making  a  display  in  the  world,  or  for 
eclipsing  some  one  else  in  elegance,  is  a  feeling  unworthy  of  a 
rational  mind,  and  deserves  condemnation.  So  also  the  miserly 
spirit  that  wo'uld  accumulate  wealth  merely  for  the  sake  of  the 
money,  merits  the  contempt  with  which  it  is  usually  regarded. 

Desire  of  Power. — The  desire  of  power  is  a  feeling  almost 
universal  in  the  human  soul.  The  value  of  this  feeling,  and  thus 
of  its  culture,  depends  on  the  object  for  which  power  is  sought. 
If  a  man  feels  that  he  is  gifted  with  the  personal  and  intellectual 
qualities  to  exercise  control  over  his  fellow-men,  and  desires  this 
control  for  their  advantage,  the  feeling  is  a  noble  one,  and  should 
be  encouraged.  If  control  is  sought  merely  for  the  exercise  of 
dominion,  to  gratify  personal  pride,  or  to  secure  the  applause  of 
the  world,  the  feeling  is  an  ignoble  one,  and  should  be  suppressed. 
Inordinate  ambition  has  been  the  source  of  untold  sorrow  and 
wretchedness  ;  it  has  shed  seas  of  gore,  and  piled  up  hecatombs  of 
victims.  Heaven  itself,  according  to  Milton,  was  lost  by  am- 
bition. A  noble  spirit  recognizes  all  mankind  as  brethren,  and 
seeks  their  well-being,  not  by  dominion,  but  by  moral  and  spir- 
itual influences. 

Desire  of  Esteem. — The  desire  of  esteem  is  a  strong  incentive 
to  exertion.  Men  will  devote  years  to  secure  the  good  opinion  of 
their  fellow  men ;  and  for  future  fame  they  will  expose  them- 
selves to  danger,  and  even  lay  down  their  lives.  It  is,  however, 


472  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

not  a  safe  guide  to  conduct,  for  it  may  lead  a  person  to  sacrifice 
his  own  principles  to  gain  the  approval  or  applause  of  others. 
A  man  who  trims  his  sails  to  the  breath  of  public  opinion, 
usually  pursues  a  devious  course  through  life.  The  entire  disre- 
gard of  public  opinion  is  equally  unsafe;  we  should  have  reason 
to  distrust  that  young  man  who  says  he  does  not  care  what  society 
or  the  world  thinks  of  him.  It  may  not  be  improper  to  try  to 
influence  a  young  person  to  well-doing  by  appealing  to  the 
opinion  of  others ;  still  it  is  a  much  higher  motive  to  act  so  as  to 
secure  the  approval  of  one's  own  sense  of  right.  An  inordinate 
love  of  esteem  is  unworthy  of  a  truly  noble  character.  The 
grandest  spiritual  natures  have  gone  straight  forward  in  the  dis- 
charge of  their  duty,  unappreciated,  misunderstood,  and  even 
condemned  by  their  contemporaries,  supported  by  their  own  sense 
of  right,  and  relying  on  the  future  to  explain  and  appreciate  their 
motives.  The  fundamental  law  of  human  action  should  be,  not 
what  others  think  of  us,  but  what  we  think  of  ourselves. 

Desire  of  Knowledge. — The  desire  of  knowledge  is  a  high 
and  noble  feeling  of  the  soul.  It  is  a  longing  for  a  possession 
that  gives  true  dignity  to  the  spiritual  nature.  Knowledge  is 
the  food  of  the  mind,  and  gives  growth  and  strength  to  it  as 
material  food  does  to  the  body.  The  intellect  grows  to  a  higher 
altitude  by  means  of  knowledge,  and  the  growth  of  the  intellect 
tends  to  lift  the  soul  up  into  a  higher  spiritual  life.  Knowledge 
is  a  possession,  too,  that  belongs  essentially  to  its  possessor,  and 
cannot  be  taken  away  from  him.  It  is  a  treasure  stored  where 
neither  moth  nor  rust  can  corrupt,  and  where  thieves  cannot 
break  through  and  steal.  It  elevates  character  by  lifting  a 
person  above  the  desires  of  sense  and  physical  gratifications,  and 
is  thus  a  means  of  moral  culture.  It  is  also  a  source  of  the  most 
refined  enjoyment.  A  person  fond  of  knowledge  can  cheer  his 
hours  of  solitude  by  holding  communion  with  the  rarest  minds  of 
every  age,  and  thus  be  in  the  best  society  when  he  is  most  alone. 
It  needs  no  suggestion  to  lead  us  to  give  fullest  culture  to  this 
desire  for  knowledge. 


THE  WILL. 


I.  NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 

I.  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 
II.  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL. 

II.  CULTURE  OF  THE  WILL. 
I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  CULTURE. 
II.  METHODS  OF  CULTURE. 

III.  HIGHER.  SPIRITUAL  CULTURE. 


THE  WILL, 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    NATURE   OF   THE   WILL. 

r  I  ^HE  WILL  is  the  power  of  deciding  or  determining  what  to 
-*-  do,  and  of  putting  forth  volitions  accordingly.  The  exercise 
of  the  will  is  called  willing;  the  act  of  the  will  is  called  a  volition. 
Volitions  are  of  two  kinds,  decisions  and  executive  volitions.  The 
Will  may  thus  be  defined  as  the  power  of  putting  forth  volitions. 
It  is  the  executive  power  of  the  mind;  the  power  in  which 
originate  our  purposes  and  voluntary  actions. 

Two  Elements. — This  definition  of  the  will  makes  it  consist 
of  two  distinct  elements.  It  gives  the  will  two  distinct  functions ; 
one  of  making  a  choice  or  decision,  and  the  other  of  putting  that 
choice  or  decision  into  an  act.  To  illustrate,  suppose  two  objects, 
A  and  B,  are  before  me;  I  look  at  them  both  and  decide  to  take 
A ;  this  decision  to  take  A  is  an  act  of  the  will.  Following  this 
decision,  I  will  that  my  hand  shall  go  forth  to  take  the  object  I 
have  selected ;  this  also  is  an  act  of  the  will. 

Elements  Distinct. — These  two  elements  or  activities  of  the 
will  are  entirely  distinct.  It  can  choose  or  decide  between  two 
objects,  and  this  choice  is  an  act  of  the  will.  The  act  of  the 
will  may  stop  here ;  the  mind  may  change  and  the  choice  or  de- 
cision never  be  put  forth  into  executive  volition.  Or  the  mind 
may  follow  up  its  decisions  and  will  to  do  what  it  decided  to  do. 
The  act  of  choice  may  be  followed  by  another  act  of  the  will 
which  puts  the  mind  or  body  into  action  in  accordance  with  the 

choice  or  decision. 

(475) 


476  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Will  not  Distinct  from  Mind. — Care  must  be  taken  in  the 
study  of  the  will,  not  to  think  of  it  as  something  distinct  from  the 
mind.  The  action  of  the  will  is  the  mind  willing;  the  power  of 
the  will  is  the  mind's  power  to  will.  My  will  is  my  power  to 
choose  or  put  forth  volitions ;  my  willing  is  my  exercise  of  this 
power.  It  is  the  /,  the  ego,  that  thinks,  feels,  and  wills. 

Elements  of  the  Will. — If  we  analyze  an  act  of  the  will,  we 
shall  find  that  it  embraces  or  implies  four  distinct  things.  First, 
there  must  be  an  object  to  be  accomplished, — a  something  to  be 
done.  Second,  there  must  be  some  reason  for  the  action, — some 
reason  why  I  decide  and  put  forth  the  volition  as  I  do.  This 
reason  why  is  called  the  motive.  Third,  there  is  a  choice  be- 
tween objects;  I  select  one  thing  in  preference  to  another. 
This  selection  is  called  choice.  Fourth,  there  is  the  will  effort  to 
act  in  accordance  with  this  choice ;  a  volition  to  carry  out  my 
choice  into  action.  This  is  called  the  executive  volition. 

Illustration. — For  illustration,  suppose  I  sit  at  a  table  and 
reach  forth  and  take  up  a  book.  Here  the  book  was  the  object 
to  be  taken.  There  was  also  some  reason  why  I  took  the  book 
rather  than  some  other  object  upon  the  table :  I  wished  to  read 
it,  or  look  at  its  engravings,  or  remove  it  from  the  table.  Then 
there  was  a  choice  or  a  selection :  I  chose  this  book  rather  than 
some  other  book  cr  some  other  object;  or  if  there  was  but  one 
book,  I  chose  between  taking  it  and  letting  it  remain.  Fourth, 
there  was  the  will  effort  that  moved  my  hand  to  take  up  the 
book,  or  the  executive  volition. 

TJie  Essential  Elements. — Of  these  four  elements  or  con- 
ditions that  enter  into  an  act  of  the  will,  the  object  to  be  accom- 
plished is  independent  of  the  mind,  and  is  therefore  not  to  be 
regarded  as  an  element  of  the  will.  The  motive,  also,  though 
subjective,  a  mental  element,  is  not  an  element  of  an  act  of  the 
will ;  but  it  is  so  intimately  related  to  an  act  of  the  will  that  it 
requires  discussion  in  the  treatment  of  the  will.  The  essential 
elements  in  an  act  of  the  will  are  the  choice  and  the  executive 
volition,  as  is  indicated  in  the  definition.  In  discussing  the  will, 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   WILL.  477 

however,  we  shall  speak  of  three  elements,  the  motive,  the  choice, 
and  the  executive  volition. 

I.  THE  MOTIVE. — The  motive  is  the  reason  why  we  choose  and 
put  forth  our  volitions  as  we  do.  It  is  the  mind's  incentive  to 
action,  its  reason  for  its  actions — at  least,  all  its  voluntary  actions. 
Such  a  condition  or  antecedent  is  always  implied  in  a  voluntary 
action ;  we  cannot  conceive  a  mind  as  acting  without  some  reason 
for  its  action.  The  motive  may  be  more  or  less  clearly  defined 
in  consciousness ;  it  may  be  a  mere  impulse  of  feeling,  or  a  definite 
judgment  of  the  understanding,  or  a  clear  conception  of  the 
reason, — but  some  motive  there  must  always  be  for  our  choices 
and  executive  volitions. 

Used  in  Two  Senses. — The  term  motive  is  used  in  two  distinct 
senses.  First,  any  reason  which  I  may  have  to  do  or  refrain 
from  doing  anything,  is  called  a  motive.  Second,  the  particular 
reason  I  had  for  doing  anything  that  I  have  done,  is  called  the 
motive.  According  to  the  first  use  of  the  term,  I  may  not  act  in 
accordance  with  some  of  my  motives ;  in  the  second  use  of  the 
term,  the  action  always  represents  the  motive.  A  motive  is  a 
reason  for  an  action ;  the  motive  is  the  reason  for  the  action. 
Motives  are  thus  both  reasons  prompting  towards  an  action,  and 
reasons  for  acting  as  we  have  acted.  In  the  strictest  sense,  only 
the  latter  is  called  a  motive ;  motives  being  not  merely  a  reason 
for  an  action,  but  the  reason  why  I  acted  as  I  "did  act. 

Motives  Subjective. — A  motive,  it  must  be  remembered,  is 
purely  subjective ;  it  is  a  product  of  the  mind,  and  belongs  to  the 
mind  and  not  to  something  external  to  the  mind.  The  orange 
before  me  is  not  a  motive  for  action ;  it  is  some  liking  for  it  or 
some  reason  for  possessing  it  that  is  the  motive.  This  idea  is 
of  vital  importance  in  comprehending  an  act  of  the  will  and  its 
relation  to  motives.  All  such  definitions  of  motives  as  "that 
which  incites  the  mind,"  "  that  which  inclines  the  mind,"  "  that 
which  influences  the  mind,"  "  every  influence  that  may  bear  upon 
the  mind  as  an  inducement  to  action,"  etc.,  are  not  only  abso- 
lutely wrong,  but  fatally  misleading  in  their  influence.  Putting 


478  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  motive  outside  of  the  mind,  they  convey  the  idea  that  our 
actions  are  caused  by  external  influences  as  an  apple  falls  from 
the  tree  under  the  influence  of  gravity.  It  is  from  such  miscon- 
ception of  the  nature  of  motives  that  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will  has  been  so  obscured  and  misunderstood. 

Classes  of  Motives. — All  of  the  motives  of  the  mind  have 
been  embraced  under  two  general  classes ;  desires  and  the  sense 
of  duty.  [  Both  of  these  classes  of  motives  are  the  occasion  of  our 
actions.)  Sometimes  we  find  ourselves  acting  from  the  desire  for 
that  which  is  agreeable  to  us,  and  again  we  act  in  accordance 
with  our  idea  of  what  is  right.  It  is  not  improbable,  however, 
that  there  are  other  motives  not  immediately  included  under 
these  two  heads  of  desire  and  duty.  Thus  the  understanding,  in 
either  judgment  or  reasoning,  may  also  furnish  conclusions  and 
opinions  that  pertain  neither  to  the  agreeable  nor  to  our  sense  of 
right,  which  may  be  motives  to  our  actions. 

Relation  of  Desire  and  Duty. — Desire  and  duty  being  very 
prominent  motives,  a  few  words  may  .be  said  in  respect  to  their 
relation.  Sometimes  these  two  classes  of  motives  act  in  unison; 
frequently,  however,  there  is  a  conflict  between  them.  When 
they  act  together,  the  mind  has  a  very  strong  motive  for  its 
actions.  In  case  of  conflict,  sometimes  we  decide  in  favor  of  one, 
and  sometimes  in  favor  of  the  other.  Now  we  yield  to  our  desire, 
and,  regardless  of  consequences,  do  that  which  we  know  to  be 
wrong,  and  which  may  bring  suffering  and  wretchedness.  Again, 
we  follow  the  sense  of  duty,  even  though  it  may  result  in  ap- 
parent evil,  sustained  by  the  approval  of  a  conscience  void  of, 
offence. 

Motive  not  a  Cause. — A  motive  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a 
cause  of  our  actions :  it  is  not  the  cause,  but  rather  the  because  of 
actions.  The  motive  is  not  something  that  attracts  or  pulls  the 
mind  hi  a  certain  direction,  as  gravity  pulls  a  stone  towards  the 
earth.  It  is  rather  the  reason  why  the  mind  decides  to  act  as  it 
does.  The  mind  is  its  own  cause  of  actions.  It  is  the  source  of 
its  own  motives  and  of  its  own  actions.  It  is  thus  the  cause  of 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   WILL.  479 

its  own  actions,  and  it  is  incorrect  to  suppose  these  actions  caused 
by  anything  else.  The  will  is  a  cause;  action  is  the  effect; 
motive  is  the  reason  why  the  will  causes  as  it  does.  This  con- 
ception lies  at  the  basis  of  a  correct  notion  of  the  will. 

II.  THE  CHOICE. — Choice  is  the  action  of  the  mind  in  decid- 
ing or  determining  what  to  do.  It  is  the  act  of  selecting  one  of 
several  objects.  The  power  of  choice  is  the  capacity  of  selecting 
among  several  objects.  Choice  is  the  putting  forth,  or  exercise, 
of  this  power.  Thus  two  or  more  objects  are  presented  to  the 
mind,  and  I  decide  which  one  I  shall  take.  This  decision  is  my 
choice.  Or  a  single  object  is  before  me,  and  I  can  take  it  or  re- 
ject it;  whichever  I  do,  that  is  my  choice. 

An  Essential  Element. — Choice  is  an  essential  element  of  an 
act  of  the  will ;  it  is  an  element  necessarily  involved  in  the  con- 
ception of  a  rational  will.  A  volition,  except  in  our  spontaneous 
actions,  implies  a  selection  or  choice.  When  two  or  more  objects 
are  before  the  mind  and  it  takes  one  of  them,  it  does  so  in  virtue 
of  some  choice  between  them.  Or,  when  a  single  object  is  to  be 
taken  or  rejected,  and  we  take  it  or  reject  it,  we  do  so  as  a  matter 
of  choice.  In  every  voluntary  action  of  a  rational  mind,  there  is 
implied  the  element  of  choice.  The  voluntary  acts  of  the  mind 
are  usually  preceded  by  deliberation  and  choice. 

Choice  Equivalent  to  Decision. — The  power  of  choice  is 
equivalent  to  the  power  of  deciding  or  determining.  The  act  of 
deciding  is  an  act  of  choice ;  decision  and  choice  are  one  and  the 
same  thing.  To  decide  is  to  choose,  and  to  choose  is  to  decide. 
We  may  thus  define  the  will  as  the  power  of  choosing  and  putting 
forth  volitions  accordingly.  Choice  is  thus  to  be  regarded  as  an 
act  of  the  will ;  it  is  itself  a  volition.  It  may  be  followed  by 
another  volition  or  not;  but  in  any  case,  it  is  itself  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  volition. 

Volition  Without  Choice. — There  seem  to  be  some  acts  of 
the  will  without  a  decision  or  choice.  .  Some  acts  appear  to  be 
purely  spontaneous;  there  is  an  executive  volition  without  a  de- 
cision or  determining  what  is  to  be  done.  We  sometimes  will 


480  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

to  do  something  without  making  any  choice  between  two  or  more 
objects  or  courses  of  action.  In  such  cases,  there  is  no  act  of 
choice,  but  an  immediate  and  spontaneous  executive  volition. 
The  action,  however,  is  a  voluntary  action;  not  an  involuntary 
one,  or  else  it  would  not  be  an  act  of  the  will.  Many  of  the  acts 
of  the  intellect  and  sensibilities  are  purely  spontaneous,  without 
any  hesitation  or  choice :  we  often  judge,  reason,  love,  hate,  etc., 
without  making  any  choice  or  decision  in  respect  to  these  actions. 
Sometimes,  also,  these  actions  are  purely  involuntary,  and  do  not 
involve  any  act  of  the  will. 

Diversity  of  Objects. — Choice  implies  diversity  of  objects. 
If  there  were  but  a  single  course  of  action  possible,  there  could 
be  no  choice  in  respect  to  it.  We  can,  however,  imagine  no  case 
in  which  there  is  not  a  diversity  of  objects;  for  even  if  there  is 
but  a  single  thing  to  be  taken,  we  can  decide  between  taking  it 
and  leaving  it  alone, — which  is  really  a  choice  between  two 
things.  The  mind  cannot  be  placed  among  circumstances  so 
that  there  is  no  diversity  in  the  object  of  its  choice;  there  is 
always  an  open  alternative  in  the  decisions  of  the  will.  Choice 
implies  an  alternative,  and  a  possible  alternative. 

Liberty  of  Selection. — Choice  implies  not  only  a  diversity  of 
objects,  but  also  the  liberty  of  selection  among  those  objects. 
There  can  be  no  choice  unless  the  mind  is  at  liberty  to  select. 
Anything  which  would  interfere  with  my  liberty  of  selection 
would  interfere  with  my  choice;  and  to  prevent  liberty  of  se 
lection  would  be  to  destroy  choice.  No  circumstances,  however, 
can  deprive  me  of  the  liberty  of  selection.  You  may  command 
me  to  burn  incense  on  a  heathen  altar  under  penalty  of  death  for 
refusal :  I  can  choose  to  do  it  and  live,  or  I  can  refuse  to  do  it 
and  die.  In  both  cases,  I  choose  freely  and  have  the  liberty  of 
selection.  If  by  physical  force  you  carry  me  to  the  altar  and 
make  my  hand  pile  on  the  wood  and  apply  the  torch,  the  act  is 
not  mine,  but  yours ;  but  even  in  this  case  I  selected  freely  the 
not-doing  of  the  act. 

CJioice  Free. — Choice,   in    its   very   nature,   implies   a  free 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE    WILL.  481 

choice.  To  say  that  I  chose,  implies  that  I  chose  freely;  choice 
that  is  not  a  free  choice  is  not  choice.  The  power  to  choose  im- 
plies that  any  one  of  several  objects  before  me  could  be  taken; 
if  this  were  not  so,  there  could  be  no  choice.  We  are  always  free 
to  choose  between  two  or  more  circumstances.  The  circumstances 
may  influence  our  choice,  but  they  do  not  determine  it ;  we  de- 
termine freely  which  of  the  circumstances  we  shall  select.  A  free 
choice — and  there  can  be  no  other — is  called  an  election.  The 
will,  in  its  first  operation,  may  thus  be  defined  as  the  power  of 
election.  These  three  terms, — deciding,  choosing,  and  electing, — 
are  all  used  here  in  the  same  sense. 

Deliberation  Implied. — Choice  implies  deliberation,  a  bal- 
ancing and  weighing  of  reasons,  a  comparison  and  estimation  of 
the  several  ends  proposed.  I  perceive  several  different  objects 
to  be  accomplished,  and  am  conscious  of  different  feelings  and 
judgments  in  respect  to  these  objects,  some  tending  towards  a 
choice  in  one  direction  and  some  in  another  direction.  My 
desires  may  influence  me  to  one  course  of  conduct,  my  judgment 
of  what  is  prudent  to  another,  my  sense  of  duty  to  another.  I 
hesitate  and  deliberate  in  making  up  my  mind  which  one  of  the 
several  courses  I  shall  pursue.  The  process  may  be  very  rapid, 
so  rapid  that  I  am  not  conscious  of  it ;  or  I  may  hesitate  long  in 
suspense  between  conflicting  motives.  Some  deliberation  is 
always  implied,  however,  in  all  of  our  choices. 

The  Final  Decision. — Following  this  deliberation  is  the  de- 
cision in  some  one  direction.  We  make  up  our  minds  what 
course  we  shall  pursue.  This  is  the  choice,  the  determination, 
the  final  decision.  It  is  the  first  one  of  the  two  dual  acts  of  the 
will.  Choice  is  thus  a  volition.  It  may  not  be  carried  out  into 
the  following  act,  or  executive  volition.  Something  may  prevent 
my  doiug  what  I  decide  to  do ;  the  opportunity  may  not  occur, 
or  I  may  change  my  mind  in  respect  to  the  matter;  but  so  far 
as  I  made  a  choice,  that  mental  act  is  an  act  of  the  will. 

III.  EXECUTIVE  VOLITION. — Having  made  our  choice,  the 
next  step  is  the  act  of  the  will  in  the  executive  volition.  We 
21 


482  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

will  to  do  what  we  have  decided  to  do.  If  the  choice  involves  a 
physical  act,  we  will  to  put  the  body  into  action  to  produce  it ; 
if  the  choice  requires  only  a  mental  action,  we  will  to  put  the 
mind  into  exercise  to  carry  out  our  choice.  The  choice  thus  be- 
comes imbodied  in  the 'act,  and  the  act,  as  the  representative  of 
this  choice,  becomes  a  fact  in  the  history  of  the  universe. 

Differs  from  Choice. — The  choice  and  the  executive  volition 
are  both  acts  of  the  will :  there  is  an  important  difference,  how- 
ever, between  them.  The  former  is  not  necessarily  followed  by 
the  latter.  All  choices  are  not  represented  in  executive  volitions. 
Thus,  I  may  decide  to-day  to  go  somewhere  to-morrow ;  but  I  do 
not  put  forth  the  executive  volition  to  go  until  to-morrow.  I 
may  change  my  mind  and  not  put  forth  the  volition  to  go  at  all. 
In  such  a  case,  the  choice  was  complete,  but  never  went  out  into 
executive  volition.  The  will  acted,  but  only  in  its  first  phase  of 
"  deciding  or  determining  what  to  do,"  but  not  in  "  putting  forth 
volitions  accordingly." 

Volition  When  Complete. — The  executive  volition  may  be 
complete,  even  if  it  is  not  always  followed  by  the  deed  designed. 
The  thing  intended  may  be  impossible;  or  other  bodies,  moving 
in  obedience  to  other  wills,  may  prevent;  or  disease  may  palsy 
the  frame  so  that  it  may  not  obey  the  mandate  of  our  wills. 
Still,  if  we  put  forth  the  executive  volition,  the  mental  act  is 
complete;  as  a  mental  act  the  volition  stands  as  a  fact  in  the 
universe.  If  the  intended  action  involved  a  moral  element,  even 
though  the  deed  was  not  accomplished,  our  volition  stands  to  our 
credit  or  discredit,  according  as  the  contemplated  act  was  right 
or  wrong. 

IV.  CORRECT  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  WILL. — We  have  thus 
seen  that  the  conditions  of  an  act  of  the  will  are, — first,  an  object 
to  be  accomplished ;  second,  the  motive  for  doing  or  not  doing 
the  action.  We  have  also  seen  that  an  act  of  the  will  consists  of 
two  elements :  first,  a  choice  or  decision  what  to  do ;  second,  an 
executive  volition  to  carry  out  the  choice  into  an  actual  fact. 
We  are  now  prepared  for  some  general  remarks  upon  the  will 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   WILL.  483 

which  grow  out  of  the  foregoing  analysis,  and  which  will  enable 
the  student  more  fully  to  understand  its  nature  and  its  operations. 

Will  an  Active  Power. — The  Will  is  an  active  power.  It  is 
not  a  mere  susceptibility  to  be  impressed  and  influenced ;  but  a 
power  for  action.  It  is  the  source  of  all  the  voluntary  acts  of 
the  other  faculties.  It  is  the  reigning,  the  dominating  power  of 
the  mind.  It  sets  the  other  powers  into  activity  and  controls 
their  action.  We  will  to  perceive,  to  judge,  to  reason ;  all  the 
facultfes  act,  more  or  less,  under  the  control  of  the  will.  The 
will  is  the  source  of  their  actions,  and  also  the  source  of  its  own 
actions.  In  other  words,  I,  as  a  rational  being,  have  the  power 
to  put  my  faculties  into  activity  and  direct  them ;  and  this  power 
is  called  my  will. 

The  Will  a  Cause. — The  will  is  thus  the  cause  of  our  actions, 
both  mental  and  bodily.  The  will  determines,  and  the  intellect 
proceeds  to  perceive,  or  remember,  or  judge,  or  reason,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  volition.  The  will  decides  to  move  the  arm  or  foot 
and  puts  forth  the  volition,  and  the  arm  or  foot  moves  in  obed- 
ience to  the  mandate.  There  may  be  actions  that  are  involun- 
tary, both  mental  and  physical,  but  the  will  is  the  source  of  all 
voluntary  activity. 

Will  a  First  Cause. — The  will  is  the  source  of  its  own 
actions,  and  thus  the  cause  of  its  own  actions.  The  cause  of  a 
volition  is  not  something  without  the  will,  but  rather  the  will 
itself.  Nothing  causes  the  will  to  act;  it  is  its  own  cause.  The 
will  is  thus  regarded  as  a  first  cause;  or  as  a  cause  uncaused. 
This  is  the  only  true  conception  of  a  rational  will.  If  this  is  not 
admitted,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  rational  will. 

Vieiv  of  Hamilton. — This  view  has  been  held,  with  more  or 
less  distinctness,  by  various  writers.  Hamilton  says,  "  Will  is  a 
Iree  cause,  a  cause  which  is  not  an  effect,  a  power  of  absolute 
origination."  It  is  proved  so  in  two  ways ;  first,  directly,  by  an 
immediate  testimony  of  consciousness  to  the  fact;  second,  indi- 
rectly, it  is  implied  in  our  consciousness  at  once  of  an  uncompro- 
mising law  of  duty,  and  of  our  being  the  accountable  authors  of 
our  actions. 


484  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

TJiis  Conception  Difficult. — The  conception  of  the  will,  as  a 
cause  uncaused,  as  a  first  cause,  is  a  difficult  one,  some  say  an  im- 
possible one.  Hamilton,  while  he  holds  that  we  must  admit  it 
to  be  correct,  says,  "  The  fact  of  a  free  volition  is  indeed  posi- 
tively inconceivable."  Still,  however  difficult,  it  is  a  necessitated 
conception.  The  difficulty  is  no  greater  than  in  some  other 
beliefs  which  we  regard  as  certain  and  necessary  truths.  Space 
and  time,  we  know,  are  infinite;  we  cannot  fully  grasp  their 
infinitude,  yet  we  are  compelled  to  admit  it.  We  are  compelled 
to  admit  some  things  to  be  true  which  we  cannot  fully  compre- 
hend nor  explain.  So  with  the  will  as  a  first  cause ;  we  know  it 
to  be  a  primitive  source  of  action,  without  being  fully  able  to 
comprehend  or  explain  it.  This  is  the  glory  of  mind,  that  it 
originates  its  own  motives  and  actions;  the  mind  is  a  spiritual 
centre  of  thought,  feeling,  and  action. 

THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL. 

I.  NATURE  OF  FREEDOM. — Freedom  of  the  will  is  the  power 
of  exercising  the  will  without  hindrance  or  restraint.  It  is  the 
power  of  deciding  and  putting  forth  volitions  freely.  In  other 
words,  it  is  the  power  of  choosing  freely  any  one  of  several  pos- 
sible objects,  and  of  putting  forth  our  volitions  freely  in  the 
direction  of  our  choice. 

A  Freedom  front. — This  definition  refers  to  the  action  of  the 
will  in  making  some  choice.  The  will  is  also  free  in  refraining 
from  making  any  choice.  There  is  thus  a  im.-do.iii  from  as  well 
as  a  freedom  to ;  a  freedom  from  making  any  choice  and  from 
putting  forth  any  volition,  as  well  as  a  freedom  to  make  a  choice 
and  put  forth  volitions.  In  this  case,  we  may  say  there  is  also 
a  choice, — a  choice  not  to  choose  any  one  of  several  objects, 
though  there  is  no  executive  volition.  This  alternative  of  not 
choosing  any  given  object  may,  in  a  large  sense,  be  reckoned 
among  the  objects  of  choice,  and  is  thus  provided  for  in  the  defi- 
nition of  freedom  given.  AVhedon  embraces  this  idea  iti  LJa 
definition  that  freedom  of  the  will  is  the  power  or  immunity  to 
put  forth  in  the  same  circumstances  any  one  of  several 


THE   NATURE    OF   THE   WILL.  485 

Another  Vieiv. — A  popular  view  of  freedom  is  that  "  the  will 
is  free  when  we  can  will  to  do  just  as  we  please."  This  view,  how- 
ever, is  misleading  if  not  erroneous,  on  account  of  the  ambigu- 
ous meaning  of  the  term  "  please."  In  one  sense  of  the  word  I 
can  do  what  I  do  not  please,  that  is,  I  can  do  what  I  am  not 
pleased  in  doing.  If  the  term  "  please "  is  used  as  equivalent  to 
choose,  then  the  definition  of  freedom  becomes  tautological,  since 
choosing  is  an  act  of  the  will.  To  say  that  the  will  is  free  when 
we  can  will  to  do  just  as  we  choose,  is  equivalent  to  saying  that 
a  choice  is  free  when  it  is  a  free  choice,  or  an  act  of  the  will  is 
free  when  it  is  a  free  act.  We  sometimes  distinguish  between 
willing  and  choosing,  regarding  willing  as  related  to  the  executive 
volition ;  and  it  is  then  proper  to  say  the  will  is  free  when  we 
can  choose  freely  and  will  as  we  choose.  It  should  be  remem- 
bered, however,  that  choosing  is  an  act  of  the  will. 

Freedom  Disputed. — The  freedom  of  the  will  is  a  disputed 
question.  Some  very  able  thinkers  have  doubted  and  even  de- 
nied the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and  others,  while 
they  seem  to  have  believed  in  freedom,  have  not  been  very  suc- 
cessful in  establishing  the  doctrine.  It  is  one  of  the  cardinal 
principles  of  the  materialistic  school  of  philosophy  to  deny  the 
freedom  of  the  will.  Buckle  represents  the  views  of  this  school 
when  he  says,  "  Freedom  of  the  will  is  a  myth." 

II.  ARGUMENTS  FOR  FREEDOM. — There  are  several  distinct 
classes  of  arguments  that  may  be  adduced  in  favor  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will.  The  most  of  these  arguments  may  be  combined 
under  four  general  heads.  First,  there  is  a  general  conviction  in 
favor  of  freedom.  SP cond,  we  are  in  a  sense  conscious  of  freedom. 
Third,  man's  moral  nature  is  a  presumption  in  favor  of  freedom. 
Fourth,  the  consequences  of  the  opposite  doctrine  afford  a  pre- 
sumption in  favor  of  freedom. 

A  General  Conviction — The  first  argument  in  favor  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will  is  that  there  is  a  general  conviction  in  favor 
of  freedom.  This  general  conviction  is  shown  in  several  ways. 
First,  it  is  affirmed,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  all  men.  Second, 


486  MENTAL   SCIEXCE. 

it  is  shown  in  their  opinions  and  actions.  Third,  it  appears  in 
the  language  and  literature  of  every  people. 

Force  of  such  a  Conviction. — Such  a  conviction  carries  force 
with  itself.  There  are  some  truths  that  are  fixed  in  the  mind  as 
fundamental  principles,  immutable  and  unquestionable.  The 
conviction  of  freedom  seems  to  be  one  of  these  truths,  and  men 
would  as  soon  question  their  personal  identity  as  question  their 
freedom.  No  arguments  to  the  contrary  can  shake  their  belief 
n  this  truth,  and  none  in  favor  of  it  can  strengthen  it. 

Consciousness  of  Freedom. — It  has  been  held  by  some 
writers  that  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  a  fact  of  consciousness. 
Phis,  however,  is  liable  to  be  misunderstood.  We  are  not, 
strictly  speaking,  conscious  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  but  rather 
of  a  belief  in  its  freedom.  Consciousness  reveals  what  is  now  in 
*ne  mind,  and  not  what  was  in  the  mind.  There  is  a  sense,  how- 
ever, in  which  we  may  appeal  to  consciousness  for  an  argument 
in  favor  of  freedom.  When  I  make  a  choice,  I  am  at  that 
moment  conscious  that  the  choice  is  a  free  choice.  I  am  also 
conscious,  at  the  time  of  putting  forth  an  executive  volition,  of 
the  power  of  putting  it  forth  and  the  power  of  withholding  it. 
In  this  sense,  consciousness  presents  a  strong  argument  in  favor 
of  the  freedom  of  the  will. 

Man's  Moral  Nature. — A  strong  argument  in  favor  of 
freedom  of  the  will  is  drawn  from  man's  moral  nature — from  his 
ideas  and  feelings  with  respect  to  moral  actions.  This  argument 
includes  several  distinct  parts  which  will  be  briefly  stated. 

First,  Freedom  is  indicated  by  the  idea  and  feeling  of  obligation. 
We  cognize  the  right  and  the  obligation  to  do  the  right;  and 
have  also  a  strong  feeling  of  obligation  to  do  that  which  we  be- 
lieve to  be  right.  Now,  if  we  did  not  assume  that  we  are  free  to 
do  what  we  think  is  right,  we  could  have  no  feeling  of  obligation 
in  respect  to  it.  I  do  not  feel  that  I  am  under  obligation  to  do 
what  is  impossible ;  it  is  only  when  I  can  do  a  thing  that  I  ex- 
perience the  feeling  that  I  ought  to  do  it.  If  I  did  not  believe 
my  will  to  be  free,  the  idea  or  feeling  of  obligation  could  not  arise 
in  my  mind. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   WILL.  487 

Second,  Freedom  is  indicated  by  our  approval  and  disapprova 
of  human  action.  I  look  at  my  own  actions,  and  I  say  I  did  right 
or  I  did  wrong.  Now,  if  I  had  no  power  over  these  actions,  if  I 
were  a  mere  machine,  such  an  idea  would  be  impossible.  I  d? 
not  approve  or  disapprove  of  the  action  of  an  inanimate  object  of 
nature  or  art.  A  locomotive  Tuns  over  a  man  and  kills  him  ;  but 
I  never  feel  like  blaming  the  locomotive  for  the  act,  because  it 
had  no  freedom  in  the  matter.  It  could  not  help  doing  what  i. 
did,  and  is  thus  in  no  way  accountable  for  the  death  of  the 
person.  What  is  true  of  my  own  actions  is  also  true  of  the 
actions  of  others.  I  approve  or  disapprove  because  I  believe  that 
they  could  have  done  otherwise  than  they  did. 

Third,  Our  feelings  of  satisfaction  and  remorse  indicate  the 
freedom  of  the  will.  When  we  have  done  what  we  think  to  be 
right,  we  have  a  feeling  of  secret  complacency;  when  we  have 
done  what  we  believe  to  be  wrong,  a  feeling  of  remorse  tortures 
the  soul.  These  feelings  would  not  be  possible  if  we  believed 
that  our  actions  were  beyond  our  control,  and  that  we  did  not  act 
freely.  The  similar  feelings  that  go  out  to  other  persons  are 
based  on  the  same  belief.  We  would  have  no  feelings  of  censure 
or  approval  for  the  acts  of  a  person  if  we  do  not  believe  those  acts 
were  free  acts. 

Fourth,  Our  view  of  crime  and  the  justice  of  its  punishment  in- 
dicates the  freedom  of  the  will.  There  is  an  instinct  of  justice  in 
the  human  mind.  All  men  feel  and  believe  that  justice  demands 
that  a  criminal  shall  be  punished  for  his  crime.  When  a  man 
has  wronged  his  fellow  men,  we  believe  that  he  should  not  only 
be  placed  where  he  can  do  no  more  harm,  but  that  the  wrong  de- 
mands punishment  also.  These  four  considerations  are  strong 
presumptive  evidence  in  favor  of  the  freedom  of  the  Avill. 

Consequences  of  the  Opposite. — The  consequences  resulting 
from  the  position  that  the  will  is  not  free,  are  themselves  an  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  freedom.  If  we  have  no  power  over  our 
volitions  and  actions,  we  surely  cannot  be  held  accountable  for 
them.  The  stone  which  must  fall  by  the  influence  of  gravity,  or 


488  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

the  bullet  which  goes  as  forced  by  the  powder,  are  not  held  re- 
sponsible for  their  motion,  even  if  they  produce  injury  and  death. 
So  if  man  is  moved  by  external  causes  and  has  no  control  of  his 
actions,  he  should  not  be  held  responsible  for  those  actions.  This 
is  the  doctrine  of  fatalism,  and  many  fatalists  accept  this  con- 
clusion. Diderot  says,  "Examine  it  narrowly,  and  you  will  see 
that  the  word  liberty  is  a  word  devoid  of  meaning ;  that  there  are 
not  and  cannot  be  free  beings.  .  .  .  The  motive  is  always  ex- 
terior and  foreign,  fastened  upon  us  by  some  cause  distinct  from 
ourselves  .  .  .  But  if  there  is  no  liberty,  there  is  no  action  that 
merits  either  praise  or  blame;  neither  vice  nor  virtue;  nothing 
that  ought  either  to  be  rewarded  or  punished  .  .  .  The  doer  of 
good  is  lucky,  not  virtuous  .  .  .  Reproach  others  for  nothing, 
and  repent  of  nothing;  this  is  the  first  step  to  wisdom"  Remorse 
is  regarded  as  a  feeling  which  arises  from  the  belief  that  we 
might  have  chosen  and  acted  differently  from  what  we  did,  and 
this  is  called  a  "fallacious  feeling."  These  legitimate  conse- 
quences of  the  opposite  doctrine,  so  contradictory  to  human 
thought  and  feeling,  are  a  very  strong  proof  of  the  doctrine  of 
freedom. 

III.  ANSWER  TO  OBJECTIONS  TO  FREEDOM. — There  have  been 
many  objections  presented  to  the  freedom  of  the  will,  some  of 
them  difficult  to  answer,  and  many  of  them  so  plausible  as  to  lead 
to  the  denial  of  freedom  altogether.  Many  of  these  objections, 
however,  indicate  a  misconception  of  freedom,  and  some  of  them, 
when  carefully  analyzed,  will  be  found  to  be  illogical  and  absurd. 
We  shall  endeavor  to  answer  the  principal  of  these  objections. 

Influence  of  the  Sensibilities. — It  is  claimed  that  the  will  is 
influenced  by  the  sensibilities,  that  our  actions  are  determined  by 
our  inclinations,  and  are  thus  not  free.  In  reply  to  this,  it  may 
be  said  that  if  we  choose  freely  among  our  several  inclinations, 
the  choice  is  a  free  one.  Again,  it  is  not  true  that  our  actions 
are  always  controlled  by  our  inclinations,  for  we  can  modify  and 
even  oppose  our  inclinations.  The  will  stands  back  of  and  can 
direct  and  control  and  antagonize  any  given  inclination.  We 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   WILL.  489 

can  tread  our  evil  inclination  under  foot,  rise  above  it,  and  stand 
in  our  freedom  against  the  strongest  desire  or  passion.  The  will 
is  king  of  the  feelings,  and  sits  among  them  with  the  crown  of 
freedom  upon  its  brow. 

Power  of  Contrary  CJioice. — It  is  objected  that  freedom  of 
the  will  assumes  the  power  of  contrary  choice,  and  that  there  is  no 
such  power.  That  is,  when  I  put  forth  a  volition  I  cannot,  at 
that  moment,  all  things  being  as  they  are,  put  forth  a  different 
volition.  This,  however,  is  an  objection  of  weight  only  to  the 
superficial  thinker.  In  a  certain  sense,  we  have  the  power  of 
contrary  choice,  that  is,  when  we  choose  A,  we  might  have  chosen 
B,  had  we  so  preferred.  In  the  sense,  however,  in  which  the 
objectors  use  it, — the  possibility  of  choosing  otherwise  than  we 
did,  all  the  conditions  being  unchanged, — no  such  power  is  needed 
for  the  freedom  of  the  will,  nor  is  there  any  such  power.  Thus, 
suppose  a  man  had  chosen  A  instead  of  B;  if  he  were  placed 
again  in  the  same  circumstances,  with  the  same  mental  condi- 
tions, he  would  inevitably  choose  A,  and  not  choose  B,  no  matter 
how  often  the  experiment  were  repeated.  The  choice  of  A  was 
freely  made;  and  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  mind,  under  the 
same  circumstances,  with  the  same  reasons,  to  choose  otherwise. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  man's  will  is  a  rational,  not  a 
blind  will.  He  has  a  reason  for  his  choices.  In  all  carefully 
considered  actions  he  chooses  freely  according  to  his  best  reason. 
To  choose  according  to  a  weaker  reason  would  be  absurd.  Thus 
the  will  can  be  perfectly  free  without  the  possibility  of  a  person's 
making  a  choice  different  from  the  one  he  did  make.  Suppose  a 
conscientious  man  chooses  truth  instead  of  falsehood,  it  would 
be  absurd  to  say  he  does  not  choose  truth  freely  because  it  is 
morally  impossible  for  him  to  choose  falsehood.  Only  a  super- 
ficial mind,  or  one  entirely  misconceiving  the  action  of  a  rational 
will,  could  be  misled  by  such  an  objection. 

Influence  of  Disposition. — An  objection  is  presented  to  the 
doctrine  of  freedom  by  the  question,  Can  we  do  what  we  are  not 
disposed  to  do  ?  If  I  have  no  disposition  to  do  a  thing,  can  I  do 


490  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

it?  If  I  have  a  disposition  to  do  one  thing,  can  I  do  another 
thing?  The  reply  to  this  objection  depends  upon  its  meaning, 
which  is  not  always  apparent.  If  by  disposition  is  meant  the 
influence  of  the  fee-lings,  it  has  already  been  answered.  If  it 
means  the  decision  of  the  judgment,  then  we  say  that  we  can 
choose  freely  in  accordance  with  our  judgment  of  what  is  best.  If 
we  have  no  judgment  as  to  which  choice  we  should  make,  then  it 
would  be  irrational  to  choose,  and  we  expect  no  such  actions  of  a 
rational  will.  There  is  thus  a  fallacy  in  the  statement  and  its 
implication.  This  fallacy  is  frequently  expressed  in  the  question, 
Can  I  do  what  I  am  not  inclined  to  do  ?  We  reply  that  we  are 
not  inclined,  we  have  power  to  incline.^Tihe  correct  conception  is 
I  incline,  not  I  am  inclined.  So  also  in  respect  to  the  term  dis- 
position; the  correct  conception  is  I  dispose,  not  I  am  disposed. 

The  Strongest  Motive. — One  of  the  most  plausible  objections 
to  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  the  assertion  that  the  will  is  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  motive.  The  fallacy  of  this  argument  can, 
however,  be  readily  seen,  and  the  objection  answered.  First,  the 
will  is  not  determined  by  the  motive;  the  will  is  itself  the  deter- 
miner, and  motive  is  only  the  reason  for  its  determinations.  The 
mind  is  the  source  of  its  own  motives,  and  thus  the  source  of  its 
own  actions.  The  motive  is  not  something  external  to  the  mind 
and  controlling  it ;  the  motive  is  merely  the  reason  why  I  act  as 
I  do.  Second,  what  is  meant  by  the  strongest  motive?  How  do 
we  know  which  is  the  strongest  motive?  The  mind  selects  one 
motive  or  acts  in  accordance  with  one  motive;  and  this  is  the 
only  way  we  have  to  determine  which  is  the  strongest  motive. 
There  is  no  strongest  motive  per  se;  the  strongest  motive  is 
merely  the  selected  motive.  The  question  thus  is,  Does  the 
selected  motive  determine  the  will  in  its  selection?  We  answer, 
No;  the  will  is  the  determiner,  and  selects  freely  among  the 
motives  the  one  which  is  its  best  reason  for  an  action.  To  say 
that  the  "  motive  prevails"  is  absurd,  and  shows  an  ignorance  of 
the  nature  of'the  will;  it  is  my  mind  that  prevails.  I  am  the 
source  and  centre  of  my  own  motives  and  thus  of  my  actions , 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   WILL.  491 

and  I  willing  and  acting  is  what  we  mean  by  my  will  willing  and 
acting. 

Motives  the  Cause. — The  conception  of  the  motive  as  the 
cause  of  the  volition  leads  to  a  denial  of  the  freedom  of  the  will. 
If  the  motive  is  the  cause  and  the  act  of  the  will  the  effect,  then 
the  will  is  caused  to  act  by  something  exterior  to  itself,  and  thus 
does  not  act  with  freedom.  This  is  also  an  incorrect  conception 
of  the  relation  .of  motive  to  the  will.  The  motive  is  not  a  source 
of  action,  but  merely  a  reason  why  the  will  acts  as  it  does.  The 
motive  is  a  because  but  not  a  cause  of  our  action.  There  is  a 
cause  why  a  stone  falls  towards  the  earth ;  it  is  gravity.  There 
is  a  reason  why  the  mind  wills  and  acts  as  it  does;  it  is  the 
motive.  The  mind  is  not  a  passive  thing,  moved  by  some  cause 
external  to  itself,  like  a  stone  or  an  apple,  and  compelled  to  act 
in  a  certain  way.  The  will  itself  is  a  cause  of  its  own  actions ;  it 
is  a  self-originating  power.  The  will  decides  and  chooses  freely 
among  the  various  motives  of  the  mind,  and  being  a  rational  will, 
is  supposed  to  act  in  accordance  with  its  best  motive  or  reason 
why. 

Dictum  Neccssitatis. — The  celebrated  argument  of  Dr. 
Edwards  against  freedom,  called  the  dictum  necessitatis,  is  as 
follows:  "If  we  should  thus  cause  a  volition,  we  should  doubtless 
cause  it  by  a  causal  act.  It  is  impossible  that  we  cause  anything 
without  a  causal  act.  And  as  it  is  supposed  that  we  cause  it 
freely,  the  causal  act  must  be  a  free  act,  i.  e.,  an  act  of  the  will, 
or  volition.  And  as  the  supposition  is,  that  all  our  volitions  are 
caused  by  ourselves,  the  causal  act  must  be  caused  by  another, 
aud  so  on  infinitely,  which  is  both  impossible  and  inconceivable." 
That  is,  if  the  mind  causes  a  volition,  it  must  first  act  to  cause  it, 
and  this  causative  act  is  a  volition,  which  requires  another  causative 
act  to  produce  it;  and  so  on  ad  injinitum. 

Reply  to  This  Doctrine. — The  fallacy  of  this  objection  lies  in 
the  statement  that  a  causative  act  needs  a  previous  causative  act  to 
produce  it.  The  true  conception  is  that  the  causing  of  a  volition 
is  the  causal  act  which  produces  it.  Any  given  volition  is  the 


492  MENTAL    SCIENCE. 

causal  act  which  gives  birth  to  that  volition.  When  the  will 
chooses,  that  choice  is  independent  of  any  previous  choice;  it 
needs  no  previous  choice  in  order  to  choose.  The  error  of 
Edwards  arose  from  his  not  being  able  to  conceive  the  mind  as  a 
cause  of  its  actions.  This  is  a  necessary  conception  of  a  rational 
will.  The  will  is  the  cause  of  its  own  volitions.  The  will  acting 
is  the  cause  of  any  given  volition  of  the  will.  The  will  is  itself  a 
cause,  a  first  cause,  an  originator  of  choices  and  volitions. 

A  Similar  Objection. — A  similar  objection  is  applied  to  the 
freedom  of  choice.  Thus,  every  act  of  the  will  presupposes  a  selected 
motive.  A  selected  motive  implies  a  previous  act  of  selection,  which 
was  an  act  of  the  will.  This  act  of  the  will  presupposes  a  selected 
motive,  which,  etc.,  giving  an  infinite  series.  The  reply  to  this 
argument  is  that  the  statement  is  incorrect  or  misleading.  The 
selection  of  a  motive  is  itself  an  act  of  the  will ;  the  selecting  of  a 
motive  is  the  act  of  the  will  which  selects  it;  to  select  a  motive  is 
an  independent  volition  depending  on  no  previous  act  of  the  will. 
The  simple  statement  is  as  follows:  Objects  A,  B,  and  C  are 
before  me ;  motives  a,  b,  and  c  arise  in  the  mind ;  I  select  a  as 
the  best  reason  why.  The  selected  reason  why  is  the  reason  why  I 
selected  it.  There  is  no  series;  the  act  of  choice  is  independent 
and  initial.  No  previous  selected  motive  is  supposed. 

Conclusion. — The  answer  to  these  objections,  in  connection 
with  the  direct  arguments,  will,  it  is  thought,  satisfy  most  minds 
as  to  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will.  It  should  be  re- 
membered, in  the  consideration  of  the  question,  that  man  does  not 
always  act  in  accordance  with  liis  prerogative  of  freedom.  He 
often  gives  way  to  his  lower  impulses,  and  becomes  a  slave  to  his 
passions  and  his  appetites.  But  he  has  the  power  to  resist  these 
impulses  and  to  stand  in  the  strength  and  dignity  of  his  manhood 
with  the  crown  of  freedom  on  his  brow. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   WILL. 

WILL  is  the  source  and  centre  of  action.  In  it  man 
-L  becomes  a  self-originating  force  in  the  world.  The  will  em- 
bodies the  ideas  of  the  mind  and  the  desires  of  the  heart  in  living 
deeds.  The  history  of  the  race  is  a  record  of  the  thoughts  and 
purposes  of  mankind,  crystallized  into  facts  by  the  power  of  the 
will.  This  power  is  therefore  of  great  value  to  man  and  demands 
careful  culture. 

I.  IMPORTANCE  or  THE  WILL. — The  value  of  the  will  as  the 
executive  power  of  the  mind  is  readily  apparent.  Without  it, 
none  of  the  other  powers  of  the  mind  would  be  of  much  use  to 
us,  as  all  voluntary  mental  activity  is  due  to  the  will.  A  strong 
will  gives  energy  to  the  faculties,  and  holds  them  true  to  the  task 
at  which  they  are  employed.  It  thus  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  high 
achievements  in  the  intellectual  world.  Strength  of  will  also 
gives  a  force  to  character  that  makes  a  person  a  centre  of  in- 
fluence in  society,  and  thus  contributes  to  his  happiness  and 
success, 

Value  to  Thought — The  will  gives  power  to  thought.  The 
solution  of  a  diffiult  problem  is  due  not  merely  to  intellectual 
ability,  but  to  the  will  that  controls  the  thought.  Newton  said 
he  discovered  the  law  of  gravitation  by  incessantly  thinking  about 
it.  The  will  power  involved  in  writing  a  work  like  the  Mecanique 
Celeste  is  almost  as  wonderful  as  the  intellectual  ability.  It  is 
unremitting  mental  activity  in  which  the  will  is  the  controlling 
influence,  that  builds  up  our  systems  of  science  and  philosophy. 
The  triumphs  of  science  are  embodiments  of  a  resolute  purpose 
as  well  as  of  scientific  genius. 

(493) 


494:  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Value  to  Discovery. — The  will  has  been  of  great  value  in  the 
sphere  of  discovery  and  invention.  It  holds  the  mind  faithful  to 
an  idea  through  years  of  disappointment  and  failure,  until  at  last 
success  crowns  the  effort.  Sustained  by  an  indomitable  will, 
Columbus  travelled  from  court  to  court,  bore  up  under  rebuff 
and  ridicule,  braved  the  storms  and  dangers  of  an  unknown 
ocean,  stood  calm  and  resolute  amid  the  murmurs  and  threats  of 
a  mutinous  crew,  and  at  last  raised  the  standard  of  Spain  on  the 
soil  of  a  new  world.  The  Goodyear  invention  is  a  monument  to 
the  patience,  courage,  long-continued  experiments,  aud  almost 
fanatical  faith  of  the  inventor.  Dr.  Kane  saved  his  companies 
from  Arctic  graves  by  a  sublime  manifestation  of  an  intelligence 
controlled  and  impelled  by  an  overmastering  will. 

Value  to  Oratory. — Strength  of  will  is  often  of  great  value 
to  the  orator.  The  effect  of  language  is  heightened  when  it  is  felt 
to  be  charged  with  a  determined  purpose.  It  is  the  man  behind 
the  word  that  gives  it  power  ;  and  the  man  is  thought  and  feeling 
embodied  in  the  will.  Words  that  come  up  out  of  the  heart 
glowing  with  feeling  and  are  sent  forth  with  a  commanding  pur- 
pose, make  an  impression  that  is  felt.  The  Philippics  of  Demos- 
thenes were  not  only  eloquent  in  thought,  but  also  eloquent  in 
courage.  The  firmness  and  intrepidity  of  Otis,  Adams,  and 
Henry  gave  weight  to  their  arguments  and  appeals,  and  stirred 
the  hearts  of  the  people  to  resist  British -aggression.  In  Webster's 
memorable  reply  to  Hayne,  we  have  a  picture  not  merely  of  a 
gigantic  intellect,  but  of  leonine  firmness  and  tremendous  energy 
of  will  that  was  determined  to  conquer 

Value  to  Military  Success. — Strength  of  will  is  necessary 
for  military  success.  It  has  been  a  distinguishing  characteristic 
of  all  the  great  military  leaders.  The  determination  to  succeed 
does  as  much  for  victory  as  the  skilful  strategical  combinations. 
The  victory,  as  some  one  has  remarked,  ofcen  depends  on  which 
party  can  stand  pounding  the  longest.  It  was  said  of  Taylor, 
who  sent  the  reply  to  a  summons  to  capitulate,  "  Gen.  Taylor 
never  surrenders,"  that  he  did  not  know  when  he  was  whipped. 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   WILL.  495 

The  military  genius  of  Gen.  Grant  is  expressed  in  his  celebrated 
dispatch,  "  I  shall  fight  it  out  on  this  line  if  it  takes  all  summer." 
When  told  that  it  was  impossible  to  take  his  army  over  the  Alps, 
Napoleon  replied,  "Impossible  is  the  adjective  of  fools,"  and 
"There  shall  be  no  Alps."  Wellington's  victory  at  Waterloo 
was  largely  due  to  British  stubbornness.  Caesar  and  Alexander 
were  impersonations  of  tremendous  will  power,  as  well  as  great 
genius  in  military  strategy. 

Value  in  Government. — A  strong  will  is  essential  to  those 
who  would  lead  public  opinion.  There  must  be  leaders  in 
society.  Mankind  rally  around  some  firm  and  daring  spirit  who 
has  the  courage  of  his  convictions  and  gives  them  expression  in 
word  and  deed.  Every  great  social  movement  or  political  refor- 
mation has  a  strong  will  at  the  centre.  The  courageous  hearts 
of  the  great  barons  forced  from  a  tyrannical  king  the  charter  of 
freedom.  The  firmness  of  Hampden  and  Cromwell  destroyed  the 
assumption  of  the  divine  right  of  kings.  The  gentle  firmness  of 
Lincoln  upheld  the  fainting  heart  of  the  nation,  and  gave  it 
courage  during  more  than  one  dark  hour  of  our  civil  war.  Men 
gather  around  a  strong  will  in  times  of  danger  and  disaster,  and 
draw  inspiration  and  confidence  from  its  unflinching  self-reliance. 

Value  in  Meliffion. — Strength  of  will  shows  most  conspicu- 
ously in  religious  belief.  Here  the  will,  throned  in  the  principle 
of  faith  in  the  infinite,  holds  a  man  true  to  his  convictions  amid 
persecution  and  denunciation,  and  even  crowns'  him  with  the 
chaplet  of  martyrdom.  Savonarola  not  only  thrilled  Italy  with 
his  eloquence,  but  made  the  Piazza  della  Signoria  celebrated  by 
his  martyr's  death  for  his  faith.  Luther  was,  in  purely  intel- 
lectual ability,  perhaps  inferior  to  Melanchthon ;  but  his  heroic 
will  nailed  the  theses  on  the  church  doors  of  Wittenberg,  and  led 
him  to  exclaim,  "  I  will  go  to  Worms  though  there  were  as  many 
devils  on  the  way  as  there  are  tiles  on  the  house-tops."  In  an 
hour  of  weakness  Cranmer  could  sign  a  recantation  of  his  faith, 
but  a  few  months  later,  with  a  firmer  courage,  he  could  hold  the 
hand  that  had  written  the  recantation  in  the  flames  until  it  was 


496  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

consumed.  In  every  age  and  in  every  faith,  men  have  shown  a 
sublime  courage  in  suffering  and  dying  for  what  they  believed  to 
be  the  truth. 

Value  for  Success. — Fidelity  to  a  purpose  is  an  inexorable 
law  of  all  high  success  in  life.  Noble  thought  and  elevated  feel- 
ing are  not  sufficient  for  the  accomplishment  of  life's  duties ;  a 
man  must  put  his  will  into  his  thought  and  feeling,  and  let  them 
flow  out  into  action.  The  great  deeds  of  the  world  were  not  the 
products  of  great  intellects  so  much  as  of  strong  wills.  It  is  tire- 
less energies  and  courageous  hearts  that  succeed.  Moderate  in- 
tellects, strong  feelings,  and  a  commanding  will,  have  attained  to 
the  highest  successes  of  life.  To  the  power  of  the  imperial  will 
hardly  anything  is  impossible.  It  spans  rivers,  bores  mountains, 
fills  up  valleys,  commands  senates,  crushes  armies,  humbles  proud 
empires,  and  binds  together  disunited  states  into  one  grand  com- 
monwealth. All  high  success  in  the  active  duties  of  life  depends 
on  a  courageous  heart  and  a  resolute  will. 

The  Will  gives  Courage. — This  work  of  the  will  is  largely 
due  to  its  endowing  the  soul  with  the  attribute  of  courage.  The 
victories  of  life  are  won,  not  by  the  timid,  but  by  the  brave. 
"  Faint  heart  never  won  fair  la"dy,"  nor  any  other  of  the  world's 
choice  prizes.  Life  is  a  campaignj  we  must  fight  for  the  triumph 
of  the  right.  Coward  hearts  faint  in  the  battle ;  the  victory  be- 
longs only  to  brave  and  valiant  souls.  Courage  means  victory. 
At  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  Gen.  Thomas  called  out  to  one  of 
his  officers,  "Col.  George,  how  long  can  you  hold  this  pass?" 
"Until  the  Second  Minnesota  is  mustered  out  of  the  service,  sir," 
replied  the  gallant  colonel.  They  held  the  pass.  All  great 
victories  in  life  are  won  by  the  same  determined  spirit.  Wise 
heads,  brave  hearts,  and  strong  wills,  form  a  trinity  of  powers 
which  conquer  the  world. 

Value  to  Character. — A  strong  will  is  essential  to  personal 
excellence.  The  will  gives  strength  and  dignity  to  character. 
We  admire  the  man  of  fixed  opinions  and  inflexible  purposes; 
we  pity  or  scorn  the  man  of  vacillating  mind  and  wavering  in- 


THE    CULTURE   OF   THE   WILL.  497 

tention.  "The  double-minded  man  is  unstable  in  all  his  \vays;" 
at  the  mercy  of  everybody's  opinions,  he  is  "  like  a  wave  of  the 
sea,  driven  with  the  wind  and  tossed."  A  truly  noble  character 
must  be  moulded  about  a  firm  and  steadfast  purpose.  Firmness 
and  courage  are  so  essential  to  true  manhood  that  even  a  bold, 
bad  man  often  commands  more  admiration  than  a  timid,  good 
man.  The  courage  of  Satan  in  "  Paradise  Lost "  almost  makes 
one  forget  that  he  was  the  devil.  For  a  high  and  noble  character, 
we  need  not  only  goodness,  but  virtue  enthroned  in  a  resolute 
will.  Such  a  character  is  not  boisterous  and  braggart;  true 
courage  is  usually  modest  in  its  demeanor,  as  if  conscious  of  its 
strength.  Gentleness,  firmness,  and  moral  purpose,  united  in  one 
personality,  present  a  beautiful  picture  of  ideal  manhood.  At 
the  centre  of  every  great  character  there  must  be  a  strong,  firm 
self-reliance,  that  moulds  the  actions  to  the  thought,  and  moves 
forward  amid  opposition  and  persecution  calm  and  undismayed. 

II.  METHODS  OF  CULTIVATING  THE  WILL. — These  statements 
of  the  value  of  the  Will  give  emphasis  to  the  importance  of  its 
culture,  and  the  teacher's  duty  in  relation  to  it.  This  culture  is 
more  difficult  than  that  of  the  intellect ;  though  much  can  be 
done  by  the  intelligent  and  judicious  teacher.  The  three  funda- 
mental principles  to  guide  us  in  training  the  will  are — Stimu- 
lation, Direction,  and  Control. 

Stimulation. — The  first  principle  for  the  culture  of  the  will 
is  that  of  stimulation.  The  weak  will  needs  to  be  stimulated  to 
activity.  The  timid,  diffident,  unreliant  lad  needs  to  be  taught 
courage  and  self-reliance.  The  hesitating,  vacillating  mind  must 
be  trained  to  decide  with  promptness  and  to  stand  true  to  its 
decisions.  Sometimes  the  defect  of  will  is  not  so  much  in  real 
weakness  of  will  as  in  indecision.  The  dreamy,  poetic  mind  that, 
like  Hamlet,  has  its  ideal,  but  is  unable  to  put  forth  its  energy 
to  attain  it,  should  be  incited  to  activity  by  a  sense  of  duty,  and 
be  trained  to  a  prompt  discharge  of  the  duties  of  practical  life. 
The  habit  of  indecision  must  be  overcome ;  it  is  often  better  to 
decide  unwisely  than  not  to  decide  at  all. 


498  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

Direction. — The  strong  will  should  be  directed  in  its  activity. 
The  old  idea  that  a  child's  will  is  to  be  broken  is  a  pernicious 
doctrine  in  education.  To  direct  and  not  to  repress  is  the  true 
law  of  culture.  The  boy  who  has  a  strong  will,  possesses  a  power 
that  may  make  him  a  blessing  to  the  world.  To  endeavor  to 
destroy  or  break  such  a  will,  would  be  a  fatal  mistake.  What 
we  need  is  to  put  it  into  the  channels  of  virtue ;  to  subordinate  it 
to  the  sense  of  duty ;  and  the  boy  may  grow  up  to  be  one  of 
those  heroic  souls  whom  the  world  honors  for  their  deeds  of  bene- 
ficence. 

Control. — A  third  principle  in  training  the  will  is  that  of 
self-control.  The  will  should  not  only  flow  out  with  energy  in  the 
channels  of  correct  activity,  but  it  should  also  be  able  to  withhold 
its  energies  at  the  dictates  of  judgment.  A  strong  will  should 
not  only  seek  to  control  the  outward  forces  and  circumstances  of 
nature,  but  should  turn  inward  and  obtain  a  mastery  over  itself. 
The  greatest  victory  of  the  will  is  the  victory  over  itself.  He 
that  ruleth  his  own  spirit  is  better  than  he  that  taketh  a  city. 
The  ability  to  hold  the  will  in  complete  subjection  to  its  own 
behests,  is  an  invaluable  attainment.  A  calm,  quiet  self-pos- 
session, a  complete  equipoise  of  mind  under  the  most  exciting  cir- 
cumstances,— such  a  power  is  both  useful  and  admirable,  and 
should  be  one  of  the  ends  of  the  culture  of  the  will. 

A  Natural  G-ift. — Men  differ  materially  in  power  of  will  as 
well  as  in  other  faculties.  There  is  a  genius  of  will  as  there  is  a 
genius  of  thought  or  imagination.  No  training  would  make  out 
of  a  man  born  with  a  feeble  will  a  heroic  soul  like  Napoleon  or 
Luther.  This  attribute  is  partly  in  the  mind  and  partly  in  the 
body ;  there  is  a  physical  courage  as  well  as  a  mental  courage. 
"  Courage,"  says  Emerson,  "  is  the  degree  of  circulation  of  blood 
in  the  arteries;"  this,  however,  is  only  half  a  truth.  Courage 
and  determination  lie  also  in  the  mind  and  moral  nature,  as  well 
as  in  the  physical.  Strength  of  will  can,  however,  be  cultivated  ; 
and  it  is  a  culture  that  will  pay  largely  for  the  labor. 

Overcoming  Obstacles. — The  will  may  be  cultivated  by  the 


THE   CULTURE   OF   THE   WILL.  499 

practice  of  overcoming  difficulties.  The  will  grows  by  what  it 
conquers.  Every  new  conquest  gives  it  additional  power  for 
some  other  conquest.  Children  should  be  led  to  acquire  the 
habit  of  overcoming  difficulties.  There  is  hope  for  the  future  of 
a  boy  who  applies  himself  to  a  task  merely  because  it  is  difficult. 
Carey,  the  eminent  missionary,  in  climbing  a  tree  when  a  boy, 
slipped  and  fell  to  the  ground,  breaking  his  leg.  Confined  to  his 
bed  for  a  few  weeks,  the  first  thing  he  did,  as  soon  as  he  was  able 
to  walk,  was  to  go  and  climb  the  tree.  The  determined  spirit 
which  moved  the  boy  to  a  feat  of  daring,  led  him  to  brave  dan- 
gers and  hardships  for  the  spread  of  the  gospel  of  peace. 

By  Difficult  Studies. — There  are  several  school  studies  that 
are  valuable  for  the  culture  of  the  will.  Among  these,  the 
branches  of  mathematics  hold  the  first  rank.  These  branches  re- 
quire close  thought  and  persistent  effort;  the  will  must  command 
the  thought  in  order  to  master  them.  The  student  that  refuses 
assistance  from  teacher  or  key  in  the  solution  of  a  hard  problem, 
and  sits  up  all  night  rather  than  fail  in  mastering  the  difficulty, 
is  cultivating  a  force  of  will  that  will  prove  invaluable  in  after 
life.  The  study  of  Latin  and  Greek  is  much  like  mathematics  in 
cultivating  the  power  of  the  will.  A  strong  objection  to  some  of 
the  oral  instruction  in  the  so-called  New  Education  is  that  it 
makes  knowledge  too  easy,  and  fails  to  cultivate  the  power  of  ap- 
plication. One  of  the  most  important  benefits  derived  from  a 
study  is  the  culture  of  habits  of  hard,  steady,  persistent,  and  self- 
reliant  labor. 

Culture  of  Self -Reliance. — Special  efforts  should  be  made  to 
render  young  persons  self-reliant.  But  little  direct  assistance 
should  be  afforded  them  in  their  studies ;  hints  may  be  given  and 
the  way  pointed  out,  but  they  should  be  required  to  do  the  labor 
themselves.  Games  of  skill  may  be  used  in  the  same  way  as 
studies.  The  competitions  of  the  play-ground  are  useful  in  this 
respect.  A  game  of  base-ball  or  cricket  gives  valuable  training 
to  the  will  power.  Running,  leaping,  the  gymnasium,  etc.,  all 
furnish  excellent  opportunities  for  the  culture  of  the  will.  Field 


500  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

sports,  hunting,  racing,  and  the  amusements  of  a  ruder  life,  did 
much  more  to  strengthen  the  will  than  the  effeminate  pastimes 
and  employments  of  modern  society.  We  hail  the  introduction 
of  athletic  sports  into  our  schools  and  colleges  as  affording  not 
only  a  development  of  physical  hardihood,  but  also  a  training  to 
resoluteness  of  purpose. 

Decide  Promptly. — It  is  well  to  form  a  habit  of  deciding 
promptly.  The  habit  of  hesitating  and  vacillating  between 
several  objects  of  choice  tends  to  weaken  the  will.  Especially 
should  the  decision  be  prompt  where  there  seems  to  be  little 
choice  between  objects,  and  where  no  important  consequences 
depend  upon  the  choice.  In  many  circumstances  in  life,  a  poorer 
choice  promptly  made,  is  better  than  a  wiser  one  arrived  at 
tardily.  The  general  on  the  field  of  battle  cannot  wait  to  delib- 
erate and  weigh  consequences.  A  poor  movement  well-executed 
will  win  a  victory,  while  a  better  one,  tardily  chosen,  would 
result  in  defeat. 

Pride  of  Decision. — Much  can  be  done  to  cultivate  the  will 
by  arousing  a  pride  of  firmness.  The  example  of  a  person  with 
a  timid  and  vacillating  disposition  is  so  repulsive  that  it  will 
awaken  a  determination  to  be  determined.  A  man  with  a  resolute 
purpose  and  heroic  courage  commands  the  admiration  of  the 
heart,  and  inspires  me  with  the  desire  and  resolve  to  emulate  this 
virtue.  The  admiration  of  the  heroic  souls  of  history  who,  by 
the  power  of  an  imperial  will,  moulded  circumstances  to  their 
purposes  and  triumphed  over  all  opposition,  stimulates  the  will  of 
the  young  to  similar  triumphs. 

Power  of  Other  Wills. — The  will  may  be  stimulated  to 
action  by  the  power  of  other  wills  operating  upon  it.  The  energy 
of  one  mind  may,  as  it  were,  be  infused  into  other  minds.  It  is 
said  of  an  officer  in  the  Revolutionary  army  that  when  lying 
helpless  from  rheumatism  he  was  ordered  by  Washington  to  per- 
form some  duty.  On  his  replying^ that  he  was  unable  to  go,  he 
received  a  message  from  Washington,  saying,  "  Sir,  you  must  go." 
Inspired  by  the  will  of  his  general,  he  mounted  his  horse  and 


THE   CULTURE    OF   THE   WILL.  501 

executed  the  order.  Caesar  made  heroes  of  his  soldiers  by  his 
own  heroic  example.  Crossing  the  sea  in  a  storm,  he  quelled  the 
fears  of  the  seamen  and  inspired  them  with  courage  by  the  words, 
"Why  do  you  fear?  You  carry  Csesar."  The  iron  will  of 
Cromwell  could  transform  simple  English  yeomen  into  the  invin- 
cible soldiers  of  his  famous  "  Ironsides."  Joan  of  Arc  seemed  to 
put  her  own  heroic  soul  into  the  bosoms  of  the  coward  soldiers 
of  Charles,  as  she  led  them  on  to  glorious  victory. 

By  Moral  Influences. — The  firmest  basis  of  a  strong  will 
is  the  seme  of  duty.  A  will  enthroned  in  conscience  is  almost 
invulnerable.  It  is  this  that  holds  a  man  true  to  his  convictions 
amid  the  sufferings  of  the  rack  and  the  flames  of  martyrdom. 
Conscience,  though  it  may  "  make  cowards  of  us  all,"  can  also 
make  heroes  of  us  all.  Faithful  to  a  sense  of  duty,  the  most 
timid  and  shrinking  soul  rises  to  an  altitude  of  heroic  firmness 
that  awakens  emotions  of  sublimity.  Margaret  Wilson,  the 
young  Scotch  Covenanter,  chained  to  a  stake  in  the  way  of  the 
rising  tide,  remained  true  to  her  faith  and  sang  praises  to  God 
until  her  voice  was  drowned  in  death  by  the  advancing  waves. 

Conclusion. — In  conclusion  I  desire  to  enjoin  upon  teachers 
and  parents  the  duty  of  training  the  will.  Kemember  that  the 
culture  of  the  intellect  is  not  sufficient  to  meet  the  demands  of 
education ;  the  power  which  directs  the  intellect  and  gives  it 
efficiency  must  also  be  cultivated.  We  need  spiritual  energy  as 
well  as  mental  acuteness;  and  the  culture  of  the  will  affords 
this  energy.  Character  is  worth  more  than  high  intellectual 
attainments ;  and  the  will  is  one  of  the  most  important  elements 
of  character.  Let  us  as  teachers  endeavor  to  develop  wise  heads, 
pure  hearts,  and  strong  wills,  and  our  pupils  will  accomplish  that 
which  dignifies  manhood  and  gives  glory  to  humanity. 


502  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

HIGHER  SPIRITUAL  CULTURE. 

We  have  led  the  student  from  the  beginning  of  mental  activity 
in  the  senses  up  through  the  sphere  of  abstract  principles,  and 
found  a  source  of  supernatural  and  absolute  truth  in  the  Reason. 
The  Reason  reaches  down  toward  the  finite,  and  reads  the  ideas 
that  it  symbols ;  it  reaches  out  in  time  and  space,  and  apprehends 
the  infinite;  it  reaches  up  towards  a  great  first  cause,  and  appre- 
hends the  necessity  of  an  absolute  beginning.  It  gives  rise  to  the 
idea  of  the  Good,  and  thus  lays  the  foundation  of  man's  moral 
nature.  Lifting  this  idea  up  into  the  sphere  of  the  infinite,  it 
attains  to  the  idea  of  GOD,  and  thus  reaches  the  Religious  Nature. 

Higher  spiritual  culture  demands  the  education  of  the  religious 
nature.  The  religious  nature,  as  we  have  shown,  is  the  highest 
form  of  the  Ethical ;  it  is  the  Ethical  acting  in  relation  to  the 
Supreme  Being.  It  implies  the  consecration  of  all  our  powers  to 
God,  and  requires  their  fullest  and  highest  activity.  The  highest 
operation  of  the  intellect  is  Faith;  the  highest  operation  of  the 
sensibilities  is  Love;  the  highest  operation  of  the  will  is  Obed- 
ience. The  elements  of  religion,  therefore,  are  Faith,  Love,  and 
Obedience;  Faith  in  God  and  salvation;  Love  to  God  and  man; 
Obedience,  the  complete  subordination  of  the  human  will  to  the 
Divine.  Here  we  reach  the  crowning  excellence  of  man's  being, 
the  keystone  of  the  spiritual  arch. 

Spiritual  culture  educates  the  principle  of  faith.  To  develop 
the  spirit  of  inquiry  is  right,  but  there  is  a  place  where  inquiry 
must  stop.  In  this  respect  the  child  and  the  philosopher  stand 
upon  the  same  level.  We  may  assign  cause  after  cause  to  account 
for  phenomena,  but  at  last  we  must  end  at  the  uncaused.  "  Who 
made  things?"  said  a  little  girl  of  three  years.  "God,"  said  her 
mother ;  "  He  made  ail  things !"  This  answered  for  a  year,  but 
at  four  the  question  came,  "  Who  made  God  ?  "  "  No  one,"  said 
the  mother;  "He  always  was."  Reflecting  a  moment,  the  little 
skeptic  exclaimed,  "  Why,  mamma,  didn't  somebody  just  make 
his  hands,  and  then  he  make  the  rest  of  hisself  ?  "  Philosophers, 
like  the  child,  often  doubt  first  causes,  and  are  constantly  looking 
for  some  one  to  "  make  the  hands." 


HIGHER   SPIRITUAL   CULTURE.  503 

The  teacher  should  labor  to  cultivate  the  faith  of  his  pupils. 
The  trust  of  childhood  should  be  developed  into  the  faith  of  the 
philosopher.  Pupils  should  be  led  to  see  that  all  science  begins 
and  ends  in  faith ;  that  the  chain  of  every  logical  induction  or 
deduction  hangs  upon  an  a  priori  truth ;  that  beyond  the  known 
stretches  a  great  unknown ;  and  that  the  loftiest  attainments  of 
the  intellect  are  but  a  mountain  peak,  from  which,  with  the  eye  of 
reason,  we  may  catch  glimpses  of  the  land  of  glory  beyond. 

The  love  element  of  religion  should  be  developed  early  in  the 
heart  of  a  child.  Love  is  the  golden  cord  that  binds  the  soul 
to  duty  and  honor.  The  mother's  love-kiss  on  the  brow,  the  caress 
of  a  sister,  the  kind  look  of  a  father,  take  deeper  hold  upon  the 
heart  than  their  precepts  and  admonitions.  Love  is  the  sunlight 
in  which  the  spirit  grows.  We  plant  a  seed  in  the  cold,  dark 
earth,  and  the  sunlight  comes  and  puts  its  golden  arms  around  it, 
and  Hits  it  into  bloom  and  beauty.  So  the  soul  is  lifted  up  into 
a  purer  and  better  life  by  the  sunlight  of  love. 

Love  is  the  very  essence  of  religion.  We  obey  God  because 
we  love  him.  The  planets  revolve  around  their  central  sun,  held 
in  their  orbits  by  the  elastic  thread  of  gravity.  Christ  is  the 
central  sun  of  the  Christian  world,  and  we  revolve  about  him, 
held  in  the  orbit  of  duty  by  the  influences  of  his  infinite  love. 
Let  us  kindle  the  flame  of  love,  therefore,  upon  the  heart-altars 
of  youth,  that  it  may  burn  with  vestal  constancy  in  manhood 
and  age.  Let  it  light  up  the  home-circle,  making  home,  as  it 
should  be,  the  dearest  spot  on  earth.  Let  it  flow  out  into  friend- 
ship, linking  souls  together  with  the  constancy  of  David  and 
Jonathan.  Let  it  spread  until  it  embraces  one's  native  land, 
filling  the  heart  with  a  patriotism  that  makes  us,  like  Warren, 
feel  that  it  is  sweet  to  die  for  one's  country.  Let  it  widen  still 
farther  until  it  covers  the  whole  earth;  and  goes  out  in  acts  of 
philanthropy,  such  as  have  given  immortality  to  Howard  and 
Florence  Nightingale.  And  then,  leaving  earth,  let  us  lead  it 
upward  to  meet  and  blend  with  the  infinite  love  that  flows  from 
the  heart  of  the  Great  Father. 

We  need,  also,  to  cultivate  the  principle  of  obedience,  the  sub- 


504:  MENTAL   SCIENCE. 

ordination  to  authority.  Obedience  to  others  gives  the  power  of 
self-control.  No  one  is  able  to  command  who  has  not  himself 
learned  to  obey.  The  best  commanding  generals  were  the  most 
obedient  subalterns.  The  habit  of  obedience  to  superiors  leads 
unconsciously  to  obedience  to  the  dictates  of  conscience. 

This  injunction  is  especially  important  to  us  as  teachers  of 
youth.  We  are  neglecting  the  principle  of  subordination  to  duty 
in  American  education.  Boys  are  allowed  to  do  too  much  as  they 
choose,  and  thus  learn  to  disregard  parental  authority.  No  boy 
who  has  been  taught  obedience  to  parents  speaks  of  his  father  as 
the  "  governor,"  or  of  his  mother  as  the  "  old  woman."  The  worst 
boys  at  school  come  from  homes  where  there  is  no  submission  to 
parental  authority.  The  result  of  such  neglect  is  a  disregard  of 
social  customs  and  restraints,  and,  too  often,  a  violation  of  legal 
statutes.  Let  teachers  and  parents,  therefore,  train  the  will  to 
submit  to  rightful  authority,  that  the  rising  generation  may  be- 
come good  citizens  and  Christian  men  and  women. 

The  culture  of  these  three  elements — Faith,  Love,  and  Obedience 
— in  their  relation  to  God,  is  religious  culture.  Faith  in  God, 
love  to  God,  and  obedience  to  God,  is  religion.  The  relation  is 
simple  and  logical.  Faith  leads  to  love ;  we  must  believe  before 
we  can  love.  Love  leads  to  obedience ;  that  obedience  is  the  most 
willing  and  perfect  which  flows  from  affection.  Faith,  then,  is 
the  foundation  upon  which  Love,  the  wise  master-builder,  rears 
the  temple  of  Obedience.  Or,  Faith  is  the  soil  in  which  grows 
the  tree  of  Love,  and  Obedience  the  ripened  fruit.  Let  us  plant 
the  tree  of  Love  in  the  soil  of  Faith  in  God,  and  it  will  reward 
us  with  the  golden  fruit  of  perfect  Obedience. 

Such  a  culture  will  not  only  secure  the  approval  of  the  wisest 
and  best  among  mankind, Jbutl  believe  that  in  the  day  when 
the  Great  Master  makes  his  awards,  the  brightest  wreath  will  be 
placed  upon  the  brow  of  him  who  has  done  the  most  for  the  spir- 
itual culture  of  the  race.  \ 


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